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Abstract 
Corporate governance and executive pay have been much studied in the past as 
separate topics. The present study examines both topics simultaneously and endeavours 
to draw from this unified view a synthesis that can throw light on future governance 
reforms. Most prior research has examined the relationship between various 
governance mechanisms and company performance but unambiguous links have proved 
difficult to establish empirically. 
 
The study investigates executive compensation qualitatively and quantitatively in the 
context of corporate governance. It first conducts a critical review of the literature to 
uncover potential reasons for the extant conflicting results and to gain an up-to-date 
understanding of the role and effects of pay. This provides a perspective for interpreting 
the results of the second part of the study: a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between the remuneration of FTSE 100 directors and company performance during 
2004-2009. The exercise seeks to shed light on whether increased governance activity 
has influenced pay practices among UK’s largest companies.  
 
Despite far-reaching governance reforms, the study finds that executive pay is still 
largely determined by company size and there are no signs of the pay-performance 
relationship becoming stronger over time. It further reveals that CEO pay is less 
performance-related than other directors and provides evidence that total cash is the 
pay element most strongly associated to performance.  
 
Taken together, the findings suggest that the UK’s governance system might be 
fragmented and incoherent, and that the flexibility offered by the ‘comply or explain’ 
approach is not fully exploited. They also lend support to the contention that managerial 
power and multiple agency problems affect board independence and the effectiveness 
of governance mechanisms, including executive pay. It closes with some considerations 
to integrate any lessons learned into pointers for future reforms. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Fashions in corporate governance1 around the world have changed considerably over the years 
since Berle and Means first articulated the problem of separation of ownership and control in 
large modern corporations in 1932 (Filatotchev et al 2007; Girma et al 2007; Groenewegen 
2004; Armour et al 2003). While the latest surge in governance activity has predominantly been 
fuelled by a troubling series of high-profile accounting irregularities and financial scams that 
surfaced in early 2000s, the groundwork for the current movement really dates back to the 
savings and loans crisis of the 1980s in the United States and the spectacular bankruptcies that 
arose in the subsequent years. These early incidents of ethical misbehaviour and reprehensible 
conduct not only severely undermined the modern corporate system but, more specifically, 
also exposed the pervasive weakness in oversight and lapses in controls and monitoring, 
thereby prompting urgent calls for governance standards to be strengthened.  
 
Much in keeping with the trend, it was the unfolding of notorious scandals such as Robert 
Maxwell’s swindling of the Daily Mirror pension fund and the collapse of Polly Peck, Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International and Barings Banks in the early 1990s that propelled UK 
corporate governance right to the forefront and spawned the process of reform. In the ensuing 
decade, the national regime was in a state of flux and underwent a period of rapid transition 
that witnessed a proliferation of best practice codes and policy initiatives to reinforce the 
governance framework (Armour et al 2003; Ho 2005; Perkins and Hendry 2005). Effectively, the 
prescriptions for UK proceduralised governance were articulated primarily through three 
reports: Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel Report (1998). 
 
The report by Cadbury (1992) addressed both the financial aspects of governance as well as 
issues related to the structure of corporate boards, while the Greenbury Report (1995) had the 
narrower remit of reporting predominantly on executive pay. A year later in 1996, the Hampel 
Committee was established to review the guidelines laid down by the earlier codes. The final 
report published in 1998 contextualised the previous recommendations, with the emphasis 
                                                          
1 Corporate governance is generally regarded as the systems, structures and processes established by corporate 
entities for ensuring proper accountability, legal compliance, probity and openness in the conduct of an organisation's 
business. The basic principles of corporate governance include transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility 
founded upon the concept of disclosure to encourage the necessary trust and confidence of shareholders. Organisations 
tend to work within the parameters set out by national laws and regulations, economic goals and expectations of 
stakeholders. Factors such as government rigidities, legal and cultural settings also often play a part in explaining the 
variation in local governance practices (Rebérioux 2004; Aguilera 2005). The definition and objectives of corporate 
governance will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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firmly on principles of good governance (the ‘comply or explain’ approach)2 as opposed to 
explicit regulatory rules that may stifle the market and business development.  
 
The reform process gathered momentum at the turn of the millennium in the wake of 
Enron/Arthur Andersen and WorldCom serious fraud allegations. At the same time, scores of 
share options backdating frauds came to light3, revealing even more fatal governance flaws 
such as a severe laxity of external audit functions. As a result, the following few years saw the 
introduction of new statutory instruments and provisions in many economies directly aimed at 
combating financial malfeasance and restoring the credibility of the economic system. For 
example:  
 
United Kingdom 
• Combined Code (2003) 
• IFRS2 under International Financial Reporting Standards 
 
United States 
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
• FAS 123 R under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) 
 
Meanwhile, media interest in the integrity of corporate boards and management began to 
intensify. It is evident that the British press particularly relishes reporting on executive 
directors’ pay packages under ‘fat cat’ headlines, and stories about sharp salary rises, overly-
generous severance payments or the magnitude of incentive awards almost never fail to attract 
readers’ attention. The incessant barrage of coverage clearly added to public outrage over the 
perceived ‘unruly’ nature of modern-day governance, and worsened the already waning public 
confidence in capital markets.  
                                                          
2 UK corporate governance operates on the basis of 'comply or explain' whereby compliance with the code of best 
practice is not mandatory but companies are required to produce a statement in their annual reports, detailing the 
extent of their application of the code, together with an explanation in the event of non-compliance (Listing Rules 
12:43A). This model, which has been at the heart of UK governance since the Cadbury Report was issued in 1992, 
advocates a more flexible approach that allows companies to adapt the guidelines to suit their circumstances in a 
competitive environment and encourages communications between the board and shareholders. 
3
 Options backdating had been identified at 130+ companies and led to the firing/resignation of some 50 directors and 
even the collapsing of the entire business. Notable companies embroiled in the scandal include Broadcom, United 
Health, One.Tel, Nortel, Apple and Dell (Burke 2007 p63). 
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As investor trust has ebbed amid all the upheaval, there has been mounting institutional 
pressure4 on businesses to focus beyond mere routine compliance and towards a more 
adaptive corporate governance approach whereby practices are tailored to individual company 
needs in support of an efficient structure that caters for improved management accountability 
and long term shareholder value creation. More than ever before, the board is expected, as a 
first priority, to effectively serve shareholder interests. The reasons for this emphasis on 
shareholders in the UK are its Anglo-Saxon legal tradition and its industrial ownership structure 
which is characterised by dispersed shareholding, both of which have made the UK committed 
to the ‘outsider’ model of governance where the focus is strictly on the interests of 
shareholders. 
 
Thus, governance polices adopted in the UK seek primarily to protect and maximise shareholder 
wealth. It is therefore not surprising that reform efforts have largely been targeted at 
enhancing the alignment of shareholders’ and senior executives’ interests, mainly through 
internal structural governance mechanisms that have two main avenues of approach. First, 
there are measures that aim at heightening controls and monitoring of management; such as 
board composition and size, independence of non-executive directors, and improving 
transparency and disclosure rules. Second, there are measures related to executive 
remuneration and service contracts; such as increasing share ownership of senior management 
through equity rewards promoting long-termism by using incentive vehicles that have a deferral 
requirement, tightening severance payout conditions, and shortening notice periods. Most 
recently, for the first time in the history of the governance of executive pay, there has been the 
introduction of penalties and claw-back provisions for non-performance or poor performance. 
 
1.1 Theoretical background 
 
The recent changes in expectations attached to boards of directors and executive pay packages, 
and parallel changes in corporate governance measures have also been accompanied by a 
resurgence in academic literature on corporate governance and executive compensation. For 
some 50 years, corporate governance and executive pay have come under intensive theoretical 
and empirical discussion by academics from an array of disciplines, ranging from accounting to 
                                                          
4
 Companies (and the board of directors to some extent) used to be in a stronger position to solidify existing executive 
compensation practices or disseminate novel ones, and thereby setting certain trends and even levels. In management 
literature such tendencies are referred to as institutional pressures where companies are pressured into adopting 
distinct remuneration practices, arrangements and procedures for enticing executives as a way to signal alignment with 
both widely held corporate conduct standards and competitive/market norms (Barkema and Pennings 1998). 
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economics to law to finance and organisational strategy (Murphy 1999; Canarella and Nourayi 
2008), employing a wide variety of theoretical frameworks, including tournament theory, 
managerial power theory and stewardship theory. However, meta-analytic work, such as that of 
Devers et al 2007 (see Appendix A), has indicated that a significant proportion of the extant 
literature is ‘firmly situated within an agency theory perspective and its assumption of the 
inherent potential for an adversarial principal-agent relationship’ (O’Neil 2007 p692). 
Originated from economics and finance, agency theory has long been applied to explain the 
issue of separation of ownership and control within companies. In essence, agency theorists 
consider an organisation to be a nexus of contracts between the owners of economic resources 
(the principals) and managers (the agents) who they hire to control those resources 
productively. The theory is based primarily on the suggestion that agents have more 
information than principals and that this information asymmetry interferes with the ability of 
the principals to know whether their agents are properly safeguarding their interests. Further, it 
is assumed that principals and agents both tend to act rationally in that they will use the 
contracting process to maximise their wealth. In other words, as agents also have self-seeking 
motives, that are not aligned with the principals’, they may be tempted to take the opportunity 
to act in their own self interest rather than in the best interests of the company (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
 
This dilemma was termed ‘the moral hazard problem’ by the pioneers of this field, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), whose work remains highly regarded by academics today. In agency theory, 
moral hazard refers to the circumstances in which the principal cannot be sure if the agent has 
put forth maximal effort or is shirking on the required duties (Eisenhardt 1989). That is, the 
hazard is the risk created by opportunism. Moral hazard can also refer to the misappropriation 
of a company’s resources by the agent, the simple avoidance of tasks required for the meeting 
of objectives (i.e. shirking), or the pursuit of personal motives such as career progression, 
instead of focusing on the needs of the company.  
 
Another type of agency problem is adverse selection. Adverse selection is the condition under 
which the principal cannot ascertain if the agent accurately represents the ability to do the 
work for which he or she is being paid (Eisenhardt, 1989). That is, the risk that the person will 
not be up to the task and/or the job. This occurs when ‘the principal does not have access to all 
available information at the time a decision is made by an agent’, and is thus ‘unable to 
determine whether the agent’s actions are in the best interests of the company’ (Sarens and 
Abdolmohammadi 2007 p3).  
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One interesting point to note here is that it is not only academics who have taken to agency 
theory: regulators policy makers and investors have all clearly drawn on the arguments of 
agency theory to generate an extensive body of governance guidelines and codes. For example, 
it is stated in Cadbury’s report that ‘boards of directors are accountable to their shareholders’ 
(1992 3.4 and 6.1), while Greenbury speaks of ’aligning interests of [executive] Directors and 
shareholders’ (Greenbury 1995 1.15). And, again, the Hampel report refers frequently to 
‘shareholder value’ and the explicit objective of, ‘the greatest practicable enhancement over 
time of their shareholders’ investment’ (Hampel 1998 1.4 and 1.6). Broadly, most governance 
guidelines drawn up in the UK ‘make recommendations on appropriate board structures and 
processes that protect the interests of the owners, and reconcile them with those of 
management and other stakeholders’ (Ho 2005 p213; Erturk et al 2008).  
 
1.2 Common research questions 
 
The recent literature has largely focused on two areas of inquiry: the effectiveness of specific 
board structural and procedural measures on one hand and, on the other, the determinants of 
directors’ remuneration, particularly the relationship between executive pay and company 
performance. 
 
On the former issue, the literature is vast. A large proportion of the research directly examines 
the relationship between corporate performance and various board attributes such as board 
size (Eisenberg et al 1998), independence of non-executive directors (Bhagat and Black 1999), 
board structure (Fosberg and Nelson 1999; Dedman 2002) and board composition (Hermalin 
and Weisbach 1991; Beatty and Zajac 1994; Dalton et al 1998; Wagner et al 1998; Rhoades et al 
2000). However, despite attempts, researchers have so far failed to demonstrate consistent 
results. In fact, none of the studies mentioned here produced any encouraging findings. Rather, 
the majority showed no correlations at all or a small yet ‘conflicting’ link.  
 
On the issue of directors’ remuneration, academics tend to follow in the footsteps of the 
seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and analyse the causes and effects of the agency 
problem and the efficacy of executive pay in driving the desired performance (Veliyath 1999). 
The majority of studies seek to explain the structure of pay and its relationship to company 
performance, while some investigate the effectiveness of incentive pay in controlling the 
conflicts and constraining the costs associated with the misalignment of interests between 
shareholders and management. At its core, agency theory considers executive compensation to 
be an effective means of addressing the conflict of interest brought about by the separation of 
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ownership and control, and argues that directors’ behaviours can be aligned with the needs of 
shareholders through appropriately designed pay structures and the use of incentive rewards 
which in turn should drive superior company performance. It is therefore not difficult to 
understand why so many researchers examine their pay related questions through the lens of 
agency theory.  
 
1.3 Research rationale 
 
There are two main considerations that have highlighted the importance of further research 
being applied to corporate governance and executive pay. The first is that, after over half a 
century of research into this subject, results are still mixed and of limited application. This 
problem is particularly acute in the UK, thus, aiming for greater clarity and filling in the gaps of 
the existing body of UK literature seems a more than worthwhile objective. The second is the 
growing social importance of corporate governance - scandals continue to emerge despite 
years of reform, and their impact is no longer confined to a few within large organisations but 
affect the global economy. The problem has become so pervasive that its effects are now felt by 
communities and individuals across the world, with the UK being no exception.  
 
1.3.1 Historical research results 
 
Given the academic significance attached to Jensen and Meckling’s contribution, it would seem 
reasonable to expect there to be considerable empirical evidence in support of their arguments. 
However, research findings within existing literature are far from uniform (Bebchuk and Fried 
2004; O’Neill 2007; Rutherford et al 2007; Canarella and Nourayi 2008). As has been said, in 
spite of the numerous research attempts to test the various agency theoretical predictions, 
there still does not seem to be much material and conclusive evidence on either the 
effectiveness of executive compensation in controlling the conflict of interests problems or the 
magnitude of the pay-performance link (Keasey and Wright 1993; Conyon and Leech 1994; 
Hallock and Murphy 1999; Tosi et al 2000; Thompson 2005). In particular, the tenuous 
relationship between pay and bottom-line performance and returns to shareholders is a major 
predicament and one that continues to baffle academics and governance policy makers alike.  
 
It is evident that demonstrable and unambiguous links between corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as board structure and executive pay, and performance have proved to be 
difficult to establish empirically, a lack of convergence that is reflected in the continuing 
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disagreements (Main et al 1996; Buck et al 2003; Conyon et al 2001; Gregg et al 2005; Girma et 
al 2007; Erturk et al 2008). Consequently, the general question regarding how appropriately to 
reward and retain valued executives while mitigating the risks of dissipating shareholder funds 
through unjustifiable pay provisions is, as yet, far from being fully answered.  
 
This issue of inconclusive and inconsistent research findings has long been a matter of concern 
but is undoubtedly becoming increasingly pressing given the strong advocacy by governing 
bodies and investor groups of measures to improve the board monitoring function and tying 
pay to performance in recent years. Moreover, UK research in these areas is still relatively scant 
in comparison to that conducted in the US. And the findings across the board are equally 
divergent with the result that the effectiveness of individual governance drivers and the reform 
movement as a whole remains at best uncertain, at worst, unknown. What is known though is 
that, overall, the corporate system remains flawed even after almost two decades of 
substantive efforts to overhaul the governance regime. The clearest possible indication of this is 
the recent financial and banking crisis. 
 
So in effect, corporate governance continues to dominate headlines, and to form the basis of 
debates in Parliament. At the same time, the row over the soaring rates of executive pay is 
showing no sign of abating, leaving the public’s perception of large corporations and those who 
manage them altogether more negative. Still, even as recently as 2012, new scandals such as 
the alleged fixing of the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) by a group of commercial banks 
continue to emerge, while large salary increases and bonus payouts are still commonplace 
among senior executives, even in times of recession and widespread unemployment. Although 
the UK has seen a gradually increasing academic debate since the early 1990s, more research is 
clearly needed to help determine whether the governance measures proposed and 
implemented recently are sound or whether regulators are tackling not just the wrong issues 
but also employing the wrong solutions. 
 
Together, the above observations do lend convincing support to the contention that corporate 
governance is a complex subject beset as much with ethical and legal considerations as 
theoretical and empirical uncertainties; even after years of reform and research efforts many 
long-standing issues surrounding the structure, role and performance of the board, as well as 
executive pay remain unresolved and hence warrant more refined elucidation.  
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1.3.2 Widening impact of corporate governance 
 
Moreover, as many of the world’s economies face the prospect of further uncertain - in some 
cases deteriorating - market and trading conditions through 2012 and beyond, it seems all the 
more important for additional corporate governance and executive pay research to be 
performed to help prevent debacles similar to recent events in the financial service sector from 
happening again in the future.  
 
Although some would argue the recent downturn of the economy in the UK and the high 
degree of corporate malpractice can be attributed to global factors, it seems likely that many 
more would suggest that local factors also played a major role. Arguably, the ‘double dip 
recession’ that the UK experienced between 2009 and 2012 and the string of banking scandals 
that have unfurled during that period were all the result of poor governance and weak internal 
controls which allowed executives to behave irresponsibly.  
 
While the ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate governance has been considered desirable 
both in the UK and abroad (for example, Australia, Canada have both followed the UK approach 
and adopted similar best practice guidelines), some critics now think that the UK may have 
been too soft, and blame the persisting problem on the reluctance of successive Governments 
to regulate businesses too intensively in what might be seen as interfering with the smooth 
running of the economy. 
 
Importantly, the problems experienced in developed capitalist economies such as Britain and 
the United States have become international concerns. The two decades have seen not only the 
emerging markets of countries (e.g. India and China) reform their governance regimes, but also 
smaller developing economies (e.g. Mongolia and Armenia) undertake steps to improve their 
governance, legal and institutional frameworks with the aim of securing long term economic 
stability and growth (OECD 2001). Corporate governance has clearly turned into a global issue 
that should not be ignored and increased attention and sustained research activity, both 
nationally and internationally, are clearly required. 
 
In addition to the above consideration, it is also important to reiterate that there has been 
rapid development in governance and executive pay in the past 20 years, during which time an 
unprecedented number of changes have taken place. While traditionally business was subject 
mainly to soft laws and guidelines, now there are already a number of regulatory interventions 
in place. The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (‘DRRR’ 2002) was the first attempt 
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by the government to legislate governance requirements and has since been updated 
(Statutory Instrument 401 came into force for financial year 2008/2009 or later). Additional 
rules are also in the process of being implemented. For instance, the UK government has 
announced in early 2012 that it is to make some forms of financial mismanagement a criminal 
offence.  
 
Many will applaud the incessant revision and introduction of governance measures as making 
progress. Yet the issues that the nation is facing can be aggravated by the speed with which the 
current environment is changing - what might be termed the problem of pace. A new initiative 
that looks sound when it is introduced and implemented may, in some circumstance, look hard 
to justify or indeed irrelevant a few years or even months later. It thus becomes crucially 
important to consistently update research efforts to capture the effects of the latest 
developments so that their lessons can be integrated. 
 
There is no question that UK regulation has increased in its scope and depth over recent years 
and that the policy initiatives have generally been regarded internationally as innovative in 
terms of the extensive use of soft-law mechanisms as well as legal regulation where deemed 
appropriate. Notwithstanding, corporate malpractices have continued to multiply. Could it be 
the case that the UK’s principles-based approach is too ‘laissez faire’ to be effective? That being 
said, however, countries that have adopted a rules-based approach (e.g. the United States) 
appear to have fared no better. So it seems probable that the problem cannot be solved by 
simply implementing more legislative rules. Additional legal regulation may be paramount in 
certain aspects of governance, but, as aptly put by Erturk et al (2008), ‘public policy should be 
guided by looking more holistically in terms of understanding the interactions among different 
aspects of corporate governance, as well as the potential complementarities between hard and 
soft forms of regulation’. 
 
Besides, there is also the issue of growing public disquiet and intense media scrutiny over the 
actions of banks and directors’ pay, both of which have continued unabated throughout the 
past three decades. Recent increased disclosure requirements and the resulting improved 
transparency have only added to the public outrage at the way companies are governed and 
the way executives are remunerated (Dyck and Zingales 2002). Senior figures at major public 
companies, the chief executive in particular, have been widely criticised by the press and the 
general public for being ruthless and greedy, and having too much power and too little 
accountability. The more cynical critics even accuse governments of fearing to implement tough 
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regulation of businesses because they are dependent on large corporations for party political 
donations and other means of support. 
  
One potential effect of this intense public anger and media attention is that a certain amount of 
public misunderstanding and misinformation has come into circulation, to which even the 
serious financial print media has proved not to be immune. This in turn has resulted in vocal 
demands for change in governance which appears to be influencing the way in which 
government and policy makers deal with the issue. It thus becomes more important than ever 
to have robust research to provide a valid basis in evidence for regulation and legislation. 
 
All in all, it is evident that after more than 50 years of corporate governance and executive pay 
research, along with 20 years of rigorous governance reform, there are still many key issues 
unresolved, many important questions unanswered. Put simply, the ever-changing governance 
landscape coupled with elevating levels of fraudulent activity and lack of robust results from 
well-founded UK research, together with heightened public and media scrutiny of corporate 
practices and excessive directors’ remuneration, all adds up to provide a fertile and timely 
setting in which to examine the evolving nature of executive pay as a corporate governance 
mechanism. 
 
1.4 Research scope  
 
Against the compelling yet controversial background described above, this study is primarily 
concerned with one of the key corporate governance mechanisms: executive pay. Its focus, 
specifically, will be remuneration of FTSE 100 directors over the period 2004 to 2009. Before 
delving into the more specific parameters of the research, it is useful to first put executive pay 
into context by reviewing the latest trends and levels among FTSE 100 companies. 
 
1.4.1 Current executive pay practices and trends 
 
A brief summary of the current practices5 is outlined for the following aspects of executive 
compensation: 
 
                                                          
5 Information and data sources: Thomson Reuters (remuneration data from company annual reports and 
accounts); Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008; KPMG Survey Of Directors' 
Compensation 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers - Executive Compensation – Review of the Year 2005, 2008 and 2009. 
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• Remuneration levels  
• Executive pay differentials and company size 
• Pay increase 
• Fixed pay versus variable pay 
• Annual bonus 
• Long term incentives. 
 
1.4.1.1 Remuneration levels 
 
During the period under study, 2004 to 2009, despite the economic downturn, executive 
remuneration continued to increase. Table 1 below summarises median market practice in FTSE 
100 companies for chief executives, finance directors and other executive directors in 2008.  
 
Table 1 FTSE 100 median market practice in 2008 
Source: KPMG Survey of Directors' Compensation 2008 
 CEO Finance Director Other Executives 
Base Salary Increase 8% 7% 7% 
Base Salary (£000) 760 469 420 
Annual Bonus 
Maximum bonus (% of salary) 150% 132% 134% 
Target bonus (% of salary) 75% 75% 73% 
Actual bonus (% of salary) 77% 81% 139% 
Commonest performance 
measure 
Personal criteria Personal criteria Personal criteria 
Share Option Plans 
Maximum award (% of salary) 300% 300% 250% 
Actual grant (% of salary) 192% 235% 151% 
Commonest performance 
measure 
EPS growth EPS growth EPS growth 
Performance Share Plans 
Maximum award (% of salary) 250% 250% 207% 
Actual award (% of salary) 211% 157% 153% 
Commonest performance 
measure 
Relative TSR Relative TSR Relative TSR 
Deferred Annual Bonus Plans 
Maximum deferral (% of bonus) 100% 100% 100% 
Typical matching ratio, if 
applicable 
1:1 1:1 1:1 
Deferral period 3 years 3 years 3 years 
Commonest performance 
measure on matching shares 
EPS growth EPS growth EPS growth 
Total Actual Remuneration 
(£000) 
2,290 1,492 1,280 
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While the base salaries of FTSE 100 directors increased by around 7%-8%, total remuneration 
increased by around 10%-14% in 2008. According to Hewitt New Bridge Street (2008), increases 
in base salary levels were offset by lower pension provision as companies continued to move 
away from more valuable defined benefit arrangements; whereas the main causes for this 
increase was the higher level of variable pay. In general, fixed pay levels appeared to have 
remained relatively static. Further, the structure of the remuneration was relatively similar to 
the previous three years, with variable pay making up approximately 55%-60% of the total 
package. Of the variable element, around 60% was linked to long term performance (compared 
to 50% in 2003). 
 
1.4.1.2 Executive pay differentials and company size 
 
In line with the literature, practitioners’ market surveys also reported that company size is one 
of the key drivers of UK executive compensation. Figure 1 below demonstrates how pay levels, 
in 2008, differed with company size by showing data from the FTSE 100 as a whole, as well as 
the FTSE 30 and FTSE 31-100 separately. An interesting point to note here is that the median 
market capitalisation of the FTSE 100 index as a whole was £5.7 billion in the year under survey, 
however, the FTSE 30 (i.e. the largest 30 companies in terms of market capitalisations) had a 
median market capitalisation of £26 billion and FTSE 31-100 of only £4 billion. This gap in size 
was reflected in the gap between pay levels in the FTSE 30 and the rest of the FTSE 100, for 
example, CEO packages in the FTSE 30 are typically worth over twice those lower down the 
FTSE 100 index. 
 
Figure 1 Median total remuneration for FTSE 100 by size in 2008 
 
 Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
1. Introduction 
23 
 
1.4.1.3 Pay increase  
 
The historic rates of salary increase for FTSE 100 directors are set out in Figure 2 below. It 
shows that, since 2001, the annual rate of salary increase had fallen slightly over time and that 
the rate for 2008 was around 7%-8%. This rate was broadly similar to the increases seen in prior 
years. While there seemed to be a downward trend, the average salary increase for the general 
workforce during the same year was considerably lower at only 3.7% (National Office of 
Statistics 2008). This disparity attracted the attention of the increasingly frustrated wider 
working population, but public hostility towards executive pay was further exacerbated the by 
the inflation figure published later that year (4.8% - Retail Prices Index between August 2007 
and August 2008, National Office of Statistics). To make matters worse, total remuneration 
levels were increasing more rapidly than base salary levels as shown in Table 2. As already 
mentioned, the growing prevalence of the use of incentive compensation was considered to be 
the key attributing factor. 
 
Figure 2 FTSE 100 median salary increases 1999-2009 
 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
 
Table 2 FTSE 100 median increases in total remuneration 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CEO 13% 11% 13% 13% 14% 
Finance Director 12% 11% 15% 11% 9% 
Other Executives 8% 13% 12% 10% 10% 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
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1.4.1.4 Fixed pay vs variable pay 
 
For decades, both shareholders and governance bodies have been encouraging companies to 
have a ‘pay for performance’ culture whereby remuneration is closely related to the 
achievement of strategic goals. It is evident from recent corporate governance codes that 
incentive pay is seen as an important mechanism to align the interests of executives to those of 
shareholders and to drive performance. Figure 3 looks at the relative weighting between fixed 
and variable pay, as well as between short term bonus and long term incentives. It shows that, 
in 2008, around 60% of an executive director’s pay package was dependent on performance 
(i.e. incentive pay). Back in 2003, only 45% was variable, with over half of the package being 
guaranteed (i.e. fixed). Whether the increase in the use of incentives actually improved the 
relationship between executive pay and performance is the key question that will be addressed 
in later chapters.  
 
Figure 3 FTSE 100 fixed vs variable pay by role 
 
 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
 
1.4.1.5 Annual bonus 
 
Virtually all of the companies in the FTSE 100 operate annual bonus plans for their executives, 
making it the most common incentive. This has been the case for the best part of the past 10-15 
years. Between 2001 and 2008, the median annual bonus potential among FTSE 100 companies 
had more than doubled (Figure 4). The median reached 150% of salary in 2008, compared to 
60% in 2001. Actual bonuses paid, as a percentage of salary, also increased (Figure 5).  
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Figure 4 Median bonus opportunity for FTSE 100 executives 2001-2008 
 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
Figure 5 Median actual bonus paid for FTSE 100 executives 2001-2008 
 
 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
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The typical bonus payment in 2008 was 80% of the maximum payable. Profit and personal 
performance remained the commonest annual performance metrics (Figure 6). It is also 
important to point out that around 60% of companies required part of their bonus to be 
deferred in shares in 2008. This practice was not common in the 1990s when annual bonuses 
were typically delivered in cash at the end of the fiscal year or performance period. Further 
details regarding deferred bonus arrangements will be outlined in the next part under Long 
term Incentives. 
 
Figure 6 Performance measures in annual bonus plans among FTSE 100 in 2008 
 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
 
1.4.1.6 Long term incentives 
 
The long term element of executive remuneration generally comes in two forms of incentives: 
share options and free shares. Typically, market value options are granted that vest three years 
later subject to continued employment and performance conditions; while free shares are 
conditional awards of whole free shares are granted which also vest three years later, again 
subject to continued employment and performance conditions.  
 
1. Introduction 
27 
 
Specifically, there are two main arrangements where free shares are awarded to executives: 
 
• Share matching plans (SMP), also known as deferred bonus plans, under which 
conditional awards of shares are made that ‘match’ the number of shares invested 
(using bonus or shares already held) and retained by the executive in the plan 
• Performance share plans (PSP; aka LTIPs), under which conditional awards of shares are 
made without executives being required to invest in shares themselves. 
 
Figure 7 shows the split between companies using options and performance shares. It shows 
that now 71% of companies used LTIPs only in 2008 (compared to only 38% in 2005). Only 22% 
of companies had a policy of granting options (compared to around 60% in 2005). Options are 
now viewed as a potentially volatile incentive that can be perceived to be worthless if 
underwater and which are typically less efficient than PSP/LTIPs from a dilution and accounting 
cost perspective. 
 
Figure 7 Types of long term incentives available to FTSE 100 executives 2005-2008 
 
 Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
 
Figure 8 shows in more detail the combination of plans operated. The commonest arrangement 
was the sole operation of a performance share plan in 2008 (38% of FTSE 100 companies). 
While, generally, options were already in decline then, Figure 8 indicates that 30% of FTSE 30 
companies still used options (although every one of these companies also operated a PSP/LTIP). 
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This could reflect the fact they are global companies which may have operations in jurisdictions 
(such as the United States) where options were still the norm. 
 
Figure 8 Types of long term incentives available to FTSE 100 executives in 2008 
 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Directors' Remuneration 2008 
 
Further details about the mechanics of share options performance shares and deferred bonus 
plans among FTSE 100 firms can be found in Appendix B. It is, however, relevant for the 
purpose of the ensuing discussion to highlight here the typical performance measures that were 
commonly attached to these plans.  
 
As shown in Figure 9, in 2008, the vesting of FTSE 100 options (i.e. the right to exercise) typically 
depended on meeting an earnings per share (EPS) performance criterion. In the same year, the 
condition most commonly used in performance share plans was total shareholder return (TSR), 
with 77% of FTSE 100 plans with such provision (Figure 10). As for deferred bonus plans, EPS 
was the most prevalent performance condition for the matching share award, closely followed 
by TSR (Figure 11). 
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Figure 9 Performance measures in FTSE 100 share option plans 
  
Figure 10 Performance measures in FTSE 100 performance share plans 
 
Figure 11 Performance measures in FTSE 100 share matching plans 
 
Source: KPMG Survey of Directors' Compensation 2008 
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The main reason for emphasising these performance conditions attached to the respective long 
term incentive plans is to point out that the plan design for share options and deferred 
matching shares favoured by many shareholders and institutional investors had an EPS 
performance target; whereas TSR relative to a comparator group was the measure of choice for 
performance share plans (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005). It is therefore not difficult to see why 
a large proportion of FTSE 100 companies had EPS and relative TSR attached to their executive 
long term incentive plans.  
 
1.4.2 Research objectives 
 
Corporate governance and executive pay have been much studied in the past as separate topics 
but rarely, if ever, has a thorough attempt been made to examine both at once, with the aims 
of bringing the two topics together for more detailed analysis and seeking to synthesise the 
findings into a common understanding. Hence, one of the goals of this study is to contribute to 
the existing body of research by investigating, qualitatively and quantitatively, senior 
executives’ remuneration not only in relation to company performance but specifically in the 
context of corporate governance.  
 
As will be seen in the literature review presented in Chapter 2, corporate governance has 
diverse aims, many of which are related to executive compensation. For example, reforms have 
sought to raise the independence of executive pay determination, the transparency of the 
process through improved disclosure and the voice of shareholders in the outcome. In addition 
to being recognised as one of the key governance drivers and hence forming a key part the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2010 (and each of the previous versions of the Code), executive 
pay has been an area of particular concern for policy makers and received much attention right 
from the initial stages of reforms. Major governance initiatives that targeted directly and 
primarily on pay issues have included the Greenbury Report (1995), the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (2002)/Statutory Instrument 401 (2008). 
 
Furthermore, governance guidelines have also been issued by bodies that represent 
institutional investors (such as the Association of British Insurers 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004 
and 2007; the National Association of Pension Funds and the Pensions and Investment Research 
Consultants 2010), all of which have made specific recommendations concerning pay. It is clear 
that, although executive pay is a highly important, intricate and controversial issue, little is 
known about its true effect as a governance mechanism within the UK. This paradox alone is 
sufficient to make it the focus of academic attention. 
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In order to better situate and integrate the large body or research conducted in the areas of 
corporate governance and executive pay/company performance literature, an original 
exploratory research framework has been developed as illustrated in Figure 12. It is intended 
that through such an exercise of comprehensive and rigorous exploratory analysis of the 
literature and data, this study will provide some direction for future research. Moreover, Figure 
12 will also act as a signpost that draws attention to the structure and the main features of the 
research and offers insight contained in later chapters of the thesis. 
 
Figure 12 Research framework 
 
Source: this author 
 
As shown in Figure 12, there are two main steps in this study. First, it is to conduct a thorough 
review of the literature regarding UK corporate governance reforms and executive pay, with 
particular focus on the research approach and theoretical application of prior empirical studies. 
The aims of this qualitative review are to gain an up-to-date understanding of the role and 
impact of the remuneration of senior executives in a governance context, and to uncover 
potential reasons that may have contributed to the mixed results of the extant literature.  
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This process is intended to provide insight and perspective for interpreting and explaining the 
results of the second part of my research: a quantitative analysis of the remuneration of UK 
FTSE 100 board executives over the period 2004 to 2009. The analysis is in three separate but 
interrelated parts (see Chapter 3 for details): 
 
Part 1: Relationship between company size and executive pay 
 
Part 2: Relationship between executive pay and company performance 
 
Part 3: Factors affecting the pay-performance relationship 
 
The main thrust of this analysis is to obtain some indication as to whether increased corporate 
governance activity has influenced the role and practices of remuneration for the executive 
directors of the UK’s largest public companies. 
 
In addition this study has a number of novel features that set it apart from previous research 
work in this area, which are set out below. 
 
Theoretical approach 
The use of executive pay, the implementation of incentive plans in particular, to promote 
shareholder value is traditionally underpinned by agency theory, hence it seems logical for the 
present study to also employ an agency perspective to allow for comparisons to be drawn 
against previous research.  
 
However, the research findings will also be examined in the light of alternative theories, such as 
managerial power theory, to supplement what is lacking in the agency perspective. This 
approach may prove useful for identifying the research gaps in the literature and furthering the 
current understanding of the subject of executive pay in the governance context.  
 
Study period 2004/05 to 2008/09 
In recent years, companies - especially those in the FTSE 100 Index - have had to respond to the 
challenge of transforming their executive remuneration approach to meet changing governance 
demands and rising expectations, with particular reference to the new disclosure requirement 
and pay setting procedure. It has thus become both interesting and necessary to conduct 
research for this period of exceptional activity to observe trends.  
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At the same time, changes in disclosure requirements mean that one can now gain access to 
publicly available remuneration data, which are presented in a more consistent manner across 
all companies. As a result, it is possible for the current study to carry out analyses based on a 
data sample that spans across a number of years 2005 to 2009. Much of the previous pay 
research has employed a cross-sectional approach, using one year’s worth of data only. 
 
Data sample 
The present study examines the companies comprising the FTSE 100 index. There are a number 
of important reasons for choosing this relatively small sample in executive pay research terms. 
First, FTSE 100 pay practices are very different from smaller FTSE250 companies. Second, FTSE 
100 companies are all traded on the London Stock Exchange and are governed by the same set 
of listing rules. Together the group represents some 81% of the UK’s market capitalisation. 
Thirdly, using a smaller sample means that more in-depth analyses can be conducted. 
 
Roles 
Executive positions that are captured in this study include CEOs, finance directors and all other 
main board directors. CEO pay is often different from other directors, therefore it is informative 
to examine the different roles side by side in order to draw comparisons. 
 
Pay variables 
The structure of directors’ remuneration is complex and has many components. Many past 
studies have used only a single pay variable - either ‘total cash compensation’ (the sum of base 
salary and annual bonus) or ‘total compensation’ (total cash plus long term incentives) to 
represent the pay variable, both of which are calculated by aggregating two or more 
components of pay into a single measure. Only a small number of researchers have considered 
the individual pay components, such as base salary, annual bonus and share incentives, 
separately in their analyses. In order to advance on the understanding of the relationship 
between the various components of pay and performance, as well as how executives perceive 
and respond to different incentive rewards, the current study breaks down the pay variable into 
its various components for separate analysis. This also enables one to test whether and how 
different factors explain different amounts of variation, relative to performance.  
 
Company performance measurement 
Prior studies have primarily chosen to use only one or two financial measures. One can argue 
that the outcome of one measure is not sufficient grounds on which to reach a definitive 
answer concerning the association between awarding compensation and improving company 
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performance. In the current study, therefore, six measures of performance were used (see 
Chapter 3 for details). 
 
Overall, this study takes advantage of the changes that took place over recent years and 
elaborates on previous research with a fresh approach and examine executive pay in a more 
comprehensive manner. 
 
In sum, the main purpose of this study is two-fold. The first is to attempt to acquire a better 
understanding of the relationship between the remuneration of different board positions and 
company performance in the context of corporate governance. As established earlier, the past 
two decades have seen an on-going stream of pay related governance changes in the UK, during 
which time market and institutional pressures targeting executive pay have also been 
mounting. It must have been quite challenging for companies having to keep up-to-date with 
the ever-changing requirements and expectations.  
 
Nevertheless, the overall the level of compliance among FTSE 100 companies to all these 
changes has been high which points to the suggestion that the pay-performance relationship 
should have improved during the five year period under study. The results from the 
quantitative investigations as presented in Chapter 4 should cast some light on this conjecture, 
as well as offer some potential answers and discussion points for the following questions: have 
recent governance reforms had a positive measurable effect? Is the engagement with ‘best 
practice’ principles proving a positive process concerning the effectiveness of the board and the 
role of executive pay? Have the new pay determination process and disclosure requirements 
influenced prevailing compensation practice? 
 
The second aim of this study is to move beyond examining the determinants of pay to exploring 
the effects and consequences of directors’ remuneration as a key corporate governance 
mechanism. In particular, it attempts to identify the factors that might be preventing 
governance reform efforts from being as successful as they could be, and where the 
government and regulators should direct their attention to improve matters. It is intended that 
the synthesis provided by this research into the twin topics of executive pay and corporate 
governance will shed light on some of the aspects of pay management that may contribute 
towards reassessing future regulatory changes. 
 
Further, the present study also seeks to overcome some of the data-related problems and 
limitations that have hampered previous research. By including the key research features 
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presented above, this study should provide further insight into why the existing literature lacks 
convergence, which may in turn enable future researchers to avoid the pitfalls that their 
predecessors have encountered. Additionally, as all the analyses are based on UK pay data and 
practices, the findings will contribute to the corpus of UK executive pay literature which is at 
present still rather sparse.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
The rest of the thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature of the 
two main areas of focus of this study which are closely interconnected: corporate governance 
and executive pay. Also included in the chapter are overviews of agency theory and managerial 
power theory since, taken together, these two theories provide the underlying concepts and 
disciplines needed for examining executive pay as a corporate governance mechanism. Chapter 
3 describes the data on which this study is based and also sets out the hypotheses tested and 
the methodology employed. Chapter 4 presents in detail the results based on the quantitative 
analyses, while Chapter 5 provides an overview of the background to the main discussion. 
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the findings in the light of the literature considered in Chapter 2 and 
address the questions and observations brought up by this study. Finally, in Chapter 8, the 
thesis closes with a discussion of the limitations and implications of the present study, as well 
as some concluding remarks to integrate any lessons learned into pointers for future 
governance reforms.
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2 Literature review  
 
This chapter begins by providing a historical survey of events of UK corporate governance over 
the past two decades.  
 
2.1 Defining corporate governance 
 
The description of corporate governance in Footnote 1 is a general working definition that 
serves to guide the present discussion. However, broadly speaking, there is no set definition for 
the concept of corporate governance (OECD 2004 p13). In fact, the term itself was scarcely used 
until the 1980s (Tricker 2009). As pointed out by Dowdney (2010 p1), ‘there is, as yet, no 
generally applicable global corporate governance model…organisations tend to work within the 
parameters set out by national laws and regulations and the economic goals and expectations 
of shareholders’. Notwithstanding, due to the emergence of the standards put forward by 
international investors and capital markets, the past decades have seen a certain degree of 
convergence in corporate governance across the world. In addition, the World Bank, the 
European Central Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have all taken considerable initiatives to establish a theoretical and analytical 
framework for corporate governance in recent years. In 1999, the OECD provided a broad yet 
widely accepted definition of corporate governance, indicating that the emphasis on 
relationships is central to the broader concept of governance: 
 
‘The OECD takes a broad view of corporate governance and defines it as the full set of 
relationships among a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. It provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance determined.’ (1999a: 
10). 
 
More recently, corporate governance has become more comprehensively defined (OECD 2004):  
 
 ‘Procedures and processes according to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
the different participants in the organisation - such as the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders - and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making.’ (European 
Central Bank 2004). 
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2.1.1 UK corporate governance approach and regulatory framework 
 
According to the Financial Reporting Council (2010), the UK corporate governance approach 
‘starts from the position that good governance is a tool that can improve the board's ability to 
manage the company effectively as well as provide accountability to shareholders: 
 
‘The effectiveness with which boards discharge their responsibilities determines Britain's 
competitive position. They must be free to drive their companies forward, but exercise that 
freedom within a framework of effective accountability. This is the essence of any system of 
good corporate governance.’ (Cadbury 1992 paragraph 1.1 p11) 
 
In addition, as further explained by the Financial Reporting Council (2010), the UK approach 
aims to benefit shareholders by improving the company’s long term value. This needs flexibility 
in the way companies adopt governance practices. To be effective, good governance has to be 
implemented in a way that fits the culture and organisation of individual companies - a factor 
that can vary enormously depending on size, ownership structure and the complexity of the 
business model.  
 
UK governance is based on the principle of 'comply or explain' through the Combined Code. The 
Code identifies good governance practices on, for instance, role and composition of the board 
and the development of sound internal controls, but firms can elect to adopt a different 
approach that is more appropriate to their own circumstances if they choose. Where a 
company does so, though, it is required to explain the reason to their shareholders who, in 
turn, must decide whether they are satisfied with the approach that has been taken. 
 
The 'comply or explain' approach enables decisions about, say, the independence of non-
executive directors, to be made in individual cases. The approach has the support of companies, 
investors and regulators in the UK and has also been adopted as a model in other financial 
markets. For the system to work, the shareholders must have relevant information to enable 
them to make a judgement on the governance practices of the firms in which they invest. They 
must also have the right to influence the behaviour of the board when they are not satisfied. 
This means that 'Comply or explain' must be backed by an appropriate regulatory framework.  
 
In UK company law, shareholders enjoy a number of rights, including the right to appoint and 
dismiss individual directors and, in some circumstances, to call an Extraordinary General 
Meeting of the company. Company law also sets out requirements relating to the Annual 
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General Meeting (AGM), including the provision of information to shareholders and 
arrangements for voting on resolutions, together with requirements for information to be 
disclosed in the annual report and accounts. These must include a Business Review, in which 
the board describes the main risks and uncertainties facing the company, and a report on 
directors' remuneration. 
 
This corporate governance framework is fortified by the Listing Rules that must be followed by 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. The Listing Rules provide additional rights to 
shareholders - for example, requiring that major transactions are put to a vote and certain 
information to be publicly disclosed to the market. This includes the need to put forward a 
'comply or explain' statement in the annual report and accounts explaining how the company 
has applied and/or adopted the recommendations in the Combined Code. In summary, the 
regulation of corporate governance in the UK is provided by a number of different rules, 
regulations and recommendations. Some of the major requirements are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Overview of the major corporate governance requirements in the UK 
 Common law rules (e.g. directors' fiduciary duties) 
 Statute (notably the Companies Act 1985) 
 A company's constitutional documents (the memorandum and articles of association). 
 The Listing Rules, which apply to all companies that are listed on the Official List (or AIM Rules, 
as appropriate) 
 The Corporate Governance Code  
 Non-legal guidelines issued by bodies that represent institutional investors (such as the 
Association of British Insurers, the National Association of Pension Funds and the Pensions and 
Investment Research Consultants. These guidelines apply to listed companies and although 
they are informal, some institutional investors may oppose any corporate actions that 
contravene them 
 In the context of takeovers of public companies, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and 
the rules of the Takeover Panel apply (2011) 
 The Financial Services Authority's Code of Market Conduct (relating to the disclosure and use 
of confidential and price sensitive information and the creation of a false market). 
Source: Dowdney (2010) 
2.1.2 UK principles-based approach vs US rules-based approach 
 
It is worthy of note that while the UK’s approach to corporate governance is principles-based, 
the one adopted in the US is strictly rules-based (Table 4). In the US, corporate governance is 
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determined predominantly by legislation in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
and detailed regulations which SOX required the Securities and Exchange Commission, New 
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ to draw up.  
 
The UK ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate governance varies significantly from the 
general approach taken by SOX. Although SOX-related regulations use the ‘comply or explain’ 
method in some instances (for example, in relation to whether a company has a ‘code of ethics’ 
or its audit committee has a ‘financial expert’), in most other instances, US regulation tends to 
rely on the legislation and fines and imprisonment penalties for violating the requirements of 
SOX.  
 
Table 4 The UK and US approach to corporate governance 
UK - Principles-based US - Rules-based 
 General principles that give ‘best practice’ 
guidelines 
 Not enforced by law 
 ‘Comply or explain’ departures mean 
companies do not have to follow guidelines 
 Strict, detailed compliance rules 
 Legally enforceable 
 All companies must comply 
 
Arguments for principles-based approach Arguments for rules-based approach 
 Companies are already highly regulated, 
more rules will stifle development  
 Low compliance cost for companies 
 Practical yet flexible: companies can apply 
the rules to suit their circumstances 
 Robust procedures are effective 
 Reduces risk of disasters as companies will 
not be satisfied by mere token compliance 
 Cost of compliance may be high but still 
less than the cost of a major fraud  
Source : Dowdney (2010) 
 
2.1.3 Development of corporate governance in the UK 
 
Cadbury Report (1992)  
 
The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, more 
commonly known as the Cadbury Report was published in December 1992. It followed the 
recommendations of the Cadbury Committee, set up in May 1991 by the Financial Reporting 
Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession in the wake of a series of 
financial scandals involving UK companies during the 1980s, which raised questions about the 
quality of companies’ financial reporting. 
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The Committee’s brief was to examine the financial aspects of corporate governance and it 
produced a Code of Best Practice, to which they recommended all boards of UK listed 
companies should comply. Chief among the Committee’s recommendations were that listed 
companies should formally declare in their Report and Accounts whether or not they complied 
with the Code’s provisions. Where they had not complied, they should provide a reason. The 
Report also recommended that auditors should review the compliance statements made by the 
companies before publication of its annual report.  
 
The Code of Best Practice was concerned chiefly with the composition of the board of directors 
and the appointment and independence of non-executive directors. It also considered the 
service contracts and remuneration of executive directors, and companies’ financial reporting 
and controls.  
 
The Committee recommended that (Manifest 2004):  
 
• The majority of non-executive directors should be independent of management and 
not have any business or other relationship 
• Non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms 
• Service contracts should not exceed three years 
• Executive remuneration should be subject to the recommendations of a remuneration 
committee made up entirely or mainly of non-executive directors 
• An audit committee, comprising at least three non-executives should be set up. 
 
Following publication of the Code, the London Stock Exchange changed its Listing Rules asking 
companies to include a statement of compliance, or non-compliance, in their annual report and 
accounts. Institutional investors and investment banks also encouraged the companies in which 
they had an interest to adopt the Code’s provisions. As a result, many companies changed their 
governance procedures and conduct to conform to the Committee’s recommendations.  
  
Greenbury Report (1995)  
 
Executive remuneration became a focus of concern for investors during the 1990s, because pay 
levels in privatised industries were rising while at the same time remuneration packages were 
not providing the necessary incentives to improve directors’ performance. To address the issues 
of corporate governance in relation to director’s remuneration more rigorously, the Greenbury 
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Committee was set up. Their findings and recommendations were published in the Greenbury 
Report, which included a Code of Best Practice on Director’s Remuneration.  
 
There were four main recommendations concerning remuneration:  
 
• That a Remuneration Committee should set the remuneration packages for the CEO 
and other directors 
• That disclosure of details of directors remuneration was needed to inform shareholders 
and, if necessary, obtain shareholder approval 
• Guidelines for determining the remuneration policy for directors 
• Service contracts binding the company to pay compensation to a director, including the 
event of his or her dismissal for poor performance. 
 
Like Cadbury, the Greenbury report recommended the establishment of a Remuneration 
Committee comprised entirely of non-executive directors to set the remuneration of the 
executive directors. Unlike Cadbury, Greenbury recommended a maximum notice period of 12 
months instead of the three years suggested by Cadbury.  
 
The recommendations of the Greenbury Committee were adopted by the London Stock 
Exchange and incorporated into its Listing Rules. However, unlike the Cadbury Code, Greenbury 
was not so widely welcomed because its recommendations were seen as not grasping the 
nettle of linking executives’ pay to company performance, in the interests of shareholders.  
 
Hampel Report (1998)  
 
In 1996, the Hampel Committee was set up to review and, where necessary, revise the 
recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees. The Hampel report placed stress 
on good governance rather than specific rules to avoid placing too much of a regulatory burden 
on companies. The Committee also took more notice of the individual differences between 
companies and their different needs in terms of good corporate governance. This emphasis on 
principles, rather than specific rules and regulations, was an early turning point in the 
development of governance. 
  
In Hampel’s view, the primary objective of a public company is to improve shareholder value 
and hence changes to corporate governance regulation should be viewed from a 
principal/agent perspective with this end in view. This was a departure from previous 
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committees who had focussed on preventing the abuse of executive power, rather than 
maximising shareholder value. Hempel favoured greater shareholder involvement in company 
affairs. 
  
A second advance in Hampel was in the area of audit and accountability. It was the board’s 
responsibility to maintain sound internal controls to safeguard shareholders’ investments. And 
the board was to be held accountable for risk management in general, not just the financial 
controls as recommended by Cadbury.  
 
Hampel did not however, contribute anything new in the area of director’s remuneration and 
simply repeated the remuneration principles in Greenbury. Hampel did not think that directors’ 
remuneration should be a matter for shareholder approval at the Annual General Meeting, 
although such approval did become a requirement when the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s report on Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations was published in 2002 (under 
Companies Act 1985).  
 
Combined Code (1998)  
 
The Combined Code, published in 1998 and revised in 2003, accepted the principles and 
recommendations of the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports. Following further 
consideration by the Financial Reporting Counsel, a second revised version of the Code was 
published in 2006. The Code has two main sections.  
 
The first section sets out the principles of best practice for companies, while the second does 
the same for shareholders. Compliance with the Combined Code is not mandatory, however, 
the London Stock Exchange appended the Code to its listing rules. In addition, Listing Rule 
12:43A requires a statement by companies to provide shareholders with enough information to 
be able to assess the extent of compliance with section one of the Code. When the Code has 
not been complied with, an explanation should be provided to shareholders.  
 
Section 1 of the Code covers topics that include the composition and operations of the board, 
directors’ remuneration, relationships with shareholders, the supply of information and 
accountability and audit. Section 2 of the Code is less extensive, dealing mainly with 
shareholder voting, dialogue with companies and evaluating governance disclosures. 
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One area of the Code considered to be weak is that it urges Institutional investors to ‘give due 
weight to all relevant factors’ when assessing the quality of governance disclosure by 
companies but does not discuss these factors in any detail. Some institutional investor 
membership associations have written guidance to their members enlarging on this area.  
 
Turnbull Report (1999)  
 
The Turnbull report (Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code) on internal control 
procedures was published in September 1999. In particular, directors should be responsible for: 
 
• Evaluating sources and types of risk that the company faces 
• Providing effective safeguards and internal controls to manage prevent or reduce the 
risks 
• Ensuring the transparency of internal controls and providing an annual risk assessment. 
 
In 2004, the Financial Reporting Council established the Turnbull Review Group to consider the 
impact of the guidance and the related disclosures and to determine whether the guidance 
needed to be updated. In reviewing the impact of the guidance, the Financial Reporting 
Council’s consultations revealed that it had very successfully gone a long way to meeting its 
original objectives. Boards and investors alike indicated that the guidance had contributed to a 
marked improvement in the overall standard of risk management and internal control since it 
was introduced eight years ago. 
 
Myners: Review of Institutional Investment (2001)  
 
The report by Paul Myners ‘Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review’ was published in 2001, 
having been commissioned by the Government, ‘to consider whether there were factors 
distorting the investment decision-making of institutions’. The Report identified a number of 
problems with the current system of governance, including that (Manifest 2004):  
 
• Pension fund trustees were being expected to make investment decisions without the 
necessary knowledge or resources required 
• Investment consultants, who advise the trustees, were also being heavily burdened 
with questions without the necessary resources 
• The task of allocating assets and selecting markets (as distinct from individual shares) 
to invest in was not properly resourced 
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• There was a lack of clarity about objectives such as those of Fund managers which 
sometimes appear to be unrelated to the fundamental purpose of a pension fund. 
 
The Myners Review concluded that the present processes of institutional investors (e.g. pension 
funds and insurance companies) used to make investment decisions were both inefficient and 
inflexible, meaning that investment decisions are always made in investors’ best interests. To 
deal with these shortcomings, Myners recommended some principles of a more effective 
approach to investment decision-making, aimed at making pension funds and other 
institutional investors more efficient. For example, Myners suggested that Trustees should 
consider if they have the capabilities and skillset, individually and collectively, and the right 
structures and processes to effectively perform their responsibilities. Besides, it is necessary for 
them to develop ‘forward-looking business plan’. Myners also pointed out that it may not be 
the ideal way forward to make compliance with these recommendations compulsory; instead it 
suggest adopting a similar approach to that of the Combined Code and preceding reports. In 
other words, institutional investors would decide whether or not to adopt the provisions of the 
Report and explain their decisions where necessary.  
 
The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) 
 
Up until the early 2000s, executive compensation had been an area where a purely voluntary 
approach was tried. Statutory intervention first took place in the form of Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (the DRRR) in 2002. According to the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI), the primary purpose of the DRRR is to: 
 
• Ensure a consistent format for disclosure to allow investors and the public to gain 
knowledge of detailed remuneration issues within companies 
• Enhance transparency in setting directors' pay  
• Provide shareholders with a guidance vote on the remuneration of directors at annual 
general meetings 
• Improve the pay-performance linkage. 
 
To elaborate, companies were previously required by the Listing Rules (LR 9.8.8) to include 
certain information concerning directors’ remuneration by way of notes to their financial 
statements. Since the DRRR came into force in 2002 pay disclosure requirements have become 
much more stringent as well as extensive. In particular, the regulations stipulated that all 
quoted companies must produce for each financial year a ‘Directors’ Remuneration Report’, 
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within which the remuneration committee is to set out specified and detailed information 
regarding the emoluments and other benefits (e.g. salary, fees, bonuses, allowances and 
expenses) of individual board members.  
 
The Report must also contain any compensation for loss of office or other termination 
payment; information on each director’s share options and interests under long term incentive 
schemes as well as pension entitlements. After all these items have been verified by the 
company’s external auditors (Listing Rules LR 9.8.11), the Report must then be sent to 
shareholders and all other persons who are entitled to receive notice of general meetings; 
failure to comply with the new requirements is a criminal offence.  
 
Although there are additional requirements concerning directors’ remuneration and equity 
rewards in Schedule 6 to Companies Act 1985 and in IFRS2 (2005) whereby companies 
reporting under international accounting standards are obliged to measure all share-based 
payments at ‘fair value’ and record them as expenses), the required content of the DRRR is 
given in Schedule 7A to the Act. The DRRR has been updated in 2008 -Statutory Instrument 401 
came into force financial year 2008/2009 or later. 
 
Higgs Report (2003)  
 
In 2003, a report was published following Derek Higgs’ review of the role of non-executive 
directors. His report recommended a number of changes to the Combined Code and a revision 
of the Code in the same year incorporated most of his recommendations. The Report focused 
on the role, independence and recruitment of non-executive directors and is often regarded as 
Britain’s response to the Enron financial scandal in the US. Higgs stated the non-executive 
director’s role as:  
 
• Making contributions to corporate strategy 
• Monitoring the performance of executive management 
• Satisfying themselves regarding the effectiveness of internal controls 
• Setting the remuneration of executive directors 
• Playing a part in the nomination, removal and succession planning of senior 
management. 
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The Combined Code recommended that boards should have at least one-third non-executive 
directors, and that the majority of them should be independent. However, the Code did not say 
how their independence should be assessed. Higgs remedied this omission with a number of 
tests independence, including length of service (ten years), associations to executive 
management, individual financial interest or significant shareholding. Further, cross-
directorships were identified as compromising independence, such as the case where two 
directors act as executive directors and non-executive directors alternatively at two companies 
(Manifest 2004). Higgs warned, though, that ‘in practice there may be a complicated network of 
inter-relationships known as ‘an old boys’ club’ so that it remains difficult to determine 
objectively a directors’ independence.’ (Manifest 2004 p4).  
 
In terms of recruitment, Higgs recommended stronger guidelines for nomination committees. 
Higgs recommended that listed companies should set up a nomination committee, chaired by 
an independent non-executive director - other than the company chairman- and with a majority 
of independent non-executive directors. Higgs also recognised that the recommendations 
regarding non-executive directors would be more difficult for smaller companies to put in place 
(Higgs 2003 p40). Further, the Higgs report also suggested that:  
 
• The board should review its performance, as well as the performance of its committees 
and individual directors at least once a year 
• The Company Secretary should be accountable to the board through the chairman on 
all governance matters 
• The terms of reference of the remuneration committee should be published. 
 
Smith Report (2003)  
 
In 2002, the Financial Reporting Council set up an independent group, chaired by Sir Robert 
Smith, to clarify the role and responsibilities of audit committees and to develop the existing 
Combined Code guidance. This group worked closely with the Higgs review and in its report (the 
Smith report) issued in January 2003, it proposed changes to provisions in the Combined Code 
dealing with the composition and role of the audit committee and its reporting to shareholders. 
Smith indicates that where a company does not follow the guidance it should explain and justify 
this in its annual report.  
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The key recommendations of the Smith Report include: 
 
• Purpose of the audit committee 
- Monitor integrity of accounts and review effectiveness of internal audit 
- Review internal financial control and risk management systems 
- Recommend to the board the appointment of the external auditor and 
monitor external auditors' independence, objectivity and effectiveness 
- Develop policy regarding use of external auditor to supply non audit services. 
 
• Membership 
- At least three members; all of whom should be independent non-executive 
directors and the chairman should not be a member.  
- Maximum period of membership is nine years 
- At least one member should have significant and relevant financial experience. 
 
• Communication 
- The Directors' Report should contain a section reporting on the audit 
committee: 
 Role/responsibilities of the committee 
 Relevant qualifications, expertise and experience of each member 
 Resources available to the committee 
 Number of meetings and details of individual directors' attendance 
 Main activities in the year 
- Chairman of the committee should attend the AGM to answer relevant 
questions. 
 
Revised Combined Code (2003)  
 
In July 2003, the revised Combined Code was published and followed closely the 
recommendations of the Higgs and the Smith reports. As in the previous Combined Code, 
‘companies are required to report on their compliance against the Code and should explain 
areas of non-compliance’ (Manifest 2004 p4). The new Code was a significant revision of the 
1998 Code. Specifically it recommends:  
 
• That the roles of chairman and chief executive should be separated. The chairman 
should satisfy the criteria for independence on appointment but once appointed, 
should not thereafter be considered independent when assessing the balance of board 
membership 
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• That the board should consist of at least half independent non-executives. The Code 
defines independence as recommended by the Higgs Report 
• That the board, its committees and directors to be subject to an annual performance 
review 
• That at least one member of the audit committee should have recent and relevant 
financial experience  
• Unlike the Higgs Report, the revised Combined Code allows the chairman to chair the 
nominations committee, except where the committee is considering the appointment 
of the chairman’s successor. 
 
Myners Report (2004)  
 
Paul Myners ‘Review of the Impediments to Voting UK shares,’ published in January 2004 for 
the Shareholder Voting Working Group, a network of investment industry and corporate 
bodies, was developed in response to the need ‘to address concerns that the system for voting 
the shares of UK issuers is not as effective and efficient as it should be.’ (p1). Specifically, as 
stated in the Report, problems have come about due to the process being ‘quite manually 
intensive’ and that ‘the chain of accountability is complex…there is a lack of transparency 
and…there is a large number of different participants, each of whom may give a different 
priority to voting.’ (p1).  
 
While it is stated that if the existing paper-based system, which has a number of structural 
weaknesses, were to be, ‘overhauled and upgraded’ (p1), it would lead to improvements being 
seen, the overriding conclusion is that, ‘electronic voting remains the key to a more efficient 
voting system, and all parties - issuers, institutional investors and the intermediaries - need to 
make conscious efforts to introduce electronic voting capabilities in 2004.’ (p3). Further to this 
it is recommended that, ‘issuers in at least the FTSE 350, investment managers, custodians and 
proxy voting agencies should all have introduced the necessary system changes so that 
electronic voting capabilities are universally available (and) that beneficial owners…make direct 
and specific enquiries of their agents and others to establish the extent to which they have, or 
will have, introduced electronic voting capabilities to be used this year.’ (p3). 
 
Revised Combined Code (2006)  
 
Two subsequent consultation exercises have resulted in changes to the Code. The first was 
conducted between July and October 2005 and the second - on draft amendments to the Code - 
2. Literature review 
49 
 
was held between January and April 2006. Both found that the Code was only partly effective 
and that minor changes were needed. This finding followed comments from UK listed 
companies and investors on the how well the Code functioned in practice. Amendments to the 
Code related to: 
 
• Amending the restriction on a company chairman serving on the remuneration 
committees so he or she may do so where considered independent on appointment as 
chairman (at the same time recommending that he or she should not also chair the 
committee). 
• Provide an option of ‘vote withheld’ on proxy appointment forms so that shareholders 
may indicate having reservations on a resolution but do not wish to vote against. A 
‘vote withheld’ is not a legal vote and is not counted in the calculation of the votes for 
and against a resolution. 
• Propose that firms publish details of proxies lodged at a general meeting where votes 
are taken on a show of hands, on their website. The Company Law Reform Bill (2005) 
contained provisions that require companies to publish details of votes taken on a poll.  
• Recommend that companies publish the terms of reference of board committees on 
their websites. 
 
The 2008 UK Combined Code and the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code  
 
Since its publication in 2003, the UK Combined Code was reviewed and revised on a number of 
occasions, with the final refinements completed in June 2008. With the aim of making the 
status of the Code as the UK’s recognised corporate governance standard clearer to investors, 
the Code was formally renamed as the UK Corporate Governance Code in October 2010. The UK 
Combined Code is the responsibility of the Financial Reporting Council and represents the 
aggregate good judgment of the reports described above. It is currently regarded as standard 
for good corporate governance practices for UK listed public companies. 
 
The Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange require that listed public companies must 
comply with the recommendations of the Code or explain why they elect to deviate from 
certain provisions of the Code - the so-called principle of 'comply or explain'. Although classed 
as 'soft-law', the Code, together with pressures from institutional investors and market forces, 
seems to have had a considerable effect on ensuring compliance. As well as the Listing Rules, 
further requirements have been established through the Directors' Remuneration Report 
Regulation 2002. And since 2005, following the implementation of the EU Accounts 
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Modernisation Directive, companies are also required to introduce an annual business review 
(Du Plessis et al 2011). 
 
On 1 December 2009, the Financial Reporting Council published its final report on its review of 
the effectiveness of the Combined Code. Briefly stated, the Code has been revised on a regular 
basis since 2003 so that it reflects changing governance views and practices as well as changing 
economic circumstances. The reports published in 2009 and 2010 reflect the lessons of the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis that affect all public companies.  
 
Some of these changes were outlined by the Financial Reporting Council in its final report in 
2009: 
 
• New principles have been proposed on: the roles of the chairman and non-executive 
directors; the need for an appropriate mix of skills on the board to ensure both 
experience and independence; the level of commitment expected of directors; and the 
board's responsibility for defining the company's appetite for risk. 
• Additional 'comply or explain' provisions including: evaluation reviews of board to be 
held externally every three years; the chairman to hold development reviews regularly 
with all directors; and companies must report on their business model and their overall 
financial strategy. 
• The section of the Code dealing with remuneration has been changed to stress the 
need for performance-related pay to be aligned with the company’s long term interest 
as well as to the company's risk policies. Variable components of remuneration to be 
reclaimed in some circumstances. 
 
The most recent report, titled the UK Corporate Governance Code, was published in 2010. The 
main provisions of the 2010 Code regarding board composition are: 
 
• The chairman should be an independent non-executive director (Code Provision A.3.1). 
• The board and its committees should consist of directors with the appropriate balance 
of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable it to 
discharge its duties and responsibilities effectively (New Principle B.1). 
• The board should include a strong presence of executive and non-executive directors 
(and in particular independent non -executive directors) such that no individual or 
small group of individuals can dominate the board's decision taking (Supporting 
Principle to B. 1). It is of considerable importance to note that there is no longer a 
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requirement that at least half of the board (excluding the chairman) should be 
independent non-executive directors (2008 UK Combined Code Provision A.3.2). 
However, the board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it 
considers to be independent (Code Provision B.1.1). 
• The board should appoint one of the independent non-executive directors to be the 
senior independent director to provide a sounding board for the chairman and to serve 
as an intermediary for the other directors when necessary. The senior independent 
director should be available to shareholders if they have concerns which contact 
through the normal channels of chairman, chief executive or other executive directors 
has failed to resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate (Code Provision A.4.1). 
• The annual report should identify the chairman, the deputy chairman (where there is 
one), the chief executive, the senior independent director and the chairmen and 
members of the board committees. It should also set out the number of meetings of 
the board and those committees and individual attendance by directors (Code 
Provision A. 1.2). 
• There should be at least three committees of the board, namely an audit committee 
(Code Provision C.3.1), a nomination committee (Code Provision B.2.1); and a 
remuneration committee (Code Provision D.2.1). 
• No one other than the committee chairman and members is entitled to be present at a 
meeting of the nomination, audit or remuneration committee, but others may attend 
at the invitation of the committee (supporting Principle to B.1). 
  
Other reports since 2008 
 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, there have been further moves towards improving corporate 
governance in the form both of further reports and Parliamentary discussion with a view to 
introducing legislation.  
 
In 2009, Sir David Walker was asked by the Prime Minister to review corporate governance in 
UK banks and other financial industry entities. His report was published in November 2009. It 
made recommendations in the areas of board size, composition and qualification, functioning 
of the board and evaluation of performance, the role of institutional shareholders: 
communication and engagement, governance of risk, and remuneration.  
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Sir David’s main recommendations were: 
 
• Board level risk committees to be chaired by a non-executive director 
• Risk committees to have power to scrutinise and if necessary block big transactions  
• More power for remuneration committees to scrutinise firm-wide pay  
• Remuneration committee to oversee pay of other high-paid executives not on the 
board  
• Significant deferred element in bonus schemes for all high-paid executives  
• Increased public disclosure about pay of high-paid executives  
• Remuneration committee chair to face re-election if report gets less than 75% approval  
• Non-executives to spend up to 50 per cent more time on the job  
• Non-executives to face tougher scrutiny under FSA authorisation process  
• Chairman of board to face annual re-election  
• Financial Reporting Council to sponsor institutional shareholder code  
• FSA to monitor conformity and disclosure by fund managers. 
 
In 2012, the government has announced plans to introduce further measures to strengthen the 
governance framework and legislation in this field. Evidently, the need for governance rules and 
regulation is widely held to be the result of asymmetry of interests between the owners of a 
company and its managers. This clash of interests is the province of agency theory, which 
therefore forms a key part of this study. The attention of Section 2.2.1 will focus on this 
influential theory. 
 
2.1.3.1 Summary 
 
The above discussion has shown that during the past 20 years there have been repeated 
investigations of the function, conduct and governance of corporate boards and directors’ 
behaviour, resulting in many reports, guidelines and codes of best practice. These, in turn, have 
been revised and reintroduced in attempts to target the latest issues emerging in the corporate 
world. Yet despite all the reports and codes, published in a piecemeal way, there is no 
measurable cumulative effect - and similar problems keep recurring. It is this resilience of the 
underlying problem, and its refusal to yield to reform, that is clearly of particular concern. 
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2.2 Agency and managerial power theories 
 
Corporate governance and executive compensation has come under intensive theoretical and 
empirical discussion by academics from an array of disciplines, ranging from accounting to 
economics to law to finance and organisational strategy (Murphy 1999; Canarella and Nourayi 
2008). For instance, as noted by Farmer (2008), accountants such as Healy (1985) have 
examined the correlation between earnings manipulation and accounting based incentives; 
whereas Baiman and Verrecchia (1995) have explored and compared market-based and 
accounting-based measurements to determine their respective effectiveness. 
 
Further, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and other financial economists have studied extensively the 
association between incentive pay and shareholder value; soon after, ‘the effect of investment 
decisions, capital structure, dividend policies, mergers and diversification on executive 
compensation’ have also been investigated (Murphy 1999 p2, cited in Farmer 2008 p3). More 
recently, organisational scholars and economists have explored the relationship between 
company performance and the quality of governance practices such as duality of CEO-chairman 
positions, board composition and diversity and effectiveness of the board and its 
subcommittees (Ho 2005; Cravens and Wallace 2001; Brennan 2006). 
 
In reviewing the literature, one can also see that although corporate governance and executive 
pay research employs a wide variety of theoretical frameworks including tournament theory, 
organisational strategy theory, stewardship theory and so on (see Table 5 for a list of 
examples), it is an agency perspective on which most studies draw (Section 2.2.1). However, 
while agency theory provides many credible and useful insights, one can argue that it may not 
be sufficient to base the present study on a single theory, as many predecessor studies have 
done. In order to provide a more objective and rounded discussion in later chapters, it is 
important also to view the subject from the standpoint of other relevant theories, chief among 
which is managerial power theory (Section 2.2.2).  
 
Managerial power theory is relevant to the present study because it appears to complement 
agency theory effectively when examining corporate governance and pay issues. For example, it 
provides potential explanations as to why the monitoring mechanisms proposed by agency 
theorists to control and oversee executives are not as effective as expected. Therefore it was 
decided to employ the two theories side by side - managerial power theory and agency theory - 
providing complementary analytical positions for examining the relationships between 
corporate board and CEO/management. 
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Table 5 Theoretical perspectives employed in executive compensation research 
Theoretical Perspective Year Author(s) 
      
Agency theory  1976 Jensen and Meckling 
  1983 Fama and Jensen 
  1983 Larcker 
  1986 Jensen 
  1988 Gibbons 
  1988 Baker, Jensen and Murphy 
  1989 Eisenhardt 
  1990 Jensen and Murphy 
  1992 Gaver et al 
  1994 Zajac and Westphal 
  1996 Barney and Hesterly 
  1996 Stroth et al 
  1997 Davis et al 
  1998 Core et al 
  1998 Sanders and Carpenter 
  1999 Benito and Conyon 
  1999 Fosberg 
  1999 Himmelberg et al 
  2001 Bebchuk et al 
  2001 Dennis 
  2001 Lambert 
  2002 Pye 
  2001 Roberts 
  2003 Buck et al 
  2005 Perkins and Hendry 
  2007 Harford and Li 
  2008 Dey 
      
Expectancy theory 1997 Ezzamel and Watson 
  2007 Bender 
    
Game theory 1993/07 Noldeke and Samuelson 
  1998 Fehr and Harbord 
  2002 Lee 
      
 Human capital theory 1998 Conyon 
  2000 Conyon 
  2005 Conyon 
Source: this author 
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Table 5 Theoretical perspectives employed in executive compensation research (continued) 
 Theoretical Perspective Year Author(s) 
      
Information processing theory 1998 Conyon and Peck 
  2001 Conyon and Sadler 
  2002 Conyon et al 
      
Managerial power theory 1995 Pettigrew and McNulty 
  1998 Buchholtz et al 
  1999 Molm et al 
  2003 Bebchuk and Fried 
  2006 Brennan 
      
Neoclassical theory 1996 Powell 
  1998 Buck et al 
  1999 Molm et al 
  2001 Roberts 
      
Organisational strategy theory 1990/92 Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 
  1999 Rindova 
  2010 Gomez-Mejia et al 
      
Relative performance evaluation theory 2002 Stiles and Taylor 
  1996 Ogden and Watson 
      
Social comparison theory 1988 O'Reilly et al 
  1992 Crystal  
  1996 Ogden and Watson 
  1997 Cosh and Hughes  
  1998 Conyon and Peck 
    
Stewardship theory 1991 Donaldson and Davis 
  1997 Davis et al 
  2004 Van den Berghe and Levrau 
  2007 Nicholson and Kiel 
      
Tournament theory 1981 Lazear and Rosen  
  1986 Rosen 
  1988 O'Reilly et al 
  1992 Crystal  
  1993 Main et al 
  1998 Conyon and Peck 
 Source: this author     
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2.2.1 Agency theory 
 
Rooted in finance and economics, agency theory is a well-applied and long-established theory 
that has been used to explain the issue of separation of ownership and control within 
organisations. It postulates that an organisation consists of a nexus of contracts between the 
owners of economic resources (the principals) and managers (the agents) who are charged with 
using and controlling those resources (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
As noted in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1), the theory is largely based on the idea that ‘agents have 
more information than principals and that this information asymmetry adversely affects the 
principals’ ability to monitor whether or not their interests are being properly served by 
agents’. It also assumes that ‘principals and agents act rationally and that they will use the 
contracting process to maximise their wealth’ (Sarens and Abdolmohammadi 2007 p3). This 
means that because agents have self-seeking motives, they may be tempted to take the 
opportunity to act in their own self- interest rather than in the best interests of the company - a 
dilemma that is often referred to as ‘the moral hazard’ problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
In general, agency theory can be applied in various contexts such as:  
 
• Intra-organisational relationships of power and control between principals and agents 
including main board executive directors vs non-executive directors/chairmen, 
shareholders vs managers, and managers vs supervisors (Barney and Hesterly 1996; 
Scott 1998) 
 
• Organisational relationships of power and control between principals and agents 
including headquarters vs subsidiaries (O'Donnell 2000) and mergers and acquisitions 
(Graebner and Eisenhardt 2001; Lane et al 1998) 
 
Yet it is the problem inherent between senior executives (agents) and shareholders (principals) 
that is of most interest to us in the present context. This section of the literature review gives a 
brief introduction to the emergence and early development of agency theory together with the 
core assumptions of agency models. The central problems and concerns around the theory are 
also considered. Finally, some of the ways in which organisations may respond to agency 
problems and costs are reviewed.  
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2.2.1.1 Background to agency theory 
 
Agency theory can be traced back to Adam Smith (1776) and his discussion of the ‘problem of 
the separation of ownership and control’ where he argued that ‘managers of other people’s 
money cannot be expected to watch over it with the same anxious vigilance’ one would expect 
from owners and that ‘negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, 
in the management of the affairs of such a company’ (p324).  
 
The theory has since been used by scholars in many fields such as accounting, economics, 
finance, marketing political science, organisational behaviour and sociology (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Organisational economists - agency theorists - in particular tend to focus on the market for 
corporate control, exploring the source of inefficiencies and how they can be remedied. Put 
simply, their primary interest lies in examining the role played by politics and power in the 
efficient functioning of corporations and markets (Barney and Hesterly 1996). 
 
Early work in agency theory centred on examining incomplete information in insurance sector 
contracts and borrowed significantly from the economics of information literature, which was 
the precursor to the application of agency theory in the fields of strategic management and 
organisation theory (Ross 1973). In the meantime, additional literature dealing with the moral 
hazard associated with inequitable distribution of information in the principal-agent 
relationship was explored in the 1960s and 1970s under the label of risk sharing (Holmstrom 
1979; Wilson 1968).  
 
Building on the risk sharing literature and underlying assumptions that the rational individual 
will act from a position of self interest and seek to maximise material returns (Worsham et al 
1997), agency theory was further developed to including the problem associated with co-
operating parties having differing goals (Jensen and Meckling 1976). A substantial amount of 
research addresses the agency problem and much of it was carried out using some core 
assumptions which are to be examined in the following section. 
 
2.2.1.2 Assumptions of agency theory 
 
For agency theorists, there is no difference between firms and markets in terms of how 
cooperation is achieved, and in how firms and markets operate and produce coordination 
(Jensen et al 1976a). Thus, they consider the price mechanism to be operative within firms. In 
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addition, some of the core and fundamental assumptions commonly grounded in agency theory 
include the followings (Eisenhardt 1989; Hendry 2002; Williamson 1975): 
 
• Human assumptions - principals and agents are:  
- Bounded rational 
- Self-interested/self-seeking 
- Opportunistic 
- Risk averse. 
 
• Organisational assumptions: 
- Goal incongruence 
- Efficiency criterion 
- Asymmetric information distributed between principals and agents.  
 
These assumptions are dealt with in literature as far back as Berle and Means (1932). In 
explaining agency theory, they noted a divergence of interests between owners and managers 
of any organisation. They pointed out that an owner is in a position to both manage a firm and 
delegate the management of the business in order to maximise profits. The manager, however, 
only operates a firm presumably for the benefit of the owners.  
 
However, Berle and Means suggested that, in reality, the major aim of the manager is more 
likely to run the company for his ‘personal profits’. Their argument was supported recently by 
Bebchuk and Fried who maintained that agents, may it be the CEO or other board executives, 
are primarily concerned with maximising their own personal outcomes and that ‘[w]hen they 
can get away with it, managers like to have their cake and eat it too; they prefer to receive a 
given amount of monetary compensation without cutting managerial slack’ (Bebchuk and Fried 
2004 p63, cited in O’Neil 2007). 
 
Further, Davis et al (1997 p22) noted that within the agency framework agents often try to 
attain as much utility with the least possible effort and risk. Williamson (1975) termed such a 
phenomenon ‘opportunism’ whereby people act with ‘self-interest and guile in pursuing their 
own goals’. Short (2000) confirmed this, stating that the agent’s private benefit of control leads 
to empire building perquisites, entrenchment and biased decision making. The agent may also 
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engage in philanthropic or ethically motivated behaviour with respect to stakeholders, which 
may not be in the best interests of the shareholders (Hendry 2002). Similarly, according to 
Sapienza et al (2000) problems associated with agency are exacerbated because of the interests 
of the principals and the agents are in conflict (‘goal conflict’) and because of ‘information 
asymmetry’ between the two parties. 
 
With the underlying assumptions set out above in mind - especially if an emphasis was to be 
placed on the one highlighting the ‘lack of congruence’ (Fama and Jensen 1983; Fama 1980) 
between the goals of principals and agents - it is not difficult to understand that tension can 
easily emerge between principals and agents, i.e. shareholders and management in a corporate 
context.  
 
The next section will discuss central issues surrounding the principal-agent relationship 
proposed by the theory. 
 
2.2.1.3 Central problems with agency theory 
 
Simply put, ‘the language employed by agency theory pertains to the situation - one that is 
basic to the structure of all organisations - in which one party, the principal, seeks to achieve 
some outcome but requires the assistance of another (the ‘agent’) to carry out a necessary 
activity’ (Scott 1998, cited in Duztas 2008 p30). This liaison between the two parties is 
commonly known as the ‘agency relationship’ and it has been defined as, ‘...a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involved delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent.’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976 p5).  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that many of the most widely examined agency problems stem 
from the separation of ownership and control: 
 
• ‘Agency problems occur whenever the principal delegates authority to the agent, and 
the welfare of the principal is affected by the choices of the agent.’ (Arrow 1985, cited 
in Barney and Hesterly 1996 p124) 
• The delegation of decision making authority from the principal to the agent is 
problematic (Barney and Hesterly 1996) 
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• Conflicts arise when there is a separation of ownership and control and when agents 
and principals have different attitude and preference toward risk (Jensen 1986). 
 
There are, in general, three main sources of principal-agent problems that are faced by almost 
all large modern corporations (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973; Arrow 1985; Rothschild and Stiglitz 
1976), namely: 
 
• Moral hazard 
• Adverse selection 
• Asymmetric information.  
 
Broadly, the central dilemma that has been subjected to much investigation by agency theorists 
in a management context is how to align the interests of senior executives to those of 
shareholders, as evidence tends to suggest that alignment can and does play a major role in 
alleviating the underlying agency problems. However, there are a number of apparent 
hindrances that make the alignment of interests between the principals and the agents rather 
difficult to achieve in practice.  
 
Firstly, as pointed out earlier, agents are more likely to be seeking to maximise personal 
returns, because their behaviour is largely driven by rational self-interest, risk-aversion and 
effort-aversion (Eisenhardt 1989; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). And more 
than that, they also have an information advantage over the principals and divergent goals or 
interests which in effect makes the task of getting the agents to act and behave in the best 
interests of the principals all the more difficult.  
 
While attempting to reduce the probability of opportunistic agent behaviour incongruent with 
their own goals and to better align their interests with those of the agents, principals inevitably 
incur ‘agency costs’ (Barney and Hesterly 1996). Agency theory divides such costs into 
structuring costs, monitoring costs, and costs of bonding a set of contracts (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; McColgan 2001) and they are largely borne by the 
principals.  
 
Furthermore, it is widely recognised that many monitoring and control procedures, such as the 
use of contracts and the setting up of mechanisms and systems to observe and measure the 
behaviour of agents, can be relatively costly; yet since they are considered as necessary to align 
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the actions of the managers with their own (Jensen 1994) principals often have little choice but 
to bear the costs and put the required procedures in place. Accordingly, the ultimate challenge 
with which the principals are faced is not just to attain optimal alignment but also to achieve it 
in the most cost effective manner. 
 
2.2.1.4 Criticisms of agency theory 
 
The central problems and concerns that lie within a principal-agent relationship have been 
subject to much scrutiny over the years. One of the most widely criticised aspects of agency 
theory is its assumption that agents are invariably intrinsically opportunistic and selfish which 
has been questioned by, for example, stewardship theorists, who posit that executives, if left 
alone, will manage responsibly the assets that have been placed under their care.  
 
Expectancy and goal setting theorists would argue that senior executives are not motivated 
purely by extrinsic rewards such as money, benefits and perquisites, so it is futile for agency 
theorists to advocate incentive pay quite so strongly. Motivational theorists believe that 
monetary reward alone is not enough to align interests. Other factors such as work 
environment prestige, status, the company's reputation and organisational culture all affect 
motivation. 
 
According to managerial power theorists, Bebchuk and Fried (2006) in particular, the use of a 
compensation contract and share incentives is often ineffective because senior executives tend 
to have the power to influence others by way of manipulating their own remuneration to suit 
their personal preferences.  
 
A recent study by Pepper et al (2012 p1) also found long term incentives plans not to have met 
expectations and argued that agency theory, in its current form, ‘does not provide a sound 
basis for modelling senior executive reward’ and proposed that a re-theorising is necessary and 
should build on the behavioural agency model as suggested by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 
(1998). These findings and arguments are highly relevant to the present study, thus, managerial 
power theory, which will be described and explained in later in Section 2.2.2, is to form a 
significant part of the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
In addition, as identified by Huse (2007) many scholars have directed their criticism at the 
‘wrong focus of agency theory’ as illustrated in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Criticisms of agency theory 
Theorists Criticism 
Process Not addressing the processes 
Transaction cost Not addressing governance mechanisms 
Game Focusing on only one direction of the agency relationship 
Source: Huse (2007 p50) 
 
Another area in which agency theory has been questioned is that it makes erroneous 
assumptions, something that has partly been considered earlier. The commonest criticism 
concerning agency theory’s incorrect assumptions include the following (Huse 2007 p50): 
 
• Human behaviour - opportunism versus altruism 
• Shareholder value supremacy 
• Separation of ownership and control versus paternalism and role integration 
• Time perspective and discrete contracts (relational norms). 
 
Similarly, as pointed out by Tricker (2009) many critics have challenged the over simplistic 
nature of agency theory:  
 
‘Some critics of agency theory cite its relatively narrow theoretical scope. To study the 
intricacies of corporate governance in terms of contracts between principals and agents, they 
argue, is naïve…Such critics believe that board behaviour does not consist of sets of contractual 
relationships, but is influenced by inter personal behaviour, group dynamics, and political 
intrigue. They question whether the subtle and complex dynamics of board behaviour lend 
themselves to measurement and numerical analysis.’ (Tricker 2009 p222). 
 
Moreover, a number of academics have gone even further and argued that agency theory has 
impacted society in a negative way. For example, Ghoshal (2005) suggested that our societies 
are ‘less well off’ as a result of ‘bad management theories’ such as agency. In addition, Ghoshal 
also claimed that many poor management practices were born out of the extreme underlying 
assumptions in agency theory which, in turn produced dysfunctional companies. He even boldly 
blamed agency theory for being one of the key causes of some of the major corporate debacles 
(e.g. Enron and Andersen).  
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Despite all the criticisms, agency theory is still widely used today in not only corporate 
governance and pay research, but also many other disciplines. But why is this the case? An 
attempt to answer this question will be presented later in Chapter 5. The justifications for this 
study to employ this theory will also be discussed. 
 
2.2.1.5 Responding to agency problems 
 
The causes and effects brought about by agency theories do not only attract the attention and 
interest of shareholders and practitioners, but also those of academics. Hence, a vast amount of 
research has already been conducted into the area of agency conflicts. Differing researchers 
have identified and subsequently argued over the effectiveness of the various ways (by means 
of controls and mechanisms) that may help mitigating agency costs and aligning the interests of 
managers with those of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Jensen 1986; Himmelberg et al 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, there is a consensus that organisations and shareholders have to take steps to 
exercise control over management so as to alleviate the agency problems. Seven main classes 
of control have been identified by McColgan in 2001 upon gathering the key findings from some 
of the major published papers and are presented in Table 7 overleaf. 
 
Undoubtedly, each and every one of the above controls for countering the problem of agency 
does have its own merits. Yet, in the present study, emphasis is placed on the two specific 
recommendations that have recently been subjected to much scrutiny by policy makers, 
investors, the public at large and above all, the media:  
 
• Board structure, attributes and roles, and 
• Executive pay. 
 
Particular attention is given to the use of incentives and to the improvements in the corporate 
governance processes respectively. The research findings from the literature on these two 
areas are examined later in this chapter (Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), following a discussion on 
managerial power theory. 
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Table 7 Controls on agency problems 
 
 
 
 
  Mechanism Theory Empirical Evidence 
1 Managerial 
Labour 
Market 
Managerial labour markets will discipline 
poorly performing management through salary 
revisions (Fama 1980). 
External labour markets use evidence on past 
performance in defining executive job 
opportunities and compensation levels (Gilson 
1989). 
2 Corporate 
Boards 
Boards should split the positions of CEO and 
chairman to improve monitoring and prevent 
one individual dominating the board (Cadbury 
1992).Effective boards should be largely 
comprised of outside independent directors to 
ensure better monitoring of management 
(Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 
Boards are less effective as they grow in size as 
decision making becomes slower and the CEO 
is able to dominate with greater ease (Jensen 
1993). 
CEOs are more likely to be removed for poor 
performance on outsider dominated boards 
(Weisbach 1988). 
 
Performance related top management 
turnover is strongly related to the proportion 
of outside directors on the company”s board 
but negatively related to board size (Dahya et 
al 2000). 
 
Market reaction to appointment of outsiders 
depends upon the extent of company”s agency 
problems and the characteristics of the 
appointee (Lin et al 2000). 
3 Corporate 
Financial 
Policy 
Monitoring from external capital markets 
when issuing debt reduces agency problems 
(Easterbrook 1984). 
 
4 Blockholders 
and 
Institutional 
Investors 
Different types of blockholders perform 
different functions within organisations 
(Bethel et al 1998).  
Greater need for distinction between different 
types of block investors (Mehran 1995). 
Positive market reaction to the appointment of 
an affiliated outsider (including those from 
blockholders) to the board (Lin et al 2000). 
Only activist investors discipline management 
in poorly performing companies (Bethel et al 
1998). 
5 The Market 
for Corporate 
Control 
Threat of takeover not enough to ensure 
complete alignment between managerial goals 
and shareholder wealth because of takeover 
costs (Jensen and Ruback 1983). 
 
6 Executive 
Compensation 
Higher managerial incentives lead to higher 
corporate performance (Jensen and Meckling 
1976).  
Equilibrium in managerial labour markets will 
prevent large salary revisions for poorly 
performing managers (Jensen and Murphy 
1990). 
At some point managers will yield to 
behavioural notions of fairness and loyalty in 
their decision making and not be driven by 
financial incentives alone (Baker et al 1988). 
The level of pay determines where managers 
work, the structure of their compensation 
contracts will determine how hard they work 
(Baker et al 1988). 
For every $1,000 change in shareholder 
wealth, CEO salary changes by 2 cents (Jensen 
and Murphy 1990). 
Higher accounting earnings in year prior to 
removal of CEO (Weisbach 1988). 
 
 
CEO remuneration significantly changed by 75 
cents for every $1,000 change in firm value 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990). 
7 Managerial 
Share 
Ownership 
As managerial share ownership increases so 
does their incentive to maximise company 
value (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Significant relationship between changes in 
shareholder wealth and the value of executive 
shareholdings (Benston 1985; Jensen and 
Murphy 1990). 
Source: McColgan (2001) 
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2.2.2 Managerial power theory 
 
The extant literature on Managerial Power Theory has investigated compensation decisions 
largely from the point of view of a board of directors that seeks to establish optimal executive 
contracts in order to mitigate agency conflicts and reduce related costs (refer to Section 
2.2.1.3). However, Hengartner (2006) noted that a growing body of research posits that the 
process of pay determination is in many ways better described as a negotiation between the 
board and top management, the CEO in particular. It is further argued that the power of 
executives to influence the board and other stakeholders provides an explanation for the lack 
of positive and consistent results in research into the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices, executive pay in particular. For instance, as cited in Hengartner (2006 p66): 
 
• Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) modelled a bargaining game in which the CEO pay is 
negotiated between the two parties. 
• Bebchuk et al (2001) postulated that the CEO’s power over the board of directors 
distorts optimal compensation contracts and that the existing empirical evidence 
better supports the bargaining model than the optimal contracting paradigm. 
• Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997 p320) suggested that ‘executive pay is a compromise 
between CEO power to inflate their compensation and societal pressures on boards to 
limit CEO pay.’ 
 
Moreover, managerial power is in fact at the heart of agency theory (Fama 1980; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) in that, for example, the ‘information asymmetry’ problem recognised by 
agency theorist (see Section 2.2.1.2) stems essentially from the imbalance of power between 
shareholders and the senior executive team. Given all the above, it is evident that managerial 
power theory deserves more attention in research into corporate governance and executive 
pay. Yet, empirical literature on power is scarce and has so far yielded ambiguous results 
(Hengartner 2006). There are a few reasons found in the literature: 
 
• There is insufficient operationalisation of power variables (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-
Mejia 2002) and better constructs and operationalisation of variables are necessary to 
capture the full picture of how more powerful CEOs, as opposed to less powerful ones, 
manage to influence the board. 
• A valid construct measuring cross-sectional differences in managerial power and its 
influence on compensation is still missing (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). 
• ‘Management power is hard to prove’ (Bratton 2005 p18). 
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A broader conceptualisation of power in the context of executive compensation was called for 
as early as the mid-1990s (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996), however, it seem that the call is still 
unanswered. 
 
Nevertheless, an overview of managerial power theory should prove useful as the focus of the 
present study in executive pay , and as mentioned above, there has been an increasing amount 
of support for a managerial power explanation of executive pay and why pay is often high and 
non-performance related (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997). 
 
2.2.2.1 Defining executive power in the context of corporate governance 
 
One reason that there is little research into the question of executive power is that there is 
currently no widely agreed definition of power itself (Hardy and Clegg 1999). However, some 
researchers into management have drawn a distinction between legitimate power and 
illegitimate power (Hengartner 2006). 
 
Hardy and Clegg, for example, hold that legitimate power arises from the organisation’s 
hierarchical structure and is about the relationship of the offices to each other (Hardy and Clegg 
1999). As far as boards of directors are concerned, corporate structure clearly grants formal 
power to the board over its executives, because it is the board’s prerogative to hire and fire the 
top management team. As this relationship is virtually inevitable, researchers have looked 
elsewhere at ‘illegitimate’ power - that is power that is exercised outside of the formal 
organisational structure. One result of this is that researchers have tended to view the exercise 
of power as being synonymous with selfish behaviour. 
 
There are two power theories that focus on dependencies arising within the organisation 
(Hengartner 2006 p67). ‘Strategic contingency theory of intra-organizational power’ (Hickson et 
al 1971) is based on the premise that power is related to the control of uncertainty. In this 
theory, the most powerful sub-units in the organisation are those that are least dependent on 
other sub-units and hence are able to deal with the greatest level of uncertainty. A second 
view, similar to the strategic contingency idea, is the resource dependency view (Hardy and 
Clegg 1999). In this view, ‘power stems from information, uncertainty, expertise, credibility, 
stature and prestige, access to and contacts with higher status personnel and the control of 
money, rewards and sanctions’ (French and Raven 1986; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995, cited in 
Hengartner 2006 p68). However, each of the factors listed can become more or less important 
as resources, depending on their context. 
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One feature that these theories have in common is that they provide a better understanding of 
how and why executives can become more powerful that their own boards. Executives, for 
example, may possess an advantage in terms of information or in having greater tolerance for 
uncertainty. 
 
Of the various definitions proposed, the following definitions of power are used in the present 
study as they suit the governance and pay context of the research: 
 
• Pfeffer (1980 p32) defines power as the ‘capability of one social actor to overcome 
resistance in achieving a desired objective or result’. 
• Finkelstein (1992 p506) refers to power as ‘the capacity of individual actors to exert 
their will’. 
 
These definitions are also used by Hengartner (2006). In his paper (2006 p75), Hengartner 
developed a framework that captures the different types of power that are related to 
governance and executive pay: 
 
• Ownership power 
- Executive ownership 
- Non-executive ownership 
- Shareholder concentration. 
 
• Structural power 
- Non-executive directors 
- Independent directors 
- CEO duality 
- Compensation committee 
- Board size.  
 
• Tenure power 
- CEO tenure 
- Interdependent directors. 
 
• Network power 
- Interlocking directors 
- Outside board memberships. 
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• Credibility power 
- Prior performance 
- CEO celebrity status 
- Education. 
 
2.2.2.2 Background to managerial power theory and pay 
 
The managerial power model begins by recognising the agency conflicts inherent in the 
relationship between shareholders and those they appoint to manage their assets and posits 
that executive pay is part of the agency problem as opposed to a potential instrument for 
addressing the issue: ‘…this [managerial power] approach… does not view executive pay 
primarily as a remedy for agency problem; on the contrary, the pay-setting process is itself seen 
as a major part of the problem.’ (Bebchuk and Fried 2004 p61). As explained by Hengartner 
(2006 p67), ‘…some features of pay arrangements reflect managerial rent-seeking rather than 
the provision of efficient incentives.’. The fact that surveys and studies ‘report huge 
(unexplained) variance in salary, bonuses and long term income of executives for companies of 
similar size, in the same industry, and performance at similar levels’ is considered by 
managerialists as an illustration of such argument (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997, cited in 
Hengartner 2006 p67). 
 
Further, Bebchuk and Fried (2006 p62) also pointed out that the managerial power approach 
does not ‘assume that the board focuses solely on shareholders' interests when negotiating 
executive pay arrangements…’, indicating that board decisions could be influenced by executive 
power. Simply put, it is conjectured that if the agent (i.e. top management) acquires growing 
influence over those who are charged with the responsibility for the pay determination process 
(i.e. the remuneration committee members as the agents of shareholders), the design and 
arrangements of the service contract might reflect management’s preferences which may lead 
to shareholder wealth creation being compromised (Zajac and Westphal 1996a; Grabke-Rundell 
and Gomez-Mejia 2002; Hengartner 2006).  
 
To this end, managerialists have made a number of predictions about executive behaviour that 
is not constrained by shareholders or the board in attempting to explain why executives tend to 
act against proactively linking pay and performance (Weisbach 2007). For instance, executives 
are considered to be risk averse, an assumption that is shared by agency theorists, and may in 
effect decouple their remuneration from company performance and move the balance of the 
pay package towards components that are not at risk such as base salary (Dyl 1998). Another 
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example is that executives are found to be less likely to be fired, even if the firm’s performance 
does drop (Salancik and Pfeffer 1980).  
 
It is important to note that this concept of power is close to what finance scholars refer to as 
‘managerial entrenchment’. The difference between the two viewpoints has been concisely 
explained by Hengartner (2006 p73), ‘…executive pay itself is used as a governance mechanism 
determining the level of entrenchment…while executive power is a construct hypothesized to 
influence compensation level and structure, managerial entrenchment is a construct that 
includes compensation structure to explain other firm-level outcomes.’ 
 
Another hypothesis of managerial power theory is that even if the board is highly capable and 
effective, and if all the non-executives strive to carry out their duties with good intentions, 
without adopting self-serving behaviour, there are still limitations to the extent to which they 
can fulfil their role (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). There are factors beyond their control. And the 
presence of these factors (as outlined in Section 2.2.2.3 below) coupled with executive power 
may help explain why executives often escape the sanction of the full range of corporate 
governance and control mechanisms, including monitoring by the board and the threat of 
dismissal.  
 
2.2.2.3 The effects of managerial power on governance mechanisms  
 
Insufficient information 
In many cases, the board may simply not be in possession of sufficient information for 
them to appreciate exactly what actions the executives are taking and exactly why they are 
taking them. As mentioned previously, this ‘information asymmetry’, an idea stemmed 
from agency theory, effectively keeps the executives’ decisions cloaked in secrecy, as far as 
the board, shareholders and other stakeholders are concerned (Huse 2007). It would, for 
example, be possible for executives to decide to cut investment in Research and 
Development. Such cuts would have a beneficial effect on the profits figure in the short 
term, but might equally be handicapping the company’s ability to remain competitive in the 
long term, by which time, the current management will have moved on (Hill and Hansen 
1989). 
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Managerial power theorists consider that having the ‘privilege’ of being in the know and 
holding information invaluable to the overall control and operation of the company, 
enables executives (the CEO in particular) to have the upper hand over the board. In other 
words, information is power.  
 
Growth and investment opportunities 
As discussed previously, there is a relatively high degree of information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders in modern corporations - a feature that is aggravated in companies 
that are growing in size because it is more difficult to observe managerial effort in ‘growth 
firms’ as they that are changing in prospect and directions (Smith and Watts 1992). As a result, 
there is greater potential for managerial opportunism.  
 
In addition, growth companies tend to select compensation packages based on incentive rather 
than fixed compensation at least in part because of the difficulties of monitoring investment 
opportunities. Research in this area has shown that the level and kind of executive 
compensation vary with the investment opportunity set of the firm. Smith and Watts (1992) 
and Gaver and Gaver (1993 and 1995) found that companies with more growth options have 
higher executive compensation (Hengartner 2006 p31). 
 
Fragmented share ownership 
 In many companies, the share ownership is fragmented and held by many investors, who are 
geographically isolated, so it is difficult for them to concert their action, and make a common 
cause to bring the board to order. As well as being separated by distance, each shareholder 
may have only relatively small investments at stake and so does not have a compelling motive 
to take serious action. 
 
Market forces 
Bebchuk (1992 p1461-1467) observed that, although market forces can correct some aspects of 
agency problems in relation to executive decisions, it is not always an effective deterrent. ‘In 
particular, market mechanisms cannot deter managers from exploiting opportunities to take 
significantly redistributive actions - actions that transfer to managers value that is not much 
smaller than the resulting loss to shareholders. In such cases, the benefits a manager reaps by 
taking the action is likely to exceed the penalty the markets might impose on him or her for the 
resulting share price decline.’.  
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Similarly, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) reiterated that while market forces do place certain 
constraints on executive compensation, they are in general inadequate to align these interests, 
‘these constraints [placed by market forces], however, are far from tight enough to ensure that 
compensation arrangements do not substantially deviate from what arm’s-length contracting 
would produce.’ (Bebchuk and Fried 2004 p53). The authors also pointed out that the market 
for corporate control is seen as important in aligning the interests of executives and 
shareholders simply because a company that performs poorly, and whose share price declines, 
thus becomes vulnerable to takeover. The existing board’s jobs would be at stake in such a 
situation.  
 
If market competition for control does not impose discipline on executives, what about the 
market for capital? Surely, a board that wishes to go to the public to raise additional capital 
must be seen to be conforming to accepted standards and norms of corporate governance 
when it comes to compensation? To depart significantly from pay arrangements that would be 
arrived at by arm’s-length contracts would deter potential investors. However, the literature 
suggests that most companies go to the equity market to raise capital very rarely, if at all. 
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2004 p56), the primary source of capital for public companies 
is retained earnings, with debt and equity coming second and third respectively. 
 
Outside connections and the external labour market 
As mentioned above, some managerialists have expanded the definition of ‘power’ to include 
executives’ social network. The kind of networks developed by the CEO include people from 
their education and past employment but also other social activities such as golf clubs and 
charities. According to managerial power theory, this wider social network often gives the CEO 
the power to influence their board and increases their ability to negotiate a more favourable 
pay deal for themselves (Barnea and Guedj 2006, Larcker et al 2006; Horton et al 2009).  
 
Brown et al investigated the impact that a CEO’s networking has on their own compensation in 
2009 and demonstrated that ‘the size of the CEO network is positively related to the level of 
CEO compensation and inversely related to its pay-performance sensitivity.’. This finding 
echoed an earlier study by Muth and Donaldson (1998), who also found that boards whose 
executive directors were well connected performed better than firms that followed codes of 
corporate governance on the use of independent directors.  
 
In addition, researchers have pointed out another significant benefit of having a larger social 
network that equips executives with even greater power. And this power comes from the 
2. Literature review 
72 
 
external labour market. Put simply, it is recognised that one of the most powerful tools held by 
any executive is the threat to resign or to withdraw their services temporarily (Jensen and Zajac 
2004), and evidence suggests that the more external social ties one has, the more information 
about alternative positions and vacancies one is likely to receive, and thus the higher the 
chances of obtaining a new job or securing a better contract with the current employer through 
the threat of resignation (Wegener 1991 and Brown et al 2009). 
 
Personality traits 
Individual personality traits are rarely taken into account when considering how executives will 
respond to their remuneration package (Hengartner 2006). In fact, individual differences may 
well be an important factor in designing compensation. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1989), for 
example, found that individuals with a low risk propensity and a low tolerance for ambiguity do 
not react well to packages that are based on variable arrangements such as bonuses and long 
term incentives. If an executive is highly risk averse and strongly prefers certainty then 
providing compensation based on risk may well be counter-productive when it comes to 
making strategic decisions, to the detriment of the company’s performance. As personal 
information, such as degree of tolerance to risk, is rarely available and is difficult to measure, 
little attention has therefore been paid to these factors in past research (Hengartner 2006). 
 
A review of past research on corporate governance is presented next. 
 
2.3 Corporate governance research 
 
This section discusses the findings of past corporate governance research that focused primarily 
on internal mechanisms and is organised into two parts: the first reviews studies that examined 
board structure and attributes while the second considers the extensive literature on executive 
pay. 
 
2.3.1 Expectations of structural governance mechanisms 
 
The UK corporate governance model places significant emphasis on internal mechanisms. The 
guidelines typically offer recommendations on ‘appropriate board structures and processes that 
protect the interests of the owners, and reconcile them with those of management and other 
stakeholders, including the communities within which they operate.’ (Ho 2005 p213). The 
importance of the board is recognised by academics, too, and is often viewed as the principal 
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governance structure for shareholders in public companies (Romano 1996). As Brennan put it, 
‘The board of directors is the official first line of defence against managers who would act 
contrary to shareholders’ interests.’ (Brennan 2006 p579). 
 
In general, it is perceived that the performance of the board’s oversight responsibilities 
depends on the effectiveness and performance of the board itself, which in turn is influenced 
by factors such as board composition and quality, size of boards, duality of CEO/chairman 
positions, board diversity, information asymmetries and board culture (Ho 2005; Cravens and 
Wallace 2001; Brennan 2006). Simply, it is expected that having these governance structural 
drivers in place to improve the board monitoring function will foster good corporate 
governance.  
 
A summary of the findings of research into the quality of governance practices will be 
presented next. 
 
2.3.1.1 Literature on board structure and attributes 
 
The literature on corporate governance has become extensive over the past 30 years and has 
focused not only on control through compensation, but also through board controls (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Ross 1973) including: 
 
• The narrowing of alternative actions through monitoring by the board of directors, i.e. 
reduction of power and discretion (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1983).  
• The strengthening of the governance structure of organisations whereby board of 
directors keep potentially self-serving managers in check by performing audits and 
performance evaluations (Fama and Jensen 1983a).  
• Rebalancing the composition of the board to include at least some outside directors to 
monitor the performance of the CEO and other managers (Mizruchi 1983; Baysinger 
and Hoskisson 1990).  
 
A significant proportion of the more recent research has examined the connection between the 
board and company performance, many of which directly analysed the impact of the various 
board attributes such as:  
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• Board size (Eisenberg et al 1998) 
• Board independence (Bhagat and Black 1999, 2002) 
• Board structure (Fosberg and Nelson 1999; Dedman 2002) 
• CEO’s role (Finkelstein and Boyd 1998; Sander 2001) 
• CEO duality (Gray and Canella 1997; Conyon and Peck 1998; Ryan and Wiggins 2001) 
• Composition of board (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Dalton et al 1998; Rhoades et al 
2000; Barnhart and Rosenstein 1998; Wagner et al 1998; Beatty and Zajac 1994). 
 
However, ‘given the importance of the subject and the level of research activity’, as noted by 
Nicholson and Kiel (2007 p585). ‘it would seem reasonable to expect that a clear and 
demonstrable link between the board and corporate performance has been established’. In 
reality, though, ‘despite a sustained effort…researchers have so far failed to identify this link.’ 
(p585). This observation is clearly based on the fact that none of the studies listed above 
actually produced any positive findings. Rather, the majority showed no correlation at all or a 
small yet conflicting link. Worse still, an analysis conducted by Donaldson and Davis (1994) 
suggests that certain roles have a negative rather than positive effect on performance and that 
adoption of non-executive dominated boards might have negative effects on corporate profit 
and shareholder returns. Similarly, a number of other studies find that the presence of 
independent directors may actually harm performance suggesting that they do not bring the 
requisite skills to the job (Yermack 1996; Bhagat and Black 1998; Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; 
Weir and Laing 1999). One could argue that although it is highly important for a board to have a 
fair independent director representation, it is equally important to have sufficient executive 
directors of the necessary experience and credentials available to run the company effectively.  
 
More recently, Brennan (2006) reviewed another set of research where academics have 
examined the relationship between board attributes (such as independence) and those 
corporate activities thought to impact on shareholder wealth: 
 
• Board structure and CEO compensation (Fosberg 1999) 
• Board structure and corporate diversification (Hill and Snell 1988; Baysinger and 
Hoskisson 1990) 
• Board structure and the adoption of takeover defences such as poison pills (Brickley et 
al 1994; Coles and Hesterly 2000) 
• Board structure and the use of long term incentives (Zajac and Westphal 1994). 
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Once again, despite years of reforms, it is disappointing to find that mainly negative results 
have been reported. In many cases, researchers have been ‘. . . unable to identify any 
correlation at all’ (Brennan 2006 p582). There were only few exceptions where positive results 
have been observed: a study carried out by Pearce and Zahra in 1991 reported a positive link 
between company performance and outsider ratios (executive directors vs non-executive 
directors). And there is some evidence that compliance with the Cadbury recommendations 
enhances board oversight with respect to the manipulation of accounting numbers and the 
discipline of the top executive (Dedman 2002). However, on the whole, the results have not 
been encouraging. 
 
In addition, another set of research based on theoretical studies has been carried out during 
the last decade (Brennan 2006). Researchers examined the effectiveness of various internal 
structural drivers and attempted to establish a link between corporate governance and 
company performance - but to no avail. A considerable number of conceptual models 
discussing the causal relationships between the two variables have been produced (Ho 2005 
p213): 
 
• The behavioural agency model (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998) 
• The finance model (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Demirag et al 1998) 
• The participative model (Collier and Esteban 1999) 
• The policy governance model (Carver 1999) 
• The political model (Pound 1992; Schwab and Thomas 1998) 
• The stakeholder model (Buchholz 1992; Donaldson and Preston 1995) 
• The stewardship model (Tricker 1994; Davis et al 1997; Keasey and Wright 1997) 
• The strategic leadership model (Simons 1995; Charan 1998; Davies 1999; Forbes et al 
1999). 
 
Overall, there has been widespread hope that a well-structured board would lead to improved 
company performance and shareholder wealth. As summed up by Brennan (2006 p582), ‘if 
boards are effective their actions should be consistent with maximising value to shareholders’.  
 
Due to this widely held assumption, governance codes often place much focus on the board as 
a key monitoring function. However, to date, theoretical and empirical research into corporate 
governance practices and their impact has not produced uniform or conclusive results in this 
regard. Why is this the case? Can corporate governance effectiveness really lead to superior 
company performance? If so, why then have research results been largely inconclusive or even 
negative in certain cases?  
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2.3.1.2 Board structure research outcomes - why the lack of positive results? 
 
While the literature contributes somewhat to one’s understanding of the various board 
attributes and board roles as internal governance mechanisms, the link between corporate 
governance and company performance in general remains elusive. Not only does the more 
ambitious general assumption - ‘good corporate governance promotes superior company 
performance’ appear to hold little truth or be false, but more than that, one could even 
question the validity of the widely accepted notion of - ‘good corporate governance enhances 
board effectiveness’. With so many questions and doubts still remaining, it is particularly 
important to explore the reasons why corporate governance (best practice recommendations 
and guidelines) does not seem to enhance company performance as expected, and to seek 
some potential solutions. 
 
Holistic research approach  
Nicholson and Kiel’s (2007) review of traditional board-performance and more recent board-
behaviour studies offers a potential explanation as to why there is as yet no solid evidence 
showing a positive link between board attributes and company performance. They argue that it 
is important to ‘understand the processes that link the board of directors to [company] 
performance’, instead of merely seeking evidence for ‘a parsimonious relationship (such as 
simple correlation) between the two’ (p586). They look at the whole process thought to link 
boards to company performance by examining three key paradigms that guide corporate 
governance research; agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory 
(p586). They find that there is no single universal theory applicable to the board-performance 
relationship, an indication that future research into the three areas should concentrate on 
identifying the conditions necessary for each theory to hold true. In terms of research agenda, it 
may be more productive to devise theoretical models along more integrative lines, to get a 
holistic view of the link between board of directors and company performance link (p604). Their 
research also indicates that boards need to make sure they are acting to fulfil the wishes of its 
shareholders and that defects in performance can arise because the board does not fully 
understanding what the company's owners require of it. Their recommendation is a clear 
specification of what constitutes corporate performance (p603).  
 
Similarly, Ho (2005) supports the idea of adopting a holistic approach. He says that many past 
studies have gauged the effectiveness of corporate governance mainly by measures of 
performance and that this approach cannot completely reflect a company’s competitiveness. 
Instead, he claims that taking the holistic approach he recommends has successfully established 
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a positive link between company competitiveness and board attributes. Ho’s research also 
demonstrates that there is no one-size-fits-all model of corporate governance (p248).  
 
Non-executive directors vs strategic management  
Non-executive directors are often expected to protect shareholders’ interests while the day-to-
day running of the company and driving of business performance is widely regarded as the duty 
of executives. Pye (2002) has a different view. He argues that if non-executives had a greater 
role in the operation of the business, the likelihood of achieving an effective board, shareholder 
alignment and a more desirable and protected environment might increase, which in turn 
would improve company performance.  
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) are also advocates of involving non-executives in strategy 
formation. They back their views by noting that non-executives already have (also are 
competent in) the strategic task of monitoring top management, being involved in such issues 
as executive succession, executive compensation and take-over defences. Hence they believe 
that in addition to managerial monitoring, non-executives also should be and would be 
competent at dealing with issues such as diversification, resource management and strategic 
change.  
 
Governance model: stakeholder model  
As the UK governance model is based on recommended internal governance mechanisms, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that given the opportunity companies will make optimal 
choices in relation to their internal governance structures. They also suggest that, with less 
freedom to choose, internal mechanisms will become increasingly homogeneous and this will 
make it more difficult to ascertain which of them are effective. Hence, they question the 
usefulness of having prescriptive internal governance mechanisms. Weir, Laing and McKnight 
(2002) found that widespread compliance with the Combined Code 1998 makes it difficult to 
assess the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms. They suggest greater flexibility and a 
recognition that the mix of governance mechanisms may vary according to a company's specific 
circumstances as a possible solution.  
 
If the internal mechanisms of board structure and board characteristics are not as effective as 
hoped, what about executive pay as a governance driver? Pay is the main focus of the present 
study and is also the issue that has attracted most attention from Government regulators, the 
media and the public. 
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2.3.2 Expectations of executive pay as governance mechanism 
 
It is evident from the extant governance literature that the misalignment of interests suggested 
by agency theory creates the need for monitoring through an effective board, service contracts 
and above all executive pay arrangements (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). 
To align the goals of the two parties, executive pay should be designed to sufficiently incentivise 
managers to make decisions that will not only increase their own wealth, but will also increase 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976.) For instance, Jensen (1994) stated clearly, 
‘Managerial decisions designed to strengthen organizations often meet with opposition from 
colleagues, employees... providing managers with incentives to compromise their decisions.’ It 
is also suggested that the best way to increase the chances of managers making the best 
decisions possible is to ensure that the incentives (‘trade-offs’) they face encourage them to 
move in the correct directions. Jensen then went on to say that overall, the goal of the agent is 
to increase shareholder wealth, which in turn should result in improved firm performance and 
value.  
 
Jensen’s view is shared by many others. According to Gibbons (1998), incentivisation is needed 
to compensate managers for taking risks that go far and beyond the remit of agreed terms and 
conditions of their employment or engagement in the successful pursuit of the principals’ 
interests. Thus, bonuses are seen as creating incentives for agents or managers to perform 
better than would normally be the case. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) went further 
and suggested specifically that the use of options in remuneration contracts aligns incentives 
between agents and principals. They also recommended that use of share incentives (‘equity 
ownership’) to tie the managers’ compensation to the level of the organisation's performance 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). In addition, Rediker and Seth (1995) also suggested that incentive 
alignment is an integral part of the governance mechanisms that ensure profit maximisation 
because it plays a major role in controlling moral hazard. 
 
The subject of remuneration forms an entire section of the UK’s corporate governance code 
(Corporate Governance Code 2010, Section D: Remuneration), indicating that it is seen as an 
important component of good governance, and an effective way to align interests and mitigate 
agency costs. Most attempts to reconcile the interests of the company’s owners and top 
management are structured not only around the ‘stick’ of monitoring through the board and 
regulation but also the ‘carrot’ of remuneration. While corporate governance seeks to curb self-
serving behaviour by executives, pay arrangements are used to motivate executives to improve 
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company performance. The findings of recent executive compensation research will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3.2.1 Literature on executive pay 
 
Executive compensation has long been a topic of much academic debate but it has certainly 
attracted considerable renewed attention in the light of recent corporate governance reforms 
(Baden-fuller 2002; Conyon and Peck 1998a; Veliyath 1999). The recent literature (Conyon and 
Leech 1994; Keasey et al 1993; Hallock and Murphy 1999; Tosi et al 2000; Thompson 2005) has 
largely focused on two issues as pointed out by O’Neil (2007 p692): ‘the overall levels of pay 
and the relationship between those amounts and company performance. The individual 
amounts of money involved are a regular subject of criticism in the business and general media; 
however, it is the lack of sensitivity of these amounts to financial performance and returns to 
shareholders that has been the major concern of academics.’ 
 
Following in the footsteps of the pioneering work by Jensen and Meckling (1976), many 
researchers have examined the causes and effects of the agency problem and the efficacy of 
executive pay in driving the desired performance (Veliyath 1999). In fact, this seminal article 
riveted not only the attention of academics but also that of policy makers and investors, for 
many of them have clearly drawn on the agency theoretical arguments to generate an 
extensive body of governance guidelines and codes (e.g. Greenbury Report 1995 and DRRR 
2002). However, although Jensen and Meckling’s contribution is widely recognised, empirical 
evidence in support of their arguments appears few and far between.  
 
While robust linkages between executive compensation and company performance have yet to 
be established, there is consistent evidence of company size being a variable that has major 
influence on directors’ remuneration (Benito and Conyon 1999; Conyon and Schwalbach 2000). 
Early studies such as Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Healy (1985), and Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) 
have all attempted to link executive pay to company size and profits, yet they have only 
managed to correlate pay with size and not performance. Subsequent research (Conyon et al 
2000; Carpenter and Sanders 2004; Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003; Indjejikian and Nanda 2002; 
Yermack 1996) has also confirmed the same positive relation with company size.  
 
Researchers continued to find the same positive pay-size relationship in the 1990s and 2000s 
(see Yermack 1995, Core et al 1999, Conyon et al 2000, Conyon and Murphy 2000; Tosi et al 
2000, Carpenter and Sanders 2002, Indjejikian and Nanda 2002, Anderson and Bizjak 2003, 
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Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003, Conyon and He 2004, Bonet and Conyon 2005). Below is a 
summary of the latest studies that reported size being an important influence on executive pay: 
 
United Kingdom 
 
• ‘The relationship between pay and performance remains weak and the link to firm size 
has, if anything been strengthened.’ (Girma et al 2007 p65) 
• ‘Company size, sales, has a significant and positive impact on the total compensation 
level.’ (Ozkan 2007 p25) 
• ‘Although performance has a positive impact on pay, firm size has a relatively larger 
impact.’ (Guest 2010 p1804) 
• ‘CEO cash pay shows a significantly positive association with size…’ (Ferri and Maber 
2008 p21) 
• ‘Our main findings are that firm size has a dominant effect in determining the level of 
executive compensation.’ (Gregg et al 2012 p27) 
• ‘The UK literature has found unanimously that company size is an important 
determinant of executive pay.’ (Gregory-Smith 2010 p49). 
 
Unite States 
 
• ‘…CEO’s pay will depend on both the size of his firm and the aggregate firm size in the 
market.’ (Gabaix and Landier 2008 p49) 
• ‘The firm size appears to be a significant explanatory variable for CEOs' cash and total 
compensation.’ (Nourayi and Mintz 2008 p524) 
• Armstrong et al (2010) analysed over 200 US companies, and they concluded that total 
annual pay level is most highly correlated with firm size (market capitalisation). 
 
United Kingdom and United States 
 
• Guay (2010 p12) also argued that ‘CEO pay increases with firm size’ in both the UK and 
the US which is again consistent with prior research. 
• Fernandes et al (2009, cited in Gregg et al 2012 p6) reported that the positive 
relationship between CEO pay and firm size documented in the US is pervasive across 
all countries, including the UK. 
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Yet, as noted earlier, after over half a century of executive compensation research, bolstered by 
repeated calls for methodological and theoretical rigour and pluralism, there still appears to be 
little consistent indication regarding the effects of directors pay on performance. To illustrate 
such inconsistency, some examples are presented below (see Appendix A for a summary of key 
executive pay studies since 1997, extracted directly from Devers et al 2007 p1044-1067): 
 
Pay-performance link 
• ‘The overall impression one gains from this vast body of work is that a link between 
executive pay (including stock option payoffs) and corporate performance does exist. 
However, the link is quite weak, statistically significant, but far from compelling’. 
(Stathopoulos et al 2005 p91, cited in Farmer2008 p2)  
• ‘So the question about the pay-performance link still remains unanswered.’ 
(Filatotchev et al 2007). 
 
Agency conflicts 
• A study by Lewellen et al (1987) demonstrates that compensation packages can, at 
least in some respects, be designed such that agency costs are somewhat reduced; 
whereas another similar but larger piece of research by Gaver et al produces rather 
contrasting results (1992). 
• Baker et al (1988) also suggest that the likelihood of service contracts ensuring 
complete coherence between executives’ decisions and shareholders wealth is not 
particularly high, with their argument being that ‘at some point management will yield 
to behavioural notions such as fairness, which do not enter into the agency 
framework’.  
 
Cash incentives 
• Banker, Lee and Potter (1996) find evidence that executive incentives, especially 
bonuses that have been designed with accounting-based performance conditions are 
more likely to provide a more effective mechanism for interest alignments between 
management and shareholders.  
• However, apart from reporting differing results, some researchers suggest that these 
bonus arrangements may lead to an over-focus on the performance targets attached to 
these incentive plans, resulting in executives neglecting other aspects of performance 
(Weisbach 1988; Dechow and Sloan 1991; O’Neill 2007). Brennan even (1994 and 
1995a) suggests that extrinsic rewards alone may not be sufficient to align interests 
between management and shareholders.  
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Share incentives 
• A number of researchers report evidence on positive reactions to the adoption of long 
term share-based incentives, suggesting such compensation arrangement being 
effective means of motivating management to act in their shareholders best interests 
(Larcker 1983; Brickley et al 1985; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). For instance, a study by 
Mehran shows a positive correlation between company value and proportion of CEOs 
total pay package which is based on share-based incentives (1995). These findings 
notwithstanding, there is literature that challenges the effectiveness of share 
incentives:  
- Conyon and Murphy (2000) argue that some research does appear to provide 
evidence of executive share incentives tying the wealth of management to their 
shareholders, but there is not sufficient evidence to show that such incentives 
can actually create or enhance shareholders value.  
- McColgan (2001) points out that that while shares options offer senior 
executives significant monetary incentives to improve performance, it seems 
also likely that they will reward non-performance or even failure during times of 
a bull market, such as that seen in the ‘dot com era’ in the late 1990s, which can 
be seen as problematic. Similarly, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001, cited in 
Buck et al 2003 p1704) suggest that ‘a proportion of total rewards based on 
share price has the potential to reduce agency problems, but introduces new 
ones: lucky executives may be rewarded when a firm’s share price rises in line 
with general capital market trends’. 
- Perkins and Hendry (2005) find evidence that executives with greater ownership 
and/or more share-based incentives are not more likely to take value-enhancing 
actions but are rather less likely to take value-destroying actions; in other words, 
managerial ownership may be a qualifier rather than a differentiator. 
- Pepper, Gore and Crossman (2012) suggest that long term incentive plans are an 
ineffective way to motivate senior executives. 
 
One reason suggested by researchers to explain this lack of positive results for the use of long 
term share incentives is that the share ownership and the level of incentives are ‘too low’ 
(Hengartner 2006). For example, Morck et al (1988) found that higher incentives lead to higher 
firm value, except among CEOs with very large fractional equity ownership. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) also presented evidence of a positive relationship between increases in 
ownership and firm performance as long as managerial ownership is less than 50 per cent 
(Hengartner 2006 p24). 
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Hall and Murphy (2002) suggested another explanation when they argued that share incentives 
are not an effective means of motivating or rewarding executives who are risk-averse. They say 
that rewarding these executives with shares could cost the company more than paying them in 
cash. This view is based on the assumption that an executive who is risk-averse cannot 
rebalance his share portfolio if its value increases, and so will discount this increase in value. 
 
Effects of managerial power 
Many researchers have taken the acquisition of power as being one important determinant of 
executive compensation, but power is rarely measured in empirical research to determine its 
effects on the level and mix of executive pay (Hengartner 2006). The inconsistency of empirical 
findings may suggest that further research into the hypothesis of executive power would yield 
valuable results. 
 
Some examples from the literature are set out below (Hengartner 2006 p71-72): 
 
• Lambert et al (1993) researched the effects of executive power in 303 organisations 
between 1982 and 1984 on the compensation of top managers. They define power as 
equity ownership and selection of board members. 
• Combs and Skill (2003) took founder status and CEO board tenure to derive a measure 
of executive power.  
• Most recently, Bebchuk and Fried (2003 and 2004) have re-kindled the discussion of 
the impact of management power on executive pay. As pointed out by Hengartner 
(2006 p72), ‘They [Bebchuk and Fried] argued that the more power a manager 
possesses, the greater the rents - benefits greater than those obtainable under true 
arm’s-length bargaining - in the pay package’. The authors say that there are four 
factors that contribute to the influence of managerial power over their pay. First, the 
board is weak because external directors may be either loyal to the CEO or dominated 
by him/her. Second, many companies do not have a large outside shareholder, who 
would exercise some influence over CEO pay. Third, similarly, some companies have 
fewer large institutional shareholders than others so there is no powerful outside 
influence over pay negotiations. Fourth, arrangements made to guard against 
takeovers mean most managers are protected from the discipline otherwise imposed 
by the market. However, while the authors contested that the surge in executive 
remuneration levels in the 1990s were due to the effects of managerial power, it is 
important to note that such propositions have not been tested cross-sectionally. 
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2.3.2.2 Executive pay in the UK 
 
The majority of executive pay research carried out over the past 50 years has been conducted 
in the US. Reasons for this US bias may include easier data accessibility in the US than the UK 
and the existence of bigger and more comprehensive US databases - for example the EDGAR 
database which stores all Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and is publicly accessible 
online. The US equivalent of the UK Annual Report (The SEC 10-K report) has always demanded 
far more detail and US companies also have to complete SEC form DEF14A which sets out line 
by line emolument tables for the top five earners, including share payments. 
 
Since the DRRR (2002) came into force, there has been a gradual increase in governance and 
pay studies that used UK data which has been more than welcome as not all of the findings 
from US research are entirely relevant to UK executive pay due to the differing levels and 
practices. For instance, UK directors’ pay has always tended to be significantly lower than their 
US counterparts. The use of long term incentives in the US, in particular, has been much more 
aggressive (see Table 8). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, UK companies were seen to be 
constantly trying to catch up with their US counterparts not only in terms of pay levels but also 
in terms of structure. Specifically, the UK made much effort to move away from fixed to variable 
pay both in the form of annual bonuses and long term incentives. More recently, it appears that 
the largest UK companies (i.e. the FTSE 30) have got a little closer to US pay levels but those 
lower down the index remain some way off. As a whole, UK pay levels are still somewhat lower 
than those of the US. However, it is evident that catching up with the US is no longer seen as 
either inevitable or desirable, especially during the recent period of economic duress and amid 
growing hostility towards executive pay. 
 
Table 8 Structure of CEO remuneration packages around the world 
Note: Companies with revenue between US$1 billion and US$3 billion 
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2009) 
Countries Base Salary (%) Cash Bonus (%) Long term Incentives 
(%) 
United States 23 17 60 
Brazil 27 41 23 
Germany 39 47 14 
United Kingdom 40 38 22 
France 44 25 31 
Ireland 44 43 13 
Hong Kong 51 19 30 
Netherlands 51 28 21 
Belgium  52 26 22 
Italy 52 29 19 
Japan  71 12 17 
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In general, UK research so far has also yielded rather contradictory results. For example, Gregg 
et al (1993) examined the pay and performance relationship using a sample of 288 large UK 
companies over an eight year period between 1983 and 1991. A weak pay-performance link 
was found until 1988 after which the link broke down became insignificant.  
 
One of the first studies to be completed in the UK that incorporated the values of executive 
option grants was that of Main, Bruce and Buck (1996). Although their sample was 
comparatively small (60 companies), they found evidence of a much stronger link between pay 
and performance. In support of this, Conyon et al (2000) also find a link between pay and 
performance. This study, however, only covers a period up to 1995, but uses two primary 
measures of performance: total shareholder return (defined as the return of an investor’s 
shareholding reflected in the company’s share price, assuming all dividends are reinvested) and 
earning per share (defined as the total profit after tax divided by the number of ordinary 
shares). While correlations are positive with regards to total shareholder return, no link exists 
between pay and earnings per share. Adding to the inconsistency, a more recent study by Buck 
et al (2003) shows that that there has been an apparent reduction in the performance 
sensitivity with regard to pay, indicating the effectiveness of either the incentive mechanism or 
the performance targets is still not adequate.  
 
Similarly, Pass (2003) finds evidence that a substantial proportion of post-Greenbury long term 
incentive plans have undemanding performance conditions and vesting schedules, rewarding 
for average performance rather than exceptional performance. It is also observed that even 
with the growth of performance conditions and the use of performance shares there has still 
been an increase in average total rewards to executives. However, the author concludes that it 
is hard to distinguish in such early studies any impact of the corporate governance reforms, as 
there is little information whether the companies studied had full implemented new 
governance recommendations into their pay strategies at the time.  
 
Following on from these early studies, Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2005) sampled companies in 
1997. These companies had the opportunity to incorporate best practice and yet still did not 
demonstrate the stronger links found by Main et al (1996). With little evidence in this study to 
link pay and performance, Conyon et al propose that the links vary with the structure of the 
option contract given to executives. In a further study of 510 CEOs in the fiscal year 1997/1998 
Conyon (2001) finds evidence of a positive relationship between performance and the effective 
ownership of share-based compensation by management. While differences in compensation 
levels are observed and links to performance in these studies are significant, some others offer 
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a word of caution that these may not be due to increased performance but could result from 
differences in firm size, growth opportunities, company financial policy, ownership 
characteristics, and other governance arrangements (Konstantinos et al 2004). 
  
Most recently, Ozkan (2007) presents results that show a significant and positive relation 
between CEO cash pay and performance which contrasts his previous findings in 2006. Girma et 
al (2007) studied the effect of the Cadbury reforms on the CEO pay for a sample of UK 
companies. Their results suggest that the relationship between pay and performance remained 
weak for their sample of firms over the period 1981-1996. Gregg et al (2012) examined the 
relationship between total cash compensation and performance between 1994 and 2006 
among UK senior executives, and reported that there is conflicting evidence as to whether the 
pay-performance link has weakened or strengthened over time. Pepper and his colleagues 
(2012) investigated the motivational effect of long term incentive plans and concluded they are 
in general not efficient and are often not highly valued by executives. 
 
All considered, the well-established mainstream conclusion is that due to the influence of 
numerous organisational and environmental contingencies that are outside the control of 
executives, the relationships between executives effort and outcomes are hugely difficult to 
ascertain (Rutherford et al 2007; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996); it is therefore not entirely 
surprising for most research to produce results that show a weak relation between pay and 
individual company performance (Baker et al 1988; Brennan 1994 and 1995; Erturk et al 2008; 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al 1987; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989; Tosi et 
al 2000). 
 
2.3.2.3 Executive pay research outcomes - why the lack of convergence? 
 
As established earlier, many of the recent studies in the UK and US attempted to find a link 
between: 
 
• Pay and performance 
• A corporate governance mechanism (such as board structure) and performance 
• Corporate governance and the pay-performance relationship. 
 
In general, there is a lack of consensus among past pay-performance studies and hence, one of 
the key tasks in researching this subject is to discover the reasons for this problem and to gain 
more insight that may help in developing a new approach. A number of possible causes for this 
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to lack convergence in research findings have been demonstrated throughout the chapter. The 
ones that are most relevant to the present research are presented below: 
 
A priori conceptions 
In a recent article reviewing existing executive compensation literature, O’Neill (2007) suggests 
that ‘a priori conceptions’ about executive pay are a contributing factor to the lack of 
convergence in research findings. O’Neill refers to Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) illustration of ‘a 
particular aspect of the a priori evident in many writing within an agency theory perspective’ 
(O’Neill 2007 p694). He first points out that ‘agency theory assumes “good reason to believe 
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal” and that this potential 
divergence of interests may be limited “by establishing appropriate incentives” (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976 p308)’; O’Neill then proceeds to argue that, ‘to claim executives are shirking and 
without an instinctive interest in maximising shareholder value (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) 
assumes a direct adversarial relationship where each party has distinctly different objectives 
and that incentives are the only available avenue of response. Not only does this perspective on 
executive motivation go well beyond the original expression of the principal-agent relationship, 
but it presents a foregone conclusion regarding executives as having an absolute and singular 
interest in their personal outcomes.’ (p694). 
 
Another example of this kind of a priori is sometimes observed when academics challenge the 
motivational effect of monetary incentives. For example, Bainbridge (2005) argues that there 
are relatively few studies that provide firm evidence indicating that company directors are 
driven by extrinsic reward; further, as demonstrated in a recent piece of research by Bender 
(2004), incentive schemes are becoming increasingly prevalent among UK companies even 
though it is often perceived by remuneration practitioners that the motivational effects of 
performance-based rewards are debatable. 
 
In addition, it seems reasonable to argue that researchers may display their own biases, more 
specifically, the tone and presentation of executive compensation literature often corroborates 
a remark of Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992 p182): ‘The way findings are posited and interpreted 
generally come as no surprise, depending on the writers background and known prejudice.’. 
Similarly, the objectivity of academics has also been questioned: ‘we can expect untested 
assumptions, assertions and foregone conclusions when journalists, talk-back radio hosts and 
community leaders’ rail against multi-million dollar amounts paid to CEOs. However, their views 
influence and shape public opinion, especially when authority is drawn from commentary and 
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findings of researchers perceived as credible in this area. But is this scholarly input itself always 
objective and constructive in developing an informed debate?’ (O’Neill 2007 p695).  
 
Practice vs theory 
In their review of the literature in the area of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997 
p737) described the subject as of ‘enormous practical importance’. Their observation, as 
suggested by Daily et al (2003 p371), ‘…highlights one of the attractions to conducting research 
in this area: its direct relationship with corporate practice’. Yet it appears that years of 
investigations have not offered a clear indication as to whether practice actually follows theory 
or indeed vice versa. The main outstanding concern seems to be the lack of agreement 
between what the literature recommends and the practices that companies employ. One can 
argue that this may be the case for incentive plans back in the 1980s and 1990s when it was, for 
instance, commonplace for companies to give away huge vanilla option awards to executives 
(i.e. options without any performance conditions attached - neither on grant or exercise). The 
recent governance codes provide companies detailed guidelines for pay practices and incentive 
designs. However, despite high levels of compliance, not much improvement has been 
observed. One explanation for this is that many incentive plans are too generic in design and 
not driving the performance specific to individual company’s circumstances and needs. 
 
In a recent paper, Gordon (2005) points out that there are cases where directors’ remuneration 
can be shown to be based on increased shareholder value but that the sums awarded to 
executives often leads to outrage from the community. Gordon argues from this that there are 
two quite separate aspects to executive pay. One relates to the agency principle of providing 
incentives for maximising shareholder value. The second is connected to social concerns about 
wealth and power. These different aspects, according to Gordon, ‘provide a system of 
simultaneous constraints (that) may give rise to conflicting results’ (Gordon 2005 p4). Gordon 
concludes that maximising shareholder value is not a sufficient basis for understanding its 
relationship to executive pay. Researchers, he believes, should move away from the narrow 
concepts inherent in agency theory and pay more attention to the views of non-executive 
directors.  
 
Research approach and methodology issues 
It is widely observed that executive pay and corporate governance research tends to be 
positivist in orientation, however, as O’Neill (2007 p969) noted, ‘…these [traditional positivist-
based] research methodologies are often argued to be problematic in two ways.’ The first, 
pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), is the likelihood of false correlation leading to 
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doubtful claims of causal relationships. They point out that the study by Shields et al (2003), 
reported excessive levels of executive pay that coincided with lower profitability of the 
company. The authors conducted an analysis, as a result of which they identified an optimum 
range for executive compensation of between 17 and 24 times average salary earnings. Beyond 
this range, they concluded, company profitability declines. But there is no examination of how 
and why executive behaviour can lead to these outcomes - merely the statistical correlation.  
 
The authors then went on to make a number of recommendations to address the issue of 
excessive executive remuneration when government organisations are awarding government 
contracts. They recommended that ‘pay relativities above a performance optimal range . . . are 
less likely to deliver a good return for shareholders or the taxpayer.’ (Shields et al 2003 p46). 
Specifically their article notes their finding that corporate performance started to deteriorate 
after executive remuneration exceeded ‘24 times the average wage’ (p6).  
 
But quite apart from possibly misleading statistical findings, traditional research in this field has 
been repeatedly questioned. Simon (1957) concluded an analysis by saying that the distribution 
of executive salaries is not determined unambiguously by economic forces, but rather is 
modified by social processes that determine social norms (p35); while Kerr and Bettis (1987) say 
that in order to understand the process of top management compensation, we must get closer 
to the process (p661).  
 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) have given a detailed critique of the commonest failings of 
empirical research into executive pay-performance. They cite the unreliability of archival data 
sources, the effects of time-frames of long term incentives and the ‘leaps of faith required to 
draw conclusions from archival data used as proxy variables for behavioural effects’. Zajac and 
Westphal (1995) refer to executive compensation as a problem that is socially defined, 
inherently subjective and open to manipulation (p306); and Gordon (2005) also refers to the 
‘social construction of the appropriate level of executive compensation’ (p697).  
 
Pettigrew (1992), noted that inferential leaps are sometimes made from variables such as the 
composition of the board to variables such as board performance but without any direct 
evidence of the linking processes in between (p171). In the same way, Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) note in their study that the effect of board demography on corporate performance may 
be complex and indirect, not the simple and direct relationship that many past studies have 
assumed. They suggest that ‘researchers must find more precise ways of studying board 
demography.’ (Forbes and Milliken 1999 p490). Daily et al (2003) are more critical still. They 
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refer to what they call ‘empirical dogmatism’ as a key bar to future research into corporate 
governance. The general picture is summed up in the words of O’Neill (2007 p697): ‘Ultimately, 
these criticisms of the dominant methodologies employed in both research streams are not just 
issues of experimental design and the need for interdisciplinary approaches: at heart there are 
significant ontological and epistemological issues at stake.’  
 
In spite of comments such as these from researchers who have identified the need for more 
process-oriented and behavioural data in both the two research streams, the views of many 
academics are set in place, making both debate and consensus problematical. For example, 
Buck et al (2003 p1719) claim that ‘regression analysis, or rather the data problems of 
quantifying all variables, can never give a complete picture of reward innovations and should be 
supplemented by parallel surveys of executive perceptions of reward packages and by company 
case studies’. Whereas Letendre (2004) says that ‘…much of the literature on boardroom 
dynamics, and the study of board behaviour generally posits no concepts or hypotheses to be 
tested and has little solid research support or empirical evidence to verify the claims made.’ 
(p101).  
 
Views such as these suggest that the work of UK researchers such as McNulty and Pettigrew 
(1996), Pettigrew and McNulty (1998), Roberts (2001 and 2002), Stiles and Taylor (2002), 
Roberts et al (2005), Perkins and Hendry (2005) and Bender (2007) all of which were conducted 
from the perspective of social science, using qualitative research methodologies, does not live 
up to the standard required for scientific research. It is difficult not to agree with Ghoshals 
(2005 p82) who expressed dismay at the ‘pretence of knowledge that follows from the denial of 
the possibility of purposeful and goal directed adaptation in behavioural theories of the firm.’. 
 
There are some signs of a move away relying solely on traditional research approaches, with 
their leaps of inference in the direction of research that engages with executives, remuneration 
committee members and other parties involved in determining executive pay. This move is 
reflected by the studies completed by Bender (Bender 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2008), together 
with some instances of researchers supplementing their traditional research designs with 
interview data from directors (Conyon et al 2000). Since the prevalence of qualitative studies is 
still relatively low, it is not a straightforward task to accurately determine the overall 
effectiveness of this type of research approach.  
 
2. Literature review 
91 
 
However, if the present methodological dominance is to be further developed, it seems logical 
to think that that engaging directly the individuals most involved in the process will be a key 
contribution. 
 
The measurement of compensation and company performance 
Some academics have argued that the tenuous relationship between executive pay and 
performance is due to the insufficient disclosure and the lack of consistent approach employed 
by previous studies with respect to the measurement and definition of both the performance 
and the pay variables and as a barrier to compensation research (Egginton et al 1993; Gregg et 
al 1993; Main et al 1996; Conyon 2001; Farmer 2008). As Buck et al (2003) suggest, existing 
research, in the USA as well as the UK has had to confront major obstacles concerning the 
realistic valuation of all the components of complex remuneration packages.  
 
This point is particularly relevant to the UK since 1995, when the Greenbury Committee called 
for company specific performance conditions. It can be argued that, on the face of it, research 
seems to define executive compensation in a consistent way: broadly speaking defined as cash 
compensation, long term incentives and/or total compensation. But the literature does not 
appear to give guidance regarding precise measurement or specification for the definition of 
compensation or performance. In practice studies use a wide variety of definitions that may 
influence their results. More precise theoretical direction is needed if researchers are to acquire 
a firm foundation to further knowledge on this topic. This issue was highlighted recently by 
Devers et al (2007 p1042, cited in Farmer 2007): ‘...specifically, more theoretical guidance is 
required particularly surrounding the choice of performance measures, timeframes, samples, 
methods, and variables.’. 
  
The measurement of the compensation variable 
Cash compensation 
A common measure of executive pay is cash compensation. It is often regarded as ‘the most 
consistently defined variable in the literature although there are still some differences across 
studies.’ (Farmer 2008 p8). Some cash compensation studies include three cash elements of pay 
- basic pay, annual bonus and allowances (Gregg et al 2005 and Conyon et al 2001); while 
others consider basic pay and annual bonus only (McKnight and Tomkins 2004; McKnight and 
Tomkins 1999; Henderson and Frederickson 1996). There is also little indication as to whether 
any account was taken of exceptional payments (such as an incentive bonus to join the 
company), which would temporarily distort the levels of pay (Bruce and Buck 1997).  
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A large proportion of research only measures cash compensation, leaving out any form of 
share-based payment (Abowd 1990; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Lambert and Larcker 1987; 
Mishra et al 2000; Murphy 1985; Sloan 1993; Girma et al 2007; Gregg et al 2005; Johnston 
2002; Benito and Conyon 1999). In studies through to the early 1990s, the use of cash 
compensation as the only measure could be justified ‘on the basis of data availability and the 
relative magnitude of the cash component in executives’ total remuneration package’ 
(Canarella and Nourayi 2008 p297). However, it must also be noted that by excluding share 
awards, the actual level of pay recorded is underestimated (Murphy 1985). The consequence of 
this is that any estimated relationship between levels of remuneration and company 
performance may be biased (Bruce et al 1997; Conyon et al 1995). Of particular relevance here 
is that Murphy (1999) concluded for the US that there is the tendency for the share incentive 
pay to be greater than the cash element and Conyon and Murphy (2000a) see the UK following 
in the same direction. So far, this has not been the case as seen in Table 8 in Section 2.3.2.2.  
 
Share compensation 
The changes that happened in the UK in the past decades in the composition of pay contracts, 
such as the expanding prevalence of share-based rewards and the emergence of governance 
codes and accounting regulations requiring companies to disclose all share incentives issued to 
executives and employees, have led to more focus being placed on the relevance of including 
long term incentive awards in executive pay studies (notable examples include: Main et al 1996; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000; Fenn and Liang 2001; Hermalin and Wallace 2001; Core et al 
2003; Cordeiro and Veliyath 2003; Buck et al 2003; Carpenter and Sanders 2004; McKnight and 
Tomkins 2004; Eichholtz et al 2008).  
  
A review of these studies finds inconsistencies in the measurement of share compensation too. 
While several studies have reported the effects of share compensation as both a stand-alone 
component as well as a part of the total compensation (McKnight and Tomkins 2004; Carpenter 
and Sanders 2004), some others only take into account total compensation (Buck et al 2003; 
Jiraporn et al 2005).  
 
To further complicate matters, the manner in which share compensation is measured have 
been varied, with some research focus solely on share options (Cordeiro and Veliyath 20; 
McKnight and Tomkins 2004); whereas others considered also the value of shareholdings 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990; Main and Johnston 1993).  
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• Executive share options 
The valuation of options tends to vary considerably and, importantly, the interpretation of the 
research results could potentially be affected by the method and model used to value the 
option awards (Core et al 1999). Such variations have been noted by Farmer (2008 p9): 
 
- Jensen and Murphy (1990) use Black-Scholes (Black and Scholes 1973) pricing 
methodology to value share options. 
- McKnight and Tomkins (1999) champion the minimum share option valuation model.  
- Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) use a binomial valuation model.  
- Carpenter and Sanders (2004) use the Exchange Commission (SEC) method 
- Henderson and Frederickson (1996) value options at 25 per cent of the exercise price. 
 
Moreover, it is evident from the literature that what is captured in the valuation of options can 
also vary somewhat, ranging from newly granted awards to ‘change in value of all outstanding 
options’ to ‘gains from share options’ (Farmer 2008 p9). For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990 
p233, cited in Farmer 2008 p9) ‘include: “....the value of the options awarded during the year 
plus the change in the value of all outstanding options during the year plus the profits (price 
minus exercise price) from exercising options during the year”. In contrast, Henderson and 
Frederickson (1996) are not explicit and therefore it is not clear whether the measure includes 
previous grants together with current grants.’. 
 
• Performance shares 
The valuation of performance share awards is equally inconsistent. For instance, some research 
attempts to take into account the effect of the performance targets attached to the share 
awards by considering the vesting probability and in turn applying discounts to the share value 
(Farmer 2008). An example of such approach can be found in the work of Conyon et al (2001) 
where a 20 per cent discount was applied to performance share awards to reflect the likely 
impact of the performance targets related to the vesting of the shares. Another approach is 
more simply to use ‘the face value of the award at the time of grant’ (Core et al 1999; Eichholtz 
et al 2008, cited in Farmer 2008 p9).  
 
Total compensation 
Total compensation is typically defined as cash plus share-based incentive rewards. The way 
cash compensation is measured tends not to vary greatly so that the share incentives 
component has the main influence on total compensation (Farmer 2008). Another point to note 
is that measures of total compensation can also be dependent on the data used. For instance, 
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where the data are taken from company annual reports and accounts, one can adjust and 
customise the data (such as by annualising, ageing or pro-rating the data) to suit the needs of 
the research.  
 
On the other hand, where the data are acquired from a financial database, they are then reliant 
on the calculated field in that database (Farmer 2008). Jensen and Murphy (1990), for example, 
used total compensation data from Forbes compensation surveys but commented that the data 
were not consistently measured from one year to the next and that share options were not 
actually included. As a result, Jensen and Murphy (1990) relied on US proxy statements, which 
was publicly available, to obtain share option data. More recently, as noted by Farmer (2008), 
Hallock (1997 p333) also based their study on Forbes data and pointed out that - as total 
compensation includes exercised options - this may not accurately reflect current 
compensation, because exercised options represent a personal investment rather than present 
compensation. 
 
The measurement of company performance 
The statistical relationship between directors’ remuneration and company performance has 
been reported to be relatively sensitive to the particular measurement of performance used 
(Baiman and Verrecchia 1995). However, it must be stressed that performance itself has many 
dimensions such as shareholder returns, growth, employment, sustainability and quality of 
earnings, risk parameters, etc., and may be difficult to summarise in a single measure (Dechow 
and Schrand 2004).  
 
The appropriateness of different measures may also differ across companies (e.g. according to 
sector or life-cycle factors) and corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. internal controls may 
reduce risks, but also reduce profits). Over the years, academics have explored the pay-
performance link using both accounting-based measures (e.g. return on assets and return on 
capital employed) and market-based measures (e.g. share price and total shareholder return). 
Yet the literature appears not to have reached any conclusion as to which type of performance 
measure is more appropriate for executive pay research purposes.  
 
As explained by Talmor and Wallace (2001 p4), ‘from the shareholders’ perspective, return is 
generated from stock price changes and is not defined by accounting terms… accounting 
numbers are ex-post measures and as such, can only relate to attained performance’. In 
contrast, according to Nourayi and Mintz (2008 p526) market-based performance, being an ex-
ante measure of value, ‘reflects actions by managers as they induce future economic profits.’ 
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That being said, share prices are considered to be a rather ‘noisy signal’ in that ‘they are 
frequently subject to significant market-wide fluctuations that mirror the determinants of the 
business cycle and the conditions of fiscal and monetary policy, and hence do not exclusively 
reflect the performance of executives.’. On the other hand, accounting-based measures do not 
suffer from as many of these problems. In fact, they ‘shield executives from much of the noise 
and accountability associated with stock market fluctuations (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2000)’.  
 
Moreover, in terms of empirical evidence, a number of studies have managed to establish a 
strong correlation between executive pay and accounting measures of return, including 
Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Sloan (1993) and Carpenter and Sanders (2004). At the same 
time, there is also literature that reports a positive association between market-based 
performance measures and directors’ remuneration (Rich and Larson 1984; Coughlan and 
Schmidt 1985; Murphy 1985 and Conyon et al 2000). Baber et al (1996), however, find that such 
positive relationships are mainly confined to the non-cash pay elements. More recently, 
Boschen et al (2003) indicates that companies tend to focus less on using accounting-based 
performance and rely increasingly on market-based measures. From the above, one can see 
how important it is for researchers to recognise that each of these measures has merits as well 
as drawbacks of its own (Baiman and Verrecchia 1995). 
 
Adding to the debate, some academics even question the use of company performance as an 
indicator of interest alignment effectiveness, given that company performance is evidently not 
only a function of executive decisions but also factors outside executives control (Gomez-Mejia 
and Wiseman 1997; Devers et al 2007). Notwithstanding, arguments employing the agency 
framework still strongly support the conclusion that shareholder wealth maximisation (e.g. 
market-based performance) should be the definitive criterion for compensation research. 
 
2.3.3 Summary of literature evidence 
 
In general, research findings within existing literature have proved conflicting and inconclusive 
(Canarella and Nourayi 2008; O’Neill 2007; Rutherford et al 2007; Bebchuk and Fried 2004), 
indicating that while the idea that executive pay is a potential solution to agency is well defined, 
the actual causality of incentive pay and interests alignment and shareholder value creation 
remains largely uncertain (Finkelstein and Mooney 2003; Pettigrew 1992). Nonetheless, the lack 
of convergence in research outcomes may, in effect, have encouraged academics to redirect 
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research attention towards a richer set of social and political explanations (O’Neill 2007; Daily 
et al 2003; Conyon and Peck 1998).  
 
Researchers have, for instance, examined social comparison processes and winner-takes-all, 
intra-executive tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Conyon and Peck 1998b; Crystal 1992; 
O’Reilly et al 1988); and executive pay has been studied in relation to organisational strategy 
(Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1990), tenure (Hill and Phan 1991), the structure of internal incentives 
(Lambert et al 1993), the dimensions of board structure and control (Conyon 1997; Conyon and 
Peck 1998a), information disclosure (Conyon and Sadler 2001; Conyon et al 2002) and 
managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried 2005). 
 
Research has been broadening, corporate governance itself has become more comprehensive, 
yet it appears that two aspects of governance have remained unchanged in the UK: 
 
• Corporate governance is as important as ever - one continues to believe that the 
positive outcome of good corporate governance is, ultimately, a strengthened 
economy and a robust governance framework is in effect a tool for socio-economic 
development (Sapovadia 2003). And maximising shareholder value is still what all 
companies continue to strive to achieve - although it has proved to be a relative 
difficult task to accomplish. Carver (2007 p1030) summarised this point clearly: 
 
‘Corporate governance exists for one reason and one reason alone: to ensure that 
shareholders’ values, as informed by knowledgeable agency, are transformed into 
company performance. To the extent a board fails in this, no matter how many other 
useful things it accomplishes, it has failed. To the extent it succeeds in this, no matter 
that it accomplishes nothing else, it has succeeded.’ 
 
• The principles of good governance have stayed the same too: transparency, 
accountability, responsibility and fairness, underpinned by disclosure. Besides, the 
objectives of governance measures have also remained similar apart from becoming 
tighter and more stringent. To-reiterate, of the many objectives of governance, the 
present study focuses on two as set out in Table 9.  
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Table 9 Key objectives of corporate governance  
Governance objectives and mechanisms UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) references  
 To improve the monitoring function of the 
board through the introduction of 
mechanisms that alter the structure of 
boards and the role of non-executives (to 
be discussed in Chapter 6). 
 Page 9, Section A: Leadership, Section A1: The 
Role of the Board. 
 Page 12, Section B: Effectiveness. 
 To align the interests of executives and 
shareholders (mitigate agency effects and 
costs) via the effective use of pay 
structure and incentives (to be discussed 
in Chapter 7). 
 Page 22, Section D: Remuneration. 
Source: this author 
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The high profile corporate collapses in the 1990s exposed the pervasive weakness in oversight 
at many companies, thereby spawning the movement to raise governance standards. 
Governance systems across the world have since been undergoing a period of serious 
transition, yet, when additional accounting scandals and executive compensation abuses came 
to light in the early 2000s, the reform movement gained further momentum. As investor trust 
has weakened yet more, following this spate of corporate malfeasance, focus has increased on 
raising the accountability of executives. In recent years there have clearly been mounting 
regulatory and institutional pressures on businesses to strengthen the link between 
shareholder and executive interests, not least to effectively align company success with the 
financial rewards of the leadership team. In the UK, for instance, board of directors are now not 
only given the primary oversight responsibility for approving and reviewing the company’s pay 
decisions, but also expected to communicate and demonstrate clearly how executive incentive 
plans are designed to drive company performance and maximise shareholder value. 
 
After years of intense debate over the subject, it is now by and large universally accepted that 
executive pay should be used to align interests and reward superior performance; in the 
meantime, companies have also become more proactive in rethinking how they create value for 
shareholders and how they translate value creation into understandable and measurable 
behaviours. However, evidence tends to show that practice does not always seem to match up 
to the promise. In fact, much academic literature indicates that incentive vehicles designed with 
the aim of improving the link between executive pay and performance and shareholder value 
are not able to attain their full desired effects.  
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The present study attempts to examine the question of why there is so little alignment in 
theory and practice based on the discussion framework set forth in Figure 13. Research into 
executive pay has mainly been carried out in two parallel streams; the first examining the 
correlation between pay and performance using quantitative research methods, and the 
second studying executive pay as one of the key mechanisms of corporate governance reform 
using qualitative research methods. The approach this study takes is to unite the two and 
synthesise a quantitative examination of pay and performance, and a qualitative evaluation of 
pay as a governance mechanism, so that studying pay in the context of corporate governance 
will yield a holistic understanding of the complex relationships between the individual topics. 
 
Figure 13 Discussion framework 
Source: this author 
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3 Hypotheses and methodology 
 
In this chapter, the research parameters, including the characteristics of the data and variable 
definitions, will first be described. The hypotheses and the rationales will then be discussed. It is 
important to point out that as part of the exploratory approach to the data adopted by this 
study (refer to Section 1.4.2 and Figure 12), the correlation exercises, i.e. the testing of the 
hypotheses set out in Section 3.2, will be performed (see Chapter 4) prior to the background to 
discussion being explained in Chapter 5. Lastly, a formal expression of the models and a brief 
explanation of the statistical processes employed to test the hypotheses will be presented. 
3.1 Sample and data 
 
The quantitative analyses of this study are based on a panel data set of the 100 largest publicly 
listed companies in the UK from the FTSE 100 Index for the period 2004/05 to 2008/09. The 
main objective is to empirically examine the link between executive pay, company size and 
performance, as well as the factors that may affect the pay-performance relationship. The data 
used in this study have been obtained from the following sources: 
 
• Remuneration data: Thomson Reuters and companies’ annual reports and accounts 
• Financial data: Bloomberg and Datastream 
• Governance and board specifics: BoardEx. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Company coverage 
 
The current study has analysed the constituents of the FTSE 100 index. However, it was decided 
that investment trusts should be left out of the analysis, as they often have organisational 
features that are quite different from other companies in the index (for example, executives 
very rarely sit on the board). This market capitalisation weighted index is considered to be 
appropriate for the following reasons: 
 
• All constituents are traded on the London Stock Exchange and are governed by the 
same set of listing rules providing consistency for data analysis. 
• It is made up of the 100 largest UK-domiciled blue chip companies, which pass 
screening for size and liquidity. 
• It represents approximately 81% of the UK’s market capitalisation (as at July 2012).  
• It also accounts for around 8.2% of the world’s equity market capitalisation (based on 
the FTSE All-World Index as at 31 July 2012). 
• Historical data (from January 1984) for the index are available electronically.  
• Pay practices among FTSE 100 constituents are, in many aspects, relatively similar, but 
are distinctive from those found in smaller FTSE 250 companies.  
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3.1.2 Study period 2004/05 to 2008/09 
 
Recent changes in disclosure requirements have made it possible for the current study to assess 
the pay-performance relationship over a period of five years. In the past problems associated 
with availability of data, coupled with difficulties associated with the valuation of long term 
incentives, have led to a tendency for academics to rely on single cross-section data. It is only 
since the introduction of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002 that 
corporate governance and executive pay researchers have started using more comprehensive 
panels of longitudinal remuneration and financial data in their empirical work (Conyon and 
Sadler 2000; Buck et al 2003). 
 
The period under study has been one of both economic fluctuations, and also changes in 
corporate governance measures. The implementation of these changes has been a gradual 
process of formalisation and improvement rather than an outright single transformation for 
most companies; hence, being able to exploit time series variation to examine executive pay 
should be a major step forward. That being said, it is understood that using five years’ worth of 
data may be limiting as natural market fluctuations and economic conditions might not be fully 
reflected in a relatively short period of time. A longer study period of perhaps 10 years would 
make observing trends easier but pay data disclosed before 2004 were still not entirely 
consistent, with gaps in many remuneration aspects. Another point to note is that this study 
has not been especially concerned with controlling for firm specific fixed effects over time. 
Rather, as Murphy (1999) proposes and the results of Balkin et al (2000) indicate, the variance 
explained by widely used variables may fluctuate somewhat across time (Hengartner 2006). 
Furthermore, estimators that are based on panel data tend to be more precise in general 
(Hengartner 2006). The panel data approach further helps ameliorating the problem of omitted 
variables associated with a cross-sectional sample (Murphy 1985). 
 
3.1.3 Incumbent coverage 
 
Positions that are captured in this study include the highest paid director (either the Chief 
Executive or the full-time Executive Chairman), Finance Directors and Other Directors (that is, 
other main board Executive Directors, excluding Chief Executives, Executive Chairmen and 
Finance Directors). It was feasible to analyse these position because all UK companies are 
required, by the DRRR (2002), to detail all forms of remuneration for each of their main board 
directors in the annual report and accounts. CEO pay tends to be different from other directors, 
therefore it is informative to examine the different roles side by side in order to draw 
comparisons. Since the FTSE 100 sample is of a manageable size, the data have been re-
organised in a way that allowed for detailed analysis. Specifically, analyses have been 
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performed for not only the CEOs as with much of the prior research but for four selected 
incumbent groups, namely: 
 
• CEOs (capturing both the Chief Executives and Executive Chairmen) 
• Finance Directors 
• All directors 
• All directors excluding CEOs. 
 
To ensure more accurate and consistent comparisons, all the analyses were carried out using a 
‘constant sample’. In other words, only incumbents who had been in the same role for two 
consecutive years were included in each dataset. In effect, new hires and recently promoted 
individuals’ data were omitted to prevent skewing the results.  
 
3.1.4 Pay variables 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the results of previous studies seem to indicate that the relationship 
between executive pay and company performance tends to vary considerably depending on 
how the pay variable is measured. In order to advance on the understanding of the relationship 
between the various components of pay and performance, it is clearly desirable to consider the 
full array of pay elements that make up the remuneration package of senior executives. By 
breaking down the pay variable into its various components for separate analysis, this study has 
also been able to examine how executives perceive and respond to different pay arrangements, 
especially incentive rewards. 
 
In the UK, a typical executive pay package is usually comprised of base salary, annual bonus, 
share options and/or performance shares and/or deferred matching shares, other benefits in 
kind and pension provisions. These terms are defined as follows in this study: broadly, a ‘base 
salary’ is a guaranteed monthly amount paid to the executive. A ‘bonus’ is typically an annual 
incentive opportunity that focuses on more short-term business performance targets. Bonus 
payout is variable depending on whether or the extent of which the pre-determined 
performance targets set by the remuneration committee have been met at the end of the year 
or the performance period. Annual awarded bonus may sometimes be required to be deferred 
to a later date and this arrangement is called a ‘deferred bonus’. It is becoming increasingly 
common for companies to require further performance targets to be tested in return for 
matching share awards (Farmer 2008). 
It is also common for executive to participate in one or more long term incentive plans in the 
forms of share option grants and/or awards of restricted shares under the rules of a 
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performance share plan (often called ‘performance shares’ or ‘LTIPs’). These equity-based 
rewards are subject to share price fluctuations and thus the potential payouts are variable and 
even ‘at risk of decreasing in value’ (Farmer 2008 p6). In addition, practically all long term 
incentive plans are designed with a performance vesting schedule whereby ‘a maximum award 
vests for performance beyond an upper threshold, while no award vests for performance below 
a lower threshold. The award vests at different levels of performance between the lower and 
upper threshold’ (Farmer 2008 p6). Again, the grant size and the performance targets attached 
to any long term plans are determined by the remuneration committee, often with the 
assistance from external consultants.  
 
All remuneration data used in this study, including the values of options performance shares 
and deferred shares, have been provided by Thomson Reuters using an ‘expected value’ 
approach similar to that used by Hewitt New Bridge Street (2007 p6). The expected value of 
long term incentives is based on the actual annual awards of options and performance shares 
made as a percentage of base salary and valued using Binomial Model. A ‘market expected 
value discount’ is also applied – for options 20%, for free share awards with performance 
conditions (i.e. performance shares) 55% and for free share awards without performance 
conditions (i.e. vanilla deferred matching shares) 90%.  
 
Furthermore, executives are typically rewarded with benefits in kind - examples include gym 
membership, a chauffeur, or a housing allowance. Benefits in kind do not, in most cases, 
represent a significant proportion of a directors’ pay package. One possible exception is that of 
executives who may be given a housing allowance to assist international relocation (Farmer 
2008). Additionally, companies will often provide their executives with a retirement plan as 
well. Neither benefits in kind or pensions have been included in the current study. This does not 
imply that they are unimportant. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Pensions form quite a major 
part of any executive package and have undergone significant changes. Generous final salary 
defined benefit plans used to be the norm until several years ago but are disappearing fast - 
they are simply not financially viable or sustainable and have left most companies with a huge 
pension deficit. There has thus been a shift to defined contribution arrangements. Due to the 
complex nature of pension arrangements and the actuarial valuations involved and all the 
recent changes, this element of remuneration has not been taken into account in this study.  
 
3.1.5 Company performance measurement 
 
Much of the previous research has considered one or two performance measures - but a wide 
range of measures have been used, from shareholders’ returns (Murphy 1985, Main et al 1996), 
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to return on equity (Ezzamel and Watson 1997), to accounting profit (Lewellen and Huntsman 
1970; Deckop 1988). In the current study, however, six measures of performance have been 
used: 
 
1)  Earnings per Share (EPS) growth 
 
The first measure is One-year Earnings per Share (EPS) Growth. This is a measure of basic EPS 
before extraordinary items and is derived from deducting EPS for the previous period from EPS 
for the current period, expressed as a percentage. EPS growth in commonly used as a guide to 
help investors identify shares that are increasing or decreasing in value. The EPS data are 
derived from Datastream. 
 
2) Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation And Amortisation (EBITDA) Margin 
 
EBITDA Margin is a measurement of a company's operating profitability. It is equal to earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total revenue. Because 
EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization, EBITDA margin can provide investors with a 
clearer view of a company's core profitability. The EBITDA figures are derived from Bloomberg. 
 
Definition: EBITDA Margin is calculated as trailing 12 month EBIDTA divided by trailing 12 month 
sales, multiplied by 100. 
 
3) Sales/Revenue growth  
 
Revenue Growth is the per cent increase (or decrease) in a company's revenue between two or 
more equivalent fiscal periods. Revenue Growth is used to measure how fast a company's 
business is expanding. The figures give analysts, investors and participants an idea of how much 
a company's sales are increasing over time. Sales data are derived from Datastream. 
 
Definition: Sales/Revenue year change (growth, in percentage) is calculated using the following 
formula: 
[(Net Sales/Revenue for the current period – 1)/(Net Sales/Revenue for the last period)] * 100 
 
4) Net Income growth  
 
This figure represents the annualized rate of net-income growth over the trailing one-year 
period for stocks. Net-income growth gives a clear picture of the rate at which companies have 
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grown their profits. All things being equal, stocks with higher net-income growth rates are 
generally more desirable than those with slower net-income growth rates. The Net Income data 
are derived from Bloomberg. 
 
Definition: Net Income year change (growth in percentage) is calculated using the following 
formula: 
[(Net Income for the current period -1)/(Net Income for the last period)] * 100 
 
5) Total Shareholder Return  
 
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) is a concept used to compare the performance of different 
companies’ stocks and shares over time. It combines share price appreciation and dividends 
paid to show the total return to the shareholder. The absolute size of the TSR will vary with 
stock markets, but the relative position reflects the market perception of overall performance 
relative to a reference group. The TSR data are derived from Datastream. 
 
Definition: Total Shareholder Return (TSR) represents a theoretical growth in value of a 
shareholding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase 
additional units of an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. 
It is calculated using the following formula: 
 
TSR = (Priceend – Pricebegin + Dividends) / Pricebegin 
Where Pricebegin = share price at beginning of period, Priceend = share price at end of period 
and Dividends = dividends paid. 
 
6) Return on Equity 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) is the amount of net income returned as a percentage of shareholders 
equity. Return on equity measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how much profit a 
company generates with the money shareholders have invested. The ROE data are derived from 
Bloomberg. 
 
Definition: Return On Equity (ROE) in percentage is calculated as trailing 12 month Net Income 
(Losses) minus trailing 12 month Cash Preferred Dividends, divided by Average of Total 
Common Equity, multiplied by 100. 
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3.2 Development of hypotheses 
 
UK corporate governance has changed significantly since reforms began some 20 years ago - 
with many initiatives attempting to strengthen governance, including the formation of different 
Committees to investigate and offer recommendations. Some dealt with governance in general 
(e.g. Cadbury 1992 and Hampel 1998), whereas others targeted more specific governance 
issues such as remuneration (Greenbury 1995), the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors (Higgs 2003) and governance in Banks and other financial institutions (Walker’s 
Review 2009).  
 
The core themes of governance, however, appear to have remained by and large unchanged 
since Cadbury. Governance codes have been reviewed, revised and amended numerous times 
but overall, reforms have mainly sought to raise the independence of executive pay 
determination, the transparency of the process via disclosure and the voice of shareholders in 
the outcome. Yet, the primary objective of these measures is often considered as an attempt to 
improve board accountability and to make executive remuneration changes reflect company 
performance, thus aligning manager-shareholder interests.  
 
How effective have two decades of such corporate governance reforms been? This apparently 
straightforward question has proved difficult to answer as already demonstrated in previous 
chapters puzzling both academics and policy makers alike. This part of the research has tried to 
address one aspect of the grander overall question, examining UK directors’ remuneration in 
relation to company size and performance. The analysis is organised into three sections:  
 
Part 1: Relationship between company size and executive pay 
Part 2: Relationship between executive pay and company performance 
Part 3: Factors affecting the pay-performance relationship  
 
3.2.1 Part 1: Relationship between company size and executive pay 
 
Executive compensation has been a widely studied subject. There have been high hopes 
(particularly among agency theorists, shareholders and governance bodies) that it should be 
predominantly driven by company performance. But to date, results remain largely 
inconclusive, the causal relationship between pay and performance remains unclear. What is 
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clear though is that company size has been consistently found to be the key determinant of 
directors’ pay.  
 
Earlier studies by Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Healy (1985), Baker 
et al (1988), Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), Rosen (1992), Conyon and Leech (1994), Yermack 
(1995), and Ezzamel and Watson (1997), to name a few, all found a strong correlation between 
company size and directors’ pay. The more recent research such as Bruce and Buck (2005), 
Girma et al (2007), Ozkan (2007), Ferri and Maber 2008, Guay (2010) and Gregg et al (2012) 
continued to yield the same finding. Much of the literature suggested that executive pay tends 
to increase with company size because of ‘the higher level of skills and managerial talent 
required by the higher degree of complexity and diversity of activities within [larger] 
organisations.’. (Canarella and Nourayi 2008 p295). 
 
Previous work has typically used total sales as the measure for company size (Conyon and Leech 
1994; Ezzamel and Watson 1997; Core et al 1999). For the banking sector, it is common to use 
total assets as a proxy for size (Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Gregg et al 2012). Market 
capitalisation is an alternative measure of company size used by many too (Bonet and Conyon 
2005; Conyon and He 2004; Armstrong et al 2010), including the current study. It is appropriate 
because the FTSE index is ranked using market capitalisation. Market capitalisation data were 
obtained from Bloomberg and below is the definition: 
  
Historical Market Capitalisation is calculated as: (Closing Price as of fiscal period end date) 
multiplied by (Shares outstanding at that period end date). Period end date is the most recent 
annual for which full fundamental data have been collected. 
 
While this part of the analysis can be considered as a ‘validity check’ to test the robustness of 
the data sets and the methods used, there are aspects of it that are designed to be more 
insightful than previous studies. For instance, many researchers have used total cash or total 
compensation to measure executive pay. Recent improvement in pay disclosure allows other 
elements of the directors' remuneration package to be analysed. Therefore, this part of the 
study explores five different pay variables against company size (hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, 
H1d and H1e), but more than that, it compares the strength of some of the correlations 
(hypotheses H1f, H1g and H1h). Overall, it is still expected that executive pay will increase with 
company size. 
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Hypotheses concerning the relationship between company size and executive pay: 
H1a: Base Salary is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
H1b: Total Cash is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
H1c: Total Compensation is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
H1d: Base Salary Increase is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
H1e: Variable Pay is positively correlated with Market Capitalisation 
H1f: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Variable Pay is different from that 
between Market Capitalisation and Base Salary 
H1g: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Total Cash is different from that 
between Market Capitalisation and Base Salary 
H1h: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Total Compensation is different from 
that between Market Capitalisation and Total Cash 
 
3.2.2 Part 2: Relationship between executive pay and company performance 
 
The second part of the analysis has focused on links between directors’ remuneration and 
various measures of corporate performance. Taking an agency stance, executive compensation 
is considered as an effective means of addressing the ‘separation of ownership and control’ 
problem. Simply put, it is argued that executives' interests and behaviours can be aligned with 
the needs of shareholders via compensation design which in turn should result in improved 
company performance. 
 
Although numerous attempts have been made to examine the relationship between indicators 
of company performance and directors’ remuneration, no firm conclusions have been reached 
overall. The position was aptly summarised by Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) who stated: 
‘In short, after at least six decades of research ... the failure to identify a robust relationship 
between top management compensation and firm performance has led scholars into a blind 
alley’ (p135). Data availability problems in the past mean that prior work tended to rely on 
evaluating cash compensation using mainly single cross-section data. However, UK company 
annual reports now contain sufficient information about executive pay packages to analyse 
total compensation and each pay element separately, hence this study does precisely that 
(except benefits and pensions).  
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It is important to point out that there has been a lot of criticism directed at studies that relied 
on evaluating total cash compensation. It is often argued these analyses ignore interesting 
differences in the extent to which the long term share-based components of compensation are 
affected by company performance, and that the weak statistical results are probably due to the 
omission of long term incentives in these studies (Ozkan 2007). After all, long term incentive 
plans, by definition, are designed to have a long term influence and to align executive pay and 
performance. That being said, it is observed that recent UK studies that consider the total 
remuneration package of senior executives (Buck et al 2003, Pepper et al 2012) do not seem to 
have produced results that show a stronger link between pay and performance. 
 
The present study has included the long term element of pay in this part of the analyses with 
one of the reasons being the prevalence of such type of incentive vehicle among UK directors. 
Every FTSE 100 company operates one or more long term incentive plans, all of which are 
performance contingent. Besides, long term incentives represent a significant portion of FTSE 
100 executive director’s total reward (around 35% in 2008), according to recent surveys by 
KPMG (2008) and Hewett New Bridge Street (2008). In greater detail, in 2008 around 55%-60% 
of an Executive Director’s remuneration package is linked to variable pay (compared to only 
45% in 2003). Of the variable pay element, around 60% is linked to long term performance 
(compared to 50% in 2003). 
 
In terms of pay components, six different ones are examined, namely base salary, annual 
bonus, total cash, long term incentives, variable pay and total compensation. With the 
exception of base salary (Hypothesis H2a) which is a fixed element of pay, it is expected that the 
other five pay variables to be positively associated to company performance (Hypotheses H2b, 
H2c, H2d and H2e). It is also predicted that total compensation will be more strongly related to 
performance than total cash, as the former includes long term incentives (Hypothesis H2g). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the implementation of corporate governance regulation has been a 
gradual process. Thus it is important for research to exploit time series variation to capture any 
observable changes. It is predicted that executive pay has become more sensitive to company 
performance over the research period (Hypotheses H2h and H2i). 
 
Hypotheses concerning the relationship between executive pay and company 
performance: 
H2a: Base Salary Increase is negatively related to Company Performance 
H2b: Annual Actual Bonus Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
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H2c: Total Cash Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
H2d: Long term Incentive Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
H2e: Variable Pay Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
H2f: Total Compensation Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
H2g: The correlation between Total Compensation and Company Performance is stronger than 
the correlation between Total Cash and Company Performance 
H2h: The strength of the relation between Total Cash and Company Performance has increased 
over the period 2004-2009 
H2i: The strength of the relation between Total Compensation and Company Performance has 
increased over the period 2004-2009 
 
3.2.3 Part 3: Factors affecting the pay-performance relationship 
 
Although the body of executive compensation has been growing, there seems to be a paucity of 
detailed studies researching into the factors that determine the pay-performance link. This part 
of the study therefore sets out to investigate the effect of some of the potential factors on the 
relationship between executive pay (measured as (i) total cash compensation and (ii) total 
compensation) and company performance (using the same six measures of performance 
outlined in Section 3.1). Again, the analysis is carried out for each of the four incumbent groups 
described earlier, over five years (2004/05-2008/09).  
 
The thirteen factors examined are listed below under four headings: 
 
1) Compensation levels and structure: 
• Absolute base salary (H3a i and ii) 
• Total compensation (H3b i and ii) 
• Variable pay as a percentage of total compensation (H3c i and ii)  
• Long term incentives as a percentage of total compensation (H3d i and ii) 
• Number of long term incentive plans in operation (H3j i and ii) 
• Maximum annual bonus grant size (H3k i and ii). 
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It is expected to see companies that offer their executives a higher level of base salary and total 
compensation, and a larger proportion of variable pay and long term incentives to be 
associated to a stronger relationship between pay and performance. Further, it is also predicted 
that the greater the bonus potential the more effort an executive will exert which in turn 
should lead to an increase in performance. However, there is evidence to suggest that the 
number of incentive plans and their complexity may affect the pay-performance link. A 
‘portfolio’ approach (i.e. the use of more than one plan) with many performance targets 
attached to each plan may make the pay structure overly complex and send out conflicting 
messages about the company needs to executives (Department of Business Innovation and 
Skills 2012).  
 
Hypotheses concerning factors affecting the pay-performance relationship - 
compensation levels and structure: 
H3a(i): The higher the level of Base Salary, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and 
Company Performance 
H3a(ii): The higher the level of Base Salary, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Compensation and Company Performance 
H3b(i): The higher the level of Total Compensation, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Cash and Company Performance. 
H3b(ii): The higher the level of Total Compensation, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Compensation and Company Performance. 
H3c(i): The higher the proportion of actual Variable Pay, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Cash and Company Performance 
H3c(ii): The higher the proportion of actual Variable Pay, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Compensation and Company Performance 
H3d(i): The higher the proportion of LTIs, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and 
Company Performance 
H3d(ii): The higher the proportion of LTIs, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Compensation and Company Performance 
H3j(i): The greater the number of LTI plans, the weaker the relationship between Total Cash and 
Company Performance 
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H3j(ii): The greater the number of LTI plans, the weaker the relationship between Total 
Compensation and Company Performance 
H3k(i): The higher the maximum award level of Annual Bonus, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash and Company Performance 
H3k(ii): The higher the maximum award level of Annual Bonus, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
 
2) Company scale: 
• Company size (H3e i and ii) 
• Industry (H3m i and ii). 
 
It is reported in a number of recent surveys that larger companies tend to provide a greater 
proportion of variable pay; and the greater the proportion of variable pay, the stronger the pay-
performance link is likely to be (KPMG 2008). Therefore, consistent with hypotheses H3b, H3c 
and H3k, larger companies’ pay should more related to performance. Due to differing business 
and production environments, and that executive pay practices do vary among companies in 
different sectors (Yermack 1996; Murphy 2003), it is expected that the pay and performance 
relationship will be somewhat different across industries. 
 
Hypotheses concerning factors affecting the pay-performance relationship - company 
scale: 
H3e(i): The larger the company (in terms of Market Capitalisation), the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash and Company Performance 
H3e(ii): The larger the company (in terms of Market Capitalisation), the stronger the 
relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
H3m(i): The relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance varies across 
industries/sectors 
H3m(ii): The relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance varies across 
industries/sectors 
 
3) Governance measures: 
• Board size (H3f i and ii) 
• Proportion of non-executive directors (H3g i and ii) 
• Remuneration committee size (H3h i and ii). 
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As suggested by Yermack (1996), smaller boards are predicted to be more effective than larger 
boards because the latter is prone to having ‘coordination costs and free rider problems’. A 
number of more recent studies presented results that support this argument (Ozkan 2007; 
Guest 2010; Renneboog and Trojanowski 2010). Thus, it is predicted that larger board size will 
disconnect the pay-performance link. However, the greater proportion of non-executives and 
the size of the remuneration committee are expected to have a positive impact on the link. 
 
Hypotheses concerning factors affecting the pay-performance relationship - governance 
measures: 
H3f(i): The larger the board (number of executive and non-executive directors), the weaker the 
relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance 
H3f(ii): The larger the board (number of executive and non-executive directors), the weaker the 
relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
H3g(i): The higher the proportion of non-executives, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Cash and Company Performance 
H3g(ii): The higher the proportion of non-executives, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Compensation and Company Performance 
H3h(i): The larger the size of the Remuneration Committee, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash and Company Performance 
H3h(ii): The larger the size of the Remuneration Committee, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Compensation and Company Performance. 
 
4) Incumbent characteristics: 
• Tenure (H3i i and ii) 
• Position (H3l i and ii).  
 
According to Lippert and Porter (1997), when a large portion of annual compensation is 
delivered as options and shares, individual executive’s accumulated equity in the company 
increases as time passes. And as the executive’s share holdings build, his interests should 
become more aligned with those of other shareholders and the probability that he might 
sacrifice the interests of shareholders for self-aggrandisement decreases (Gong 2010). This 
appears to suggest that the tenure of senior executives should have a positive impact on the 
pay-performance relationship. Hill and Phan (1991) and Murphy (1986) both argued otherwise 
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but since the use of share options and performance shares has become increasingly prominent 
over the past decade (KPMG 2008), it is expected that there is a positive relationship between 
executive pay and company performance as tenure increases.   
 
It is reported by KPMG (2008) that CEO's pay packages tend to be distinctive from other 
executives and have a greater proportion of variable elements than those of other directors. 
The objective of this arrangement is to improve the line of sight of the CEO, who after all is seen 
to have the most influence on business performance. For this reason, among others, prior 
research often focused solely on CEO pay. Since this study captures all board executives, 
hypotheses H3l(i) and H3l(ii) aim to test whether CEO pay is indeed more performance related 
compared to other executives given the higher proportion of incentive pay. 
 
Hypotheses concerning factors affecting the pay-performance relationship - incumbent 
characteristics: 
H3i(i): The longer the tenure, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company 
Performance 
H3i(ii): The longer the tenure, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and 
Company Performance 
H3l(i): CEO Total Cash is more strongly linked to Company Performance than that of executive 
directors 
H3l(ii): CEO Total Compensation is more strongly linked to Company Performance than that of 
executive directors. 
 
3.3 Model specifications 
 
The hypotheses described in Section 3.2 are tested using three different models and all the 
calculations are done using MINITAB: 
 
Hypothesis Estimating 
model 
Hypothesis 
rationale* 
H1a Base Salary is positively related to Market Capitalisation 1 B 
H1b: Total Cash is positively related to Market Capitalisation 1 B 
H1c: Total Compensation is positively related to Market Capitalisation 1 B 
H1d: Base Salary Increase is positively related to Market Capitalisation 1 C 
H1e: Variable Pay is positively correlated with Market Capitalisation 1 B 
H1f: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Variable Pay is different from that 
between Market Capitalisation and Base Salary 
2 A 
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Hypothesis Estimating 
model 
Hypothesis 
rationale* 
H1g: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Total Cash is different from that 
between Market Capitalisation and Base Salary  
2 A 
H1h: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Total Compensation is different from 
that between Market Capitalisation and Total Cash 
2 A 
   
H2a: Base Salary Increase is negatively related to Company Performance 1 C/D 
H2b: Annual Actual Bonus Increase is positively related to Company Performance 1 D 
H2c: Total Cash Increase is positively related to Company Performance 1 D 
H2d: Long term Incentive Increase is positively related to Company Performance 1 D 
H2e: Variable Pay Increase is positively related to Company Performance 1 D 
H2f: Total Compensation Increase is positively related to Company Performance 1 D 
H2g: The correlation between Total Compensation and Company Performance is stronger 
than the correlation between Total Cash and Company Performance 
2 C/D 
H2h: The strength of the relation between Total Cash and Company Performance has 
increased over the period 2004-2009 
see H2c D 
H2i: The strength of the relation between Total Compensation and Company Performance has 
increased over the period 2004-2009 
see H2f D 
   
H3a(i): The higher the level of Base Salary, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash 
and Company Performance 
3 C 
H3a(ii): The higher the level of Base Salary, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Compensation and Company Performance 
3 C 
H3b(i): The higher the level of Total Compensation, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Cash and Company Performance. 
3 C/D 
H3b(ii): The higher the level of Total Compensation, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Compensation and Company Performance. 
3 C/D 
H3c(i): The higher the proportion of actual Variable Pay, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash and Company Performance 
3 A 
H3c(ii): The higher the proportion of actual Variable Pay, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
3 A 
H3d(i): The higher the proportion of LTIs, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash 
and Company Performance 
3 A 
H3d(ii): The higher the proportion of LTIs, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Compensation and Company Performance 
3 A 
H3e(i): The larger the company (in terms of Market Capitalisation), the stronger the 
relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance 
3 C 
H3e(ii): The larger the company (in terms of Market Capitalisation), the stronger the 
relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
3 C 
H3f(i): The larger the board (number of executive and non-executive directors), the weaker 
the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance 
3 B 
H3f(ii): The larger the board (number of executive and non-executive directors), the weaker 
the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
3 B 
H3g(i): The higher the proportion of non-executives, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Cash and Company Performance 
3 B 
H3g(ii): The higher the proportion of non-executives, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Compensation and Company Performance 
3 B 
H3h(i): The larger the size of the Remuneration Committee, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash and Company Performance 
3 B 
H3h(ii): The larger the size of the Remuneration Committee, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
3 B 
H3i(i): The longer the tenure, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company 
Performance 
3 B 
H3i(ii): The longer the tenure, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and 
Company Performance 
 
 
3 B 
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Hypothesis Estimating 
model 
Hypothesis 
rationale* 
H3j(i): The greater the number of LTI plans, the weaker the relationship between Total Cash 
and Company Performance 
3 A/C 
H3j(ii): The greater the number of LTI plans, the weaker the relationship between Total 
Compensation and Company Performance 
3 A/C 
H3k(i): The higher the maximum award level of Annual Bonus, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash and Company Performance 
3 A/C 
H3k(ii): The higher the maximum award level of Annual Bonus, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Compensation and Company Performance 
3 A/C 
H3l(i): CEO Total Cash is more strongly linked to Company Performance than that of executive 
directors 
1 A 
H3l(ii): CEO Total Compensation is more strongly linked to Company Performance than that of 
executive directors 
1 A 
H3m(i): The relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance varies across 
industries/sectors 
1 B 
H3m(ii): The relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance varies 
across industries/sectors 
1 B 
 
*Keys for “Hypothesis Rationale”:  
A – Common views of prior literature         B – Synthesis of past studies’ results     
C – Popular perception         D – Popular expection from governance reforms  
3.3.1 Model 1 
 
Model 1 is a simple regression model that will provide an indication of the strength and 
direction of a linear relationship between two variables (Moore and McCabe 2005). An example 
is presented below: 
 
Example: H2b Annual Bonus Increase is positively related to Company Performance (TSR) 
 
Symbols 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let AB TSR be the population correlation coefficient for Annual Bonus and Total Shareholder 
Return. The hypothesis can then be rewritten as: 
 
H0 :  AB TSR = 0 vs  Ha :  AB TSR > 0 
 
The sample data can be grouped in a number of ways, the two main ones are as follows: 
 
Sample A - covers one single position (i.e. CEO or Finance Director) over any given year and the 
data include: 
Notation Variable 
AB Annual Bonus 
TSR Total Shareholder Return 
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(AB1,TSR1),(AB2,TSR2),...,(ABn,TSRn) 
 
Sample B - covers all board executives (i.e. CEO, Finance Director and other executive directors) 
by averaging the Annual Bonus (AVEAB) figure over any given year. The data for this sample 
are: 
 
(AVEAB1,TSR1),(AVEAB2,TSR2),...,(AVEABn,TSRn) 
 
In both cases (Sample A and Sample B), n is the total number of companies in the FTSE 100 
index minus any investment trusts and the sample correlation coefficient (also known as the 
Pearson's correlation coefficient) for Annual Bonus and Total Shareholder Return is: 
 
 
where 
 
 
and 
 
The observed level of significance (i.e. the p-value) of the above test, as suggested by Peck et al 
(2005 ch13), is calculated in such a way 
p – value = P(tn-2 > t*) 
where tn–2 is the Student t distribution with (n - 2) degrees of freedom and 
 
 
 
The resulting p-value will determine whether the data provide evidence to support the 
hypothesis (i.e. Annual Bonus and Total Shareholder Return are positively related to each 
other). If the p-value is less than 0.05 (i.e. with a 5% level of significance), the correlation is 
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considered to be significant. However, if the p-value is greater than 0.05, the result is not 
significant at 5% level and hence the correlation is insignificant. It is important to note that for 
hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d and H1e, before the testing was carried out using Model 1, the 
data have first been organised by ranking - the methodology of which is described below:  
 
Example: H1a Base Salary is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
 
Notation: (Si;Ci) represents the Base Salary and Market Capitalisation of the i company. In other 
words, the data can be arranged as (S1;C1); (S2;C2); : : : ; (Sn;Cn). 
 
Since the values of Market Capitalisation vary tremendously among FTSE 100 companies, it 
seems more appropriate to consider the relationship between the rank of Base Salary (‘Base 
Salary Rank’) and the rank of Market Capitalisation (‘Market Capitalisation Rank’) instead of 
using absolute levels. The hypothesis therefore predicts that the lower the rank of Base Salary, 
the lower the rank of Market Capitalisation and vice versa. 
 
Let s1; : : : ; sn be the rank of S1; : : : ; Sn and similarly c1; : : : ; cn be the rank of C1; : : : ;Cn.  
 
The example shown below illustrates how the ranking is compiled: 
 
S C s c 
10 100 4 3.5 
5 90 2.5 2 
3 100 1 3.5 
5 80 2.5 1 
 
The data for S include: (10; 5; 3; 5) where 3 is smallest and so it is ranked 1. The second 
smallest S is 5 and so is the third, in such a case, they are both ranked 2.5 which is the average 
of ranks 2 and 3. Lastly, 10 is the largest of all the numbers and so its ranking is 4. Based on this 
method, s is therefore (4; 2:5; 2:5; 1). Similarly, C is (100; 90; 100; 80) and in effect c consists 
of (3:5; 2:3:5; 1).  
 
Once the rankings are determined, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is applied: 
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The observed level of significance (i.e. the p-value) of the above test, as suggested by Peck et al 
(2005 chapter 13), will be used to determine whether the data provide evidence to support the 
hypothesis. If the p-value is less than 0.05 (i.e. with a 5% level of significance), the correlation is 
considered to be significant. However, if the p-value is greater than 0.05, the result is not 
significant at 5% level and hence the correlation is insignificant. 
 
3.3.2 Model 2 
 
Model 2 is designed to compare two sets of correlation.  
 
Example: H1g -The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Total Cash is stronger than 
the correlation between Market Capitalisation and Base Salary 
 
Symbols 
 
Notation Variable 
BS Base Salary 
TC Total Cash 
MC Market Capitalisation 
 
To translate this hypothesis into notation, let  TC MC be the correlation between Total Cash 
and Market Capitalisation. And let  BS MC be the correlation between Base Salary and Market 
Capitalisation. The hypothesis can be written as: 
 
H0 :  TC MC =  BS MC  vs  Ha :  TC MC > BS MC 
The sample data used here can again be grouped in a number of ways, the two main ones are: 
 
Sample A - covers one single position (i.e. CEO or Finance Director) over any given year and the 
data include: 
 
(TC1,BS1,MC1),(TC2,BS2,MC2),...,(TCn,BSn,MCn) 
 
Sample B - covers all main board positions (i.e. CEO, Finance Director and other executive 
directors) by averaging the Total Cash (AVETC) and the Base Salary (AVEBS) figures over any 
given year. The data for this sample are: 
(AVETC1,AVEBS1,MC1),(AVETC2,AVEBS2,MC2),...,(AVETCn,AVEBSn,MCn) 
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For both samples, n is the total number of companies in the FTSE 100 index minus any 
investment trusts and the sample correlation coefficient for Total Cash and Market 
Capitalisation is: 
 
 
 
where  
 
and  
 
Similarly, the sample correlation coefficient for Base Salary and Market Capitalisation and the 
sample correlation coefficient for Base Salary and Total Cash are: 
 
 
 
It appears that standard statistics texts, in general, do not cover this type of hypothesis testing 
problems. Nevertheless, Olkin and Finn (1990 and 1995) present a methodology for testing the 
following scenario: 
 
H0 :  TC MC =  BS MC  vs    Ha :  TC MC ≠ BS MC 
 
While Olkin and Finn’s example is a two-sided hypothesis test problem, H1g is a one-sided 
problem:  
 
H0 :  TC MC =  BS MC  vs  Ha :  TC MC > BS MC 
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So under hypothesis H1g, Ha will only be ‘significant’ if TC MC is significantly bigger than 
 BS MC.  
 
By modifying the result shown by Olkin and Finn (1990 and 1995), the observed level of 
significance (i.e. the p-value) of the test can be calculated as follow: 
 
p – value = P(Z > z*)   
 
where Z  is the standard Normal distribution and z*  is: 
 
 
     
and 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Model 3 
 
Model 3 is for testing the conjectures stated above in Part 3 under Section 3.2.3 (except for 
hypotheses H3l (i) and (ii) and H3m(i) and (ii) which are tested using Model 1). 
 
Example: H3a: The higher the level of Base Salary, the stronger the relationship between 
Total Cash and Company Performance (TSR) 
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Notation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where ‘standardised’ = (variable - average) / (standard deviation). 
 
Model: 
 
Y* = β1W* + β2X* + β3W*X* + Є 
 
This is a multiple regression model with interaction on standardised variables. 
 
In particular, β3 indicates the correlation between Total Cash and TSR for a given Base Salary. 
The output given is an estimation of β3 (standard error and the corresponding p-value). 
 
The resulted p-value is for testing if a trend (an increasing or a decreasing one) exists. In other 
words, it is to find out whether or not the relationship between Total Cash and TSR becomes 
stronger as Base Salary increases.  
 
Output for the above example: 
 
Conjecture: the higher the level of base salary, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Cash and TSR (for 2008/09; position: CEO). 
 
Estimate of β3 = 0.3979 
Test statistic = 1.41 (positive trend) 
p-value = 0.08200 (significant at 0.1 level) 
According to the above, the data do not refute the conjecture (i.e. the hypothesis is supported 
by the data
Notation Meaning 
Y Base Salary 
W Total Cash 
X TSR 
Y* ‘standardised’ Base Salary 
W* ‘standardised’ Total Cash 
X* ‘standardised’ TSR 
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4 Research results and key findings 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the descriptive properties of executive remuneration 
among companies in the FTSE 100 index. Next, the results of the tests of hypotheses will be 
presented (refer to Appendix for details), before turning to examining the selected key findings 
and observations derived from both the quantitative analyses and the literature review. 
 
4.1 Descriptive results 
 
As previously described in Chapter 3, based on a sample of the 100 largest companies in the UK 
over the period 2004-2009, this study tested 43 hypotheses - grouped under three parts: 
 
• Part 1: Relationship between company size and executive pay 
• Part 2: Relationship between executive pay and company performance 
• Part 3: Factors affecting the pay-performance (note: total cash and total compensation 
are the two pay variables included in the analysis) 
 
Due to the large number of analyses performed, this section will focus on the results that are 
most significant and noteworthy. Detailed statistical tables for all the tests conducted can, 
however, be found in Appendix C.  
 
4.1.1 Part 1: Relationship between company size and executive pay 
 
The hypotheses tested under this part of the analysis and the variables are set out below: 
 
Hypotheses: 
• H1a Base Salary is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
• H1b: Total Cash is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
• H1c: Total Compensation is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
• H1d: Base Salary Increase is positively related to Market Capitalisation 
• H1e: Variable Pay is positively correlated with Market Capitalisation 
• H1f: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Variable Pay is different from 
that between Market Capitalisation and Base Salary. 
• H1g: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Total Cash is different from 
that between Market Capitalisation and Base Salary  
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• H1h: The correlation between Market Capitalisation and Total Compensation is 
different from that between Market Capitalisation and Total Cash. 
 
FTSE 100 incumbent groups:    
• CEOs  
• Finance directors  
• All directors  
• All directors excluding CEOs. 
  
Size measure:            
• Market Capitalisation (data source: Bloomberg) 
Definition: Historical Market Capitalisation is calculated as: (Closing Price as of fiscal 
period end date) * (Shares outstanding at that period end date). Period end date is the 
most recent annual for which full fundamental data have been collected 
 
4.1.1.1 Results for part 1 
 
Pay and Size (H1a, H1b, H1c and H1e - Appendix C pages 285-286) 
Company Size is found to be strongly and positively related to Base Pay, Total Cash, Total 
Compensation and Variable Pay across the four incumbent groups. Previous research has 
consistently found that executive pay (base pay in particular) is primarily driven by company 
size. Similar results are observed for FTSE 100 companies. Further, it is interesting to see that 
the rS values are fairly constant (especially for the All Directors excluding CEOs incumbent group 
under hypothesis H1a - see Appendix C, page 285), indicating that the relationships have barely 
changed over the past five years. 
 
Base Salary Increase and Size (H1d - Appendix C page 286) 
Unlike the above, the relationship between Size and Base Pay Increase is not as clear cut, with 
only three significant positive results. There are even several negative correlations (Appendix C, 
page 286), something that is not found in hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c and H1e (Appendix C, 
pages 285-286). The results suggest that annual changes in Base Pay for executives are not 
determined by the Market Capitalisations of companies but perhaps to economic factors, e.g. 
inflation. Consistent findings are seen across all incumbent groups and throughout the study 
period. 
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Individual Pay components and Size (H1f, H1g and H1h - Appendix C pages 287-289) 
All the test stat numbers for H1f are negative (Appendix C, page 287), indicating that Size is 
more strongly related to Base Pay than it is to Variable Pay. In other words, the correlations 
observed in H1a are stronger than those presented in H1e, although all relationships are 
significant and positive.  
 
Again, while both H1a and H1b show strong positive results, H1g (Appendix C, page 288) 
suggests that the former relationship (Size-Base Pay) appears to be stronger than the latter 
(Size-Total Cash). All but one of the test stat of H1h (Appendix C, page 289) is negative which 
means Total Cash is more strongly related to Size than Total Compensation (i.e. H1b produces 
stronger positive results than H1c). However, the findings are not as significant as H1g and even 
least so than H1f, suggesting that Size is more strongly related to Base Pay than it is to Variable 
Pay, Total Cash and Total Compensation. Moreover, a difference in the strength of correlation 
with Size has been observed among the various pay elements. Though all positive, its link with 
Base Pay is the strongest, followed by Total Cash then Total Compensation and least so with 
Variable Pay. 
 
4.1.2 Part 2: Relationship between executive pay and company performance 
 
The nine hypotheses and the variables included in this part of the study are as follows: 
 
Hypotheses: 
• H2a: Base Salary Increase is negatively related to Company Performance 
• H2b: Annual Actual Bonus Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
• H2c: Total Cash Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
• H2d: Long term Incentive Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
• H2e: Variable Pay Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
• H2f: Total Compensation Increase is positively related to Company Performance 
• H2g: The correlation between Total Compensation and Company Performance is 
stronger than the correlation between Total Cash and Company Performance 
• H2h: The strength of the relation between Total Cash and Company Performance has 
increased over the period 2004-2009 
• H2i: The strength of the relation between Total Compensation and Company 
Performance has increased over the period 2004-2009. 
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FTSE 100 incumbent groups:    
• CEOs  
• Finance directors  
• All directors  
• All directors excluding CEOs. 
  
Measures of company performance: 
• One-year EPS Growth (data source: Datastream) 
Definition: Earnings per Share Growth is based on Basic EPS before Extraordinary items 
and is calculated using the following formula: 
[(EPS for the current period - EPS for the previous period)/(EPS for the previous 
period)] * 100 
• EBITDA Margin (data source: Bloomberg) 
Definition: EBITDA Margin is calculated as trailing twelve month EBITDA divided by 
trailing twelve month sales, times 100.  
• One-year Sales/Revenue Growth (data source: Datastream) 
Definition: Sales/Revenue year change (growth, in percentage) is calculated using the 
following formula: 
[(Net Sales/Revenue for the current period - 1)/(Net Sales/Revenue for the last 
period)]*100 
• One-year Net Income Growth (data source: Bloomberg)  
Definition: Net income year change (growth, in percentage) is calculated using the 
following formula: 
 [(Net Income for the current period - 1)/(Net Income for the last period)]*100 
• Total Shareholder Return (data source: Datastream) 
Definition: TSR represents a theoretical growth in value of a shareholding over a 
specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units 
of an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. It is 
calculated using the following formula with Pricebegin = share price at beginning of 
period, Priceend = share price at end of period and Dividends = dividends paid: 
TSR = (Priceend - Pricebegin + Dividends) / Pricebegin 
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• Return on Equity (data source: Bloomberg) 
Definition: Return on equity (ROE), in percentage, is calculated as trailing 12 month Net 
Income (Losses) minus trailing 12 month Cash Preferred Dividends, divided by Average 
of Total Common Equity, times 100.  
      
4.1.2.1 Results for part 2 
  
Base Pay and Performance (H2a - Appendix C page 291) 
Considering all incumbent groups, Sales is the performance measure that has the highest 
number of significant positive, relationships with Base Salary Increase over the past five years, 
followed by Net Income and ROE. It is important to point out that practically all of the 
significant observations for Sales and Net Income are found in the earlier years (2004/05 and 
2005/06). More recently, there appears to be a shift to ROE, with three of the four (CEO being 
the exception) incumbent groups demonstrating a significant positive link between Base Pay 
Increase and ROE in 2008/09. 
 
As expected, Base Pay Increase does not seem to be strongly related to Performance (or to Size 
as seen in H1d). No clear trend of associations has been observed other than those just-
mentioned. However, it is worth noting that in 2008/09, Finance Director Base Pay Increase is 
significantly linked to three performance measures, namely: Sales, TSR and ROE.  
 
Compared to the other incumbent groups, CEO has the fewest number of significant positive 
Base Pay Increase-Performance links. One explanation could be that CEO Pay Increase is more 
likely to be driven on external market and economic factors.  
 
Annual bonus and Performance (H2b - Appendix C page 292) 
Annual Bonus is positively correlated to TSR for all positions every year between 2006 and 2009 
(2005 too for Finance Director and All Directors minus CEOs). However, it is not linked to other 
performance measures. The only other significant positive result is found in 2007/08 between 
Sales and the All Director minus CEOs group. While not related to any performance measures in 
2004/05, bonus is consistently positively linked to TSR in the past three to four years. It is well 
documented that LTIs have the potential to drive shareholder value but not so much annual 
bonus, making the results here rather interesting. 
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Total Cash and Performance (H2c - Appendix C page 293) 
A strong positive correlation is found in 2008/09 between Total Cash and TSR for all incumbent 
groups. In particular, this positive link is observed for four consecutive years for the All 
Directors minus CEOs group, and three years for All Directors. For year 2008/09, CEO Total Cash 
is positively linked to four performance measures: Sales, Net Income, TSR and ROE. Similarly, 
Finance Director Total Cash is related to four measures: EPS, Sales, TSR and ROE. All Directors 
minus CEOs Total Cash is found to be linked to Net Income, TSR and ROE. Again, most of the 
more significant results are produced by the TSR measure. 
 
It is interesting to note that Total Cash of the top two positions (CEO and Finance Director) is 
linked to TSR in only two years, which is fewer than the other two incumbent groups . The 
Finance Director group and the All Directors minus CEOs group have the most number of 
significant positive correlations between Total Cash and Performance (eight each). Year 
2008/09 has by the far the highest number of positive Total Cash-Performance links: 2004/05: 
three; 2005/06: six; 2006/07: three; 2007/08: two; 2008/09: twelve). 
 
Long term Incentives (LTIs) and Performance (H2d - Appendix C page 294) 
Only the CEO and the Finance Director groups are included in H2d as the LTIs data for the other 
two groups are not complete. Also note that 2004/05 has insufficient data for the analysis to be 
carried out. Finance Director LTIs is significantly positively related to TSR for three consecutive 
years: 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08. Whereas CEO LTIs and TSR produces significant 
correlations for two years in 2005/06 and 2007/08. The best year for Finance Director appears 
to be 2005/06 with three significant relationships with EPS, Sales and TSR.  
 
As for CEO, it is 2006/07 where LTIs is linked to EBITDA, Net Income and TSR. There are no 
positive link between LTIs and Performance at all in 2008/09. Of all the pay elements, LTIs is 
often expected to be most related to company performance because LTI plans used by FTSE 100 
companies all supposedly have ‘appropriate’ and ‘challenging’ targets attached. Yet, the results 
seem to suggest otherwise.  
 
For many companies, TSR is used as the performance target within their LTI plans (performance 
share plan in particular), therefore, it is not surprising to find it positively related to CEO and 
Finance Director LTIs in more cases than other measures. However, unlike Annual Bonus and 
Total Cash, CEO LTIs and Finance Director LTIs are not related to TSR (or any measure) 
in2008/09. This is particularly interesting given 2008/09 is the year where Total Cash is 
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significantly linked to the most number of measures, with all four incumbent groups 
demonstrate a positive link with TSR. 
 
Variable Pay (i.e. Annual Bonus plus LTIs) and Performance (H2e - Appendix C page 295) 
As with H2b, H2c and H2d, TSR is the measure that demonstrates the most number of 
significant positive results, in this case with Variable Pay. There are nine of such observations, 
three of which are found in the All Directors minus CEOs group. In more detail, Variable Pay is 
related to TSR for the All Directors minus CEOs group in 2008/09, and across all incumbent 
groups in both 2004/2005 and 2007/08.  
 
However, no significant result is found at all between 2005 and 2007. Another point worth 
noting is that in 2008/09, Variable Pay (for all positions) is significantly linked to ROE (rather 
than TSR).  
 
Is Variable Pay performance related at all? Not on the face of it but for the last two years, it is 
actually related to either TSR or ROE for all positions. Same can be said for 2004/05. There is for 
some reason a gap where there is no significant performance link in 2005/06 and 2006/07. It is 
also interesting to note that Variable Pay does not appear to be as related to performance as 
Total Cash (see Table 10). 
 
Total Compensation and Performance (H2f - Appendix C page 296) 
TSR is once again the Performance measure that appears to be most related to Pay - Total 
Compensation in this instance, although not for 2008/09.CEO Total Compensation is linked to 
TSR in three of the last five years, and two of the three for Finance Directors and All Directors, 
and only one for the All Directors minus CEOs group. This is different from the other hypotheses 
in that the CEO group has more significant relationships with TSR than the other incumbent 
groups.  
 
The significance of Total Cash (H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e and H2f - Appendix C pages 291-296) 
It can be seen from Table 10 that over the study period, Total Cash is the pay element with the 
greatest overall number of significant positive links to company performance. For the All 
Directors minus CEOs group, Total Cash is significantly related to performance in eight cases, 
followed by Variable Pay (seven cases). Base Pay Increase and Annual Bonus have five 
significant positive links each, while Total Compensation only has four. When only the data for 
the CEO and Finance Director groups are taken into account (to include LTIs), Total Cash still has 
most significant results (13 cases).  
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The Pay and Performance relationship by Incumbent Group (H2a, H2b, H2c, H2e and H2f - 
Appendix C pages 291-296) 
Looking more closely at all the Pay-Performance links for the four incumbent groups (leaving 
out H2d - only sufficient LTIs data for CEO and Finance Directors), it is observed that the CEO 
group has the least number of significant results with only 18. All Directors minus CEOs has the 
most with 30, followed by Finance Director then All Directors with 27 and 23 respectively (see 
Table 10). Even when focusing on just the pay variables that have one or more performance-
related components (i.e. taking out Base Pay Increase), similar results are observed with the 
CEO group being the least performance related in terms of the number of significant positive 
pay-performance correlations (15 cases). 
 
The All Directors minus CEOs group has 23 of such relationships, while the Finance Director 
group has 20 and the All Directors group has 17.There are two-thirds more positive pay-
performance correlations found in the All Directors minus CEOs group than the CEO group 
which is rather interesting and arguably surprising. CEO pay is often under more scrutiny and 
thus expected to be more closely linked to performance than other executives. 
 
Similar findings are found even after taking Base Pay Increase, a variable that the CEO group is 
least related to Performance, out of the equation. Comparing the CEO group with the Finance 
Director group, the latter is consistently observed to have a higher number of significant 
positive Pay-Performance links than the former, irrespective of whether LTIs and Base Salary 
Increase is taken into consideration. 
 
Table 10 Total number of significant positive correlations between 2004 and 2009 by pay element and 
incumbent group 
    CEO 
Finance 
Directors 
All 
Directors All - CEO 
Total all 
groups 
 
CEO 
+ 
FD 
 
n 
H2a Base Increase 3 7 6 5 21 
 
10 
 
30 
H2b Annual Bonus 3 4 3 5 15 
 
7 
 
30 
H2c Total Cash 5 8 5 8 26 
 
13 
 
30 
H2d LTIs 4 5 
 
    
 
9 
 
24 
H2e Variable Pay 3 5 3 7 18 
 
8 
 
30 
H2f Total Comp 4 3 6 4 17 
 
7 
 
30 
All Pay elements: 22 32     
Excluding H2a: 19 25 
 
  
Excluding H2d: 18 27 23 29 
Excluding H2a & H2d: 15 20 17 24 
Difference in % 
FD vs 
CEO 
All - CEO 
vs CEO 
All Pay elements: 45.45%   
Excluding H2a: 31.58%   
Excluding H2d: 50.00% 61.11% 
Excluding H2a & H2d: 33.33% 60.00% 
Source: this author 
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Comparing the Pay and Performance relationships between CEOs and Finance Directors (H2a, 
H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e and H2f - Appendix C pages 291-296) 
Turning the focus to only the CEO and the Finance Director groups (including H2e - LTIs), the 
former demonstrates a significant Pay-Performance correlation in 22 cases whereas there are 
32 cases for the latter group (with a difference of 45.45%). Even when Base Pay Increase is 
excluded, the figures become 19 for the CEO group and 25 for the Finance Director group. As 
seen in Table 10, these differences in percentage terms are relatively significant, ranging from 
31.58% (all pay elements except Base Pay Increase) to 50% (all elements except LTIs). 
 
The Pay and Performance relationship by Performance Measure (H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e and 
H2f - Appendix C pages 291-296) 
Comparing the six different performance measures over the study period and across the four 
incumbent groups, TSR has by far the highest number of significant positive relationships with 
executive pay in general (all elements except LTIs) with 45 cases. Sales is next down the list with 
16 cases which only amounts to about a third of that of TSR. Net Income and ROE both have 14 
cases while EBITDA has five and EPS only three, making it the least related to executive pay.  
 
Table 11(i) shows that the figures for TSR are consistently high for each of the incumbent 
groups. Looking at just the CEO and Finance Director groups but all pay variables (i.e. including 
H2d - LTIs), the findings are fairly similar (Table 11(ii)). The inclusion of LTIs results only makes 
TSR appear even more related to Pay than the other performance measures. CEO Pay appears 
to be consistently less related to performance (all measures) than Finance and other directors. 
Broadly, apart from TSR, all other performance measures appear to have little to do with 
executive pay.  
 
Table 11 Total number of significant positive correlations between 2004 and 2009 by incumbent group and 
performance measure 
Table 11(i): H2a, H2b, H2c, H2e and H2f (excluding H2d - LTIs) 
      EPS EBITDA Sales Net Inc TSR ROE 
 
n 
CEO 0 0 2 2 11 3 
 
25 
FD 2 1 5 3 12 4 
 
25 
All 0 2 4 4 10 3 
 
25 
All-CEO 1 2 5 5 12 4 
 
25 
Total 3 5 16 14 45 14 
 
100 
 
Table 11(i): Expressed in percentage terms: 
       
EPS EBITDA Sales Net Inc TSR ROE 
  CEO 0.00% 0.00% 8.00% 8.00% 44.00% 12.00% 
  FD 8.00% 4.00% 20.00% 12.00% 48.00% 16.00% 
  All 0.00% 8.00% 16.00% 16.00% 40.00% 12.00% 
  All-CEO 4.00% 8.00% 20.00% 20.00% 48.00% 16.00% 
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Table 11(ii): All Pay elements 
          EPS EBITDA Sales Net Inc TSR ROE 
 
Total 
 
n 
CEO 1 0 3 2 13 3 
 
22 
 
29 
FD 2 2 5 4 15 4 
 
32 
 
29 
Total 3 2 8 6 28 7 
   
58 
           Table 11(ii): Expressed in percentage terms: 
         EPS EBITDA Sales Net Inc TSR ROE 
    CEO 3.45% 0.00% 10.34% 6.90% 44.83% 10.34% 
    FD 6.90% 6.90% 17.24% 13.79% 51.72% 13.79% 
    Source: this author 
 
The significance of TSR as a Performance Measure (H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e and H2f - 
Appendix C pages 291-296) 
As noted earlier, TSR has emerged as the Performance measure that is most often correlated to 
Pay. Delving deeper into results for TSR (also see Table 12(i)), it is found that over the past five 
years across the four incumbent groups, the Pay element (excluding LTIs) that has shown the 
most number of positive relationship with TSR is Annual Bonus (14/20 cases). There are 27% 
more positive correlations to TSR for Annual Bonus than Total Cash.  
 
Focusing only on the results for the CEO and the Finance Director groups and including LTIs, 
Annual Bonus comes out top with seven out of eight cases, then closely followed by LTIs with 
five cases (Table 12(ii)). Contrary to the results, it was expected that there would be more 
positive correlations between TSR-LTIs than TSR-Annual Bonus which is rather interesting and 
will be discussed further later in the Section 4.2 as well as in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Table 12 Total shareholder return (TSR) analysis 
Table 12(i): TSR analysis - all incumbent groups excluding long term incentives 
   
  Base Increase 
Annual 
Bonus Total Cash 
Variable 
Pay Total Comp Total 
 
n 
2004/05 0 0 1 4 1 6 
 
20 
2005/06 1 2 2 0 3 8 
  2006/07 0 4 2 0 0 6 
  2007/08 1 4 2 4 4 15 
  2008/09 1 4 4 1 0 10 
  Total 3 14 11 9 8 45 
  Total % 15.00% 70.00% 55.00% 45.00% 40.00% 
            
Table 12(ii): TSR Analysis - CEO and Finance Directors including long term incentives (2004/05 
excluded due to insufficient data) 
  Base Increase 
Annual 
Bonus Total Cash 
Variable 
Pay Total Comp LTIs 
 
n 
2005/06 1 1 1 1 2 2 
 
8 
2006/07 0 2 0 0 0 1 
  2007/08 1 2 0 2 2 2 
  2008/09 1 2 2 0 0 0 
  Total 3 7 3 3 4 5 
  Total % 37.50% 87.50% 37.50% 37.50% 50.00% 62.50% 
  Source: this author 
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The Pay and Performance relationship by Year (H2a, H2b, H2c, H2e, H2f, H2h and H2i - 
Appendix C pages 291-296) 
Examining the results year by year, with 28 cases, 2008/09 has the greatest number of positive 
Pay-Performance correlations across the four incumbent groups (excluding LTIs but including all 
performance measures). 2004/05, 2005/06 and 2007/08 have similar number of cases, ranging 
from 19 to 23.  
 
However, it must be emphasised that there is a clear dip in 2006/07 down to only eight cases, 
possibly due to the economic down turn related to the banking crisis. Table 13 shows that while 
2008/09 has the most positive relationships, 28 cases may not be enough to say that there is a 
significant improvement in the pay-performance link. Moreover, there does not seem to be any 
trends or patterns emerging from the results which is in line with a recently study by Gregg et al 
(2012) who confirmed that executive compensation is more sensitive to company size than 
company performance within UK companies. They also provided evidence suggesting that there 
is no significant trend over time for the pay-size sensitivity between the period 1994/95 and 
2005/06 which is consistent with what the present study has found 2004/05 to 2008/09. 
 
Table 13 Total number of significant positive pay-performance correlations by year and incumbent group 
  
CEO FD 
All 
Directors All - CEO Total 
 
n 
2004/05 4 4 4 7 19 
 
30 
2005/06 3 8 6 6 23 
 
30 
2006/07 1 1 3 3 8 
 
30 
2007/08 3 5 6 5 19 
 
30 
2008/09 7 9 4 8 28 
 
30 
Total 18 27 23 29 
  
150 
Source: this author 
 
4.1.3 Part 3: Factors affecting the pay-performance relationship 
 
The third part of the study examined the factors that may affect the pay and performance link, 
using the same four Incumbent Groups and six Performance Measures described above under 
Part 2.  
 
A list of the hypotheses is shown below, followed by a summary of the list of factors: 
• H3a(i) and H3a(ii): The higher the level of Base Salary, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
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• H3b(i) and H3b(ii): The higher the level of Total Compensation, the stronger the 
relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3c(i) and H3c(ii): The higher the proportion of actual Variable Pay, the stronger the 
relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3d(i) and H3d(ii): The higher the proportion of LTIs, the stronger the relationship 
between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3e(i) and H3e(ii): The larger the company (in terms of Market Capitalisation), the 
stronger the relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance 
• H3f(i) and H3f(ii): The larger the board (number of executive and non-executive 
directors), the weaker the relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and 
Performance. 
• H3g(i) and H3g(ii): The higher the proportion of non-executives, the stronger the 
relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3h(i) and H3h(ii): The larger the size of the Remuneration Committee, the stronger 
the relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3i(i) and H3i(ii): The longer the tenure, the stronger the relationship between Total 
Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3j(i) and H3j(ii): The greater the number of LTI plans, the weaker the relationship 
between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3k(i) and H3k(ii): The higher the maximum award level of Annual Bonus, the stronger 
the relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and Performance. 
• H3l(i) and H3l(ii): CEO Total Cash / Total Compensation is more strongly linked to 
Performance than that of executive directors 
• H3m(i) and H3m(ii): The relationship between Total Cash / Total Compensation and 
Performance varies across industries/sectors. 
 
Factors affecting the relationship between Pay and Company Performance:    
• Absolute Base Salary level  
• Total Compensation level  
• Variable Pay as a percentage of Total Compensation 
• LTIs as a percentage of Total Compensation  
• Company Size  
• Board Size (total number of executive and non-executive directors)  
• Non-executive Directive / Executive Director ratio  
• Remuneration Committee Size  
• Tenure  
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• Positions (comparing CEOs to other executive directors)  
• Number of LTI plans in operation  
• Maximum Annual Bonus grant size  
• Industry.  
 
4.1.3.1  Results for part 3 
 
The effects of Base Salary levels on the Pay-Performance relationship (H3a(i) and H3a(ii) - 
Appendix C pages 305-306) 
 The results for H3a(i) do not seem to show any patterns - the test stat numbers are not leaning 
towards one direction, indicating that Absolute Base Pay level has little impact on the 
relationship between Total Cash and Performance. However, the test stat s for H3a(ii) are 
mostly negative, suggesting that the higher the Base Salary level, the weaker the link between 
Total Compensation and Company Performance (i.e. the hypothesis is not supported).  
 
This observation is particularly evident for the CEO group in 2008/09 and for TSR where 
significant results are present in five out of six the performance measures and for four 
consecutive years since 2005/06 respectively. According to results in Part 1, Base Salary is 
strongly and positively related to Company Size. This may therefore suggest that the correlation 
between Total Compensation and Performance is weaker among larger companies. Based on 
this finding and that of Annual Bonus being the most TSR related pay element, perhaps one 
could argue that companies should re-balance the Total Cash mix of executives and focus more 
on the variable element. 
 
Focusing on the CEOs, this group shows the most number of significant results which indicates 
that the Total Compensation-Performance relationship is more likely to be negatively affected 
by Base Pay for CEOs than it is for other groups. Specifically, the results suggest that the link 
between Total Compensation and TSR could be weakened by higher Base Pay.  
 
The effects of Variable Pay on the Pay-Performance relationship (H3c(i) and H3c(ii) - Appendix 
C pages 309-310) 
Although there are some negative numbers, all of the significant P-values for H3c(i) have 
positive test stats. This supports the hypothesis (i.e. the higher proportion of Variable Pay the 
stronger the Total Cash-Performance link) to a certain extent. H3c(ii) shows similar results for 
the Total Compensation-Performance link. It is not exactly surprising to find that higher 
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proportion of Variable Pay has a positive effect on the Pay-Performance link. And TSR being the 
measure that produced significant results does tally with other findings in Part 2. 
 
The effect of LTIs on the Pay-Performance relationship (H3d(i) and H3c(ii) - Appendix C pages 
311-312) 
Hypothesis H3d(i) has only produced a small number of significant P-values. However, based on 
the signs of the test stats, the results appear to be consistent with those of H2d. For H3d(ii), 
there is a considerable number of negative test stats, suggesting that the higher the proportion 
of LTIs, the weaker the relationship between Total Compensation and Performance which is 
contrary to the prediction. The only positive significant results include the CEO group: 2005/06 
TSR; 2007/08 TSR and the Finance Director group: 2005/06 TSR; 2006/07 TSR and Net Income; 
2007/08 TSR. The results of H3d(ii) do mirror those of H2d in that higher LTIs proportion 
appears to have a positive effect on the Total Compensation-TSR relationship despite largely 
not with other performance measures. 
 
The effects of Size on the Pay-Performance relationship (H3e(i) and H3e(ii) - Appendix C pages 
312-313) 
The results for H3e(i) do not appear to show any patterns. The test stat numbers are not 
leaning towards one direction. Company size appears to have little impact on the relationship 
between Total Cash and Performance which is consistent with the findings of H3a(i) as it is the 
larger companies that tend to pay higher base salaries. For H3e(ii), the results are not 
significantly indicative but most of the test stat signs are negative which imply that the larger 
the size of companies, the weaker the Total Compensation-Performance link. While Size is the 
main driver of Base Pay levels of executives, it has relatively little, if any, influence on the Pay-
Performance relationships. Larger companies tend to have very different pay practices to 
smaller ones but among the FTSE 100 group, the differences are not significant enough to affect 
the pay-performance link. 
 
The effect of Board Structure on the Pay-Performance relationship (H3f(i), H3f(ii), H3g(i), 
H3g(ii), H3h(i) and H3h(ii) - Appendix C pages 314-328) 
H3f (Board Size), H3g (Proportion of Non-executive Directors) and H3h (Remuneration 
Committee Size) are the three variables which were tested to examine the impact of corporate 
governance board structure factors on the Pay-Performance link. The results for H3g and H3h 
are mostly random, indicating that the Proportion of Non-executive Director and Remuneration 
Committee Size bear little effect on the Pay-Performance relationship.  
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Board Size seems to be the only factor that demonstrates some mildly meaningful results. Most 
test stat numbers are negative, suggesting that the link between Pay-Performance is negatively 
correlated to Board Size for hypotheses H3f(i) and H3f(ii). Both sets of results indicate that the 
larger the board, the weaker the Pay-Performance link. H3f(i) appears to have produced more 
significant than H3f(ii), i.e. Board Size negatively affects the Total Cash-Performance link more 
than the Total Compensation-Performance link. 
 
The effect of Bonus Opportunities on the Pay-Performance relationship (H3k(i) and H3k(ii) - 
Appendix C pages 323-324) 
Most test stat numbers are positive for both H3k(i) and H3k(ii), suggesting that the greater the 
bonus potential, the more closely linked is it between Pay and Performance. The overall 
significance level is higher for H3k(ii) - Total Compensation-performance relationship than that 
of H3k(i) - Total Cash-performance relationship.  
 
It is common practice for companies to have different Maximum Annual Bonus Opportunity (as 
reflected in Table 1) for their CEOs and other executive directors (and sometimes even a 
different plan structure with different measures altogether). The purpose to have different 
plans is often due to the recognition that CEOs have more influence over the company 
performance and greater responsibility. However it appears that bigger bonus potential does 
not necessarily improve the Pay-Performance link significantly.  
 
The Pay-Performance relationship - Total Cash vs Total Compensation (H2c, H2f, H3l(i) and 
H3l(ii), Appendix C pages 293, 296 and 325-328) 
Before moving on to discussing H3l(i) and H3l(ii) which are focused on the relationship between 
Performance and Total Cash and Total Compensation, it is important to first look at the results 
of H2c and H2f side by side. As shown in Tables 14(i) and 14(ii), in 2008/09, considering all four 
incumbent groups, there are 11 cases where Total Cash is significantly correlated to 
performance.  
 
However, there is only one case for Total Compensation. Over the study period, Total Cash is 
significantly correlated to performance in 26 cases; Total Compensation has only 18 cases. In 
other words, looking at the broad picture, Total Cash seems to be more related to Performance 
than Total Compensation. 
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Table 14 Comparisons of pay-performance relationships between H2c and H2f  
Table 14(i): H2c - The number of significant positive correlations between total cash and performance across 
all incumbent groups by year and position 
  CEO FD 
All 
Directors All - CEO Total 
2004/05 1 1 1 1 4 
2005/06 0 3 1 2 6 
2006/07 0 0 1 1 2 
2007/08 0 1 1 1 3 
2008/09 3 4 1 3 11 
Total 4 9 5 8 26 
 
Table 14(ii): H2f - The number of significant positive correlations between total compensation and 
performance across all incumbent groups by year and position 
  
CEO FD 
All 
Directors All - CEO Total 
2004/05 1 0 1 2 4 
2005/06 1 2 3 1 7 
2006/07 0 0 0 1 1 
2007/08 1 1 2 1 5 
2008/09 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 3 6 5 18 
Source: this author 
The relationship between Total Cash and Performance - CEOs vs Other Directors (H3l(i), 
Appendix C pages 325-326) 
Hypothesis H3l(i) is not supported by the results as CEO Total Cash is not more positively 
related to Performance than other incumbent groups. The incumbent groups Finance Director 
and All Directors minus CEOs both out-ranked CEO in this respect (see Table 15(ii) for details). In 
fact, the CEO group has the most number of Rank 4s.  
 
Research tends to report that CEO's pay package often have a greater proportion of variable 
elements such as LTIs than those of other directors. And variable pay should in theory improve 
the Pay-Performance link. However the results for H3l(i) do not support this argument and the 
CEO group does not have stronger Pay-Performance relationships than the other incumbent 
groups. Quite conversely, Tables 15(i) and (ii) show that CEOs are often with the least number 
of significant correlations and the least correlated in terms of significance. 
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Table 15 Total cash: CEOs vs other directors 
Table 15(i) - Ranking 
Total Cash vs Company Performance 
Year 2004/05 
  CEO FD All Dir All - CEO 
EPS 1 2 3 4 
EBITDA 3 4 1 2 
Sales 4 3 2 1 
Net Inc 3 4 2 1 
TSR 1 2 3 4 
ROE 3 4 1 2 
          
Total Cash vs Company Performance 
Year 2005/06 
  CEO FD All Dir All - CEO 
EPS 4 2 3 1 
EBITDA 4 3 2 1 
Sales 4 1 3 2 
Net Inc 4 1 3 2 
TSR 4 1 3 2 
ROE 2 1 4 3 
     
Total Cash vs Company Performance 
Year 2006/07 
  CEO FD All Dir All - CEO 
EPS 2 4 3 1 
EBITDA 1 2 3 4 
Sales 4 2 3 1 
Net Inc 2 4 3 1 
TSR 4 3 1 2 
ROE 2 1 4 3 
          
Total Cash vs Company Performance 
Year 2007/08 
  CEO FD All Dir All - CEO 
EPS 1 4 3 2 
EBITDA 4 1 2 3 
Sales 4 3 2 1 
Net Inc 3 2 4 1 
TSR 4 3 2 1 
ROE 4 3 2 1 
          
Total Cash vs Company Performance 
Year 2008/09 
  CEO FD All Dir All - CEO 
EPS 4 1 3 2 
EBITDA 3 4 2 1 
Sales 2 1 4 3 
Net Inc 1 3 4 2 
TSR 4 1 3 2 
ROE 3 1 4 2 
Source: this author 
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Table 15(ii) - Counts 
Total Cash 
2004/05 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 2 0 2 2 
# Rank 2 0 2 2 2 
# Rank 3 3 1 2 0 
# Rank 4 1 3 0 2 
          
2005/06 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 0 4 0 2 
# Rank 2 1 1 1 3 
# Rank 3 0 1 4 1 
# Rank 4 5 0 1 0 
          
2006/07 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 1 1 1 3 
# Rank 2 3 2 0 1 
# Rank 3 0 1 4 1 
# Rank 4 2 2 1 1 
          
2007/08 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 1 1 0 4 
# Rank 2 0 1 4 1 
# Rank 3 1 3 1 1 
# Rank 4 4 1 1 0 
          
2009/09 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 1 4 0 1 
# Rank 2 1 0 1 4 
# Rank 3 2 1 2 1 
# Rank 4 2 1 3 0 
          
Total: CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 5 10 3 12 
# Rank 2 5 6 8 11 
# Rank 3 6 7 13 4 
# Rank 4 14 7 6 3 
Source: this author 
The relationship between Total Compensation and Performance - CEOs vs Other Directors 
(H3l(ii), Appendix C pages 327-328) 
Similar to H3l(i), CEO Total Compensation is not more positively correlated to Performance than 
other incumbent groups. While there are more Rank 1s for the CEO group, only two of them are 
significant results (Table 16(i)). Again, the CEO group has actually the most number of Rank 4s 
(see Table 16(ii)). The All Director minus CEO groups appears to have stronger correlations 
between Pay and Performance than the CEO group. 
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Table 16 Total compensation and performance: CEOs vs other directors 
Table 16(i) - Rank 
   Total Compensation vs Company Performance 
Year 2004/05 
  CEO FD All Dir All – CEO 
EPS 2 1 3 4 
EBITDA 1 4 2 3 
Sales 4 3 2 1 
Net Inc 4 3 2 1 
TSR 1 2 3 4 
ROE 3 4 1 2 
          
Total Compensation vs Company Performance 
Year 2005/06 
  CEO FD All Dir All – CEO 
EPS 4 1 3 2 
EBITDA 3 4 2 1 
Sales 4 3 1 2 
Net Inc 4 3 1 2 
TSR 2 3 1 4 
ROE 1 4 3 2 
          
Total Compensation vs Company Performance 
Year 2006/07 
  CEO FD All Dir All – CEO 
EPS 4 3 2 1 
EBITDA 2 4 3 1 
Sales 4 1 3 2 
Net Inc 2 4 1 3 
TSR 4 2 1 3 
ROE 1 4 2 3 
          
Total Compensation vs Company Performance 
Year 2007/08 
 
CEO FD All Dir All – CEO 
EPS 1 4 3 2 
EBITDA 2 1 3 4 
Sales 4 2 1 3 
Net Inc 4 2 3 1 
TSR 4 3 2 1 
ROE 3 4 1 2 
          
Total Compensation vs Company Performance 
Year 2008/09 
 
CEO FD All Dir All – CEO 
EPS 1 4 3 2 
EBITDA 3 2 4 1 
Sales 1 2 4 3 
Net Inc 4 2 3 1 
TSR 4 2 3 1 
ROE 1 4 2 3 
Source: this author 
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Table 16(ii) - Counts 
   Total Compensation 
2004/05 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 2 1 1 2 
# Rank 2 1 1 3 1 
# Rank 3 1 2 2 1 
# Rank 4 2 2 0 2 
          
2005/06 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 1 1 3 1 
# Rank 2 1 0 1 4 
# Rank 3 1 3 2 0 
# Rank 4 3 2 0 1 
          
2006/07 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 1 1 2 2 
# Rank 2 2 1 2 1 
# Rank 3 0 1 2 3 
# Rank 4 3 3 0 0 
          
2007/08 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 1 1 2 2 
# Rank 2 1 2 1 2 
# Rank 3 1 1 3 1 
# Rank 4 3 2 0 1 
          
2009/09 CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 3 0 0 3 
# Rank 2 0 4 1 1 
# Rank 3 1 0 3 2 
# Rank 4 2 2 2 0 
          
Total: CEO FD All Dir All-CEO 
# Rank 1 8 4 8 10 
# Rank 2 5 8 8 9 
# Rank 3 4 7 12 7 
# Rank 4 13 11 2 4 
Source: this author 
The Pay-Performance relationship by Industry (H3m(i) and H3m(ii) - Appendix C pages 329-
352) 
Considering all incumbent groups and performance measures (between 2004-2009), the 
industry that has the most number of positive Total Cash-Performance links is Oil/Gas and 
Minerals, followed by Finance then Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals. If split by incumbent group, 
the top result for each is as follows: 
 
CEOs: Other services 
Finance Directors: Finance 
All Directors: Oil/Gas and Minerals 
All Directors excluding CEOs: Oil/Gas and Minerals. 
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Retail & distribution and Transport & Leisure are the two industries that have the most number 
of negative relationships. It is interesting that Finance actually comes second (in terms of the 
number of significant positive results) given all the controversy over bankers’ bonuses in recent 
years. And it has only one negative correlation (compared to 10 for Retail & Distribution and 
Transport and Leisure (see Tables 17(i) and 17(iii) for details; note: industries with zero counts 
have not been included). 
 
As for Total Compensation, the Chemical & Pharmaceuticals industry has the greatest number 
of significant positive correlations, followed by Food/drink & tobacco then by Finance. Property 
and Utilities have the highest number of negative correlations. Again, Finance did not fare as 
badly as one might expect (see Tables 18(i) and 18(iii) for details; note: industries with zero 
counts have not been included). In addition, it is found that TSR is the performance measure 
that has the most number of significant positive links with Total Cash across the industries (22 
cases). These results are dominated by three sectors, namely Finance, Oil/Gas and Minerals and 
Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals. The other performance measures have between 11 to 14 cases 
of significant positive result each. 
 
In term of measures with significant negative performance links, EBITDA fares worst with 14 
cases (many of which in either the Retail & Distribution or the Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals 
sectors), followed closely by TSR (mainly Engineering Electrical and other Manufacture 
companies) and ROE (mainly Transport & Leisure companies) with 13 cases each. 
 
Although the data are not too robust, it may be worth pointing out that for the CEO group, EPS 
is the measure that has the greatest number of significant positive Total Cash-Performance 
relationships across the industries. At the same time, for the All Directors minus CEOs group, 
EPS has the least number of such links. Further, the measure that has the highest number of 
significant positive correlations with Total Compensation across the industries is Sales (22 cases 
- mainly Food/Drink & Tobacco, Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals and Media/Marketing & 
Telecommunications companies).  
 
TSR came next with 18 cases (largely Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals and Finance companies). EPS 
and TSR have the fewest significant negative links. Similar results are observed across the 
incumbent groups. As seen in Tables 17(ii) and 17(iv), 2008/09 has the highest number of 
significant positive Total Cash-Performance links across the industries while also the least 
number of negative links. The same year also sees the most significant positive Total 
Compensation-Performance relationships. Yet there are also the highest numbers of such 
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negative links (Tables 18 (ii) and 18(iv) for details). Again, the data may not be robust enough 
for any of the findings to be considered statistically significant due to the relatively small 
sample size. 
 
Table 17 Industry comparisons - total cash 
Table 17(i) - Significant positive relationships - total cash across industries by incumbent group 
  CEO Tcash FD Tcash All Tcash All-CEO Tcash Total 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 2 3 3 3 11 
Construction & building materials 0 0 0 0 0 
E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering electrical and other manufacture 3 0 3 3 9 
Finance 1 4 4 3 12 
Food/drink & tobacco 1 0 1 0 2 
Media/marketing & telecommunications 1 1 1 1 4 
Oil/gas & minerals 2 0 8 8 18 
Other services 5 1 0 1 7 
Property 0 0 2 1 3 
Retail & distribution 2 1 2 3 8 
Transport & leisure 1 1 0 1 3 
Utilities 2 3 0 2 7 
 
Table 17(ii) - Significant positive relationships - total cash across industries by year 
 Industry 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 Total 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 0 1 5 4 11 
Construction & building materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering electrical and other manufacture 0 6 3 0 0 9 
Finance 3 1 0 6 2 12 
Food/drink & tobacco 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Media/marketing & telecommunications 2 0 0 2 0 4 
Oil/gas & minerals 3 5 7 0 3 18 
Other services 2 3 0 0 2 7 
Property 0 1 0 0 2 3 
Retail & distribution 1 0 0 0 7 8 
Transport & leisure 1 0 0 0 2 3 
Utilities 2 2 2 0 1 7 
Total 15 18 14 13 24 
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Table 17(iii) - Significant negative relationships - total cash across industries by incumbent group 
 
CEO Tcash FD Tcash All Tcash 
All-
CEO 
Tcash Total 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 3 3 2 9 
Construction & building materials 0 0 2 0 2 
E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering electrical and other manufacture 2 0 3 3 8 
Finance 0 0 0 1 1 
Food/drink & tobacco 0 1 0 2 3 
Media/marketing & telecommunications 2 2 2 2 8 
Oil/gas & minerals 1 0 0 1 2 
Other services 0 0 1 0 1 
Property 2 1 1 1 5 
Retail & distribution 3 3 2 2 10 
Transport & leisure 3 0 4 3 10 
Utilities 0 1 0 0 1 
 
Table 17(iv) - Significant negative relationships - total cash across industries by year 
  Industry 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 Total 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 2 0 3 4 0 9 
Construction & building materials 0 0 2 0 0 2 
E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering electrical and other manufacture 0 6 0 2 0 8 
Finance 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Food/drink & tobacco 1 0 0 0 2 3 
Media/marketing & telecommunications 0 0 2 4 2 8 
Oil/gas & minerals 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Other services 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Property 0 1 0 3 1 5 
Retail & distribution 0 7 2 0 1 10 
Transport & leisure 7 1 0 2 0 10 
Utilities 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 10 16 9 19 6 
 Source: this author 
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Table 18 Industry comparisons - total compensation 
Table 18(i) - Significant positive relationships - total compensation across industries by incumbent group 
 Industry CEO Tcomp FD Tcomp All Tcomp All-CEO Tcomp Total 
 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 5 3 5 4 17 
 Construction & building materials 0 0 0 0 0 
 E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 
 Engineering electrical and other manufacture 1 2 1 2 6 
 Finance 1 3 2 2 8 
 Food/drink & tobacco 4 3 3 1 11 
 Media/marketing & telecommunications 1 1 2 4 8 
 Oil/gas & minerals 0 0 0 1 1 
 Other services 2 0 0 0 2 
 Property 2 0 2 2 6 
 Retail & distribution 1 0 1 1 3 
 Transport & leisure 1 0 1 1 3 
 Utilities 0 2 1 3 6 
  
Table 18(ii) - Significant positive relationships - total compensation across industries by year 
Total Compensation 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 Total 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 2 1 3 6 5 17 
Construction & building materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering electrical and other manufacture 0 0 1 2 3 6 
Finance 0 1 1 2 4 8 
Food/drink & tobacco 4 4 0 1 2 11 
Media/marketing & telecommunications 4 1 2 0 1 8 
Oil/gas & minerals 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Other services 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Property 0 2 0 0 4 6 
Retail & distribution 2 0 0 0 1 3 
Transport & leisure 0 0 2 1 0 3 
Utilities 1 2 2 1 0 6 
Total 14 11 12 13 21 
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Table 18(iii) - Significant negative relationships - total compensation across industries by incumbent group 
Industry CEO Tcomp FD Tcomp All Tcomp All-CEO Tcomp Total 
 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 0 1 1 3 
 Construction & building materials 0 0 0 0 0 
 E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 
 Engineering electrical and other manufacture 0 0 0 0 0 
 Finance 0 0 1 1 2 
 Food/drink & tobacco 0 0 0 1 1 
 Media/marketing & telecommunications 1 1 1 1 4 
 Oil/gas & minerals 3 1 1 1 6 
 Other services 0 2 3 1 6 
 Property 3 0 3 2 8 
 Retail & distribution 0 1 1 3 5 
 Transport & leisure 1 1 2 2 6 
 Utilities 1 3 2 2 8 
  
Table 18(iv) - Significant negative relationships - total compensation across industries by year 
Industry 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 Total 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Construction & building materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E-business/software & computer services 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering electrical and other manufacture 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finance 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Food/drink & tobacco 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Media/marketing & telecommunications 0 1 0 1 2 4 
Oil/gas & minerals 0 0 3 1 2 6 
Other services 0 0 0 1 5 6 
Property 0 1 6 1 0 8 
Retail & distribution 0 4 1 0 0 5 
Transport & leisure 2 1 0 2 1 6 
Utilities 0 1 0 0 7 8 
Total 3 8 11 10 17 
 
 
Source: this author 
 
Negative Pay-Performance relationships (H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e and H2f - Appendix C pages 
291-296) 
When examining the relationships between the different pay elements and performance, the 
focus was predominantly on all the significant positive results. However, perhaps it is also worth 
noting that there are, in total, only two significant negative correlation across the six 
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hypotheses in discussion: H2e - All Directors group - 2006/07 - EBITDA, and H2f - All Directors 
minus CEOs - 2006/07 - EBITDA.  
 
So, while insignificant results are in the majority, in comparison, there are many more 
significant positive correlations than negative, indicating that executive pay is at least not as 
negatively related to performance as one might have feared. 
 
4.2 Key findings and observations 
 
The hypothesis testing results have been summarised above, but what do these results actually 
mean? After consolidating all the statistical data as well as the observations gathered from the 
literature review, ten findings have been established that are of sufficient significance in 
relation to the study to warrant more detailed examination.  
 
A list of these findings is set out in Table 19, each of which will then be briefly discussed 
individually in relation to the literature to set the basis for the discussion chapters that follow.  
 
Table 19 Key findings and observations 
F1 CEO Pay in general appears to be less strongly related to performance than finance directors 
and other executives. 
F2 Annual bonuses are found to be as related to company performance as long term incentives 
and other elements of pay. 
F3 Total cash is the pay element that seems to be most strongly related to performance - more 
than long term incentives, variable pay and total compensation. 
F4 Companies seem to be more concerned with being compliant to governance codes and 
following their industry peers in devising executive pay structures than they are in designing 
reward schemes that are attuned to the firm’s specific market circumstances. 
F5 There are no obvious signs showing that the relationship between pay and performance 
became any stronger between 2004 and 2009 despite the many far-reaching changes in 
governance that were implemented in this period. 
F6 Board size is found to have a negative effect on the overall pay-performance relationship. 
F7 Total shareholder return is the performance measure that is by far most closely associated to 
executive pay. 
F8 Executive long term incentive plans of FTSE 100 companies are by and large very similar both 
in general design and in matters of detail. 
F9 The financial services industry has not performed discreditably in terms of linking pay and 
performance, when compared to other industry sectors. 
F10 Pay levels are still largely determined by the size of the company. 
Source: this author 
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Finding 1 (F1) - CEO pay in general appears to be less strongly related to performance than 
finance directors and other executives. 
 
The finding that CEO pay appears to be less strongly related to performance than finance 
directors and other executives appears to support some of the principles put forward by 
managerial power theory. If the men or women at the top are found to be able to command 
higher remuneration than their fellow executives regardless of individual or company 
performances, perhaps it could be attributed to the ability of the CEO to demand and receive 
that remuneration by virtue of the greater power conferred by his or her position. If this 
argument holds, one could suggest that such imperial behaviour may be colluded in, even 
encouraged, by some board members for a variety of multiple agency related reasons. The 
financial director, for example, may have more than one selfish motive to act as the CEO’s 
accomplice. Frequently, the CEO’s role is filled by promotion of the financial director. In 
supporting a CEO’s demand for higher pay, the financial director is thus paving the way for 
higher remuneration for him-/herself in future. Again, the financial director is frequently in a 
position of great power within the company by virtue of his or her command highly sensitive 
and confidential financial information, while at the same time remaining far less prominent or 
visible to the media and corporate stakeholders.  
 
Finding 2 (F2) - Annual bonuses are found to be as related to company performance as long 
term incentives and other elements of pay. 
 
Few other aspects of pay have attracted as much criticism from the public and the media as the 
payment of annual bonuses as incentive vehicle for top executives. The criticisms most 
frequently and most widely voiced against bonuses are that they focus only on annual 
performance targets and hence encourage short-termism in management and that they are 
often surrounded by secrecy, covered by claims of 'commercial sensitivity' simply to avoid full 
disclosure of the details that would reveal whether or not they are justified. Above all, annual 
bonuses were criticised as it was said they were ineffective in aligning the interests of 
shareholders and executives (see Chapter 2 for details). 
 
Bonuses were also a target for criticism from the start of attempts at modern governance 
reform and were highlighted by the Greenbury Report in 1995 and subsequent investigations of 
pay. They represented an obvious target for media headlines of the 'fat cat' variety and the 
attention of both media and regulators cause a decline in popularity of bonuses during the 
2000s. However, it must be noted that one of the commonest misperceptions of executive 
annual bonuses was and is that they are an arbitrary extra 'treat', rather than a carefully 
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calculated part of a remuneration package that is dependent on the achieving of specified 
targets. Hence, most attempts at reform considered that the interests of shareholders were 
best served not by short-term incentives such as annual bonuses but by long term incentives 
such as two-part share plans. For example, the Financial Reporting Council’s Combined Code 
(2006) requires companies’ remuneration committees to attach appropriate performance 
conditions to all incentives: 
 
• Short term bonuses should have conditions that are ‘relevant, stretching and designed 
to enhance shareholder value’. 
 
• Long term incentives must be subject to ‘challenging performance criteria reflecting 
the company’s objectives’. 
 
The present finding appears to indicate that long term incentives are not superior to annual 
bonuses as far as linking to performance is concerned, nor are any other component of pay. 
 
Another point to note is that annual bonus and long term incentives have not been commonly 
studied as stand-alone variables in pay-performance link analysis, although bonus payments are 
usually included in both total cash and in total compensation; while long term incentives are 
included only in total compensation. As observed by Bruce et al (2007), annual bonuses have 
been practically ignored in UK’s pay and performance literature. The rationale and processes 
behind bonus award, and the impact of bonus on aggregate pay and the pay-performance 
relationship, have received comparatively little attention from a UK perspective. 
 
The study by McKnight and Tomkins (1999) is one of the few that focused on bonuses using UK 
data. Bruce et al (2007 p292) went on to suggest that, ‘the absence of more detailed scrutiny in 
the UK relates to the fact that annual bonus has always been “part of the furniture” of UK 
executive pay, whereas less familiar and more recent pay component innovations, such as 
share options or LTIPs have attracted the attention of pay analysts and academic researchers in 
recent years’. There have also been many doubts among academics in regards to the 
effectiveness of bonus plans. Some suggested that these bonus arrangements may lead to a 
focus on the determining variables of these compensation plans, perhaps leading management 
to neglect other aspects of performance (Weisbach 1988; Dechow and Sloan 1991; O’Neill 
2007). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) even argued that bonus performance criteria may themselves 
serve the interests of executives rather than shareholders.  
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As a whole, it would seem fair to say that latest corporate governance reforms did not place 
much emphasis on bonuses. For instance, the UK Combined Code (2006) simply requires 
companies’ remuneration committees to attach appropriate performance conditions to all 
incentives: short-term bonuses should have conditions that are ‘relevant, stretching and 
designed to enhance shareholder value’. 
 
It is therefore interesting that my results have indicated a positive relationship between bonus 
and performance (TSR), but more than that, the relationship between bonus and performance 
is no weaker than that of long term incentives. 
 
Finding 3 (F3) - Total cash is the pay element that seems to be most strongly related to 
performance - more than long term incentives, variable pay and total compensation. 
 
As noted previously, UK corporate governance, institutional investors and shareholders all seem 
to favour the use of LTIs than annual bonus plans. Given this climate of thinking, one might 
expect total compensation to be more performance driven then total cash as the latter does 
not include LTIs. However, the results from this study indicate that this does not seem to be the 
case. Moreover, many researchers have criticised previous research that use total cash as their 
main or, in some case, only pay variable, instead of total compensation, which captures LTIs. 
However, based on the findings described in the previous section, total cash seems far from 
being irrelevant as a pay variable in corporate governance research.  
 
What is more, the appeal of long term incentives appears to have waned somewhat in the past 
few years and the UK has never caught up with the LTIs payout levels in the US. According to 
Fernandes et al (2009), base salary and annual bonus typically constitute around seventy five 
per cent of UK executive’s pay packages. While it would be good to include LTIs, it is still 
justifiable to continue analysing total cash compensation as Gregg et al (2012 p26) aptly put it: 
‘…our pay variables did not include equity incentive payments, but given the increase in cash 
compensation over the period of study, it seems relevant to examine whether there is any link 
between the cash pay of executives and the performance of the company, during a time of 
extreme stock price volatility and against a back-drop of a series of changes to corporate 
governance mechanisms’. 
 
There is recent evidence (Girma et al 2007; Ozkan 2007; Guest 2010; Gregg et al 2010) to 
suggest that CEO total cash is often found to be positively related to performance yet the 
significance is not always consistent. Results from the current analysis are also in support of 
those just-mentioned but importantly, it is found that the Total Cash-Performance links for the 
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Finance Directors and the All Directors minus CEOs groups are even stronger than that of the 
CEOs group. This finding is of particular interest because there are relatively few studies that 
have examined executive positions separately.  
 
Finding 4 (F4) - Companies seem to be more concerned with being compliant to governance 
codes and following their industry peers in devising executive pay structures than they are in 
designing reward schemes that are attuned to the firm’s specific market circumstances. 
 
A common theme of the efforts that have been made over the past twenty years to improve UK 
corporate governance has been through greater transparency and disclosure. Best practice 
guidelines have therefore become considerably more comprehensive, often detailing specific 
recommended features for different forms of remuneration arrangements as outlined in 
Chapater 2 (Section 2.1.3). This might have contibuted to the much similar executive pay 
structures and incentive plan designs that is evident among FTSE 100 companies today. One 
could go as far as arguing that, in general, companies are more concerned with being compliant 
with rules and regulations, and merely doing what peer companies do in terms of 
compensation provisions than they are in devising programmes that are most relevant to the 
firm’s individual business needs. This is more likely to ensure that they are not in danger of 
drawing any non-compliance related negative attention to themselves unnecessarily. This is one 
of the unexpected outcomes of corporate governance policy and will be discussed greater 
length in the next chapter. 
 
Finding 5 (F5) - There are no obvious signs showing that the relationship between pay and 
performance became any stronger between 2004 and 2009 despite the many far-reaching 
changes in governance that were implemented in this period. 
 
One marked trend exposed by the data is that there are no obvious signs showing that pay-
performance link became any stronger between 2004-2009 despite all the many far-reaching 
changes in governance that were implemented in this period. This finding is similar to the one 
observed in a recent longitudinal study conducted by Gregg et al (2012 p4) which also found 
‘little evidence of an upward trend in pay-performance sensitivities’ between 1994 and 2006.  
 
However, there does appear to be variation in the strength of pay-performance linkage in two 
distinct phases of the period under study - 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 respectively. It appears 
that the link was weaker in a bull market, before 2006, when investor confidence was higher, 
when the economy and markets themselves were stronger and companies were performing 
better. During these very buoyant market conditions, it is to be expected that companies 
became more relaxed in their attitude towards corporate governance practices. At the same 
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time shareholders and investors, too were more relaxed about executive pay levels when 
companies were performing well and delivering high profits, so that shareholders were 
receiving tangible benefits and perceived that their assets were being managed to their 
advantage. 
 
An additional effect of the bull market was that, as corporate performance was high, a certain 
level of complacency was arguably evident, reflected in lack of scrutiny of the pay-performance 
link, and lack of criticism from public, media and parliament. However, in 2006-2007, the 
economy began to collapse and the linkage between pay and performance improved soon 
after. This can best be interpreted as indicating that companies responded quickly to market 
movements by tightening up on governance to avoid negative reactions from stakeholders and 
the press.  
 
Finding 6 (F6) - Board size is found to have a negative effect on the overall pay-performance 
relationship.  
 
Between 2004 and 2009, the size of boards tended to grow smaller. In many cases, this was a 
deliberate move and was considered to be a move in the direction of better governance 
practice. However, while the results were largely in line with the hypothesis, the overall effect is 
not marked enough to translate into a much stronger link between pay and performance. At 
the same time it is also found that remuneration committee size and non-executive ratio have 
no bearing on the link between pay and performance. 
 
From the outset of governance reform it was argued that smaller board size will ‘have a 
restraining impact on pay levels or changes and a positive impact on the pay-performance link’ 
(Guest 2009 p1077). Smaller boards are expected to be more effective because the latter often 
face with problems associated with free-riding (Yermack 1996). For example, it is harder for 
larger boards to organise meeting, make decisions, which results in lower efficiency and 
effectiveness (Jensen 1993). As noted by Guest (2010 p1078), free-riding occurs more 
frequently ‘because the cost to an individual director of not carrying out his monitoring role 
properly decreases as board size increases.’ (Lipton and Lorsch 1992, cited in Guest 2010 
p1078). 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) conducted a review of the literature and found the majority of 
empirical studies documented a negative association between board size and company 
performance. More recently, Guest (2010) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2010) both 
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observed similar findings and presented evidence that larger boards to be associated with a 
higher level of compensation. Two recent studies also presented similar findings. On the other 
hand, however, Morck (2004, cited in Ozkan 2007 p11) argued that ‘based on the findings in the 
social psychology literature larger, more diverse boards can be related to more effective 
monitoring’. 
 
Finding 7 (F7) - Total shareholder return is the performance measure that is by far most 
closely associated to executive pay. 
 
Clearly, the UK governance reform has placed much emphasis on the use of long term incentive 
and total shareholder return relative to an appropriate index or peer group has persistently 
been recommended by governing bodies and regulators as a generally acceptable performance 
criterion. These recommendations received widespread support from shareholders. As a result, 
the majority of FTSE companies adopted performance share plans with TSR as the vesting 
conditions (Conyon et al 2000 and Ozkan 2007). It is therefore not too surprising to see TSR 
being the performance measures with the most positive links to executive pay in this study. 
While it is encouraging that TSR has produced such positive results, it is both disappointing and 
baffling that a number of other performance variable analysed (e.g. EPS and EBITDA) are 
virtually unrelated to pay.  
 
Finding 8 (F8) - Executive long term incentive plans of FTSE 100 companies are by and large 
very similar both in general design and in matters of detail. 
  
Of all the pay elements, LTIs are often expected to be most related to company performance 
because the plans adopted by FTSE 100 companies all supposedly have ‘appropriate’ and 
‘challenging’ targets attached. Yet, the results seem to suggest otherwise. As Finding 4 above 
pointed out, LTIs are not found to be more effective in driving company performance than 
other incentive vehicles. Could this be a result of FTSE 100 companies having pay practices and 
incentive arrangements that are very much alike (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007 p24)? For 
instance, around 90% of FTSE 100 companies operate a performance share plan (Hewitt New 
Bridge Street 2006), 77% of which have TSR as the performance target (see Figure 10 in Chapter 
1) as recommended by various best practice codes (e.g. Association of British Insurers 
Guidelines 2002 and 2005).  
 
Could this be an indication of companies being overly compliant as suggested earlier when 
discussing Finding 4? Perhaps the increasingly stringent restriction of corporate governance 
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regulations has played a part in motivating companies to accept a one-size-fits-all approach to 
remuneration design as this reduces the risk of failing to comply? This, together with other 
possible explanations will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Finding 9 (F9) - The financial services industry has not performed discreditably in terms of 
linking pay and performance, when compared to other industry sectors. 
 
It appears that the financial services industry has not performed worse than other sectors 
during the study period. Similar results have been reported in recent studies conducted in both 
in the UK and the US. For example, Gregg et al (2012) explored the relationship between UK 
directors’ cash compensation and performance over a 12-year period, focusing specifically on 
the financial services industry, and reported that, ‘…although pay in the financial services sector 
is high, the cash pay-performance sensitivity of banks and financial firms is not significantly 
higher than in other sectors.’. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) and Adams (2009) both found no 
evidence suggesting that executive incentives and governance practices of financial firms are 
less effective than non-financial firms. This finding is noteworthy because it points to the 
possibility that much of the malpractice actually occurred in the lines of business that were 
beyond the remit of governance and the individuals involved were non-board executives.  
 
Finding 10 (F10) - Pay levels are still largely determined by the size of the company. 
 
The study found size to be strongly and positively related to pay across all incumbent groups 
throughout the study period which is in line with past research. 
 
The review of literature in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2.1) has highlighted that while linkages 
between directors’ remuneration and company performance are yet to be established, there is 
consistent evidence of company size being a variable that has strong influence on pay in both 
the US and the UK (Benito and Conyon 1999; Conyon and Schwalbach 2000). There are several 
theoretical arguments which predict company size to be related to executive pay (refer to 
Section 2.2), and the one that is most relevant to the current study is the managerialist view. In 
short, proponents of managerial power theory suggest that executives exert power to seek 
control of the remuneration process and use their influence to link pay to factors, like company 
size, which are more stable and subject to lower compensation risk. This very concept and all 
the other key findings will be explored in more depth in the next chapter.   
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5 Background to discussion 
 
Despite the progress made in governance regulation throughout the 1990s, financial scandals 
continued to be a feature of corporate life throughout the 2000s, leading to intensified scrutiny 
of executive pay by Parliament, media and public. News stories about directors setting their 
own pay, and massive payouts of seemingly unjustified bonuses, share incentives and pension 
benefits became common, resulting in public anger. Executives were seen as villains who 
partnered with remuneration consultants to ratchet up compensation levels. There was a 
perception that executive pay was increasingly out of control; a perception that was aggravated 
further by frequent reports of fraudulent activities, accounting irregularities, insider trading and 
lack of accountability, all seen as contributing to the latest economic crisis. 
 
Against this controversial backdrop, the present study seeks to answer some of the outstanding 
questions raised by the extant literature on corporate governance and executive pay. The 
objectives of this piece of research have been detailed in Section 1.4.2 but the main aims are 
summarised again in Section 5.1 below together with an explanation of the research approach 
adopted.  
 
In addition, as seen in Section 2.1.3 of Chapter 2, corporate governance in the UK has gone 
through a period of rapid and complex transition over the past 20 years, and many changes, 
including some drastic revisions continued to be introduced to the early 2010s. It is thus 
important to provide an overview of the current status of UK governance, as of mid-2012, and 
identify the key aspects that are most relevant and useful for this study (see Section 5.2). 
 
To further help interpret the research findings and understand how observations were derived, 
the underlying assumptions on which this study is based will be set out in Section 5.3. This is 
followed by an outline of the structure of the discussion chapters (see Section 5.4). 
 
Taken together as an overview, the background presented in this chapter will set the context 
for the ensuing discussions in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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5.1 Summary of research aims and approach 
 
The fundamental goals of this study are: 
 
• To seek to understand better the relationship between company performance and the 
remuneration of different FTSE 100 executive roles in the context of corporate 
governance - the insights gained through this exercise will then be used to attempt to 
answer further questions of interest and relevance such as: 
- Whether recent governance reforms have had a measurable positive effect? 
- Has the engagement with ‘best practice’ principles been proved a positive process 
in relation to the role of executive pay?  
- Have the new processes for determining pay, together with the requirement for 
the process to be more transparent, had an influence on prevailing compensation 
practices? 
 
• To go beyond examining the determinants of pay to exploring the effects and 
consequences directors’ remuneration as a key corporate governance mechanism. 
Specifically, the research is designed to: 
- Identify factors that may be inhibiting governance reform efforts and where 
government and regulators attention might best be directed to improve 
governance regulations. 
- Attempt to explain why, in practice, the reality of the boardroom differs from the 
predictions of academic theories. 
 
• The study also seeks to overcome some of the data-related problems and limitations 
that have hampered previous research and contribute to the body of UK governance 
and executive pay literature which is at the moment relatively limited, especially 
compared to the US.  
 
This study was carried out using a methodology that is in some respects similar to past 
governance and executive compensation research, but in some respects different. It is similar to 
past research in that its primary objective is to explore the relationship between pay and 
performance and that it employs some of the central assumptions of agency theory. In essence 
these assumptions are that pay schemes, if designed and implemented effectively, can help 
align the interests of the company and its executives, and that this alignment will in turn 
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improve the company’s performance. Aside from this, however, my approach employed a 
number of key aspects that are less widely seen in previous research. 
 
The study examined solely the United Kingdom market and its focus was limited to a relatively 
small sample of the 100 largest businesses in the UK - the FTSE 100 companies. Concentrating 
on a restricted sample of the FTSE 100 firms made it possible to consider the data in greater 
depth and examine a greater number of factors that may affect the pay-performance 
relationship individually (see Chapters 3 and 4 for details). In total, five years’ worth of data 
have been analysed (from 2005 to 2009) in an attempt to uncover any trends in the study 
period. 
 
To ensure more accurate and consistent comparisons, all the analyses were carried out using a 
‘constant sample’ line by line basis (i.e. only incumbents who had been in the same role for two 
consecutive years were included in the dataset. In effect, new hires and recently promoted 
individuals’ data were omitted to prevent skewing the results). 
 
Due to the sample being restricted to no more than 100 companies, I was able to re-organise 
the data in a way that allowed for highly detailed analysis. Specifically, I managed to perform 
separate analyses for not only the chief executives (CEOs) but for four selected incumbent 
groups, namely: 
 
• CEOs 
• Finance directors 
• All executive directors, and 
• All executive directors excluding CEOs. 
 
In terms of the remuneration data, they were categorised into a number of individual 
components as well as various collective elements (e.g. variable pay which was made up of 
annual bonus and different forms of long term incentives). 
 
Additionally, as evidenced by the literature, the measurement of company performance has 
always been an issue on which executive compensation researchers are divided. One could 
even argue that it is one of the reasons for empirical findings being largely inconclusive. By way 
of mitigating this matter of contention, six company variables were used, capturing both 
accounting measures and market measures (refer to Chapters 3 and 4 for more detailed 
descriptions): 
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• Earnings per share growth 
• EBITDA margins 
• Sales growth 
• Net income growth 
• Total shareholder return, and  
• Return on equity. 
 
In order to capture such a broad range of data subsets, as explained in Chapter 4, it was 
decided to employ a statistical approach was relatively straight forward and uncomplicated. 
 
The research takes agency theory as its main theoretical perspective because, despite some 
flaws, it is accepted as one of the best understood and most influential theories both in 
corporate governance and pay research, and also other social science disciplines. Further 
reasons for adopting agency theory in this study will be outlined in Section 5.1.1 below. But one 
of the most commonly perceived advantages of agency theory may be mentioned now: that it 
provides a relatively promising framework of how the use of a well thought-out set of 
employment contracts and a reward strategy that complements the company’s business goals 
and direction can help reduce agency costs. It is believed interest alignment and improved 
company performance can be achieved through the appropriate design of an optimal pay 
structure, i.e. one that: 
 
• Promotes fairness and accountability. 
• Provides a suitable mix of reward components where the balances between fixed and 
variable, long and short term, cash and share and so on are properly considered. 
• Comprises well-executed compensation arrangements that serve their intended 
purposes of changing the behaviour of executives, improving company performance 
and creating shareholder wealth.  
 
Of course, in reality, it is almost inevitable that there will be unforeseen market events that 
affect the effectiveness of pay arrangements, but nevertheless the use of pay to drive results, 
performance and improve shareholder value is still widely practiced across the world’s major 
economies. However, does such a thing as an ‘optimal’ pay structure really exist? And if the 
answer is no then why should this be the case if agency theory is partially correct? On paper, 
agency theory leads us to believe that there is such a thing, but in practice it has proved 
impossible to find. 
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It may well be that it is simply too difficult, if not impossible, to gauge accurately the 
effectiveness of a pay structure or an incentive plans because executive compensation does not 
operate in a vacuum. When a company performs well, there may be numerous contributing 
factors, some of which are difficult, if not impossible, to identify. How much of the improved 
performance is attributable to the pay structure of the contract or incentive plan? How much is 
due to unpredictable market movements, and how much is even down to luck? 
 
One could also argue that there is no one-size-fits-all model simply because every company is 
different in many ways and has needs specific to its own business model. If so, a formula that 
works well for one company, may not work for another - even a company in the same industry, 
or of similar size. 
 
A further reason for the dissonance between theory and practice is that most studies have been 
carried out quantitatively using large samples and aggregated data. If it is true that there is no 
single model that is universally applicable, then what is the point in simply increasing the 
sample size? In recent years there has been more qualitative research, such as Bender (2007), 
which is beginning to give the literature a more diverse and fresh perspective. However, it is still 
difficult to find detailed case studies to test the effectiveness of pay structure arrangements. 
 
Finally, one has to recognise that in dealing with questions of pay and both executive and 
corporate performance, one is dealing with questions of the utmost commercial and personal 
sensitivity, thus making both data collection and analysis a thorny issue. Indeed, corporate 
governance changes have improved disclosure and transparency to some extent but there is 
still a need for companies not to compromise their operations and to retain commercial 
confidentiality to some extent. 
 
5.1.1 Why using agency theory is appropriate 
 
Even with all its limitations, agency theory assumptions are still very popular among regulatory 
bodies, consultants, industry experts and academics. Assumptions of the theory are deeply 
embedded in our corporate governance codes and in almost all past research. It is therefore 
important to examine and understand the subject of pay through the lens of agency theory. The 
UK Government has announced in 2012 that it is to introduce even more strict codes of 
corporate governance, including the introduction of the criminal offence of 'corporate 
negligence' with regard to financial matters, and these moves are also based on the 
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assumptions of agency theory - that incentives must be found to induce board executives to put 
the company’s interests before their own. 
 
Such ready acceptance of agency theory assumptions is found not only in the UK but also other 
countries such as US and Australia. Their corporate governance codes are all heavily based on 
the two key agency assumptions. For instance, many of the transparency and disclosure 
measures found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US) and the corporate governance guidelines issued 
by the ASX Corporate Governance Council (Australia) were designed to tackle the issue of 
information asymmetry. Similarly, independence of non-executives and subcommittees is used 
to improve the monitoring function of the board, while incentive pay plays a major role in both 
economies, attempting to motivate executives to act and think more like shareholders. 
 
It is perhaps necessary to point out that this may be less relevant for countries where the 
‘outsider governance model’ is adopted (e.g. Germany). Under this system, the board structure 
is two tiered and the emphasis is on meeting the interests of all the stakeholders. However 
countries such as the UK and the US operate under the ‘insider model’ which is characterised by 
seeking to maximise shareholder value. This fact further highlights the relevance of agency 
theory in the context of this study. 
 
5.2 UK’s approach to corporate governance reforms  
 
As seen in Section 2.1.3, there have been successive attempts to introduce regulations and 
guidelines aimed at curbing what are widely perceived as abuses during the past two decades. 
Many of these measures were considered as 'revolutionary' in their day (the Cadbury Report 
1992 being the prime example). However, their effectiveness has yet to be proven. It has also 
been established in the course of this study that the problem pertaining to past corporate 
governance and executive pay studies could be due to issues with research methodologies and 
the over-reliance on agency theory’s assumptions. Since the UK’s governance guidelines have, 
one way or another, been shaped by agency theory, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
another possible contributing factor to the whole executive compensation muddle that the 
nation faces today (both in practical and academic research) is the governance reform itself. 
 
A renewed examination of the reform process itself is of particular importance because 
corporate governance is now a prominent social issue; one whose impact is far-reaching, 
affecting all sections of society, and not just in the short term but perhaps for years if not 
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decades ahead. It has also become one of the priorities of the present Government’s political 
agenda, and further legislation and regulation are currently under discussion. Moreover, a 
number of major financial institutions in the UK have been taken wholly or partly into public 
ownership as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 - hence it has become in the government’s 
as well as the tax payers’ interests to prevent similar problems from happening in future.  
 
5.2.1 Corporate governance - current status 
 
The main measures adopted since the reform movement began include additional monitoring 
duties for independent directors to prevent executives from setting their own pay, and new 
mandatory disclosure requirements. There have also been best practice guidelines for service 
contracts, reward package arrangements and incentive plan designs, from grant levels to 
specific performance targets. These measures are still considered to be relevant today as they 
continue to appear in the Code (2010) and the latest recommendations put forward by the 
government in 2012.  
 
The present social climate of demanding greater regulation represents a balancing act for 
corporate boards, and in particular for members of remuneration committees as well as 
external compensation consultants, when developing pay packages. On one hand there are 
pressures on them for greater compliance as deviations from recommendations are not only 
regarded as bad practice but often a source of controversy and bad press. On the other there is 
the need for them to be flexible, to move away from the norm and become adaptable to 
specific business needs - a topic that is further discussed later on in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Another major challenge faced by those tasked with reforming governance is that few of the 
attempts at reform in the past were conceived strategically. In many cases they were simply ad 
hoc responses to specific problems that arose, for instance: 
 
• The Cadbury Report (1992) came about to tackle the issues associated with the 
collapse of BCCI Bank and the Robert Maxwell pension fund scandal which led to the 
formalisation of UK procedural governance under the principle of 'comply or explain'. 
• The Greenbury Report (1995) was a direct attempt to assuage public outrage and 
rebuild investor confidence regarding executives setting their own pay and the 
payment of large bonuses. 
• Other reports such as Higgs (2001), DRRR (2002) and IFRS2 were all developed to deal 
with specific problems that had arisen through abuse and malpractice. 
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As a result, one could argue that after 20 years of reform, the UK now has a corporate 
governance system made up of a series of piecemeal initiatives, all with different objectives 
trying to address different issues, and hence not at all integrated. 
 
Not only have attempts at reform been piecemeal, but so too have their effects. The UK’s 
general approach of 'comply or explain' allows much room for companies to adapt the 
guidelines to their individual circumstances, making it even harder to measure the exact impact 
of each mechanism. To date, the cumulative effect of all these governance changes is still 
unclear, but the general perception - rightly or wrongly - is that little has improved. It is clear 
that this is an issue that needs to be explored further. 
 
In seeking to discover to what extent attempts at reform have been successful it is important to 
first clarify what exactly are the objectives of the corporate governance initiatives. Take for 
example the ground-breaking Cadbury Report of 1992, so far, much of the available literature 
suggests that the reforms of Cadbury have been ineffective (Dedman 2002, Thompson 2005, 
Heracleous 2001). But what were the real aims of the Report? 
 
• To improve company performance? 
• To create shareholder value? 
• To align interests? 
• To improve the pay-performance link? 
• To prevent further scandals? 
• To monitor and change the behaviour of executives  
• To encourage executives to act ethically and accountably? 
• To ensure pay levels do not get out of hand and ensure fair and justifiable executive 
pay? 
• To induce good governance practice and promote company social responsibility? 
 
Given such a wide divergence of possible aims, it is difficult to be clear as to which aspects of 
the corporate governance reform are working and which are not working. Or were reforms 
intended to achieve all of the above? And if so, were governance reforms too ambitious in their 
scope? Is the role currently ascribed to corporate governance too broad? Is it even possible to 
achieve all of these aims, especially working in a fragmentary manner? 
 
As already explained, the rationale behind the ‘comply or explain’ approach is to give 
companies a certain degree of flexibility to adapt and adopt the best practice guidelines to best 
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suit their specific circumstances. This is unquestionably a refreshing idea that was much 
welcomed not only in the UK but also globally, but one can argue that the idea may have 
somewhat backfired, since it appears that boards, remuneration consultants and even 
shareholders and investors have been placing excessive emphasis on being compliant rather 
than making most of the benefits of this 'comply or explain' approach. In many cases, 
companies seem to have become complacent and comfortable with simply following the 
recommendations to the letter to avoid the scrutiny of regulators or the media.  
 
This approach of becoming highly compliance-led may well be desirable when it comes to issues 
like level of disclosure, transparency, board composition, board evaluation process and the like. 
But such levels of compliance could negatively affect the effectiveness of executive pay as a 
tool to drive company performance.  
 
For example, it is already evident that instead of implementing arrangements that are tailored 
to their own individual company needs and goals, the majority of FTSE 100 companies have 
adopted very similar pay structures and plans. They have adopted annual bonus schemes and 
performance share plans all with very similar features such as target levels, maximum levels, 
and performance conditions, irrespective of company size or industry or cycle or performance 
or financial situations. Put simply, remuneration committees and consultants are happy to 
settle for a 'cookie cutter' approach to governance - primarily to avoid accusations of being 
non-compliant. The main aim of this approach seems to be a way of playing safe to avoid 
getting 'red-topped' (accused of a breach of guidelines) by the Association of British Insurers, 
rocking the boat at the Annual General Meeting, or generating still more negative media 
coverage. 
 
While measuring the effectiveness of regulation is difficult, it is fair to say that much progress 
has been made with respect to board processes and that there have been many changes 
brought about by corporate governance among FTSE 100 companies over the past 5-10 years 
that are clearly distinguishable, for example: 
  
• Board sizes have, on average, become smaller, which research suggests is better from a 
governance point of view. 
• The number of non-executive directors on the board has increased. The appointment 
of senior non-executive directors has become commonplace and measures have been 
put in place to ensure their independence both on the board and on and on 
subcommittees. 
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• There is now a clearer separation in the roles of chairman and chief executive officer. 
• Average service contract has been shortened - typically down to 12 months from 24 
months (Higgs 2002).  
• The practice of paying bonuses on signature and on leaving (so-called 'golden hello' or 
'golden handshake' deals), excessive liquidation damages clauses, pension 
augmentations on termination, and change of control provisions that allow incentive 
plans to vest without reference to performance are no longer common practices. 
• There is more comprehensive disclosure and improved transparency, for example 
reporting on remuneration, naming of external consultants, publication of TSR charts, 
and the need to seek shareholders’ approval vote at AGMs.  
 
In fact, the tightening of governance guidelines has positively influenced not only board 
structure and contracting arrangements but also specific incentive plan designs as such: 
 
• Non-performance dependent share options and restricted shares have all but 
disappeared and replaced by performance related awards. 
• Re-testing of performance conditions (whereby executives were given a second chance 
to meet their target) is also largely a thing of the past and has been replaced with 
sliding scales arrangements. 
 
Interestingly, all the changes in regulation seem to have this side effect: that executive pay itself 
has become subject to whatever may be the latest regulatory fad. As noted earlier, questions of 
pay structure and pay mix as well as incentive plan design appear to have been, in some cases, 
dictated by the latest corporate governance recommendations, rather than chosen with regard 
to what is right for the company at that point in time. In a similar vein, the so-called ‘best 
practices’ related to executive pay often change due to factors, that far from being generally 
accepted or agreed upon, are still subject to vigorous debate. To illustrate this point, some 
examples are given below. 
 
What is and should be the purpose of pay? 
From a corporate perspective the purpose of pay is to attract and retain talented people, 
motivate executives to still higher levels of performance, reward past effort, and to align the 
executive’s interests with the company’s. A particular remuneration package will be a 
combination of these elements but with different weighting depending on the circumstance of 
the company. 
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The actual compensation mix (i.e. fixed pay versus variable pay; short term versus long term 
incentives; cash based versus equity based) should be determined according to individual 
company needs rather than based solely on market data, the latest trends, or what other 
companies are doing.  
 
What are or should be the appropriate pay levels? 
The question of whether pay levels are 'high', or 'too high' is subject to many different views 
and depends on which side of the negotiating table you are sitting. For every criticism of 'high' 
pay there is an equal and opposite commendation. 
  
High pay is fine, it is said, so long as it performance linked. Against this it is said that high pay is 
not fine as it will generate negative media comment which will upset investors and 
shareholders and may influence the buying decisions of customers. Pay, it is said, should be 
dependent on performance and not size. But against this it is argued that the larger the 
company, the greater the responsibility, so pay should also reflects this. 
 
Where there is perhaps a higher measure of agreement is that the relativity (in terms of pay 
levels and rate of increase) to general employees must not be excessive and that any pay gap 
must be narrowed. One frequently invoked yardstick is to claim that pay should be 
'competitive' - yet in aiming to be competitive, all sides seem to aim for the 50th percentile or 
above. Competitive has thus become synonymous with high. 
 
The design of incentive plans 
This is an area that has been subjected to much controversy from not only industry experts, 
academics, policy makers, regulators but also the media and the general public. Debates tend 
to be related to the following issues: 
 
• The plan mechanics being too complex versus being too simple yet easily understood 
• Potential payouts set too high, running the risk of upsetting shareholders versus too 
low a quantum to be sufficient to attract and retain executives and drive the desired 
behaviour 
• Performance targets not challenging enough versus them being perceived as being 
unachievable by the participants. This perception may have a detrimental effect on the 
motivation of senior executives 
• The question of whether to benchmark relative performance to an index or an industry 
group is another matter of contention 
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• More recently, incentive plans have also been accused of being too ‘compliance led’ 
and prescriptive, but then, anything out of the box or unconventional would often 
attract much less than welcome attention. 
 
Performance measures and targets 
This is a widely discussed topic that has already been brought up a number of times in this 
thesis. One can argue that there is no such thing as a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ measure in absolute 
terms as whether a measure is suitable would depend on the specific circumstances of a 
company. There are numerous metrics to measure company performance, each with their 
advantages and disadvantages. Debates are often between advocates of accounting measures 
(e.g. the bottom line) and those in favour of measuring performance in the market against 
prevailing conditions and competition. 
 
In addition, the past 20 years have also seen the rise and fall of the more complex measures 
such Economic Value Added as well as simpler ones such as earnings per Share. Of late, it 
appears that many companies in the FTSE 100 index have opted to use the suggested 
recommended performance criteria set out in the various governance guidelines. As a result, 
the majority of share option plans are subject to an EPS target whereas relative TSR is the 
measure of choice for performance share plans. 
 
Incentives and motivation 
Companies use incentives to motivate executives with the aim of driving the required behaviour 
and results for shareholders. It could be argued that attempts at aligning executive interests 
with shareholder interests are based on the assumption that executives are primarily motivated 
by financial incentives. However, there has been a gradual shift in the perception of what 
actually motivates senior executives. It is increasingly evident that factors such as work 
environment, power, status, reputation and peer rivalry all matter as much as extrinsic rewards. 
 
The role external consultants and remuneration committees 
Most, if not all, remuneration packages among FTSE 100 companies are designed with the 
assistance of external remuneration consultants. On the face of it, such consultants are 
employed by the company to represent the shareholders’ interests. In reality, however, 
consultants are selected and engaged by the company’s executives and such contracts are a 
lucrative source of business for consultants. There is thus a potential conflict of interest in 
which it may not be clear which side the remuneration consultants are on. Potential also exists 
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for executives to exert pressure on consultants to agree ever-higher remuneration packages 
that are essentially devised by executives themselves.  
 
Although there can never be a 'one size fits all' corporate governance framework or pay 
structure that works perfectly for everyone, some companies still appear to prioritise 
compliance over designing a remuneration plan that makes best business sense for the 
company in its present market context. In the 1990s, it was common for companies to spend 
millions on hiring high profile management consulting firms (e.g. McKinsey, AT Kearney, Bain & 
Co and the like) to help develop and implement highly technical yet tailored pay arrangements 
but these attracted criticism for being too complex (see Section 5.3). The trend started 
reversing when governance codes became increasingly precise in pay-related 
recommendations. It seems clear that being strictly compliant does not automatically lead to 
improved company performance which raises the question: why do so many companies still 
comply blindly, especially when in the UK they enjoy the privilege of being able to 'comply or 
explain' - something denied to their US counterparts? Are they being cautious, or are they being 
complacent?  
 
When a board is clearly complying with the letter of every regulation, few voices are raised in 
dissent. Could it be that the very detailed best practice guidelines are giving shareholders the 
false impression that by being compliant, all other issues will be solved? That simply by being 
seen to toe the line: 
 
• There will be no more excessive pay 
• Pay will be linked to performance 
• Interests will be aligned 
• Shareholder value creation has top priority 
• Non-executives and consultants will carry out their regulatory roles effectively 
• Shareholders and investors will be happy, improving confidence all round. 
 
Clearly, in reality, this issue is about striking a balance between compliance and remaining 
competitive - a balance that is demonstrably hard to achieve, hence the continued widespread 
perception that governance is still largely failing and pay continues to be seen as largely non-
performance linked. So, is it the case that corporate governance recommendations and 
mechanisms (including those related to executive pay) simply do not work? Or is it that they do 
work, just that they have not been implemented properly? Who is to blame for this situation? 
The board? Remuneration consultants? Chief executives with too much power? And what 
5. Background to discussion 
  168 
 
exactly is it that is going wrong? Is it the theories, the research methods, the approach to 
governance, or merely a matter of perception, or perhaps a combination of all these elements? 
The remainder of the chapter will explore these questions. 
 
5.3 Assumptions underlying the interpretation of results  
 
The interpretations of the findings presented in the following discussion are based on a set of 
assumptions that are consonant with the context of this study and are explained below.  
 
Agency theory posits that an effective pay contract that is by and large optimal, coupled with 
monitoring, can drive down the cost associated with the problem of separate ownership and 
control for a particular company at a certain time. Thus executive pay packages (incentives in 
particular), if designed and implemented effectively, can help mitigate agency problems and 
costs.  
 
As noted earlier, there is a current tendency for FTSE 100 companies to arrive at very similar 
ready-made remuneration packages with a minimum of individual tailoring or bespoke 
elements designed to fit their organisation and its market position. Arguably, the most likely 
explanation is that they all use only a handful remuneration consulting firms6 who hold an 
effective oligopoly at the top end of the FTSE scale. This tendency stands in contrast to the 
1990s, when monitoring was not as stringent, and when it was common for companies to hire 
management consultants, who specialised in strategy, to develop and implement highly tailored 
pay arrangements and remuneration policy that aligned closely with the business strategy. This 
resulted in highly customised and complicated models that few people - even within the 
boardroom - understood. At the time, much less explaining to shareholders about how and why 
these plans deviated from best practice or the practice of peer organisations needed. 
 
Today, with much stricter governance measures, including rules on disclosure, it would be an 
uphill task for executives to explain such deviations to gain the support and approval of 
shareholders. Life is much easier and simpler for companies that simply do what others are 
doing and follow the official guidelines. When governance reforms began in the 1990s, one 
main aim was to give more information to shareholders and the public and this was why 
complaints were raised regarding highly complex value tree type models as being overly 
                                                          
6
 The largest executive compensation consultants in the UK include Towers Watson, Mercer, Hewitt New Bridge Street, 
Hay Group, Kepler Associates, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopoers, Deloitte and Ernst and Young. 
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elaborate. Companies responded to these complaints by simplifying their models and following 
governance recommendations more closely, even though many of these customised models 
managed to effectively target very specific company business drivers in a transparent manner, 
and in many cases, actually delivered relatively satisfactory end results. 
 
Agency theorists believe that incentives hold a lot of the answer to correcting the opportunistic 
behaviour exhibited by executives. Much literature has acknowledged the merits of this point. 
One could, however, question whether incentives could actually drive shareholder-friendly 
actions and business results if their designs and mechanics are largely dictated by governance 
codes. 
 
In terms of sample size, it is relatively common for researchers to include FTSE 350 or Fortune 
500 companies in their pay studies. The positive aspects of a large sample to interpret 
significant results are that it allows a more precise estimate of the effect the variable and it is 
usually easier to assess the representativeness of the sample and to generalise the results. Yet, 
with a smaller sample, such as the FTSE 100 in my case, it is feasible to conduct more detailed 
analysis. This approach should prove advantageous to investigating why in reality, good 
corporate governance practices and the use of pay contracts have not delivered the expected 
results - at least not in a consistent manner. 
  
Rarely a day goes by without some mention of (or attack on) executive pay in the media. The 
following list of examples of common perceptions and misconceptions regarding executive pay 
and corporate governance have been taken from the pages of daily broadsheet newspapers. 
They are representative of views expressed by many print and broadcast media and in 
Parliament by Members. They also reflect the overall impressions of the issue of the general 
public. However, it is necessary to point out that some of the claims seem to have been 
exaggerated and some of the perceptions misconceived, the reason for which will be discussed 
in the course of this chapter.  
 
• 'CEOs set their own pay.' 
• 'Executive pay is too high and rising too fast especially in relation to general employees’ 
pay.' 
• 'Companies still do what they want - their managements are out of control.' 
• 'Company executives are ruthless, greedy, even unethical - all they care about is 
money.' 
• 'Corporate governance reform has been ineffective.' 
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• 'There is not enough monitoring and government intervention.' 
• 'There are too few regulations regarding pay, and pay is not adequately performance-
linked.' 
• 'Corruption and fraudulent activities are commonplace in the boardroom, especially in 
the financial services sector'. 
• 'The whole corporate system of governance is not transparent and is aided by 
politicians.' 
• 'In many areas, we find that pay systems are not meeting their intended goals of 
attracting, motivating, and retaining executives. To the extent that these goals are 
being met, it is often in spite of rather than because of the incentive plans in place.'  
 
These media perceptions and criticisms are a reflection of a substantial list of prevailing 
problems that are widely seen as continuing to dog UK companies despite two decades of 
attempted reform: 
 
• Executives continue to be the subject of fierce public and media scrutiny 
• The disparity between CEO and employee pay continues to widen 
• CEOs are still too influential and powerful 
• Executive behaviour remains largely unchanged 
• There are no signs of executive pay becoming fairer 
• Executive pay continues to be driven mainly by company size rather than performance 
• Executive incentives it not strongly linked to performance but down to luck, market 
movements and survey data 
• Compliance is over-reliant on the board and non-executives to monitor executives 
• Evaluation of boards is not widespread and there are no guidelines for such evaluation 
• There are no penalties, or punishments for non performing executives or boards 
• External advice is provided by too few consultants. There is not enough true 
competition 
• Investors’ confidence is at an all-time low 
• The problem identified by agency theory still exists: there continues to be poor 
alignment of interests between owners and executives and companies still incur a cost 
as a result. 
 
Before moving on to discuss whether my results support any of these allegations, it may be 
useful to recap the process the UK has taken to reform the corporate governance system. 
Figure 14, Figure 15 and Table 20 show, respectively, in simplified form an overall view of the 
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UK corporate governance reform process, a single illustration of this process at work, and 
changes in corporate governance and executive pay practices that resulted.  
 
Providing a generalised overview of this process in both general and particular should be of 
value in gaining a better understanding of the current problems, interpreting my results more 
appropriately, and providing a fresh perspective to this longstanding contentious issue. As the 
Figures 14 and 15 paint a gloomy picture, it is important and necessary at this point to reiterate 
that all in all, some progress has been made over the past twenty years in key areas (Table 20) 
that are invaluable in helping create a fairer and more successful corporate landscape. 
 
Figure 14 A simplified view of the UK corporate governance reform process since 1990 
 
Source: this author 
 
1. Past company problems acting as a trigger – e.g. corporate scandals are exposed
6. Publications of research findings: most with different conclusions, rationales and suggestions
4. Changes made by companies in terms of corporate governance compliance
3. Official responses: interventions and issue of best practice guidelines from regulatory bodies and institutional investors
2. Media reaction to the scandal and public response
5. Researchers testing and theorising about the impact and effectiveness of the reforms
7. Perceptions of media, public, and regulators are revised – either more positive or negative
8. Updated view of situation in business.  Do the original problems still persist or are they resolved?  Have the problems 
developed into a new set of issues over time? Have governance initiatives targeted the wrong issues?  Is it too soon to 
draw conclusions? Have new scandal arisen, complicating matters further? 
9. Response to updated situation:  More guidelines and rules (back to point 3 and start again)
10. Current general view: 'as bad as 20 years ago if not worse'.
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Figure 15 An illustration of the process described in Figure 14 
 
Source: this author 
 
 
This typical example is drawn from the recent past and it would be easy for a modern audience 
to gain the impression that corporate governance reforms around the world started with a 
blank slate in the early 1990s. In fact, of course, this cycle of events has happened on many 
previous occasions historically, notably following the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Many of the 
issues raised above were examined in detail in The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(Berle and Means 1932) published in the wake of the stock exchange crisis of 1929. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Corporate problems  in early 1990s: BCCI and Maxwell scandals disclose financial reporting irregularities: governance 
system found to be lacking transparency and accountability.
6. Research findings: Cadbury is ineffective but no consistent indication as to why
4. Relatively good uptake of Cadbury recommendations by companies
3. 1992 – Cadbury Report published in response
2. Public outrage
5. Attempts to determine the effectiveness of Cadbury recommendations
7. Cadbury seen as a promising initiative but the focus moves to 'fat cat' news (e.g. British Gas CEO 75 per cent pay rise in
1995)
8. Corporate governance even more 'broken' than first thought – executive pay is a sham
9. Greenbury Report on directors’ remuneration addresses growing concerns (1995)
10. Executive pay still generates many negative headlines today (e.g. a survey of boardroom pay by Incomes Data 
Services found that average earnings for directors of FTSE 100 companies went up by 49 per cent last year to £2.7million, 
far outpacing pay for other workers - October 2011).
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Table 20 Changes in corporate governance and executive pay practices 
 Separation of roles of chairman and CEO  
 Independence of non-executives 
 Independence of subcommittees 
 Senior Independent Director role 
 12 month contract (down from 24 months) 
 Fewer golden handshake/golden parachute cases 
 Improved transparency 
 Mandatory disclosure requirements under the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 
2002 
 IFRS 2 - expensing share payments (option grants are no longer 'free') 
 External advisers’ accountability 
 Shareholder votes needed for approval of pay plan  
 More stringent incentive plan criteria and performance targets 
 Zero pay rise and incentive payouts 
 Shareholder activism: Association of British Insurers rating systems 
 Regulatory bodies responding to public and media concerns 
 Safeguards to prevent executives from being able to manipulate their own earnings 
Source: this author 
These measures have been implemented, albeit bit by bit, but with good up-take, many of 
which have undoubtedly had an impact on the way in which companies are structured and run, 
especially in terms of pay practices. More than that, at the international level, many countries 
view the UK governance framework as the benchmark of how these things are done. Many 
have even adopted certain aspects of the UK model, with enhanced remuneration disclosure 
requirements and the advisory vote on the remuneration report being among the most well-
regarded polices.  
 
However, it is clear that corporate governance is still largely perceived as inadequate in general, 
with executive pay continuing to face fierce criticisms from every direction. It is almost 
inconceivable to think that 20 years of reform have got us nowhere.  
 
Is the general perception distorted or biased? The key question here is whether the successive 
iterations of governance rules and guidelines have actually achieved their objectives? In other 
words, has the recent development in UK corporate governance been successful in eradicating 
the worst instances of payment for failure in the UK? More specifically, has it been successful at 
promoting pay for performance? An attempt to address these fundamental questions will be 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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5.4 Structure of discussion chapters 
 
The main discussion will consider the research findings in the context of corporate governance, 
based on the examination of the literature and the results from the quantitative investigations. 
It is organised in two phases, following the two specific corporate governance objectives that 
have been briefly considered in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) and are set out in Table 9. In short, they 
are: 
 
CHAPTER 6: OBJECTIVE 1 - To improve the monitoring function of the board 
 
CHAPTER 7: OBJECTIVE 2 - To align the interests of executives and shareholders through pay  
 
The first objective to be considered (Chapter 6) is related to increased monitoring and control 
of executives by forming a board of directors to act in a watchdog role. The intention is that the 
presence of an effective board will bridge the 'information asymmetry' gap between executives 
and shareholders and deter executives from seeking personal gain at the expense of the long 
term health of the business (Huse 2007). Immediately, one can see that while considering 
executives to be self-interest-seeking, it is assumed that non-executive directors somehow have 
little regard to their own personal interests and are to be trusted to serve the interests of 
shareholders in an impartial manner. This assumption of the board’s ability to exhibit altruism 
and professionalism, while executives cannot, is at least inconsistent. The second governance 
objective to be addressed in Chapter 7 concerns the use of remuneration, share incentives in 
particular, to motivate executives in order to align their interests with those of the 
shareholders.  
 
Both objectives reflect agency perspectives, and despite theoretical rigour being demonstrated 
in research, a number of these perspectives are questionable in practice. Findings from this 
study suggest that, in practice, the objectives are ineffective and flawed in certain aspects. 
Some of these defects have been highlighted by previous researchers while some are new, and 
both will be discussed in the next two chapters.
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6 Discussion phase 1 
Governance objective 1- to improve the board monitoring 
function 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, many of the UK corporate governance reform efforts have been 
introduced to enhance the monitoring of executive behaviour through ‘independent’ boards. 
Using multiple agency and managerial power arguments, this chapter examines whether 
Objective 1 (i.e. to improve the board monitoring function) has been achieved and suggests 
potential hindrances to improving board oversight (as illustrated in Figure 16) The discussion 
will be based on both the observations made in Chapter 2 as well as Findings 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 
10 presented in Table 19 and discussed in Section 4.2. Three key issues will be explored, 
namely: the desired pay-related effects (Section 6.1), the verdict rendered by the findings of the 
present study (Section 6.2) and possible rationales for these findings (Sections 6.3and 6.4). 
 
Figure 16 Discussion phase 1 - improving oversight through ‘independent’ board 
 
Source: this author 
 
6.1 The desired pay-related effects of objective 1 
 
One of the aims of strengthening the monitoring and control function of the board, by making 
structural and procedural changes, was to improve pay related issues such as the pay 
determination process and the linkage between pay and company performance, specifically: 
   6. Discussion phase 1 
176 
 
 
• Size of organisation should not be the key or the only statistically proven determinant 
of pay levels: performance should play a much more significant part. In the recent past 
we have had the example of the Royal Bank of Scotland which expanded rapidly to 
become a global bank but then failed because of poor performance (Cadbury 1992). 
• The pay setting process itself should become fairer and more transparent - all decisions 
made must be impartial and justifiable, and subject to shareholders’ approval at the 
AGM, so that executive pay levels will increasingly move in line with company 
performance as opposed to market movements. In particular, measures should reduce 
the chances of windfall gains in pay (Greenbury 1995; DRRR 2002). 
• To achieve greater fairness, executives should no longer be involved in deciding their 
own pay and should not even be present during remuneration committee meetings. 
Remuneration committee should both be truly independent of influence from 
executives and should be seen to be independent (Cadbury 1992; Higgs 2003). 
• Instead of the CEO, Financial Director, or other individuals with potential conflict of 
interest, external consultants should be appointed by remuneration committee to 
assist in setting pay levels. All advice and recommendations of both external 
consultants and members of the remuneration committee should be disclosed in the 
Remuneration Report (DRRR 2002). 
• Changes to the composition of board, such as overall board size, the ratio of 
independent non-executive directors to executives, the separation of the roles of CEO 
and Chairman, and the appointment of a senior independent director, should be made 
with the aim of creating a board with stronger shareholder interest representation 
(Cadbury 1992; Higgs 2003). 
• The organisation’s pay policy and practices should reinforce the company business 
strategy and reflect good corporate governance (a high level of compliance to 
governance guidelines) and should have as their top priority the importance of creating 
shareholder value (Cadbury 1992). 
•  The pay arrangements decided upon should serve a variety of purposes; to attract, 
retain and motivate executives, to reward executives and align their interests, and 
should be linked to company-specific performance targets (Greenbury 1995). 
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• Executives’ performance, especially the CEO’s, should be closely monitored by the 
Board at all times and thorough appraisals should be conducted regularly, ideally on an 
annual basis, as is usual with other staff (Cadbury 1992). 
• Improved disclosure and transparency should alleviate the problems associated with 
information asymmetry, making it harder for executives to withhold information and 
following the board to evaluate the performance of executives more accurately 
(Cadbury, 1992, DRRR 2002). 
 
Has any of the above been achieved, and to what extent? The results from this study provide a 
number of indications. 
 
6.2 Indications from the literature and research results 
 
It appears that few of these objectives have been achieved.  
 
Executive pay is still mainly driven by size of organisation, much more so than by company 
performance, as consistently found by previous researchers. Given that this is still the case 
despite governance changes that have been made, one can legitimately ask who or what is 
more to blame for this situation? Is it the board (including the executives) itself, who continues 
to exercise a dominating influence of the setting of pay? Or is it that remuneration committees 
and consultants have too tamely acceded to the wishes of the board? 
 
Over the period of the study, the link of pay and performance has not got much stronger and 
despite some positive correlations being found, there is no significant upward trend. By far the 
most important finding is that the pay of CEOs is found to be less strongly performance linked 
than other executive board members. This finding is quite at odds with the fact that CEOs have 
a larger proportion of variable pay than other executives, so their pay should be more related 
to performance. The CEO's remuneration package is usually more variable simply because their 
greater influence over the business means that they need to be more accountable and more 
transparent than their colleagues. Can the fact that their pay continues to be less related to 
performance be attributed to them using their position of power to reward themselves? This 
highly relevant and important question will be discussed in greater detail later Section 6.4. 
 
Further, pay is found to be correlated mainly to total shareholder return. No consistent results 
have been observed with other performance measures included in the analysis (EPS growth, net 
income growth, EBITDA margin, sales growth and ROE). In one sense this finding is good news, 
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in that improved shareholder value is one of the key measures advocated by those wishing to 
link pay more closely to company performance. But one is bound to question whether the fact 
that total shareholder return is the only performance variable that has produced significant 
positive results is a sufficient indication that corporate governance has helped progress 
executive pay in the right direction, however small the movement might be? 
 
The ratio of non-executive directors to executive has increased, as intended by corporate 
governance reformers, but this increase in ratio has had no significant positive impact on the 
pay-performance relationship. So does this mean that increased monitoring by non-executives 
is futile? What explanations can be found for corporate governance reforms failing to have the 
desired effects? One way to try to understand the current situation is in terms of the existing 
theories - the finding will be discussed through agency theory and managerial power theory in 
turn. 
 
6.3 Discussion from an agency perspective 
 
As noted earlier, in academic research, agency theory provides the general model for analysing 
managerial behaviour and offers one of the most influential concepts in the study of corporate 
governance and executive compensation. Within the agency framework, executives are seen as 
being liable to take actions that are advantageous to themselves even if those actions are to the 
detriment of the company and its shareholders.  
 
Aside from the specific criticisms discussed in Section 2.2.1.4, the most significant overall 
criticism levelled at this view in previous studies is that it is an unrealistic oversimplification of 
what must inevitably be very complex personal human relationships, and that in many 
circumstances those personal relationships will be more important in determining the outcome 
of board decisions than the simple principal-agent relationship. This criticism, however, does 
not dispose of the merit of recognising that there is a misalignment of interests between 
executives and shareholders. And the concept of ‘multiple agencies’ - branched out from 
agency theory and based on the same principles - should be of help in providing some potential 
explanations in support of the research findings.  
 
6.3.1 Multiple agency conflicts 
 
Resting on a simple duality between principal and agent seems too simple for modern 
corporate structures. Relationships are often more complex than this. Double or multiple 
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agency conflicts may be intertwined and numerous complex relationships are possible. For 
instance, the finance director might be the agent of the CEO (who is the principal in this 
argument) or may be colluding since finance directors are often promoted to become CEOs 
themselves. Other possible multiple agency relationships within a company may include: 
 
• CEO vs board vs shareholders 
• CEO vs finance director and other executives 
• CEO vs shareholders 
• CEO vs board vs external advisers 
• CEO vs remuneration committee vs board vs shareholders 
 
This issue in regards to multiple agencies has been highlighted precisely by Tricker (2009), 
‘other critics have challenged the shareholder-director agency model as simplistic as practice. 
Where, for example, the ultimate beneficial owner has invested through a pension fund, which 
invests in a hedge fund, which invests in a private equity company, which places funds in the 
hands of a financial institution, which invests in the shares of a listed company but lends them 
as collateral for another transaction, who is agent for whom I ask?’ (Tricker 2009 p222). 
 
Clearly, it is possible for individuals other than the CEO (including non-executive directors), to 
behave as ‘agents’ where the problem of potential moral hazard and conflict of interest may 
well arise. Since more and more responsibilities and expectations are being placed on the board 
to safeguard and promote the interests of shareholders, it is crucial to not only question 
whether it is reasonable to rely quite so heavily on a few of these 'independent non-executives' 
but also re-visit the definition of independence. Simply meeting the criteria for being 
independent surely does not automatically mean that the individual will unequivocally support 
the shareholders and have their interests at heart and at all times?  
 
Is it ever possible to know for sure that these so-called 'independent directors' do not and will 
not have conflicting interests to the shareholders or be apathetic? Why are they seen as 
naturally more trustworthy and thus less likely to seek personal gains at the expense of 
shareholders? It is difficult to see any rational basis for the assumption that non-executive 
directors will not engage in self-serving behaviours simply because they have been designated 
as ‘independent’. Further, the board is created to monitor senior executives and evaluate their 
performance, but who is there to assess the performance of the board? 
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Is this not a case of, in the words of Juvenal, ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ or ‘Who will watch 
the watchmen’? Similar questions have been raised by a number of academics (see Table 21 
below), yet no one seems to have arrived at a satisfactory answer, a solution or a meaningful 
conclusion. 
 
Table 21 Literature evidence that questions the concept of ‘independent’ directors 
Author Exemplary quotes 
Rodrigues (2007 p1)  ‘According to conventional wisdom, a supermajority 
independent board of directors is the ideal corporate 
governance structure. Debate nevertheless continues empirical 
evidence suggests that independent boards do not improve 
firm performance’ 
Clarke (2007 p73)  ‘…the whole purpose of having independent directors is 
surprisingly under theorised, leading to inconsistent rules’ 
Page (2009)  ‘unconscious bias’ of ‘ independent’ non-executive directors 
Monks and Sykes (2002 p16) Monks and Sykes asked …why redefine definitions of 
independence’ which everyone knows to be untrue?’ 
Reference: Quotes cited in Baker and Andersen (2010 p90) 
 
In the UK, good corporate governance relies heavily on corporate boards that are altruistic to 
act as a restraining influence on self-interested executives. Similarly, boards rely on external 
advisers to act responsibly and ethically. Clearly, if in reality things were indeed so simplistic, 
my research and that of others would have shown very different results - given the high level of 
conformity and compliance to governance guidelines. So why has the use of non-executive 
directors failed to prove effective as hoped in moderating remuneration? 
 
6.3.2 Independence of non-executive directors 
 
Synthesising the findings of the study and the literature review has provided a number of 
possible explanations as to why non-executive directors are not effective. 
  
First, there is no compelling reason for non-executives to take what are bound to be unpopular 
decisions and to act in a way that is likely to seen as disruptive and be resented by their 
colleagues. Quite simply, it is easier to leave things as they are and not make changes that are 
likely to annoy other board members. 
 
In some cases, non-executives do not have either enough information to be aware that action 
needs to be taken, or enough power to take action. More than that, non-executives tend to 
meet infrequently or only on a limited number of times a year. This means that they only have 
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time to focus on basic issues of compliance, with little or no time left for in-depth discussions 
about matters of detail, which may be perceived as relatively unimportant. One can also argue 
that they do not get paid enough (£40,000 to £60,000 a year is the current rate, KPMG 2008) to 
motivate them to tackle their role with sufficient energy to make serious or disruptive changes.  
 
Moreover, it is not unusual for non-executives to take on appointments for personal reasons 
such as prestige or to build up their curriculum vitae, or for networking purposes. Such motives 
as these are likely to make a non-executive hesitate before taking actions that may ultimately 
results in losing those benefits. There may also be instances where a non-executive director 
may already have a personal relationship with the CEO (Gomez-Mejia et al 2010) or other board 
executives (e.g. finance director) yet still be classed as 'independent' according to the official 
definition. In such cases, is it realistic to expect non-executives to be totally altruistic simply by 
labelling them independent?  
 
This issue has been highlighted by Tricker (2009 p244), ‘…most of the “games” described 
involve the subtleties of communication and interpersonal relations. Most of the tactics are not 
illegal, do not amount to fraud, nor are they inherently dishonest. They are a means to 
achieving directors' personal preferences.’ The author argued that the role of non-executives 
can be neutralised completely because of outright collusion between board members to 
manipulate events for their own advantage. In writing about 'Games Directors Play', Tricker 
(2009 p244) pointed out that, 'two or more members of the board [may] conspire together to 
influence a board decision.’  
 
Tricker’s observations are shared by Gomez-Mejia et al (2010 p125) who suggested that, ‘… 
board members, just like executives, indulge in self-serving behaviours and often receive hefty 
fees and perks that cannot be justified on any rational basis.’. Similarly, Paredes (2004, cited in 
Brown et al 2009 p3) argued that ‘huge executive compensation packages often amount to little 
more than corporate looting and that huge CEO pay reflects a board of directors that is shirking 
its responsibility by not exercising due care in overseeing and negotiating executive pay 
packages’. 
 
The question about the true nature and effectiveness of the role of non-executive is certainly 
an interesting one and will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.3.3. If the independence of 
non-executives is questionable, then should one not also challenge, or at least query, the 
independence of those who actually provide the market data and develop the pay packages of 
executives? The role of remuneration consultants will be examined next. 
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6.3.3 Independence of external advisers 
 
Most, if not all, FTSE 100 companies seek advice from remuneration consultants (often more 
than one firm) to help manage their executive pay affairs. Their activities include developing 
business and pay strategies, determining the structure of pay, designing long term Incentive 
and annual bonus plans, drawing up service contracts, formulating the appropriate competitive 
market level, attending remuneration committee meetings, drafting remuneration reports, 
deciding on succession planning arrangements, as well as other firm wide human resources 
policies and practices for general employees. 
 
If there are many pressures on non-executives for them to conform to the board’s wishes, and 
for them to ignore compliance trouble-spots, one would agree that the picture is no different as 
far as external advisers, and remuneration consultants in particular, are concerned. Listing rules 
and governance regulations such as those set out in the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations (2002) require companies to name these advisers and described clearly the level of 
their involvement.  
 
However does this have any impact on their behaviour? Remuneration consultants are hired by 
the board to serve on remuneration committees, but they often have close relationships with 
the executives (CEOs and finance directors in particular) especially since external advisers used 
to be appointed by executive directors until recently. Whether the new ‘arm’s length’ recruiting 
approach is sufficient to negate existing personal relationships is undoubtedly questionable. 
 
Such consultancy work is a lucrative source of business and consultancies naturally wish to be 
re-appointed year after year. Arguably, one of the most effective ways for them to gain repeat 
business is to do what pleases the company (their client) which may make it all the more 
difficult for them to act in a totally impartial manner. As far as advising FTSE 100 companies is 
concerned the industry is dominated by a handful of firms (see Footnote 6). Together they 
constitute an oligopoly, just as in accountancy where there are four big firms who dominate the 
market. 
 
While most FTSE 100 companies differ in terms of products and services and the markets they 
serve, it appears that the consulting firms have figured that it is in their interests to devise 
common remuneration strategies which they can sell 'off the shelf' rather than re-inventing the 
wheel. Arguably, it is less costly and less time consuming for consultants to offer more or less 
the same advice to all clients. Moreover, the advice and services provided by these firms are 
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rarely, if ever, challenged by governing bodies because they are supposedly hired by the 
independent remuneration company and are named in the remuneration report. 
 
It seems that Tricker was not merely being cynical in observing that, ‘…inherent in agency 
theory is a philosophical, moral assumption about the nature of mankind. The theory assumes 
that people are self-interested not altruistic. They cannot be expected to look after the 
interests of others.’ (Tricker 2009 p222).  
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it seems one has good grounds to accept Tricker's 
proposition and argue that all directors, executives and non-executives, independent or 
otherwise, cannot be trusted - in other words, agency conflicts are therefore virtually 
inevitable; not just between executives and shareholders but among everyone. So the idea of 
using non-executive as an insulation and to represent the interests of the shareholders is quite 
possibly flawed. To illustrate the irony of the situation, here is a piece of interesting data:  
 
According to a survey conducted by KPMG in 2010, the median fee for non-executive chairmen 
among the FTSE 100 companies rose by 21% which was considerable. The pay (or ‘fees’ as it is 
commonly called) of non-executive directors rarely makes the headlines but maybe more 
attention should be paid to the way non-executives are remunerated which might just give us 
more clues as to whether the board is (and can be) actually well-placed to do serve the 
interests of shareholders. Much food for thought is presented below: 
 
• Could a 21 per cent fee increase in 2010 be justifiable when one of the main criticisms 
regarding executive compensation is the continually widening pay gap between the top 
and the rest of the company? 
 
• Typically, non-executive directors (including senior independent directors, non-
executive deputy chairmen and non-executive chairmen) receive not only an annual 
basic fee, but also additional fees for chairing or being a member of a subcommittee 
(e.g. audit , remuneration, health and safety, risk, corporate governance, to name a 
few). In many cases, the company will cover travel expenses and offer other benefits 
and perquisite to their non-executives too. 
 
• The compensation package and levels are set by the same group of consulting firms 
that work alongside Remuneration Committees in determining how senior executives 
(as well as the general employees) are rewarded.  
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Despite the many potential and actual weaknesses of agency theory, the above discussion 
shows that the theory has, nonetheless, helped us to acknowledge that while the separation of 
ownership and control problem does exist, a governance model that depends quite so heavily 
on the board and external advisers may not work as well as anticipated because of the 
complexities of multiple agencies. It has also helped understand, at least partially, why 
interventions such as increased monitoring by non-executive directors, ‘outsourcing’ the pay 
setting process to supposedly impartial experts through the remuneration committee and 
enhanced disclosure requirements, have not quite achieved the desired effect.  
 
All in all, it may be necessary to first re-consider whether it is realistic to expect non-executives 
and advisers to act truly ‘independently’, after which perhaps one will then be in a better 
position to determine the efficacy of the current approach of having the board holding the key 
to achieving good corporate governance.  
 
6.4 Discussion from a managerial power perspective 
 
The multiple agency dilemma discussed above is further complicated by the issues raised in 
managerial power theory. In essence, managerialists argue that executives are able to, directly 
or indirectly, influence board decisions, including the pay setting process, by exerting ‘power’ 
towards the non-executives (Brown et al 2009).  
 
The background and assumptions of managerial power theory have been outlined in Section 
2.2.2. Of particular relevance to interpreting the findings at this point include two specific 
issues: company size and board effectiveness. 
 
6.4.1 Company size 
 
As noted in the discussion on growth and investment opportunities in in Section 2.2.2.3, 
executives who possess the necessary information and power are often driven to increase the 
size of the company, sometimes even at the expense of profits and the organisation’s long term 
health. In a recent text, Gomez-Mejia et al (2010 p125) observed that, ‘managerialists impute 
two main motives to the CEO's “sales maximizing” behaviours. First, expanding scale of 
operations enhances the visibility of the firm. This promotes the CEO's prestige, appealing to his 
or her ego needs (Marris 1964; Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007). Second, firm size may be used 
by executives and hired consultants to justify higher pay at the top (Dyl 1988; Tosi et al 2000).’ 
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In addition, as size increases, so does the degree of complexity of the company, making it more 
difficult for the board to perform its monitoring and control duties effectively (Smith and Watts 
1992). 
 
This issue has been summed up concisely by Hengartner (2006 p60), ‘…research on executive 
compensation attributed the relationship between firm size and CEO pay to a manifestation of 
managerialism. In this posture, firm size rather than performance, is the main predictor of 
executive pay, because greater size offers the executive several advantages: more power and 
prestige, less pay risk (because the incumbent has more control over firm size than 
performance), less employment risk (since firm size provides a buffer against business cycle 
effects), and a legitimate means to justify more pay at the top.’  
 
With these factors taken into account, it becomes clearer as to why empirical research 
consistently finds company size to be the prime determinant of executive pay, and the present 
study is no exception. 
 
6.4.2 Board effectiveness 
 
Another important factor raised by managerialists which seems to help explain why the 
governance structural mechanisms devised to monitor executives more closely do not appear 
to reach their full effect is that many boards are actually ineffective in keeping executives, 
especially the CEO, in order. And rarely do companies have any form of board evaluation 
system in place either (Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Minow 2008a - cited in Gomez-Mejia et al 
2010). This issue has been explored at great length by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) who 
questioned how well can the board perform their duties. In their view, the connections 
between the CEO and the company’s ‘nominally independent’ directors are created through 
'The social and psychological factors of friendship, collegiality, loyalty, team spirit and natural 
deference to the firm's leader . . .’ (Bebchuk and Fried 2004 p43). Nowhere is this argument 
regarding board effectiveness more evident than in the determination process of executive pay, 
a view shared by many, including Herman (1981), Fierman (1990), Boone et al (2007), Lublin 
(2008) and Gomez-Mejia et al (2010). Some representative quotes are presented below: 
 
‘The people who set the CEO's pay ... the compensation committee ... always conflicted, usually 
co-opted ... they have the tricky task of setting salaries for their peers, who more often than 
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not, are their friends. . . . The CEO, whose pay the committee sets, sits on both sides of the 
table.’ (Fierman 1990 p5 and p66, cited in Gomez-Mejia et al 2010 p127). 
 
'Aggressive boards determined to rein in management's clout and rewards remain the 
exception rather than the rule. Pay committees too often take away with one hand and give 
back with the other.' (Minow 2008a pR2 Wall Street Journal, cited in Gomez-Mejia et al 2010 
p127). 
 
'Compensation committee leaders feel torn between pleasing investors and pleasing the top 
brass.' (Lublin 2008, cited in Gomez-Mejia et al 2010 p127). 
 
The considerations discussed above in relation to the findings of the present study support the 
view that executive pay is not as strongly correlated to performance as agency predicts because 
of the power of executives to frustrate the intentions of governance structural reform efforts. 
 
Even more interesting is the finding that the pay-performance link for the CEOs is in general 
comparatively weaker than the other executives (Finding 1 in Table 19). This seems to suggest 
that the CEO tends to possess even greater power than other executive directors to escape the 
restricting effects intended by the governance mechanisms related to improving the board 
monitoring function. 
 
One possible explanation for this finding could be related to the effects of outside connections 
and the external labour market on executive power as outlined in Section 2.2.2.3. That 
discussion provided evidence that the greater the external social ties one has, the more likely 
and more opportunities he has to find a new job (Wegener 1991; Jensen and Zajac 2004; Brown 
et al 2009). And of all the directors, ‘the CEO is typically the most powerful member of the 
corporate elite’ (Jensen and Zajac 2004, cited in Brown et al p3) which means that he or she 
tend to have the greatest power in terms of the ability to exercise the option to resign (Brown 
et al 2009 p3). Not only does this observation help explain this finding (Finding 1, Table 19), but 
indicates that remuneration committees and compensation consultants should take into 
account the increased influence and power of CEOs when developing service contracts and 
remuneration arrangements - to mitigate the effects both of CEOs using their power to grow 
the company without justifiable reasons and use the external labour market as a threat to drive 
up their own pay. 
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This part of the discussion has provided arguments in support of the literature and the research 
findings to attempt to explain why the intention of improving the monitoring function of the 
board through changes to board structures has not been as successful and straightforward as 
expected. However, internal structural mechanisms form only part of the equation of what 
constitutes good corporate governance. The other important element is executive pay - its 
purpose is to enhance interest alignment - will be discussed next.
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7 Discussion phase 2 
Governance objective 2 - to align the interests of executives 
and shareholders through executive pay 
 
So far discussions pointed out that there is room for improvement for governance interventions 
and measures to improve the monitoring function of corporate boards, this chapter now moves 
on to examine whether executive pay has been an effective internal governance mechanism in 
terms of improving shareholder interest alignment (i.e. Objective 2). As shown in Figure 17, 
potential issues with specific regard to remuneration committees, pay consultants and the 
prevailing pay practices that may hinder the effectiveness of pay will be identified in due 
course. Observations gathered from Chapter 2 and Findings 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 presented 
in Table 19 will all be used to aid the ensuing discussions. In the process, an attempt will be 
made to answer the following questions: 
 
• What was expected to be achieved through the use of pay arrangements (Section 0)? 
• According to the literature and results of this study, have the objectives and 
expectations been achieved (Section 7.2)? 
• And what are the rationales for these findings (Section 7.3)? 
 
Figure 17 Discussion phase 2 - improving interest alignment through pay
 
Source: this author 
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7.1 The desired effects of objective 2  
 
Agency theory considers executive pay as a key tool in aligning interests and resolving the many 
issues that stem from the separation of ownership and control. Ultimately, if remuneration is 
applied correctly, the associated agency costs will be reduced and shareholder wealth will be 
enhanced. 
 
The various guidelines and codes that have been promulgated in the UK agree that executive 
pay is an important component of good corporate governance. Pay, in particular long term 
incentives, is viewed as a vehicle that can help lessen the detrimental effects of the agency 
dilemma. As mentioned earlier, options and shares awarded to senior executives have been 
receiving on-going scrutiny from institutional investors, shareholders and the media since they 
became increasingly popular in the early 1990s. There are several reasons for this: 
 
• Share-based incentives, especially among FTSE 100 companies, often comprised the 
greatest portion of the total remuneration package of executives and therefore 
resulted in the highest compensation amounts. Since 2002, shareholder approval was 
required before adopting any new executive incentive schemes or making 
amendments to the existing ones. Under present arrangements, shareholders are given 
an advisory vote at the AGM. The recent banking crisis exposed a number of pay 
practices that angered the nation, as a result, the Government is at present in the 
process of developing more stringent governance provisions to regulate the way 
executives are remunerated. 
 
• Companies continue to place more focus on their executive pay policy and practices, 
always reconsidering the balance and mix of cash and shares in their pay programmes 
and the mix between short and long term incentives. This is by and large due to the 
common belief that executive compensation does matter and can even encourage 
directors to think and behave like shareholders.  
 
• The design and delivery of share plans have also been undergoing dramatic changes in 
response to corporate governance requirements and pressure from different 
constituencies. More specifically, companies have been urged by corporate governance 
codes to consider a broader range of share incentive vehicles with design features that 
support a long term business view, increased executive share ownership, a shareholder 
friendly environment and, most importantly, a much stronger relationship between pay 
and performance. 
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UK corporate governance reforms have undoubtedly placed much emphasis on executive pay, 
but the key question now is whether it has delivered? 
 
7.2 Evidence from the literature and research results 
 
The evidence shows that companies have been taking up the governance advice given to them 
regarding their pay arrangements. Compliance levels have been high, and relatively few 
companies have breached the regulations in this respect. But whether these best practice 
changes actively helped executive pay achieve its desired effects, as an effective governance 
tool to align interest and reduce agency costs, is not so clear. 
 
The question that most clearly demands a definitive answer is: has pay managed to incentivise 
executives to make decisions that will not only increase their wealth, but will also increase 
shareholders’ wealth - that is, change the behaviour of executives to drive shareholder value? 
 
It has already been noted earlier that pay is still predominantly driven by company size. More 
importantly, however, has pay become more related to performance over the past 20 years, 
during which time the use of long term incentives has grown and plan designs among FTSE 100 
companies do largely conform to governance guidelines? 
 
Have compensation levels become less dependent on market movements (e.g. inflation levels) 
but more on performance? Based on the results discussed in Chapter 4, executive pay in 
general is not entirely unrelated to performance as relatively significant results have been 
found between pay and TSR. But it is disappointing to see that: 
 
• Long term incentives do not seem to live up to expectations as the pay element that is 
supposed to help align interests and drive performance and shareholder value. 
• The link between annual bonuses and performance is no weaker than that of long term 
incentives and performance despite the fact that bonuses tend to be short term 
focused and partly cash based.  
• Similarly, total cash compensation (base salary plus annual bonus) is the pay element 
that is most strongly correlated to company performance. 
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• Between 2004 and 2009, the pay-performance link does not appear to show any 
detectable trend in improvement. So it looks like it is economic movement that still 
determines how companies perform. 
 
Considering the amount of effort invested by academics, industry experts and governance 
bodies in examining and promoting the use of long term incentives for senior executives, there 
has been a great deal of expectation for the linkage between executive pay and company 
performance to improve over time. Particularly, the prevalence of equity based reward has 
been increasing not only among top executives but at all levels during the past few decades. 
 
It is now not uncommon for non-executives to be paid in shares and many FTSE 100 companies 
offer their general employees the opportunity to participate in government subsidised 
Sharesave schemes. Besides, much literature in the meantime has advocated for long term 
share incentives over annual bonuses and other form of short term cash alternatives. So much 
so that pay research that examined only the cash components (i.e. omitting long term 
incentives) was often heavily criticised for failing to capture the most performance driven 
element of an executive’s pay package, and hence, the results were often deemed less credible. 
The years following the change in disclosure requirements have seen an increase in pay studies 
that investigated the effects of long term incentives. As seen in Chapter 2 and the results 
presented in Chapter 4, no marked changes to the overall picture of pay research findings have 
been observed, and the pay and performance relationship did not seem to have strengthened 
during the 2000s. Some possible reasons for this will be discussed next. 
 
7.3 Possible rationales for weak pay-performance link 
 
Why is it that executive pay does not seem to be delivering its promises or at least not as 
effectively as hoped? The potential reasons that may account for the disappointingly mixed 
research findings (from both this study and past evidence) will be discussed in this part and are 
grouped as follows. 
 
• The influence of executives on company performance (Section 7.3.1) 
- Do executives really matter?  
- Are there not too many external environmental factors that are beyond the 
control of even the CEO? 
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• The role of executive pay and incentives (Section 7.3.2) 
- Do executives respond to pay?  
- Is it realistic to expect executive pay to deliver so many different objectives? 
 
• The effectiveness of the pay structure and incentive plan design (Section 7.3.3) 
- Are remuneration committees and pay consultants to blame for failing to provide 
impartial and expert advice that is tailored to the business needs of individual 
companies?  
- Are the best practice guidelines too specific and too subject to the latest fad?  
- Are pay practices and incentive plan details to compliance-led? 
 
7.3.1 The influence of executives on business performance 
 
Clearly, the widely held assumption that executives in general and the CEO in particular, are 
normally able to exercise a decisive influence on company performance by reason of the 
strategic managerial decisions they make, is fundamental to many theories of pay and 
governance. But how far is this assumption confirmed by evidence? 
 
This question has been under investigation for at least four decades according to Gomez-Mejia 
et al (2010). As long ago as the 1970s, researchers such as Chandler (1977) argued that 
executives have a great deal of influence over the destiny of their companies, while in the same 
year, Hannan and Freeman (1977) argued that external factors were the dominant factor. 
Similarly, Murray (1989) found that executives’ contributions to short term performance is 
almost zero in the food and petroleum industries, but on the other hand that long term 
performance was influenced largely by the internal effects of management’s decisions. This 
finding can be explained by seeing management’s contribution in the short term as being 
responses to factors emerging from the trading environment outside the company, whereas 
long term effects originate from within the company as a result of strategic initiatives by the 
board (Gomez-Mejia et al 2010). 
 
Even prominent scholars such as Jensen and Murphy (1990a p253) suggested in a major study 
that the 'small observed pay-performance sensitivity seems inconsistent with the implications 
of formal principal agent model... [because] CEOs are not, in fact, important agents of 
shareholders . . . CEOs do not matter.’ Most recently, Gomez Mejia et al (2010 p141) also 
demonstrated that executives can indeed influence company performance. 
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In addition to the above, there has also been recent research (Loomis 2009; Parloff 2009) into 
how executives’ decisions affect the performance of companies in certain sectors of the 
financial services market, following the banking crisis of 2008 (Gomez-Mejia et al 2010). In 
general, the findings tended to indicate that much of the economic upheaval may be attributed 
to poor decisions made by board executive directors and ill-conceived pay plans. 
 
Broadly, evidence appears to suggest that executives can indeed one way or another influence 
company performance. This view necessarily underlies the fundamental proposition that there 
is indeed a point in making efforts to link executive pay to company performance. However, the 
research results have shown that the prime determinant of executive pay continues to be 
company size. So while it is possible for executives to improve performance by their strategic 
choices, one can argue that perhaps it is easier and more preferable for them to focus on 
increasing the company’s size in order to maximise their own remuneration. In addition, it is 
also worth noting that when compensation consultants review or set the pay levels for senior 
executives, the size of a company (whether in terms of sales or market share) is a key factor in 
the benchmarking exercise where the ultimate ‘competitive’ rate for each executive is 
measured. While there are justifiable reasons that executive pay should reflect the size and 
complexity of the company7, what continues to frustrate researchers is the seemingly simple 
yet unresolved question: ‘Does executive pay reward top management's ability to expand 
corporate size or to increase profitability’ (Gomez-Mejia et al 2010 p157). 
 
This question, coupled with earlier discussions about executives inclining to increase company 
size, further underline the importance of taking into consideration managerial power when 
tackling the issue of interest misalignment - whether through governance mechanisms related 
to board structure and increased monitoring or the use of executive pay. 
 
7.3.2 The role of executive pay arrangements 
 
The above discussion shows that in order to improve business performance (not just to expand 
in size), it is crucial for companies to have the instruments in place to encourage executives to 
bring about a win-win situation in which both themselves and the shareholders benefit 
financially. Pay and incentive plans are the tools that have traditionally been used drive this 
                                                          
7 Measure of company complexity: the overwhelming majority of FTSE 100 companies have international operations. 
Due to the need to compete for executive talent in the global market place, their view of executive compensation will be 
global rather than merely national and is likely to reflect in much more generous short- and long term incentive 
opportunities often found in overseas economies such as the United States, resulting in higher total remuneration levels 
(Hengartner 2006). 
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result. However, before beginning the examination the role of this tool, it is important to try to 
determine whether executives actually are motivated by pay. Is money the carrot that we 
should be dangling in front of executives to induce the desired behaviour and improve their 
performance? Moreover, is it realistic to expect executive pay to deliver the great many 
different goals that are expected of it? 
 
A brief review of the literature has revealed much evidence that monetary reward does 
motivate executives somewhat (Berrone and Gomez Mejia 2009; Mathieu and Zajac 1990, 
Hambrick et al 2008). Interestingly, as noted by Gomez-Mejia et al (2010), the literature also 
indicates that the structure of top management’s pay compensation package often has an 
effect on their decisions regarding: 
 
• Capital investments (Larcker 1983; Bergman and Jenter 2005) 
• Mergers and acquisitions (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Wright et al 2003) 
• Accounting choices (Dyl 1988) 
• Research and Development expenditure and efforts to innovate products and services 
(Hoskisson, Hitt and Hill 1990; Makri, Lane and Gomez-Mejia 2006; Balkin, Markman 
and Gomez-Mejia 2000) 
• Dividend policies (Fenn and Liang 2001) 
• The company's overall strategy (Dow and Raposo 2005) 
 
However, Gomez-Mejia et al (2010 p161) also identified that, somehow, not many companies 
make their executive pay ‘contingent on strategic decisions that will eventually impact on 
performance.  
 
All in all, much of the literature argues that CEOs and other board directors do respond to 
monetary rewards. However, there is evidence to suggest that while necessary, money alone 
may not be a sufficient condition to motivate executives in the boardroom. A recent survey by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008 p26-27) interviewed the CEOs of some of the largest UK public 
companies questioning their views on financial rewards and the key findings are set out below: 
 
• The majority of participants regard financial incentives as important as long as a 
minimum threshold is met, but not necessarily of critical importance, to business 
success. 
• Money is considered as a measure of success, its social value is as important as its 
purchasing power. As one of the CEOs put it, ‘…senior executives, competitive by 
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nature, want to know how they are doing relative to their peers. Earnings are an 
obvious way of measuring this, a proxy for wider measures of success.’ 
• Only a small number of executives are primarily motivated by potential monetary gain. 
Instead, it is found that executives are commonly driven by: 
- A sense of achievement and being valued 
- Being part of a ‘successful’ team where they are in tune with the organisation's 
values 
• Other factors that are perceived as important include fairness power and status. 
 
Arguably, these considerations seem to provide a potential explanation for why top executives 
are often willing to waive their bonuses or freeze their base salary in the knowledge that the 
payout amount and their entitlement actually makes them appear more 'powerful' if they 
publicly relinquish it. Many cherish this power to forego what it rightfully theirs.  
 
While executive remuneration as a while forms a key part of governance codes, much of the 
expectations has been placed specifically on long term incentives. This is largely due to the fact 
that of all the different pay elements, agency theorists and governance reformers have been 
vocal in pushing for long term Incentives in the expectation that increased share ownership will 
encourage executives to think more like the owners and become more focused on the long 
term rather than on short term gains. However, in practice, how are long term incentives 
actually perceived by the recipients (i.e. the executives themselves)?  
 
Growing evidence from academic research as well as practitioner and business press argues 
that long term incentive plans are an ineffective way to motivate senior executives (Buck et al 
2003, Pepper et al 2012, PricewaterhouseCooper 2006, The Sunday Telegraph’s Executive Pay 
Report 2010). This is partly because, as suggested by Pepper et al (2012 p13), ‘the financial cost 
of LTIPs [long term incentive plans] is greater than the value perceived executives.’. This 
observation is consistent with that of Buck et al (2003). These studies have demonstrated that 
factors such as risk aversion, time discounting and uncertainty aversion can significantly affect 
the way executives assess probabilities and value of their long term incentive awards.  
 
Further, PricewaterhouseCooper (2008) has also found that executives in general believe long 
term incentives to have failed to meet the objectives of interest alignment. Among reasons 
given, the most commonly cited was the complexity of many long term incentive plans, and 
calling them ‘arbitrary’ (p28). On the other hand, short term incentives (annual bonuses) were 
generally seen as very effective by executives and non-executives alike. Participants described 
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them, as having much better 'line of sight' meaning that the connection between successful 
actions on their part and the reward gained is more obvious. In addition, short term incentives 
are typically paid in cash within a 12 month period of achieving the relevant performance 
targets, and this immediacy increases the value of an award in the eyes of executives. This 
particular point, together with the finding from this study that annual bonuses appear to be at 
least as performance-linked as long term incentives (see Finding 4, Table 19), calls into doubt 
the effectiveness of not only long term incentive plans but also the pay structure of senior 
executives, especially the balance between long and short term incentive rewards.  
 
The discussion so far has established that executive pay does matter and serve many purposes. 
Apart from remunerating and motivating executives, it is expected that a pay package will play 
a key part in attracting and retaining the best talent and, above all, drive the desired behaviours 
to align interests. In addition, a great deal of emphasis has been specifically placed on incentive 
plans. In particular, much has been written about how these plans should focus participants on 
the company’s operational and financial priorities in order to hold executives accountable to 
results, which, in turn, should maximise shareholder wealth in the long run (Chingos 2004). If all 
this is not enough, every aspect of executive pay should also be compliant with relevant 
governance regulations and governing entities. Is there a possibility that we might just be 
expecting too much from executive pay? 
 
With the aim of helping companies make the most of their executive pay arrangements, a 
considerable number of measures have been instigated by governance bodies. Pay related best 
practice recommendations can be found in almost every governance guidelines. And as already 
mentioned, companies have tended to be compliant with governance codes, but then how does 
it come about there is as yet no significant evidence indicating that the connection between 
executive pay and company performance has improved during the reform period?  
 
The results from this study suggest that while some positive links are found between pay and 
TSR, long term incentives and total compensation are not showing stronger correlations than 
components that are not and do not include long term share based rewards such as annual 
bonus and total cash. Equally disappointingly, the overall pay-performance relationship does 
not seem to be strengthening over the five year study period (2004-2009) even with the 
adoption of some considerably robust governance measures the decade before (see Finding 5, 
Table 19). Any material changes to the link appear to be due to market movements  
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What then has gone wrong? The government, regulatory bodies, shareholders, institutional 
investors, remuneration committee members, pay consultants, economists, academics and 
agency theorists all believe that executive pay can help alleviate the agency dilemma through 
its motivational value to drive the desired behaviour which will translate into improved 
company performance and shareholder value. So what is not quite right in the equation?  
 
Are we expecting too much from pay? Is it reasonable to expect pay to be arranged in a way 
that is both effective and compliant to governance codes? And why is pay still generating so 
much bad press day in day out? It may be that the answer to this question is affirmative if 
corporate governance is not flexible, but that the 'comply or explain' model should provide the 
flexibility sufficient to make the system workable. These questions clearly demand answers. 
However, before being in a position to do so we need to investigate further the design of pay 
structures and plans to provide additional clues. 
 
7.3.3 The effectiveness of the pay structure and incentive plan design 
 
This part of the discussion sets out to question whether the tenuous relationship between 
executive compensation and company performance could be due to issues with the pay 
structure and the designs of incentive plan. How well have remuneration committees and pay 
consultants performed their role? Have they managed to provide impartial and expert advice 
that is tailored to the business needs of individual companies? Or could the failure be 
accounted to the best practice guidelines being too specific and too subject to the latest 
panacea, leading to actual pay practices and incentive plan details changing too lightly? A 
discussion of these questions may provide some clues as to why TSR is the only measure that 
shows positive links to pay. 
 
In general, media coverage of executives' pay is often negative and blame is placed on the 
executives themselves. However, unlike the past, CEO and executives are not involved in 
deciding on their salary levels or designing any of the incentive plans. Numerous governance 
measures have been put in place ensure that executives have no say on their own pay. The 
responsibility of pay setting lies with the remuneration committee. Expert advice is often 
sought from remuneration consultants to assist with the development and implementation of 
various pay arrangements. It is typically the chairman of the remuneration committee who is 
responsible for hiring the consultants, determining the company’s pay strategy and policies, 
and ultimately signing off each and every element of the pay packages.  
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Unlike executives, one rarely hears media questions raised about the integrity, the competence 
or the motives of those who actually devise the arrangements that lead to payouts. Hence, 
while discussing the effectiveness of FTSE 100 pay structures and incentive schemes, some 
rarely asked questions will be considered as well: 
 
• Are remuneration committees and pay consultants at fault? (Section 7.3.3.1) 
• Are the best practice guidelines too specific and too changeable? (Section 7.3.3.2) 
• Are compensation practices too compliance-led? (Section 7.3.3.3). 
 
As corporate governance systems have become more complex over the past two decades, so 
too have pay programmes and incentive plans. Many factors can affect their effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, a myriad of measures have been introduced to enable 
companies to develop and implement pay arrangements that are unbiased, governance friendly 
and in alignment with their business goals. These arrangements include two key provisions: 
 
• All pay related decisions are to be made by the remuneration committee, which is 
made up of independent non-executive directors only, to ensure that executives are 
not involved in the pay setting process and have no influence over their own pay - that 
decisions are taken ‘at arm’s length’ (Cadbury 1992; Greenbury 1995). 
• Expert advice should be sought from remuneration consultants whose appointments 
are made directly by the remuneration committee (not the CEO or other executive 
directors). Their names, and the service they provide, have to be noted in detail in the 
remuneration report (Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 / Statutory 
Instrument 401 2008). 
 
The various pay related provisions (refer to Chapter 2 for details), coupled with the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach should allow flexibility and encourage consultants and remuneration 
committees to use their discretion to adapt best practice guidelines to suit individual company 
needs and to implement effective pay programmes. But, as noted earlier, it appears that in 
complying with these regulations pay packages and incentive plans have all become very much 
the same, rather than being adapted to individual needs. This is not at all the aim of the system, 
which is to provide flexibility. 
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At the moment, there is clearly still much disquiet among the different stakeholders about the 
current state of affairs regarding executive compensation (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007 p3). 
For instance, executives are not pleased with the fact that the incentive plans being devised are 
not closely enough connected with the factors they can control; that they are being blamed for 
being awarded a bonus or long term incentives that they earned, not designed by them, but 
approved by the board.  
 
The board is not happy because they are being cast in the role as ‘policemen’ instead of 
constructive partners. Remuneration consultants, too, are unhappy and feel unjust for being 
blamed for being the cause for ratcheting pay through providing inflationary benchmark data. 
In practice, consultants simply provide the data and information; remuneration committees 
decide what is suitable for the company. Needless to say, shareholders are disgruntled about 
executive pay not being driven by business performance. Last but not least, general employees 
and the public also are angered by executive pay and found it distasteful, in particular, they are 
outraged by the disparity in pay between senior executives and average workers. 
 
This last point about the salary gap between the top management and the rest of the 
employees is one of the most contentious sources of discontent with executive pay as far as the 
media and the general public are concerned. While this issue is not the focus of the present 
discussion, and arguably, a separate matter of contention altogether, it is nevertheless 
important for it to be addressed, even just briefly. This is because it is a subject that tend to 
always attract a great deal of attention from the media and politicians, but more than that, 
because it highlights that fact that pay not being performance linked is only one half of the 
executive compensation problem. 
 
Currently, the disclosure regulations require companies to explain how they have taken account 
of pay and conditions in the whole company when setting the remuneration of the executive 
directors. But there seems to be no agreement as to exactly what information a company must 
disclose. Some reformers are suggesting that companies should disclose the ratio between the 
CEO's salary and that of the rest of employees. Others go so far as to say that this ratio should 
be capped as has been suggested in the public sector (Hewitt New Bridge Street 2010 p5).  
 
One of the difficulties with disclosing information and providing justifications on the 
relationship between executive pay and workforce pay concerned with drawing valid 
comparisons between industry sectors. According to Hewitt New Bridge Street, in their Report 
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on FTSE 100 Director’s Remuneration (2010), there is no 'one-size fits all' solution as to what is 
the appropriate pay relativity. 
 
‘As shown in [Figure 18 Ratio of CEO pay to average employee pay in 2010] below, the 
relationship between CEO and average employee pay varies enormously between sectors. This 
does not mean that one sector 'overpays' its CEO compared to another. Instead, the 
discrepancies are more likely to be driven by the fact that the average worker in one industry 
will have very different skill requirements - and therefore earning potential - than one working 
in another industry.’ (p5) 
 
Figure 18 Ratio of CEO pay to average employee pay in 2010 
 
Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street Report on FTSE 100 Director’s Remuneration 2010 
 
Solving this problem will not solve the problem of how to link executive pay and performance. 
But current thinking on corporate governance reforms, especially in the media, appears to see 
these two issues as one thing and tends to lump them together when tackling the overall 
problem under the heading of 'executive pay'. 
 
Other than improving the connection between pay and performance, the responsibility for 
disproportionate differentials has increasingly been placed on the shoulders of remuneration 
7. Discussion phase 2 
 
201 
 
committees. Meanwhile voices from within the governance community have also been raised 
to express concern of their effectiveness. The question of the ‘independence’ of non-executive 
directors has already been raised earlier; and now the discussion resumes, focusing largely on 
the role of remuneration committees, the aim of which is to shed light on the part they play in 
the seemingly never-ending executive pay fiasco and how well placed are they to improve 
governance in the boardroom. 
 
7.3.3.1 The role of the remuneration committee 
 
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, a key question here is whether a remuneration committee can be 
truly independent. Can one be certain that all members will put their personal interests aside 
and have the shareholders’ best interest at heart throughout their tenure? It appears the 
answer to this question is in the negative. UK corporate governance has relentlessly sought to 
reduce the dominance of top management by increasing the number of independent directors 
on boards and removing executive directors’ involvement in any remuneration committee 
business.  
 
However, Clarke et al (1998) presented evidence that nearly half of company chairmen 
surveyed in the wake of the Hampel Report (1998) thought that bidding up of pay occurred. 
Ezzamel and Watson's (1997) also suggested that a 'cosy collusion' exists between executive 
directors and non-executive director who happen to sit on each other’s remuneration 
committees and thus are able to bid up each other’s earning. As recent as 2007, Filatotchev et 
al (2007) continued to find that directors are actively colluding with each other over pay. If this 
is the case, then the concept of the remuneration committee is clearly failing as an agency 
control mechanism (Froud et al 2008).  
 
It seems that in many respects, the board, including the remuneration committee, is a less than 
perfect solution as a primary safeguard of governance, i.e.to prevent another Enron or the 2008 
banking crisis from happening again in the future. Yet, at the same time it is almost 
indispensable, until a better solution is found. Would it be fair to suggest that, currently, one 
can at best view a remuneration committee as an effective insulation layer between executives 
and the pay setting process - it is there to make it more difficult for executives to influence their 
own pay - rather than to devise a pay formula that is foolproof?  
 
One of the key challenges that remuneration committees face is about managing discretion - 
the committee should satisfy itself that all the advice is delivered with integrity and is unfiltered 
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which may not always be straightforward as pointed out earlier in this discussion 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009 p49). Perhaps tougher measures are required to hold non-
executive directors more strongly to account and formal process should be in place to evaluate 
the performance of each of the subcommittees. And would it really change behaviour?  
 
Whether a remuneration committee can maintain independence at all times is difficult to judge 
but as reported by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009 p49), most committee members do take 
their responsibilities extremely seriously and shareholders are happy with their work. That said, 
referring back to the discussion in Section 6.4 of the view of managerialists regarding how 
senior executives (CEOs in particular) can influence the pay setting process through the various 
forms of ‘power’ that they possess. If this view holds, then perhaps one of the ways to measure 
‘independence’ would be to evaluate the level of willingness of remuneration committee 
members to challenge the CEO and other executives, as well as remuneration proposals 
brought to them by pay consultants.  
 
It is therefore essential that remuneration committees equip themselves for a more proactive 
and less reactive approach to executive compensation. One could argue that this is more 
important than ever today when executive pay is once again dominating the headlines and 
shareholders as well as the general public increasingly view governance about remuneration as 
a visible signal of the quality of governance more widely in the board. As suggested in the 
Executive Compensation Review (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009 p51-52): 
 
‘Perhaps most challenging, remuneration committee members need to be prepared to have 
difficult conversations about pay and performance with executive management. The tolerance 
for (constructive) conflict needs to rise. While this may seem challenging, the stakes are high. 
Failure to rebuild trust in the remuneration process may lead to regulation, with all the 
unintended consequences that could bring.’ 
 
The above discussion has highlighted that there are various ways of improving the effectiveness 
of remuneration committees. There is clearly evidence pointing to the need for companies to 
implement a formal board evaluation system that will enhance the transparency of the decision 
making process of the board as a whole and each of the subcommittees. This will allow 
shareholders and governance bodies to hold them accountable for their actions should such a 
need occur need in the future. At the same time, there also seems to be the need to review 
external advice requirements to increase the accountability of compensation consultants to 
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encourage them to work more closely and, arguably, more responsibly with remuneration 
committees to make decisions that fit individual company’s business.  
 
7.3.3.2 The role of remuneration consultants 
 
While it is the responsibility of remuneration committee to decide on how the executive team is 
rewarded, many of their decisions are based on the information and professional advice 
presented to them by pay consultants who are experts in the field. These external advisers are 
supposed to have the technical knowledge to create pay programmes that serve their purposes 
in helping to improve the performance of their client organisation, but more than that, they 
also provide salient data and information as well as valuable analysis (Baker, Jensen, and 
Murphy 1988; Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Conyon et al 2009a; Murphy and Sandino 2009).  
 
Evidently, consultants do play a considerable role in shaping UK executive compensation, 
especially among FTSE 100 companies. Bender (2007 p1) argued that by providing ‘proprietary 
survey data on pay in comparable companies, on which the remuneration committee can base 
its decisions…[consultants are in effect influencing] the choice of comparators, and thus the 
level of pay’.  
 
Similarly, Baker and Anderson (2010 p288) suggested that if their responsibilities are carried out 
effectively, ‘they [pay consultants]can form part of an optimal governance structure by 
providing information that can reduce agency costs and help boards arrive at the best 
compensation contract to offer the CEO on the behalf of shareholders’. 
 
However, executive pay is not delivering though. The most frequently voiced criticisms are 
summed up below: 
 
• ‘Consultants are responsible for high levels of CEO pay and their poorly designed 
compensation packages include too many perks, hidden benefits such as golden 
parachutes or lucrative pension deals, and non-demanding performance criteria.’ 
(Baker and Anderson 2010 p286). 
 
• ‘… consultants do fail, too often by focusing too much on market practice, rather than 
on what is right for the business’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007 p3).  
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• ‘[executive compensation] …did not go out of control simply through some random 
process; it went out of control because of the actions—or inactions—of a number of 
parties. The first culprits in what will be a litany of culprits are compensation 
consultants.’ (Crystal 1992 p9). 
 
• Consultants suffer from conflicts of interest because they often supply additional 
services other than pay advice to client companies, such as actuarial or benefits advice 
(Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Waxman 2007; Baker and Anderson 2010). 
 
• ‘Another function of the consultant is to legitimise the committee's decisions in an area 
which is often contentious. However, this ability to legitimise relies to some extent on 
the consultants' independence from the board and the committee. This can be at odds 
with a growing public belief that they are influenced by company executives, and not 
totally independent.’ (Bender 2008 p1). 
 
Clearly, remuneration committees and consultants are charged with many important 
responsibilities and duties. It is becoming all the more challenging for them to get the balance 
just right during a period when new best-practice governance recommendations are constantly 
surfacing. One of the major concerns is about too much focus being placed on governance 
codes while too little on actual business needs of individual companies. 
 
This potential problem may be stemmed from consultant's desire to maintain a high-quality 
reputation (Armstrong et al 2008; Cadman et al 2008; Conyon et al 2009a; Murphy and Sandino 
2009). As Baker and Anderson (2010 p290) succinctly put, ‘a consultant exposed for colluding 
with management or recommending lucrative pay deals for poor performance will suffer a loss 
of reputation. Maintaining and developing a good market reputation is therefore important for 
the consultant and ameliorates the tendency for consultants to side with management over 
shareholders. The effect of maintaining a good reputation works against finding a positive 
correlation between CEO pay and conflicted consultants’. 
 
All considering, it seems a key question for those formulating governance regulations in future 
will be: have pay practices become too compliance-led? If so, are remuneration consultants to 
blame? After all, they are supposed to use their expertise and present fresh perspectives and to 
challenge their clients’ thinking. Perhaps it is the complacency of remuneration committee 
members that led to the lack of linkage between pay and performance? Or could it be that the 
provisions contained in the governance code and other guidelines have become overly specific?  
7. Discussion phase 2 
 
205 
 
7.3.3.3 Have pay practices become too compliance-led? 
 
The principles-based ‘comply or explain’ governance model adopted in the UK is designed to 
allow companies the freedom to develop compensation programmes that are tailored to the 
business requirements and that align executives with the particular value creation imperatives 
of the company. However, it appears that executives generally feel that incentives have 
become too complex and prescriptive, and are not aligned to the business strategy or within 
their control. As a consequence, many long term incentive plans are seen as ineffective in terms 
of driving achievement of the company’s strategy or changing behaviours. Worse still, 
executives often perceive incentives simply to be a lottery, with little motivational effect. A 
recent study of the attitudes of senior executives and non-executive directors found that long 
term incentive plans are failing in their core purposes of motivation and retention 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008 p52-56).  
 
This problem could be attributed to there being a tendency to make decisions based largely on 
market practice with insufficient emphasis on a company’s own particular circumstances 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009). As discussed in the earlier, both remuneration committees 
and external advisers are in one way or another responsible. However, one can also argue that 
shareholders themselves should take some of the blame for this as well. A recent executive 
remuneration survey conducted by KPMG (2010 p5-6) reported that: 
 
• ‘…[shareholders] have tended to outline their preferred approach and encourage 
companies to follow this, and there has been a degree of unwillingness to accept 
arrangements which are different’.  
 
• ‘…some institutions showing reluctance when approached to discuss exceptions [to 
codes of best practice]’ 
 
•  ‘…many remuneration committees exercise caution in the last couple of years, as the 
wider economic environment has been of prime concern’.  
 
Despite the UK Corporate Governance code being based on a ‘comply or explain’ framework, it 
is clear from my data sample that compliance with the code among FTSE 100 companies is 
widespread and most are happy to settle for what has become the norm, with little objections 
from remuneration committees, consultants or shareholders. Complying with published 
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guidelines, while ‘safe’ and ‘hassle free’, should not be considered as the fail-proof first line 
approach simply because the recommendations set out in the corporate governance code are 
supposedly ‘best practices’.  
 
An excessive reliance and focus on governance guidelines can turn the pay setting process into 
a box ticking exercise which defeats the principle of the ‘comply or explain’ approach. It is 
therefore paramount for companies to bear in mind that the Code (2010) should be treated as a 
set of guiding principles, rather than a checklist of absolute and fixed standards.  
  
Another potential problem of being overly compliant is that companies may end up amending 
their pay practices and incentive plans too readily merely to stay up-to-date with the latest best 
practice recommendations. Governance guidelines tend to change frequently and in a 
piecemeal manner, often in response to the latest executive pay blunder. Unnecessary ad hoc 
changes to compensation arrangements can be perceived as an incoherent approach to pay 
setting; incentive plans can appear even less relevant to the executives who participate in 
them, and thus less motivational - something that no company would find acceptable.  
 
It is evident that UK companies have the tendency to adopt pay arrangements (incentive plans 
and performance measures in particular) that: 
 
• Are compliant with best practice guidelines 
• Fit in with the market based on survey data 
• Appear to be readily recognisable and similar to those adopted by other companies. 
 
This seems to have led to a lack of variety in compensation practices where pay structures and 
incentive plan designs have gradually become more standard and less tailored to specific 
organisational requirements. This cannot be an effective approach as different companies have 
different needs.  
 
In particular, very different incentive plans are required in different industries and business 
phases. Many long term incentive plans adopted by FTSE 100 companies appear to be relatively 
similar (e.g. in terms of performance metrics, target and maximum award levels, and vesting 
schedule), implying that all businesses are operating at similar points in their business cycles, 
experience similar market forces and have similar levels of risk which is simply untrue . This 
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observation may well partly explain why incentive plans are often found in research to be 
ineffective and do not provide a good link between reward and the long term creation of 
shareholder value. 
 
How did this situation come about? Under current governance code, companies are required to 
provide detailed statements on their pay policy and practices in their Remuneration Report. As 
one can imagine, many of the compensation matters are highly sensitive and could easily 
attract unwanted attention from not only shareholders but also the media and the general 
public.  
 
Much effort is needed to prepare explanatory materials and information that meet the all the 
disclosure requirements set out under the Listing Rules. This task often becomes even more 
laborious when there are any proposed changes. Decisions to amend existing pay arrangements 
(including salary increase) or to adopt new incentive plans, all will need to be carefully 
explained and justified at length to shareholders and in the Remuneration Report.  
 
It is therefore not difficult to see why remuneration committees and consultants are drawn to 
adhering closely to governance recommendations and put in place market-standard incentive 
plans. Companies trying to do something ‘outside the box’ and relevant to their own business 
can find the hurdles too great to overcome for reasons such as: 
 
• To avoid resistance from shareholders who tend not to care for unfamiliar concepts 
and practices (for example, the plan design for long term incentive plans favoured by 
many shareholders has a performance condition based on TSR). 
 
• To prevent facing potential fierce questioning and unwarranted criticism from the 
public which may lead to bad press for the company, consulting firms and even 
individual remuneration committee members. Few are prepared to risk their 
reputation being ruined.  
 
• To keep costs down - purchasing ‘off the shelf’ products (including incentive schemes) 
tends to be much less expensive than engaging the services of consultants to devise 
bespoke pay programmes. 
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In addition, there could also be other personal reasons for remuneration committee members 
and consultants to remain reluctant putting in place more customised arrangements, below are 
a few examples: 
 
• Unwillingness to invest any extra time and effort that may be required. 
• Fearful of getting it wrong and be held responsible and accountable for their decisions 
to do something ‘different’. 
• Lack of ability or interest to do what is right for the company and to communicate to 
the relevant stakeholders. 
 
While criticisms related to executive pay have mostly targeted the CEOs in the past, in recent 
years, there seems to be more widespread concern among shareholders that remuneration 
committees are not being tough enough and exercise poor discretion that often favours 
executives. Remuneration consultants have also been accused of being too ready to say that 
‘shareholders will not have it’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009).  
  
Although it is widely accepted that there is no one ‘right’ approach to remuneration, nor is 
there a single prescription for improving corporate governance matters, UK companies appear 
to have a compliance mentality and tend to be over reliant on best practice recommendations 
and market data, instead of tailored business requirements. As a result, FTSE 100 executive 
pay practices have arguably become relatively similar in structure and design. Alongside the 
potential reasons discussed, this phenomenon can also be explained using institutional 
theory (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995). As aptly raised by Bender (2004 p523), 
‘…companies structure themselves in order to be like other companies, rather than for 
reasons tailored to their individual circumstances. Explanations given for that include 
coercive isomorphism… and mimetic isomorphism.’.  In the context executive 
compensation, coercive isomorphic pressures are typically characterised as the set of 
regulatory requirements within the corporate governance system; whereas mimetic 
pressures describe the rational strategies of emulation and modelling of pay practices of 
peer companies that are perceived as good (Riedl 2010 p6).  
 
The above discussion has highlighted that remuneration committees and compensation 
consultants will have to move away from being too compliance-led when developing policies 
and practices in order not to affect the effectiveness of incentive plans as a governance 
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mechanism. Future research might find a stronger connection between pay and performance if 
more incentive plans are designed to address the specific needs of individual companies. If 
companies do not change, and continue to do what they have been doing or do what 
everybody else does, we may face a future of ‘suboptimal ‘me-too’ compensation programmes, 
disconnected from the business strategy and, consequently, without the power to engage or 
motivate executives.’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005 p27). Rather than continuously revising 
the governance guidelines in hope of finally arriving at a perfect formula for executive pay 
perhaps the way forward is, as suggested by Chingos (2004), for remuneration committees to 
ask some hard questions about their incentive programmes, in particular long term incentives: 
 
• What is their purpose within the package and are they achieving that purpose?  
• Are they motivating for executives and influencing behaviour?  
• Are they achieving alignment with shareholders?  
 
It is of utmost importance that remuneration committees have a clear idea of the company 
goals and directions, and communicate this to the consultants who could then help them 
develop pay policy and practices that reinforce the wider corporate business strategy and 
reflect good corporate governance all at the same time.  
 
This section has presented several possible explanations as why executive pay has not been as 
effective in changing behaviour and improving company performance as expected. There are 
numerous factors that can impact on the effectiveness of a pay programme, many of which are 
beyond the control of the company and corporate governance. However, as suggested 
throughout this discussion, there is clearly much room for improvement in terms of the manner 
in which remuneration committees and consultants carry out their responsibilities, and how 
pay arrangements can be better structured and designed to deliver the desired results.  
 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
 
During the period under study, 2004-2009, company size continued to be the key determinant 
of executive pay among the companies in the FTSE 100 index. While executive pay is found to 
be consistently significantly related to TSR, the same cannot be said about other performance 
measures where a connection was non-existent or at best tenuous. Disappointingly, despite all 
the changes in corporate governance over the past two decades, no upward trend has been 
observed regarding the linkage between pay and performance during the study period. These 
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findings accord with numerous executive pay studies in both the UK and the US, of other time 
periods. 
 
It may be relevant to point out that there was an unprecedented level of disturbance in 
markets, characterised by the failure or rescue with public funds of leading banking and 
financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Northern Rock and others. Many of these organisations were over-expanding in a bull market 
and, despite their failures, executives continued to receive generous salary increases and 
incentive payouts which attracted criticism from the media and the public. The string of 
collapses of high-risk businesses was, in many respects, not dissimilar to the previous high 
profile scandals such as BCCI almost two decades before - while the nature of the failures was 
different, they are all the consequence of poor corporate governance. With this uncomfortable 
sense of déjà vu in mind, one cannot help but surmise that recent cases of corporate 
malfeasance could arguably be described as the failure of 20 years of corporate governance 
reforms. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
The connection between executive pay and company performance in the context of corporate 
governance attracted my initial attention as a research topic for two main reasons. 
  
Firstly, some fifty years of academic research did not appear to have produced any concrete 
understanding of the effects of executive compensation nor the relationship between pay and 
performance. Today, it seems that we are no wiser about the effectiveness and usefulness of 
pay in motivating executives, in changing their behaviour, or in aligning their interests with 
those of shareholders. We are, essentially, still uncertain as to what role executive 
compensation precisely plays in corporate management. In theory, as demonstrated in Chapter 
2, the general rationale for using remuneration as a corporate governance measure seems clear 
and straightforward and academics, policy makers and practitioners alike continue to have high 
expectations for executive pay programmes - especially long term incentive plans such as 
performance share awards. In reality, however, the causal relationship between pay and 
performance is still not well understood and there is still relatively little empirical evidence to 
establish whether executive pay is effective in driving desired behaviour and shareholder value. 
  
All in all, the literature does not point us to any convergence of viewpoint. The findings are 
mixed and contradictory, no matter who carried out the research, whether it was conducted in 
the US or UK, by economists or organisational behaviourists, agency theorists or managerialists 
- the question remains as baffling as ever, and hence is an important target for greater clarity 
and understanding.  
 
My second reason for being drawn to this area of research is the continuing occurrence of 
headline fraud and scandals despite on-going governance initiatives and increased regulations 
to try to combat issues concerning corporate oversight and board accountability. 
 
Based on these premises, I set out to examine this topical and seemingly ever growing problem 
more closely, focusing on the UK where literature is scarce, and with several objectives in mind. 
In this chapter, I seek to review what I have found during the research process and examine 
how far I have achieved my original goals, before closing with some final remarks. 
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8.1 Objectives of the study 
 
In the ensuing discussion, the objectives outlined in Chapter 1 are organised into two parts. The 
first considers executive compensation more generally as a corporate governance mechanism 
and the second focuses specifically on its relationship with company performance.  
 
8.1.1 Executive pay as a corporate governance mechanism 
 
One of the aims of study was to overcome some of the data-related obstacles that have 
constrained previous research by taking advantage of recent developments in disclosure. In 
addition, since the study sampled only FTSE 100 companies, it was also intended to contribute 
to the current body of research into UK executive pay and other corporate governance 
practices, which is at present rather scant.  
 
Regarding the available data, I believe that my study has made reasonable use of the 
information on directors’ remuneration now readily disclosed in companies’ annual reports and 
accounts. The improved accessibility of data has allowed me to investigate the 100 largest UK 
listed companies in a more comprehensive manner by conducting rigorous analyses that 
captured different aspects of executive pay. More explicitly, I have been able to explore an 
array of pay and company performance variables over a period of five years and examine the 
various board roles both separately and collectively to draw comparisons. Few, if any previous 
studies have examined pay in this depth or this level of detail. 
 
In general terms, my own set of results reflects the inconclusive findings of past literature. 
What is certain is that company size is still the key determinant of executive pay (Finding 10, 
Table 19). This finding is what one expects to see since larger companies are more complex by 
nature, the higher level of remuneration is therefore indicative of merely the increased 
responsibility associated with the more demanding role. However, the discussion in Section 6.4 
has highlighted other, more controversial reasons why directors’ remuneration is consistently 
found to be driven by size - the managerial power perspective argues that executives appear to 
have the incentive to grow the company to increase their own remuneration. By doing so, they 
are also making it harder for the board to carry out their monitoring duties - as evidenced in 
Section 2.2.2.3, managerial opportunism tends to be more prevalent in growth firms (Smith and 
Watts 1992).  
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Further, the finding that company size is the only consistently proven driver of pay while, at the 
same time, there is no firm sign of pay being related to performance, or moving in that 
direction since governance reforms began some 20 years ago, is a major source of concern for 
policy-making.  
 
Despite these reservations, UK corporate governance has progressed considerably in many 
respects since Cadbury (1992). In particular, companies have experienced far-reaching 
structural and procedural changes, many of which have been concerned with directors’ 
remuneration. For example, unlike the pre-reform era, one can no longer accuse CEOs of 
setting their own salary levels or constructing the terms and conditions of their own 
remuneration packages. Public companies’ boards have been charged with the responsibility of 
pay determination for the best part of the last two decades. With the guidance of governance 
codes of best practice and expert advice given by external compensation consultants, 
remuneration committees have been delegated to develop equitable, governance and 
shareholder friendly and, above all, business performance enhancing pay policies and 
programmes.  
 
However, in line with other recent research, the findings of the present study suggest that the 
pay-performance relationship has not strengthened measurably over time (Finding 5, Table 19). 
It may be too ambitious to expect to see an upward trend, because in fact, even the literature 
that used one year cross-sectional data has not yet managed to provide any distinct indication 
as to whether a strong correlation actually exists between executive pay and company 
performance, be it positive or negative. Even in cases where positive results have been 
observed, the connections were at best tenuous. Despite the changes that governance reforms 
have brought about, it appears that we are as far as ever from seeing a stronger pay-
performance link.  
 
So where does the problem lie? One of the explanations that I have given in this thesis for the 
problem is that many companies have taken an overly compliance-led approach to governance 
requirements, including the design of compensation arrangements (Findings 4 and 8, Table 19). 
In other words, the flexibility afforded by the ‘comply or explain’ framework has not been fully 
exploited. One such example is that of the long term incentive schemes among FTSE 100 
companies, most of which are somewhat similar in structure and design mechanics (refer to 
Appendix B).  
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Why is it still relatively uncommon for organisations to proactively adapt best practice 
guidelines to suit their specific business needs and circumstances? Why do they choose to 
forego the chance of using governance mechanisms potentially to improve company 
performance? Do they consider it too much trouble? Are they afraid of being seen as non-
compliant and attracting a bad press? It would certainly be cause for concern if the leading 
companies were avoiding being innovative in their pay practices merely for fear of falling foul of 
regulations. The previous chapters (Sections 6.3.3 and 7.3.3.2) have suggested that it could be 
the external advisers appointed by the board, the pay consultants, who are playing safe. Or who 
are selfishly opting for the more cost and time-effective option of recommending common pay 
practices for their clients rather than designing bespoke arrangements tailored to fit.  
 
Equally, evidence has been provided in Sections 6.3.2 and 7.3.3.1 arguing that remuneration 
committees are at fault, at least partly because, in general, they still lack total independence 
and members tend to be too wary of rocking the boat for fear of jeopardising their own 
relationships with management and imperilling their career longevity. 
 
It is evident that both pay consultants and remuneration committees could and should have 
done more to overcome any coercive and mimetic isomorphic pressures and develop 
compensation instruments that are more effective in driving performance. Just as there is also 
much room for improvement in the way corporate boards carry out their other duties. While 
this study does not aim to establish the causality between executive pay and corporate 
governance, it is still important to stress that although pay is sometimes viewed as a driver of 
governance, one could equally argue that governance requirements are determinants of pay 
which have helped shape the reward practices of UK board directors.  Nevertheless, one must 
recognise that board effectiveness (or the lack of such) is only a small part of the greater 
problem; so although the recent seismic shift in governance policies was targeted extensively at 
board structure and processes, all these efforts may prove futile if other fundamental issues 
inherent in the present governance framework are left un-addressed or poorly-addressed. 
 
The UK corporate governance model, while widely regarded as one of the world’s most 
advanced, is not without some flaws in its conception. First, a core tenet of the current model is 
that the board should be an independent body capable of providing objective monitoring of 
management. Therefore, reforms have persistently stressed the importance of having boards of 
directors that are composed of a majority of independent directors, as well as the value of 
having key subcommittees - those involved with oversight of audits, executive pay, and 
nomination of new board members - consisting entirely of independent directors. 
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Even though all this does seem sound in principle, one could argue that the current approach 
relies somewhat too heavily on corporate boards, especially when this reliance centres on the 
frankly unrealistic premise that non-executives possess largely altruistic motives in that they 
care little for personal gain and serve shareholders unreservedly. Is it not overly ambitious to 
expect a handful of supposedly ‘independent’ individuals (i.e. the non-executives) to not only 
facilitate effective monitoring and bridge the gap between shareholders and executives, but 
also safeguard the company’s long term interests? The most likely answer is yes. It has been 
established in the preceding discussions that non-executives, despite being deemed as 
‘independent’ are not necessarily unfettered by selfish calculations and bias.  
 
To illustrate, a number of recent studies (Ozkan 2007; Guest 2010; Renneboog and Trojanowski 
2010), including this one (Finding 6, Table 19), have generated results that indicate board size 
has a negative impact on performance which support the argument that problems of free-riding 
and poor decision-making making undermine the effectiveness of large boards. The doubts cast 
on the independence of directors have prompted me to question seriously the ability of boards 
and their subcommittees to elicit good monitoring and other oversight requirements. 
 
Due to the aforementioned assumption about board independence, UK corporate governance 
is concerned predominantly with the agency conflicts that exist between shareholders and 
management, overlooking many multiple agency issues related to non-executives and other 
stakeholders. Further, my discussion on the effects of multiple agency conflicts (Section 6.3.1) 
has underscored the extent of the power that the CEO and other senior executives can exert on 
the board and beyond. But perhaps because of the overwhelming focus on the alignment of the 
interests between shareholders and top management, the current framework seems to have 
neglected the potential problems arising from the influence of the CEO (whether direct or 
indirect, intended or inadvertent) and thus their impact on the effectiveness of the board and 
other governance provisions.  
 
My finding that the remuneration of CEO is not as performance linked as that of other directors 
(Finding 1, Table 19) has only emphasised further the significance of managerial power in the 
context of governance and the potential opportunities that addressing CEO power may afford. 
While curbing CEO power alone will not be the panacea for all the corporate governance ills 
that afflict businesses, it is clearly something in which policy-makers should be taking a closer 
interest.  
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A simple starting point would be to make use of the concepts of managerial power and multiple 
agency conflicts to increase awareness that the board itself cannot be the sole repository of 
good corporate governance. At present, it appears that a senior executive (often the CEO), as 
opposed to the board, is blamed whenever any kind of corporate abuse occurs within an 
organisation. One could argue that this is because the CEO-shareholder agency problem is the 
only lens through which corporate affairs are viewed. Agency theory predicts - put simplistically 
- that CEOs are opportunistic and so when a scandal breaks, it must be them and their 
accomplices who are at fault. In contrast, the effects of managerial power on non-executives or 
external advisers, and any suggestions that the board and its subcommittees are subject to 
multiple agency relationships that may affect their obligations to the interests of the 
shareholders seem to be largely ignored - and have become the elephant in the room. Critical 
headlines and Parliamentary debates tend to target top management: rarely, if ever, has one 
seen a remuneration committee chair stepping up to explain the situation - even though it was 
he or she who set the remuneration levels, approved the incentive schemes and devised the 
service contracts. Blaming the CEOs alone risks masking the underlying causes and failing to 
hold other parties accountable for their actions.  
  
In the light of this analysis, it seems reasonable to suggest that when the roles and 
responsibilities of non-executive director and chair are more widely understood, along with 
their potential effects, there will be a greater prospect of the board and management working 
more effectively towards a single common goal - that of serving the interests of shareholders 
and maximising their wealth.  
 
8.1.2 The relationship between executive pay and company performance 
 
Another key objective of my research was to improve our understanding of the relationship 
between the remuneration of UK directors and company performance. Specifically, by 
employing detailed analyses, this study sought to identify important aspects of pay 
management in governance terms that may help the designing of future reforms of corporate 
governance. Here I consider how far my attempt has succeeded in accomplishing these aims. 
 
As previously noted, my research did produce some significant positive results between pay and 
performance, yet confined to mainly one performance measure: TSR (Finding 7, Table 19). 
Admittedly, despite copious analyses of wide ranging variables, my search for stronger 
empirical evidence supporting the belief that there is a clear link between directors’ 
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remuneration and company performance was generally unenlightening. The exhaustive 
exercise has, notwithstanding, yielded certain interesting findings:  
 
• Annual bonus appears to be no less related to performance than long term incentives 
or other components of pay (Finding 2, Table 19) 
• Total cash has more significant positive connections with company performance than 
all other pay variables (Finding 3, Table 19). 
  
These findings suggest an irony: the elements of remuneration that have received the greatest 
amount of all round advocacy (from agency theorists to governance bodies, to industry 
practitioners to policy makers and market analysts), i.e. long term share incentives, have not 
quite measured up to the high level of expectations vested in them; whereas the elements that 
have come under incessant attacks, particularly from pay researchers, the media and the 
general public, i.e. annual bonus and total cash, seem to have fared moderately better than 
predicted. One must, however, bear in mind that this is not to say that annual bonus is a 
superior incentive vehicle to long term incentives or vice versa. By drawing attention to these 
results, the importance of a balanced remuneration structure, one that effectively combines 
fixed and variable pay, long and short term incentives, is once again reasserted which leads us 
to the next point.  
 
Another notable observation from the current research is the propensity for companies to 
imitate each other and follow trends in executive compensation practices due to coercive and 
mimetic pressures (Bender 2004). Perhaps the best illustration of this point is the use of non-
performance contingent share options: once heralded as the answer to aligning the interests of 
shareholders and management in the late 1990s, they were rendered practically obsolete not 
long after the ‘dot com bubble’ collapsed in 2000. Such degree of flexibility and adjustability can 
sometimes be positive. During the periods of intense reforms, for instance, companies were 
able to keep up with the rapidly changing regulatory requirements as demonstrated by the high 
level of compliance to governance codes8. However, rather disappointingly, this dynamism 
shown by many companies seems to have been overshadowed by their apparent inability to 
leverage more tailored incentive plans and other pay devices to improve performance.  
 
                                                          
8 In 2011, the level of straight compliance of the UK Corporate Governance Code in the FTSE 350 was around 50%, 
however, non-compliance typically related to only one or two provisions. Therefore, including those who cited full 
compliance, the FTSE 350 comply with 96% of the Code’s provision (Grant Thornton, 2001). 
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In light of the foregoing, I surmise that unless companies refrain from adopting governance 
practices in a sweeping manner and that the earlier-mentioned issues concerning the over-
reliance on corporate boards, independence of directors, multiple agency conflicts and the 
pervasive impact of managerial power are thoroughly addressed when designing future reform 
proposals, no pay programmes nor other structural and procedural mechanisms are likely to 
work to their full effect.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the findings from the pay-performance analysis for the financial 
services industry are not worse than for other industry sectors (Finding 9, Table 19). While the 
quantitative results from this study should be considered with caution due to the limitations of 
the methodology (arguably, more sophisticated modelling techniques could have been 
employed), this particular finding seems intriguing in that it has highlighted that UK corporate 
governance only applies to the public company boards, which, in today’s corporate 
environment, is no longer sufficient and has already had some profound consequences.  
 
For example, it is evident that the gripping accounts of the latest malfeasance in the banking 
sector are of a somewhat different genre, involving subsidiaries and investment arms of public 
limited companies, which are generally not bound by governance regulations. Besides, many of 
the senior executives who run these profit centres do not in fact sit on the board and are, 
hence, not subject to the same level of governance pressure or inspection and can escape 
scrutiny more easily. The remuneration packages (incentive opportunities in particular) of these 
individuals more often than not are substantially higher than their board counterparts, 
including the chief executive. Although much progress has been made in the most recent past 
to regulate financial institutions (Walker 2009), it may be necessary for corporate governance 
to extend beyond the realm of listed companies. 
 
8.2 Summary 
 
It is both extraordinary and counterintuitive to reflect that practically no meaningful connection 
can be found between what large public companies pay their senior executives and how well 
those companies perform for their shareholders. Almost everyone acquainted with business 
would surely expect that the promise of high rewards would incentivise executives to make 
sure that the assets under their care would be used as profitably as possible. 
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Discouragingly, repeated empirical studies that bear on the relationship between pay and 
performance have yet to produce results that confidently predict strong positive findings. At 
the same time, company size has all the while been reported as the most statistically significant 
predictor of directors’ remuneration in both academic research and industry surveys. This link 
does have some justifiable grounds, as discussed earlier. However, putting these two 
observations together provides a rather worrying formula. For it appears that in practice, senior 
executives have little or no incentive to maximise share value through normal trading activities, 
while they have every incentive to push to grow the size of their company by every means, 
including acquisition. Faced, for example, with the decision as to whether to distribute profits 
as dividends, or to use those profits to buy suitable companies, the CEO has every incentive to 
prefer the acquisition. 
 
This scenario is not merely a hypothetical concern, for it is precisely this malpractice that has 
been alleged as one of the causes of the financial crash of 2008. Banks in Iceland, Ireland, the 
UK and the US, expanded very rapidly by acquisition and inflating their balance sheets with 
loans that had little chance of being repaid - enriching the executives of those banks at the 
expense of their own shareholders. Perhaps boards should be alert to signs in their company of 
reckless, sudden expansion, and ask if this is an indication of top management doing what is 
beneficial for them rather than for the company - i.e. a sign of interest misalignment of which 
they should be cautious.  
 
This is by no means the only paradox encountered by the student of the relationship between 
pay and corporate performance. Equally contradictory is the fact that the governments and 
regulatory authorities of Britain have continuously revised and strengthened the rules, both 
advisory and mandatory, surrounding governance for two decades with ever-stricter measures 
to deter corporate malfeasance; yet the financial debacles and their repercussions have grown 
rather than diminished. 
 
Given the 20-year history of cumulative reforms in corporate governance, this fundamental 
failure is all the more astonishing and inexplicable. As a consequence, it becomes crucially 
important to attempt to understand every nuance of the relationship between reward and 
performance so that companies will be better equipped to get the best from their senior 
executives and regulators will better understand how to foster productive behaviour while 
deterring malpractice.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
220 
 
Taken all round, the changes made to the governance code may have standardised and 
strengthened structural and procedural governance, but it seems that they have done little to 
enhance the integrity and accountability of the board itself; and more than that, the current 
governance approach is not without some apparent flaws that require attention as 
demonstrated in Figures 19 and 20. If boards are to be able in future to fulfil their role as agents 
of the shareholders more effectively, they will almost certainly have to go beyond the letter of 
current codes and best practices and, in effect, develop their own sense of effective 
governance.  
 
Figure 19 Flaws of current governance approach 
 
Source: this author 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
221 
 
Figure 20 Proposed considerations for improving UK corporate governance 
 
Source: this author 
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8.3 Limitations and implications 
 
It is important for the interpretations of my research findings, and the discussion presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7 and elsewhere, to be considered in the context of the limitations of the study. 
In this section, I discuss the limitations of my research and also look forward to what new 
avenues my findings have prompted for future research.  
 
The first limitation of my study is the length of the study period. While the Cadbury Report was 
published in 1992, it was not until 2002 when the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 
came into force that remuneration disclosure became mandatory and began to become 
standardised. This meant that data from 2002 and 2004 were still not entirely consistent, with 
gaps in many remuneration aspects, especially regarding the long term incentives. Detailed 
information about option and share awards were also limited, often insufficient to carry out 
valuations of factors such as grant and exercise prices, grant, vesting and exercise dates, 
number of options or shares granted, vested, exercised during the year and in previous years, 
any discounts offered plan rules and performance condition specifics. Using only five years’ 
worth of data is limiting as natural market fluctuations and economy conditions cannot be fully 
reflected in a relatively short period of time. A longer study period (perhaps 10 years) would 
yield more detailed data and could make observing trends easier. Nor must one forget that 
governance reform did not happen overnight. Measures were introduced gradually, a few at a 
time, under the various codes and guidelines, over a 20-year time frame, with revisions and 
updates being made all the while. So although it might seem that enough time has gone by to 
draw some conclusions as to whether the reform has worked, one must take into account the 
fact that some aspects of the system are still undergoing major changes. Against this, one must 
recognise that the reform of corporate governance is likely to be always a work in progress, and 
unlikely ever to reach a perfected state.  
 
A second limitation is my sample size. While the FTSE 100 is a very distinctive group and 
meaningful results can be drawn, it is not quite large enough to do more in-depth industry 
analysis or perform some other data cuts such a by company life cycle and other, more fine-
grained company, board and directors’ characteristics. This point is important because even at a 
time when corporate governance and executive pay are considered as inadequate, there are 
companies that are operating effectively, with pay arrangements that function properly and 
deliver outcomes that benefit both the executives and shareholders, and hence valuable 
conclusions to be drawn. Who are these paragons of good corporate governance? For instance, 
are they industry specific? What are their defining characteristics? How do they motivate their 
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executives typically? To answer these questions, future research could consider carrying out 
analysis based on a larger data set, FTSE 350 for example, specifically to try to find out what 
make these ‘model’ companies stand out, and what sets them apart from their peers. 
 
Another key limitation lies with the data being solely UK based. The present study focuses on 
corporate governance practices in the UK and all the analyses were conducted using the 
remuneration data of locally based directors. Such country-specific approach could place 
limitations on the application of the results. In particular, corporate governance policies vary 
considerably for different countries due to differing laws and regulations; the policies examined 
in this thesis are only applicable to the UK which might potentially limit how the research 
findings can be generalised. If the study were replicated in other jurisdictions, different results 
may be obtained.  
 
A fourth limitation is my research method and methodology. Although the research is based 
partly on a review of the literature and partly on a quantitative method, empirical evidence and 
statistical analysis may not be enough to answer all the outstanding questions and unresolved 
problems about corporate governance and executive pay. Since no two companies are the 
same and have the same needs, case studies might be the best way forward and offer us 
insights that aggregated data from a large sample simply cannot. Letendre (2004) and Bender 
(2007) both pointed out that case studies would be good to supplement quantitative work.  
 
After all, corporate governance and executive pay research is not just of concern for academics 
trying to find correlations between an executive pay or governance variable and a financial 
performance variable. The subject must be looked at more holistically as it touches on issues 
about ethics, morals, personality traits, corporate culture. It seems clear that it is very difficult, 
if not impossible, to gauge accurately the effectiveness of executive pay arrangements and 
governance measures and to establish the performance link by using large data sets with 
aggregated data. This method is far from accurate and reliable because there are too many 
outside factors in the equation, and both executive pay and corporate governance are multi-
faceted subjects involving human psychology. 
 
Given this difficulty, case studies of individual companies appear to be a better alternative, so 
companies should be encouraged to allow, and perhaps also to fund, researchers to analyse 
their main board and executive pay practices to determine what is working and what is not 
working. Such individual investigation will ultimately help them devise a customised approach 
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that is tailored to the needs of the business, financially and operationally, the needs of 
shareholders, and the needs of the executives and employees, as well as reflecting good 
corporate governance. Such case studies would be not dissimilar to the way external strategy 
consultants are contracted to improve the company’s long term success - but without the 
problems with consultants discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 regarding lack of independence and 
with ‘profit’ being their main end goal.  
 
At present such detailed individual studies are not widely done, mainly due to commercial 
sensitivity and confidentiality. It is also an expensive and time-consuming undertaking for 
companies to commit themselves to. But given the governance problems currently being 
experienced in parts of the corporate world, it seems more than ever a matter of urgency to do 
something more than simply promulgating more and more guidelines. What seems clear is that 
it cannot be right for companies to all just follow governance best practice recommendations - 
it is simply unrealistic to imagine that these best practices are really optimal for each and every 
company. 
 
In summary, future research in this area may find it necessary to clarify or even rethink the 
objectives and goals of corporate governance and executive pay. For instance, should corporate 
governance been seen as a system to protect the interests of shareholders? Or a safety net to 
prevent major corporate malpractice? Or do we want it to align interests in order to improve 
company financial performance? A second issue is executive pay itself. Are we trying to regulate 
pay levels, or stop paying for non-performance and failure? In the 2010 UK Corporate 
Governance Code, for example, there is a provision for actually penalising executives for poor 
performance. Or should we instead be viewing executive pay as a tool to create shareholder 
value? It is clear that both governance and pay have many objectives. What is open to question 
is whether it is realistic to expect reforms to governance and pay practices to deliver all the 
desired benefits equally effectively and all at the same time. 
 
8.4 Closing remarks 
 
While still far from perfect, almost every aspect of UK corporate governance, including 
executive pay, has progressed considerably since reforms began. The extant literature may not 
have provided uniform evidence suggesting that the latest improvements in governance, 
marked by tighter structures and more formal processes, have delivered what agency theory 
postulates in relation to using incentives to eliminate conflicts of interests and alleviate the 
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associated costs. Nonetheless, the field’s collective research efforts have brought to light 
potential reasons for the prevailing issues with not only the present governance framework, but 
also with previous studies, including theoretical, conceptual and methodological concerns. And 
I profoundly hope that my research is among them, offering empirical evidence, analytical 
arguments and critical thought that contribute to our understanding of executive pay in the 
context of corporate governance.  
 
As with most reform movements, there is often a tendency, especially in the media, for radical 
complaints, bitter denunciation and general negativities about the related policy initiatives. To 
say that the changes in governance standards are not optimal where some or all of them may 
not have the desired impacts to any measurable degree is not to say that they do not have a 
rational basis or are misdirected. It is paramount to recognise and appreciate that, on balance, 
many of the newly implemented practices have formed crucial parts of the platform of good 
corporate governance. But more than that, the active introduction of new measures by 
governing bodies over the years would also have served, to some extent, the all-important 
function of restoring public trust and investors’ confidence in the markets. 
 
Furthermore, one must also acknowledge that no governance initiative is or can be foolproof 
and, more importantly, reform is a continuous process that requires reassessments on a 
periodic basis; it is not something that can be fixed once and for all - adjustments to current 
policies and implementation of new measures will inevitably be necessary on occasion. As 
suggested in Section 5.2 past reform efforts have come to be seen as generated sporadically in 
response to major crises and the residual public outrage, many of which have been stridently 
criticised as being ill thought-out quick fixes that are neither effective nor sustainable. Thus, in 
my view, an important task for the future would be to draw a lesson from recent experiences 
and be vigilant that any corporate governance changes should be made with care in light of the 
periodic reviews and best obtainable empirical evidence and existing practices should not be 
undone without justifiable grounds. Perhaps it is time to do more than just periodically revise 
existing guidelines and re-publishing an updated version of the governance code; but to review 
the entire UK system to ensure a holistic approach is being achieved. It may even be necessary 
to re-consider or to clarify the objectives of corporate governance in order to judge whether it 
is fit for today’s purpose. Similarly, companies should look at their corporate governance 
practices and see if they work coherently as one - the fact that individual mechanisms are 
effective does not mean that they combine to form an effective overall governance 
programme.  
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All considering, the stance I take is that we should not focus narrowly on the bad and ugly of 
corporate governance and executive pay. It may be that we have underestimated the severity 
and the magnitude of the overall problem of corporate oversight and interest alignment, and 
overestimated the effectiveness of the governance solutions that have been implemented. Yet, 
there is at present no need to call for another overhaul of current practices or repeal the entire 
system, or even dismiss the reform movement as a failure.  
 
Instead, while continuing to look forward, let us also take heed of what two decades of 
governance reforms have achieved. They have brought about greater awareness of the 
problems, exposing their seriousness. They have also equipped us with tools that enable us to 
identify the issues more easily and devise more appropriate measures. And above all, they have 
helped us lay a solid foundation that is ready to welcome future changes to the corporate 
landscape. 
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Source: Devers et al 2007 pages 1044-1067 
Exhibit 1: Types of Long-term Incentives Available to FTSE 100 Executives 2005-2008
Appendix B - FTSE 100 long-term incentive pay practices
Long-term incentives typically comprise around 35% of a FTSE 100 executive director’s remuneration package. 
The two main types of long-term incentive award types are:
Share options - market value options are granted that vest three years later subject to continued employment 
and performance conditions
Free shares - conditional awards of whole free shares are granted which also vest three years later, again 
subject to
continued employment and performance conditions. 
There are two main arrangements where free shares are awarded to executives:
Performance Share Plans (PSP), under which conditional awards of shares are made without executives being 
required to invest in shares themselves.
Share Matching Plans (SMP), also known as Deferred Bonus Plans, under which conditional awards of shares are 
made that “match” the number of shares invested (using bonus, other monies or shares already held) and 
retained by the executive in the Plan.
Exhibit 1 shows the split between companies using options and LTIPs. It shows that now 71% of companies use 
LTIPs only (compared to only 38% in 2005). Only 22% of companies have a policy of granting options 
(compared to around 60% in 2005). Options are now viewed as a potentially volatile incentive that can be 
perceived to be worthless if underwater and which are typically less efficient than LTIPs from a dilution and 
accounting cost perspective.
Exhibit 2 shows in more detail the combination of plans operated. It shows that the most common arrangement 
is the sole operation of a Performance Share Plan (38% of FTSE 100 companies). Whilst, generally, options are 
in (probably terminal) decline, Exhibit 2 shows that 30% of FTSE 30 companies still use options (although every 
one of these companies also operates a Performance Share Plan). This could reflect the fact they are global 
companies which may have operations in jurisdictions where options are still the norm.
Other Key Points to Note:
- 38% of FTSE 100 companies operate only a Performance Share Plan.
- 34% operate a Share Matching Plan/Deferred Share Plan.
- Only 22% grant options (compared to around 60% in 2005).
- The median expected value of long-term incentive provision for the Highest Paid Director (i.e. CEO) is 135% of 
salary (i.e. equivalent to a 245% of salary long-term incentive award in face value terms). For the other 
executives it is 110% of salary (i.e. a 200% of salary long-term incentive award in face value terms).
- While TSR is still the most prevalent metric, many LTIPs use a combination of performance measures.
(Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street 2008)
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Exhibit 2: Types of Long-term Incentives Available to FTSE 100 Executives in 2008
(Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street 2008)
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Exhibit 3: FTSE 100 Share Option Grant Practices and Levels in 2008
Share Options
A share option is the right to buy a certain number of shares at a fixed price at a future date. This ‘exercise price’ 
is typically equal to the market value of the underlying share on the date the option is granted. An employee 
realises value from a share option to the extent that the share price on the date of exercise exceeds the exercise 
price. Vesting of the option – and so the right to exercise it – will, with almost all awards to executive directors of 
FTSE 100 companies, depend on meeting a specified performance condition, with real EPS growth the most 
common measurement (Exhibit 4).
The tables in Exhibit 3 show the levels of share option grants made to chief executives, finance directors and 
other executive directors of FTSE 100 companies respectively. The tables show: i) the maximum grant as a 
percentage of salary where this is indicated for the plan. Plans which are uncapped or where the maximum is not 
expressed as a percentage of salary (or not disclosed) have been excluded from this analysis; ii) the actual grants 
made (i.e., the face value of shares conditionally awarded) both as a percentage of salary and a monetary 
amount, and iii) the expected value of awards. 
Note: The actual levels of award referred to in these tables are notional amounts based on an estimated value 
and not the payouts that will eventually be received. The payout received under any plan will depend upon the 
extent to which performance conditions are met and on the share price at the time of payout (data source: KPMG 
2008)
Exhibit 5 shows details of how EPS targets are structured in Option Plans. Most plans use a sliding scale EPS 
measure, the median performance range is EPS growth exceeding RPI by 3% p.a. to RPI plus 6.5% p.a. Whereas 
in Option Plans which use TSR measured against a comparator group, the typical vesting range is median for 
awards to begin to vest (this is the case for all plans) and upper quartile (46% of plans) for awards to vest in full 
(although 38% of plans now
require above upper quartile performance).
(Source: KPMG 2008)
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Share Options
Exhibit 4: Performance Measures in FTSE 100 Share Option Plans
(Source: KPMG 2008)
(Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street 2008)
Exhibit 5: EPS Targets for Minimum to Maximum Vesting in FTSE 100 Executive Options Plans Using 
an EPS against RPI Performance Measure
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Exhibit 6: FTSE 100 Performance Share Plan Practices and Levels in 2008
(Source: KPMG 2008)
Performance Shares
Performance share plans are long-term incentive plans that deliver free shares to participants at the end of a 
specified performance period, commonly three years. Awards are often structured as conditional rights to acquire 
shares on vesting or as nil-cost options and, as such, are ‘whole share’ awards as opposed to ‘upside-only’ 
awards, such as market value share options. Awards vest at the end of the performance period to the extent that 
specified performance conditions have been achieved. The performance condition most commonly used in 
performance share plans is TSR, with 77% of FTSE 100 plans with such provision (Exhibit 7).
The following tables (Exhibit 6) look at performance share plan awards made to chief executives, finance directors 
and other executive directors of FTSE 100. They show: i) the maximum award level as a percentage of salary 
where this is indicated for the plan. Plans which are uncapped or where the maximum is not expressed as a 
percentage of salary, or not disclosed, have been excluded from this analysis; ii) the actual awards made (i.e., 
the face value of shares conditionally awarded) both as a percentage of salary and a monetary amount, and iii) 
the expected value of awards. 
Note: The actual levels of award referred to in these tables are notional amounts based on an estimated value 
and not the payouts that will eventually be received. The payout received under any plan will depend upon the 
extent to which performance conditions are met and on the share price at the time of payout (data source: KPMG 
2008).
Exhibit 8 shows details of how TSR targets are structured in FTSE 100 Performance Share Plans. All TSR PSP 
plans require the company to be ranked at least median for awards to start to vest. Whilst upper quartile 
performance is still the most common level (49% of plans), 50% of plans require above upper quartile 
performance for awards to vest in full (with around 15% of plans requiring at or above upper decile, i.e. top 10% 
or above, performance for awards to vest in full).
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Performance Shares
Exhibit 7: Performance Measures in FTSE 100 Performance Share Plans
(Source: KPMG 2008)
(Source: Hewitt New Bridge Street 2008)
Exhibit 8: TSR Targets for Maximum Vesting in FTSE 100 Performance Share Plans Using a Relative 
TSR Performance Measure
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Deferred Matching Shares
(Source: KPMG 2008)
A share matching plan (also referred to as deferred bonus plan or deferred shares) typically involves the 
voluntary and/or compulsory deferral of some or all of an annual bonus into an award over company shares, 
which is restricted for a period of time ('deferred shares'). In 2008, 60% of FTSE 100 companies (up from 52% 
last year) compulsorily require part of the bonus to be deferred in shares, with over 80% of these arrangements 
structured so that the deferred shares are forfeited if the executive leaves. The most common level of deferral is 
a third of any bonus paid and the typical length of deferral is three years (over 70%, although around 25% of 
companies allow all or some of the shares to vest before three years). Around a third of the companies that 
require part of the bonus to be deferred in shares also grant a corresponding award of “matching” shares under a 
“Share Matching Plan”. The matching shares typically vest subject to the achievement of long-term performance 
targets. 
Exhibit 10 shows the range of actual deferrals made, as reported in the most recent report and accounts, in 
deferred annual bonus plans operated by FTSE 100, expressed as a percentage of total bonus. Where the deferral 
is voluntary, the actual deferral levels, as a percentage of bonus, are generally much lower than if the deferral is 
compulsory. The compulsory deferral figures below include plans with both compulsory and voluntary deferral 
elements.
Matching share awards are made under the majority of live plans as well as almost all of the plans newly 
introduced in 2008. 1:1 remains the most common matching ratio, although a 2:1 match is now used by 32 
percent of FTSE 100 companies (Exhibit 11). EPS is the most common performance condition for the matching 
share award (Exhibit 12). Exhibit 9 below shows the types of deferred annual bonus plans currently (in 2008) in 
operation in the FTSE 100, as well as the types that have been introduced or amended during the 2008 AGM 
season. There has been a continuing trend of more deferred annual bonus plans for executive directors offering 
performance-related matching shares in recent years.
Exhibit 9:  Deferred Bonus Plan Types as a Percentage of Live Plans – FTSE 100 Companies (2008)
Note: Share Matching Plans are rarely used on their own as the upfront investment in shares tends to be funded 
via annual bonus (even if other funding routes are available). 
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Deferred Matching Shares
Exhibit 10:  Deferral Practice in FTSE 100 Deferred Bonus Plans (2008)
Exhibit 11:  Matching Ratios in FTSE 100 Deferred Bonus Plans (2008)
Exhibit 12:  Performance Measures in FTSE 100 Share Matching Plans
(Source: KPMG 2008)
(Source: KPMG 2008)
(Source: KPMG 2008)
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Appendix C - Detailed Statistical Results
Part 1 - Relationship between Pay and Company Size
Size measure: Market Capitalisation
Data source: Bloomberg
Definition:
Incumbent groups: CEO
Finance Director (Fin Dir)
All directors (All Dir)
All directors excluding CEOs (All Dir - CEO)
Significance association levels:
Red + Bold: significance level at 5% (0.05)
Blue + Italic:  significance level at 10% (0.1)
Black: no association
H1a: Base Salary is positively related to Market Capitalisation
rs p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value
2004-05 0.552 <0.0001 0.595 <0.0001 0.570 <0.0001 0.648 <0.0001
2005-06 0.641 <0.0001 0.732 <0.0001 0.635 <0.0001 0.696 <0.0001
2006-07 0.682 <0.0001 0.617 <0.0001 0.641 <0.0001 0.648 <0.0001
2007-08 0.703 <0.0001 0.748 <0.0001 0.556 <0.0001 0.698 <0.0001
2008-09 0.677 <0.0001 0.746 <0.0001 0.615 <0.0001 0.685 <0.0001
H1b: Total Cash is positively related to Market Capitalisation
rs p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value
2004-05 0.519 <0.0001 0.550 <0.0001 0.591 <0.0001 0.640 <0.0001
2005-06 0.545 <0.0001 0.627 <0.0001 0.640 <0.0001 0.686 <0.0001
2006-07 0.546 <0.0001 0.524 <0.0001 0.550 <0.0001 0.516 <0.0001
2007-08 0.608 <0.0001 0.646 <0.0001 0.479 <0.0001 0.578 <0.0001
2008-09 0.527 <0.0001 0.627 <0.0001 0.490 <0.0001 0.575 <0.0001
The smaller the p-value, the more significant is the result
Year "t"
CEO Fin Dir All  Dir All Dir - CEO
Year "t"
CEO Fin Dir All  Dir All Dir - CEO
P-value 
interpretations:
Historical Market Capitalisation is calculated as: (Closing Price as of fiscal period end date) * (Shares outstanding at that period end date). Period 
end date is the most recent annual for which full fundamental data has been collected.
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H1c: Total Compensation is positively related to Market Capitalisation
r
s
p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value
2004-05 0.446 <0.0001 0.547 <0.0001 0.564 <0.0001 0.606 <0.0001
2005-06 0.479 <0.0001 0.433 <0.0001 0.489 <0.0001 0.552 <0.0001
2006-07 0.506 <0.0001 0.549 <0.0001 0.582 <0.0001 0.557 <0.0001
2007-08 0.503 <0.0001 0.620 <0.0001 0.410 <0.0001 0.549 <0.0001
2008-09 0.509 <0.0001 0.625 <0.0001 0.537 <0.0001 0.600 <0.0001
H1d: Base Salary Increase is positively related to Market Capitalisation
rs p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value
2004-05 -0.144 0.8310 -0.216 0.9310 0.011 0.4640 0.121 0.8280
2005-06 -0.095 0.7880 0.020 0.4400 0.060 0.3030 0.128 0.1380
2006-07 0.017 0.4470 -0.172 0.8700 -0.084 0.7630 0.090 0.7640
2007-08 0.147 0.2380 0.417 0.0010 0.256 0.0110 0.198 0.0490
2008-09 0.094 0.2200 0.055 0.3440 0.090 0.2130 0.074 0.2680
H1e: Variable Pay is positively related to Market Capitalisation
rs p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value r
s
p-value
2004-05 0.288 0.0015 0.408 0.0020 0.345 0.0005 0.335 0.0005
2005-06 0.273 0.0040 0.036 0.3870 0.221 0.0190 0.248 0.0100
2006-07 0.357 0.0005 0.343 0.0010 0.352 0.0005 0.321 0.0010
2007-08 0.309 0.0010 0.397 <0.0001 0.263 0.0050 0.262 0.0070
2008-09 0.207 0.0240 0.286 0.0065 0.252 0.0070 0.222 0.0020
Year "t"
CEO Fin Dir All  Dir All Dir - CEO
Year "t"
CEO Fin Dir All  Dir All Dir - CEO
Year "t"
CEO Fin Dir All  Dir All Dir - CEO
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H1f: The correlation between Market Capitalisation & Variable Pay is different from that between Market Capitalisation & Base Salary
1 = Market Capitalisation (MC)
2 = Variable Pay (VP)
3 = Base Salary (BS)
N = Number of cases
Note: Negative test stat = corr(MC, VP) < corr(MC, BS) whilst positive test stat = corr(MC, VP) > corr(MC, BS)
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 104 0.449 0.542 0.515 -1.1461 0.2545
2005-06 92 0.162 0.566 0.297 -3.8301 0.0002
2006-07 88 0.298 0.615 0.241 -2.9531 0.0041
2007-08 96 0.112 0.506 0.339 -3.8027 0.0003
2008-09 92 0.008 0.408 0.194 -3.2433 0.0017
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 86 0.193 0.548 0.223 -3.0418 0.0031
2005-06 65 0.074 0.546 0.067 -3.1661 0.0024
2006-07 78 0.199 0.427 0.255 -1.7755 0.0799
2007-08 79 0.322 0.576 0.309 -2.2823 0.0253
2008-09 75 0.126 0.595 0.231 -3.9023 0.0002
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 98 0.308 0.489 0.289 -1.6958 0.0932
2005-06 89 0.146 0.477 0.196 -2.7145 0.0040
2006-07 88 0.223 0.591 0.199 -3.2448 0.0017
2007-08 94 0.092 0.407 0.454 -3.1568 0.0022
2008-09 94 0.051 0.498 0.197 -3.8356 0.0002
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 96 0.267 0.530 0.211 -2.3569 0.0205
2005-06 88 0.167 0.533 -0.052 -2.6902 0.0086
2006-07 88 0.215 0.488 -0.072 -1.9542 0.0540
2007-08 88 0.175 0.580 0.171 -3.4696 0.0008
2008-09 86 0.159 0.499 0.042 -2.5363 0.0131
CEO
Financial Directors
All Directors
All Directors - CEO
Appendix C Detailed statistical results
287
Part 1 - Relationship between Pay and Company Size
H1g: The correlation between  Market Capitalisation & Total Cash is different from that between Market Capitalisation & Base Salary 
Note: Negative test stat = corr(MC, TCash) < corr(MC, BS) whilst positive test stat = corr(MC, TCash) > corr(MC, BS) 
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 104 0.531 0.542 0.789 -0.1293 0.8974
2005-06 92 0.571 0.566 0.553 0.0642 0.9490
2006-07 88 0.388 0.615 0.539 -2.7368 0.0076
2007-08 96 0.322 0.506 0.30 -1.7389 0.0854
2008-09 93 0.408 0.297 0.401 -1.0573 0.2932
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 86 0.354 0.548 0.536 -2.1797 0.0321
2005-06 65 0.227 0.546 0.366 -2.6246 0.0109
2006-07 78 0.313 0.427 0.660 -1.3217 0.1903
2007-08 79 0.519 0.576 0.755 -0.5889 0.5577
2008-09 75 0.476 0.595 0.560 -1.3523 0.1805
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 98 0.468 0.489 0.641 -0.2829 0.7779
2005-06 89 0.398 0.477 0.517 -0.8575 0.3935
2006-07 89 0.307 0.558 0.347 -2.4293 0.0172
2007-08 95 0.237 0.346 0.339 -0.9706 0.3343
2008-09 95 0.345 0.361 0.467 -0.1620 0.8716
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 96 0.460 0.530 0.598 -0.9002 0.3703
2005-06 88 0.393 0.533 0.476 -1.4960 0.1384
2006-07 88 0.235 0.488 0.312 -2.2554 0.0267
2007-08 88 0.384 0.580 0.490 -2.1853 0.0316
2008-09 86 0.439 0.499 0.535 -0.6659 0.5073
2 = Total Cash (TCash)
1 = Market Capitalisation (MC)
Financial Directors
All Directors
All Directors - CEO
3 = Base Salary (BS)
N = Number of cases
CEO
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H1h: The correlation between Market Capitalisation & Total Compensation is different from that between Market Capitalisation & Total Cash
Note: Negative test stat = corr(MC, TComp) < corr(MC, TCash) whilst positive test stat = corr(MC, TComp) > corr(MC, TCash)
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 104 0.492 0.531 0.783 -0.4951 0.6216
2005-06 92 0.199 0.571 0.659 -5.3819 <0.0001
2006-07 88 0.334 0.388 0.531 -0.5623 0.5754
2007-08 96 0.151 0.322 0.590 -1.9229 0.0575
2008-09 93 0.025 0.297 0.407 -2.4922 0.0145
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 86 0.250 0.354 0.723 -1.3596 0.1776
2005-06 65 0.138 0.227 0.718 -0.9584 0.3418
2006-07 78 0.225 0.313 0.594 -0.8898 0.3764
2007-08 79 0.368 0.519 0.618 -1.7559 0.0831
2008-09 75 0.181 0.476 0.499 -2.8351 0.0059
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 98 0.359 0.468 0.762 -1.7395 0.0852
2005-06 89 0.198 0.398 0.718 -2.7146 0.0080
2006-07 89 0.272 0.307 0.742 -0.4755 0.6356
2007-08 95 0.128 0.216 0.637 -1.0140 0.3132
2008-09 95 0.079 0.345 0.459 -2.6186 0.0103
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 96 0.331 0.46 0.789 -2.1579 0.0335
2005-06 88 0.279 0.393 0.760 -1.6489 0.1029
2006-07 88 0.252 0.235 0.840 0.2865 0.7752
2007-08 88 0.315 0.384 0.592 -0.7652 0.4463
2008-09 86 0.206 0.439 0.538 -2.4491 0.0164
1 = Market Capitalisation (MC)
All Directors - CEO
2 = Total Compensation (TComp)
3 = Total Cash (TCash)
N = Number of cases
CEO
Financial Directors
All Directors
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Company Performance Measures:
Measure 1: One-year EPS Growth (EPS)
Data source: Datastream
Definition:
Measure 2: EBITDA Margin (EBITDA)
Data source: Bloomberg
Definition: EBITDA Margin is calculated as trailing twelve month EBITDA divided by trailing twelve month sales, times 100.
Measure 3: One-year Sales/Revenue Growth (Sales)
Data source: Datastream
Definition: Sales/Revenue year change (growth, in percentage) is calculated using the following formula:
[ (Net Sales/Revenue for the current period - 1)/(Net Sales/Revenue for the last period) ]*100
Measure 4: One-year Net Income Growth (Net Inc)
Data source: Bloomberg
Definition: Net income year change (growth, in percentage) is calculated using the following formula:
 [ (Net Income for the current period - 1)/(Net Income for the last period) ]*100
Measure 5: Total Shareholder Return (TSR)
Data source: Datastream
Definition:
TSR = (Priceend - Pricebegin ) + Dividends / Pricebegin
Measure 6: Return on Equity (ROE)
Data source: Bloomberg
Definition:
Incumbent groups: CEO
Finance Director (Fin Dir)
All directors (All Dir)
All directors excluding CEOs (All Dir - CEO)
Return on equity (in percentage) is calculated as trailing 12 month Net Income (Losses) minus trailing 12 month Cash Preferred Dividends, divided by Average of 
Total Common Equity, times 100. 
Earnings per Share Growth is based on Basic EPS before Extraordinary items and is calculated using the following formula:
 [ (EPS for the current period - EPS for the previous period ) / ( EPS for the previous period) ] * 100
TSR represents a theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of 
an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. It is calculated using the following formula with Pricebegin = share price at 
beginning of period, Priceend = share price at end of period and Dividends = dividends paid:
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Significance association levels:
Red + Bold: significance level at 5% (0.05)
Blue + Italic:  significance level at 10% (0.1)
Black: no association
H2a: Base Salary Increase is related to Company Performance
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.137 0.347 0.047 0.780 0.435 0.002 0.071 0.636 -0.037 0.799 0.127 0.393
2005-06 -0.038 0.749 -0.008 0.952 -0.068 0.571 0.261 0.028 0.215 0.069 0.099 0.415
2006-07 0.171 0.184 0.150 0.298 0.110 0.401 0.173 0.183 0.004 0.975 -0.186 0.149
2007-08 -0.066 0.624 -0.057 0.707 0.013 0.926 -0.068 0.621 -0.063 0.642 -0.080 0.558
2008-09 -0.027 0.827 0.053 0.695 0.152 0.209 0.176 0.145 0.126 0.299 0.107 0.384
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.100 0.492 -0.151 0.359 0.382 0.007 0.133 0.374 0.002 0.988 0.038 0.806
2005-06 0.174 0.192 0.021 0.888 0.269 0.043 0.481 0.000 0.174 0.196 -0.054 0.692
2006-07 -0.154 0.305 0.249 0.143 0.233 0.123 0.103 0.503 0.142 0.347 -0.142 0.358
2007-08 -0.161 0.249 0.015 0.924 0.001 0.995 0.061 0.669 0.347 0.011 0.135 0.337
2008-09 -0.052 0.706 0.018 0.904 0.225 0.095 0.152 0.263 0.242 0.072 0.273 0.044
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.074 0.543 0.122 0.378 0.039 0.753 0.261 0.032 -0.076 0.532 0.085 0.491
2005-06 0.092 0.426 0.141 0.280 0.207 0.073 0.393 0.000 0.129 0.267 -0.036 0.760
2006-07 0.005 0.963 0.093 0.479 0.067 0.566 0.154 0.188 0.128 0.269 0.204 0.083
2007-08 -0.119 0.294 0.260 0.038 -0.019 0.868 -0.044 0.705 0.148 0.190 -0.013 0.914
2008-09 0.020 0.861 0.123 0.319 0.117 0.300 0.124 0.272 0.121 0.286 0.214 0.060
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.036 0.777 -0.023 0.877 0.259 0.042 -0.007 0.959 -0.018 0.889 0.083 0.531
2005-06 0.111 0.345 0.038 0.778 0.235 0.045 0.448 0.000 0.071 0.548 -0.002 0.984
2006-07 -0.038 0.759 -0.003 0.985 0.095 0.449 0.058 0.643 0.132 0.288 0.248 0.048
2007-08 -0.077 0.525 0.125 0.357 -0.010 0.934 0.025 0.840 0.153 0.203 -0.016 0.897
2008-09 0.091 0.449 0.103 0.436 0.182 0.125 0.141 0.238 0.142 0.234 0.262 0.027
All Directors - CEO
The smaller the p-value, the more significant is the resultP-value 
interpretations:
CEO
Finance Director
All Directors
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H2b: Annual Actual Bonus Increase is associated related to Company Performance
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.132 0.381 -0.130 0.449 0.058 0.707 0.023 0.880 0.213 0.155 0.030 0.849
2005-06 0.048 0.692 -0.042 0.759 0.001 0.991 0.155 0.202 0.178 0.141 0.061 0.624
2006-07 0.061 0.643 0.160 0.272 -0.005 0.971 0.061 0.647 0.328 0.012 0.024 0.860
2007-08 0.094 0.491 -0.101 0.505 0.130 0.344 0.018 0.900 0.256 0.075 -0.010 0.944
2008-09 0.116 0.349 -0.082 0.549 0.177 0.152 0.155 0.211 0.369 0.002 0.190 0.129
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.109 0.473 -0.130 0.450 0.072 0.639 -0.014 0.930 0.052 0.729 0.017 0.913
2005-06 0.059 0.661 -0.006 0.967 0.056 0.685 0.162 0.239 0.361 0.006 -0.137 0.317
2006-07 0.116 0.447 0.151 0.388 0.021 0.891 0.029 0.851 0.279 0.063 0.049 0.755
2007-08 -0.020 0.894 -0.156 0.344 0.186 0.210 0.084 0.580 0.332 0.021 0.199 0.201
2008-09 0.147 0.285 -0.029 0.084 0.129 0.347 0.100 0.467 0.286 0.035 0.201 0.145
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.005 0.966 -0.061 0.665 0.154 0.209 0.046 0.712 0.147 0.227 0.058 0.647
2005-06 -0.008 0.943 -0.041 0.754 0.006 0.956 0.164 0.159 0.088 0.451 -0.076 0.521
2006-07 0.155 0.183 0.160 0.231 0.021 0.861 0.090 0.446 0.290 0.012 0.015 0.903
2007-08 0.022 0.848 0.052 0.687 0.192 0.097 0.020 0.866 0.246 0.031 0.123 0.298
2008-09 0.137 0.230 -0.053 0.670 0.120 0.294 0.129 0.260 0.378 0.001 0.152 0.191
All Directors - CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.006 0.960 -0.028 0.841 0.155 0.204 0.127 0.302 0.152 0.208 0.053 0.680
2005-06 -0.007 0.950 0.008 0.953 0.013 0.910 0.160 0.176 0.213 0.069 -0.151 0.207
2006-07 0.191 0.118 0.103 0.467 0.080 0.518 0.106 0.392 0.360 0.003 0.025 0.844
2007-08 0.030 0.804 0.079 0.565 0.199 0.099 0.024 0.845 0.282 0.017 0.125 0.303
2008-09 0.084 0.486 -0.046 0.729 0.073 0.546 0.119 0.324 0.356 0.002 0.179 0.138
Finance Director
All Directors
CEO
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H2c: Total Cash Increase is related to Company Performance
CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.120 0.411 0.036 0.830 0.116 0.434 0.068 0.650 0.343 0.016 0.005 0.971
2005-06 -0.015 0.896 -0.046 0.725 -0.165 0.153 0.013 0.913 0.029 0.802 0.059 0.615
2006-07 0.104 0.422 0.036 0.802 0.027 0.838 0.074 0.569 0.123 0.341 -0.036 0.745
2007-08 -0.018 0.894 0.047 0.753 0.074 0.579 -0.008 0.950 0.146 0.271 -0.033 0.808
2008-09 0.106 0.383 -0.134 0.317 0.229 0.057 0.204 0.090 0.247 0.040 0.171 0.045
Finance Director
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.096 0.510 -0.186 0.257 0.232 0.112 0.064 0.670 0.199 0.171 -0.052 0.733
2005-06 0.058 0.663 0.017 0.910 0.186 0.166 0.249 0.064 0.221 0.098 0.191 0.158
2006-07 -0.002 0.989 -0.020 0.907 0.089 0.560 0.055 0.719 0.214 0.108 -0.033 0.830
2007-08 -0.150 0.276 0.250 0.094 0.152 0.272 0.010 0.945 0.193 0.159 -0.007 0.958
2008-09 0.244 0.067 -0.217 0.138 0.243 0.069 0.164 0.224 0.318 0.016 0.361 0.006
All Directors
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.010 0.934 0.142 0.297 0.283 0.017 0.133 0.274 0.184 0.121 0.059 0.637
2005-06 0.051 0.660 0.122 0.344 0.126 0.274 0.230 0.046 0.047 0.684 -0.055 0.641
2006-07 0.092 0.425 -0.127 0.334 0.051 0.663 0.062 0.598 0.327 0.004 -0.177 0.131
2007-08 -0.080 0.480 0.085 0.506 0.168 0.140 -0.011 0.923 0.221 0.049 0.042 0.716
2008-09 0.146 0.197 -0.132 0.286 0.111 0.327 0.113 0.318 0.251 0.024 0.117 0.306
All Directors - CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.017 0.895 0.064 0.657 0.293 0.018 0.196 0.121 0.092 0.463 0.044 0.739
2005-06 0.082 0.482 0.165 0.207 0.158 0.180 0.233 0.048 0.193 0.100 -0.047 0.693
2006-07 0.109 0.373 -0.187 0.179 0.125 0.311 0.079 0.524 0.272 0.024 -0.134 0.285
2007-08 -0.380 0.753 0.056 0.682 0.192 0.110 0.014 0.909 0.243 0.041 0.045 0.712
2008-09 0.177 0.139 -0.124 0.348 0.183 0.128 0.197 0.100 0.315 0.007 0.257 0.031
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H2d: Long-term Incentive Increase is related to Company Performance
CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05
2005-06 0.207 0.071 0.148 0.259 0.244 0.034 0.031 0.792 0.294 0.010 0.038 0.747
2006-07 0.068 0.600 -0.027 0.855 0.060 0.649 0.008 0.949 0.015 0.908 -0.150 0.257
2007-08 -0.046 0.727 -0.153 0.299 -0.038 0.778 0.049 0.717 0.247 0.059 0.084 0.531
2008-09 -0.109 0.371 -0.062 0.645 -0.180 0.137 -0.141 0.244 -0.122 0.313 0.115 0.349
Finance Director
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05
2005-06 0.039 0.760 0.167 0.232 -0.012 0.926 -0.079 0.540 0.257 0.040 -0.056 0.661
2006-07 0.167 0.286 0.345 0.039 0.044 0.776 0.414 0.005 0.327 0.032 -0.198 0.214
2007-08 -0.127 0.357 -0.175 0.239 -0.018 0.898 0.094 0.501 0.284 0.036 -0.002 0.990
2008-09 -0.119 0.379 -0.044 0.767 0.107 0.428 0.138 0.306 -0.071 0.601 0.081 0.555
All Directors
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
All Directors - CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
insufficient data
insufficient data
insufficient data
insufficient data
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
H2e: Variable Pay Increase is related to Company Performance
CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.085 0.561 0.209 0.209 -0.040 0.787 0.002 0.989 0.368 0.009 0.097 0.518
2005-06 0.078 0.498 0.196 0.134 0.138 0.231 0.034 0.771 0.183 0.111 0.050 0.673
2006-07 0.036 0.778 -0.015 0.917 0.037 0.776 -0.017 0.895 0.119 0.358 -0.160 0.227
2007-08 -0.058 0.663 -0.104 0.482 0.037 0.780 0.070 0.607 0.328 0.011 0.106 0.430
2008-09 0.025 0.835 -0.211 0.115 0.007 0.952 -0.019 0.874 0.088 0.473 0.299 0.014
Finance Director
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.025 0.822 0.012 0.922 0.214 0.051 0.191 0.086 0.193 0.079 -0.043 0.704
2005-06 0.143 0.286 0.140 0.348 -0.067 0.619 0.087 0.526 0.170 0.205 -0.052 0.702
2006-07 -0.020 0.895 -0.265 0.118 0.044 0.776 -0.052 0.736 0.043 0.777 -0.190 0.217
2007-08 -0.067 0.629 0.052 0.730 0.006 0.963 0.051 0.715 0.328 0.014 -0.071 0.606
2008-09 -0.021 0.874 -0.175 0.233 0.148 0.271 0.165 0.221 0.079 0.558 0.305 0.022
All Directors
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.014 0.906 0.106 0.437 0.083 0.492 0.133 0.271 0.259 0.028 0.113 0.363
2005-06 0.026 0.823 0.094 0.466 0.043 0.711 0.077 0.509 0.027 0.813 -0.007 0.954
2006-07 -0.015 0.896 -0.127 0.036 0.015 0.897 -0.075 0.517 0.103 0.372 -0.177 0.132
2007-08 -0.069 0.545 -0.187 0.139 0.135 0.236 0.065 0.572 0.275 0.014 0.100 0.386
2008-09 0.033 0.773 -0.168 0.174 0.013 0.911 0.043 0.706 0.181 0.108 0.298 0.008
All Directors - CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.247 0.046 0.282 0.045 0.119 0.346 0.205 0.105 0.276 0.025 0.162 0.209
2005-06 0.148 0.204 0.030 0.818 0.150 0.203 0.036 0.763 0.033 0.778 -0.112 0.318
2006-07 0.203 0.102 -0.137 0.342 0.088 0.485 -0.088 0.486 -0.013 0.906 -0.130 0.253
2007-08 0.023 0.842 -0.193 0.143 0.099 0.405 0.032 0.788 0.200 0.088 -0.023 0.846
2008-09 0.158 0.185 -0.183 0.164 0.094 0.434 0.202 0.089 0.365 0.002 0.172 0.033
9 4
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
H2f: Total Compensation Increase is related to Company Performance
CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.001 0.997 0.246 0.131 0.015 0.921 0.004 0.980 0.418 0.003 0.152 0.303
2005-06 0.067 0.559 0.131 0.318 0.015 0.896 0.056 0.632 0.234 0.041 0.030 0.797
2006-07 0.054 0.678 0.080 0.579 -0.103 0.428 0.173 0.183 -0.028 0.828 -0.032 0.807
2007-08 0.006 0.962 -0.018 0.902 0.046 0.733 0.056 0.677 0.229 0.081 0.020 0.882
2008-09 0.034 0.779 -0.085 0.526 0.032 0.792 -0.093 0.442 -0.164 0.175 0.223 0.067
Finance Director
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 0.005 0.975 0.088 0.596 0.211 0.150 0.085 0.571 0.213 0.142 0.140 0.358
2005-06 0.224 0.092 0.129 0.386 0.069 0.610 0.188 0.166 0.223 0.095 -0.068 0.620
2006-07 0.076 0.617 -0.221 0.196 0.139 0.364 0.032 0.833 0.060 0.693 -0.219 0.154
2007-08 -0.205 0.133 0.042 0.783 0.159 0.250 0.078 0.580 0.294 0.030 0.017 0.903
2008-09 -0.162 0.229 -0.074 0.615 0.020 0.884 0.031 0.819 0.007 0.961 0.122 0.370
All Directors
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.047 0.696 0.202 0.136 0.217 0.069 0.183 0.130 0.192 0.106 0.167 0.177
2005-06 0.126 0.272 0.216 0.092 0.170 0.139 0.196 0.089 0.237 0.038 -0.011 0.924
2006-07 0.111 0.335 -0.126 0.338 -0.028 0.808 0.174 0.133 0.105 0.362 -0.089 0.453
2007-08 -0.078 0.491 -0.021 0.868 0.188 0.097 0.066 0.566 0.325 0.003 0.138 0.230
2008-09 -0.087 0.443 -0.105 0.397 -0.059 0.601 -0.079 0.485 -0.039 0.733 0.160 0.162
All Directors - CEO
Year EPS p-value EBITDA p-value Sales p-value Net Inc p-value TSR p-value ROE p-value
2004-05 -0.070 0.576 0.194 0.173 0.246 0.048 0.254 0.042 0.119 0.343 0.153 0.244
2005-06 0.177 0.129 0.269 0.038 0.136 0.246 0.192 0.104 0.184 0.117 0.008 0.946
2006-07 0.147 0.229 -0.329 0.016 0.099 0.420 0.044 0.724 0.003 0.979 -0.167 0.181
2007-08 -0.068 0.572 -0.143 0.293 0.149 0.219 0.081 0.511 0.338 0.004 0.070 0.562
2008-09 -0.052 0.663 -0.055 0.678 0.013 0.912 0.057 0.633 0.065 0.589 0.127 0.292
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 51 0.0600 0.1200 0.6210 -0.4809 0.6327
2005-06 80 0.0670 -0.0150 0.6470 0.8608 0.3920
2006-07 63 0.0540 0.1040 0.1780 -0.3036 0.7625
2007-08 59 0.0060 -0.0180 0.5430 0.1879 0.8516
2008-09 70 0.0340 0.1060 0.2860 -0.4957 0.6217
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 50 0.0050 0.0960 0.6320 -0.7324 0.4675
2005-06 58 0.2240 0.0580 0.3510 1.1072 0.2730
2006-07 46 0.0760 -0.0020 0.2300 0.4134 0.6814
2007-08 55 -0.2050 -0.1500 0.7220 -0.5432 0.5892
2008-09 57 -0.1620 0.2440 0.2740 -2.6331 0.0110
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 71 -0.0470 -0.0100 0.7720 -0.4034 0.6882
2005-06 78 0.1260 0.0510 0.3860 0.5905 0.5566
2006-07 77 0.1110 0.0920 0.2310 0.1328 0.8947
2007-08 80 -0.0780 -0.0800 0.7010 0.0228 0.9819
2008-09 80 -0.0870 0.1460 0.2450 -1.6956 0.0940
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 66 -0.0700 -0.0170 0.8050 -0.6768 0.5010
2005-06 75 0.1770 0.0820 0.7140 1.0850 0.2816
2006-07 69 0.1470 0.1090 0.3900 0.2827 0.7782
2007-08 71 -0.0680 -0.0380 0.6710 -0.3057 0.7608
2008-09 72 -0.0520 0.1600 0.2200 -1.4337 0.1562
H2g: The correlation between Company Performance & Total Compensation is different from that between Company Performance & Total Cash
1 = Company Performance (CP)
2 = Total Compensation (TComp)
3 = Total Cash (TCash)
N = Number of cases
CEO
Financial Directors
All Directors
All Directors - CEO
Company Performance: EPS Growth
Note: Negative test stat = corr(CP, TComp) < corr(CP, TCash) whilst positive test stat = corr(CP, TComp) > corr(CP, TCash).
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 51 0.2470 0.0360 0.6210 1.7530 0.0860
2005-06 73 0.1310 -0.0460 0.6470 1.8049 0.0754
2006-07 63 0.0800 0.0360 0.1780 0.2666 0.7907
2007-08 59 -0.0180 0.0470 0.5430 -0.5100 0.6120
2008-09 70 -0.0850 -0.1340 0.2860 0.3387 0.7359
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 50 0.0880 -0.1860 0.6320 2.3142 0.0251
2005-06 53 0.1290 0.0170 0.3510 0.7010 0.4865
2006-07 46 -0.2210 -0.0200 0.2300 -1.0877 0.2828
2007-08 55 0.0420 0.2500 0.7220 -2.1228 0.0385
2008-09 57 -0.0740 -0.2170 0.2740 -1.8356 0.0719
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 56 0.202 0.142 0.772 0.6605 0.5118
2005-06 62 0.216 0.122 0.386 0.6666 0.5076
2006-07 60 -0.126 -0.127 0.231 0.0062 0.9951
2007-08 64 -0.021 0.085 0.701 -1.0814 0.2838
2008-09 67 -0.105 -0.132 0.245 -1.5727 0.1207
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 51 0.1940 0.0640 0.8050 1.4888 0.1431
2005-06 60 0.2690 0.1650 0.7140 1.0782 0.2855
2006-07 53 -0.3290 -1.8700 0.3900 4.9491 <0.0001
2007-08 56 -0.1430 0.0560 0.6710 -1.8445 0.0707
2008-09 59 -0.0550 -0.1240 0.2200 -1.0846 0.2828
Company Performance: EBITDA Margin
CEO
Financial Directors
All Directors
All Directors - CEO
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 51 0.0620 0.1160 0.6210 -0.4326 0.6672
2005-06 80 0.0150 -0.1650 0.6470 1.9312 0.0571
2006-07 63 -0.1030 0.0270 0.1780 -0.7902 0.4325
2007-08 59 0.0460 0.0740 0.5430 -0.2198 0.8269
2008-09 70 0.0320 0.2290 0.2860 -1.3847 0.1707
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 50 0.2110 0.2320 0.6320 -0.1730 0.8634
2005-06 58 0.0690 0.1860 0.3510 -0.7742 0.4422
2006-07 46 0.1390 0.0890 0.2300 0.2669 0.7909
2007-08 55 0.1590 0.1520 0.7220 0.0687 0.9455
2008-09 57 0.0200 0.2430 0.2740 -1.4011 0.1669
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 71 0.2170 0.2830 0.7720 -0.8399 0.4039
2005-06 77 0.1700 0.1260 0.3860 0.3469 0.7297
2006-07 76 -0.0280 0.0510 0.2310 -0.5454 0.5871
2007-08 79 0.1880 0.1680 0.7010 0.2298 0.8189
2008-09 80 -0.0590 0.1110 0.2450 -1.2263 0.2238
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 65 0.2460 0.2930 0.8050 -0.6196 0.5378
2005-06 74 0.1360 0.1580 0.7140 -0.2483 0.8046
2006-07 68 0.0990 0.1250 0.3900 -0.1914 0.8488
2007-08 70 0.1490 0.1920 0.6710 -0.4421 0.6598
2008-09 72 0.0130 0.0760 0.2200 -0.4201 0.6757
Company Performance: Sales Growth
CEO
Financial Directors
All Directors
All Directors - CEO
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 51 0.0400 0.0680 0.6210 -0.2233 0.8242
2005-06 80 0.0560 0.0130 0.6470 0.4500 0.6540
2006-07 63 0.1730 0.0740 0.1780 0.6065 0.5465
2007-08 59 0.0560 -0.0080 0.5430 0.5022 0.6175
2008-09 70 -0.0930 0.2040 0.2860 -2.1050 0.0390
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 50 0.0850 0.0640 0.6320 0.1684 0.8670
2005-06 58 0.1880 0.2490 0.3510 -0.4109 0.6827
2006-07 46 0.0320 0.0550 0.2300 -0.1217 0.9037
2007-08 55 0.0780 0.0100 0.7220 0.6611 0.5114
2008-09 57 0.0310 0.1640 0.2740 -0.8215 0.4150
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 70 0.1830 0.1330 0.7720 0.6164 0.5397
2005-06 76 0.1960 0.2300 0.3860 -0.2704 0.7876
2006-07 76 0.1740 0.0620 0.2310 0.7825 0.4365
2007-08 77 0.0660 -0.0110 0.7010 0.6139 0.5412
2008-09 80 -0.0790 0.1130 0.2450 -1.3884 0.1690
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 64 0.2540 0.1960 0.8050 0.7498 0.4562
2005-06 73 0.1920 0.2330 0.7140 -0.4665 0.6423
2006-07 68 0.0440 0.0790 0.3900 -0.2562 0.7986
2007-08 68 0.0810 0.0140 0.6710 0.6691 0.5058
2008-09 72 0.0570 0.0980 0.2200 -0.2740 0.7849
Company Performance: Net Income Growth
CEO
Financial Directors
All Directors
All Directors - CEO
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 51 0.4580 0.3430 0.6210 1.0286 0.3088
2005-06 80 0.2340 0.0290 0.6470 2.2319 0.0285
2006-07 63 -0.0280 0.1230 0.1780 -0.9201 0.3612
2007-08 59 0.2290 0.1460 0.5430 0.6668 0.5076
2008-09 70 -0.1640 0.2470 0.2860 -3.0021 0.0038
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 50 0.2130 0.1990 0.6320 0.1148 0.9091
2005-06 58 0.2230 0.2210 0.3510 0.0135 0.9893
2006-07 46 0.0600 0.2400 0.2300 -0.9771 0.3340
2007-08 55 0.2940 0.1960 0.7220 0.9912 0.3262
2008-09 57 0.0070 0.3180 0.2740 -2.0023 0.0503
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 72 0.1920 0.1840 0.7720 0.1004 0.9203
2005-06 77 0.2370 0.0470 0.3860 1.5179 0.1333
2006-07 77 0.1050 0.3270 0.2310 -1.6204 0.1094
2007-08 80 0.3250 0.2210 0.7010 1.2466 0.2163
2008-09 80 -0.0390 0.2510 0.2450 -2.1488 0.0348
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 66 0.1190 0.0920 0.8050 0.3456 0.7308
2005-06 74 0.1840 0.1930 0.7140 -0.1024 0.9187
2006-07 69 0.0030 0.2720 0.3900 -2.0673 0.0426
2007-08 71 0.3380 0.2430 0.6710 1.0249 0.3090
2008-09 72 0.0650 0.2250 0.2200 -1.0893 0.2798
Financial Directors
Company Performance: TSR
CEO
All Directors
All Directors - CEO
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Part 2 - Relationship between Pay and Company Performance
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 51 0.1460 0.0050 0.6210 1.1410 0.2595
2005-06 80 0.0300 0.0590 0.6470 -0.3034 0.7624
2006-07 63 -0.0320 -0.2800 0.1780 1.5552 0.1251
2007-08 59 0.0200 -0.0330 0.5430 0.4155 0.6794
2008-09 70 0.2230 0.1710 0.2860 0.3664 0.7152
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 50 0.1400 -0.0520 0.6320 1.5761 0.1217
2005-06 58 -0.0680 -0.1910 0.3510 0.8146 0.4188
2006-07 46 -0.2190 -0.0330 0.2300 -1.0055 0.3202
2007-08 55 0.0170 -0.0070 0.7220 0.2322 0.8173
2008-09 57 0.1220 0.3610 0.2740 -1.5530 0.1263
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 67 0.1670 0.0590 0.7720 1.3057 0.1963
2005-06 75 -0.0110 -0.0550 0.3860 0.3374 0.7368
2006-07 74 -0.0890 -0.1770 0.2310 0.6070 0.5458
2007-08 77 0.1380 0.0420 0.7010 1.0814 0.2830
2008-09 78 0.1600 0.1170 0.2450 0.3073 0.7594
Year N r12 r13 r23 test stat p-value
2004-05 60 0.1530 0.0440 0.8050 1.3457 0.1837
2005-06 72 0.0080 -0.0470 0.7140 0.6058 0.5466
2006-07 18 0.1320 0.3000 0.3900 -0.6157 0.5473
2007-08 70 0.0700 0.0450 0.6710 0.2529 0.8011
2008-09 71 0.1270 0.0920 0.2200 0.2331 0.8164
H2h: The strength of the relation between Total Cash and Company Performance has increased over the period 2004-2009
Refer to the results for H2c above to observe trend.
H2i:  The strength of the relation between Total Compensation and Company Performance has increased over the period 2004-2009
Refer to the results for H2f above to observe trend.
All Directors - CEO
Company Performance: ROE
CEO
Financial Directors
All Directors
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Factors: - Absolute base salary level
- Total compensation level
- Variable pay as a percentage of total compensation (variable pay = annual bonus + long-term incentives)
- Long-term incentives as a percentage of total compensation
- Company size
- Board size (total number of executive and non-executive directors)
- Non-executive director/executive director ratio
- Remuneration committee size
- Tenure
- Positions (comparing CEOs to other executive directors)
- Number of long-term incentive plans in operation
- Maximum annual bonus grant size
- Industry
Company Performance Measures:
Measure 1: One-year EPS Growth (EPS)
Data source: Datastream
Definition:
Measure 2: EBITDA Margin (EBITDA)
Data source: Bloomberg
Definition: EBITDA Margin is calculated as trailing twelve month EBITDA divided by trailing twelve month sales, times 100.
Measure 3: One-year Sales/Revenue Growth (Sales)
Data source: Datastream
Definition: Sales/Revenue year change (growth, in percentage) is calculated using the following formula:
[ (Net Sales/Revenue for the current period - 1)/(Net Sales/Revenue for the last period) ]*100
Measure 4: One-year Net Income Growth (Net Inc)
Data source: Bloomberg
Definition: Net income year change (growth, in percentage) is calculated using the following formula:
 [ (Net Income for the current period - 1)/(Net Income for the last period) ]*100
Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
Earnings per Share Growth is based on Basic EPS before Extraordinary items and is calculated using the following formula:
 [ (EPS for the current period - EPS for the previous period ) / ( EPS for the previous period) ] * 100
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
Measure 5: Total Shareholder Return (TSR)
Data source: Datastream
Definition:
TSR = (Priceend - Pricebegin ) + Dividends / Pricebegin
Measure 6: Return on Equity (ROE)
Data source: Bloomberg
Definition:
Incumbent groups: CEO
Finance Director (Fin Dir)
All directors (All Dir)
All directors excluding CEOs (All Dir - CEO)
Significance association levels:
Red + Bold: significance level at 5% (0.05)
Blue + Italic:  significance level at 10% (0.1)
Black: no association
Test stat interpretation: Test statistic measures how many standard deviation the partial correlation is away from 0.
P-value interpretation: The smaller the p-value, the more significant is the result
TSR represents a theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of 
an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. It is calculated using the following formula with Pricebegin = share price at 
beginning of period, Priceend = share price at end of period and Dividends = dividends paid:
Return on equity (in percentage) is calculated as trailing 12 month Net Income (Losses) minus trailing 12 month Cash Preferred Dividends, divided by Average 
of Total Common Equity, times 100. 
The closer the test stat to 0, the weaker the correlation (0 = no correlation).
Negative test stat means when one variable increases the other decreases (i.e., a reversed relationship) and positive test stat means when one increases so 
does the other.
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3a(i): The higher the level of base salary, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.7200 0.2400 -1.8400 0.0320 -0.6800 0.2480 0.6900 0.2960 0.2100 0.4150
EBITDA -0.6900 0.2500 -0.6100 0.2710 0.5500 0.2910 1.7200 0.0450 -0.0700 0.4700
Sales 0.0100 0.4970 -1.8000 0.0380 -1.3300 0.0930 0.0900 0.4630 -0.0600 0.4780
Net Inc -2.6900 0.0040 0.9100 0.1840 -1.3700 0.0870 -0.7500 0.2280 -0.4800 0.3170
TSR 1.4100 0.0820 -0.3600 0.3590 0.9400 0.1760 1.3100 0.0980 -0.6900 0.2460
ROE 1.0200 0.1560 -0.7400 0.2300 -0.9700 0.1680 0.5100 0.3040 -0.5300 0.2980
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 2.4700 0.0085 -1.1200 0.1340 -1.9700 0.0270 -0.0400 0.4830 -0.0100 0.4950
EBITDA 0.0500 0.4800 0.7900 0.2160 -0.0400 0.4830 0.7700 0.2210 0.7400 0.2320
Sales -1.3500 0.0910 1.0000 0.1610 -0.4100 0.3430 -2.0500 0.0220 -0.2000 0.4210
Net Inc -0.5600 0.2880 -1.1100 0.1370 -0.6900 0.2470 -0.8600 0.1960 -0.7000 0.2440
TSR 1.0800 0.1420 -0.3700 0.3580 0.8300 0.2050 -0.8600 0.1960 0.1400 0.4430
ROE 0.4600 0.3240 -1.0500 0.1500 -0.4700 0.3200 1.1400 0.1300 0.7600 0.2250
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.7100 0.0450 0.1300 0.4480 -0.7200 0.2360 -0.2700 0.3920 0.5200 0.3030
EBITDA 0.5000 0.3080 2.6800 0.0050 0.7700 0.2220 1.3100 0.0970 0.0300 0.4890
Sales 0.0600 0.4770 -1.3500 0.0910 -0.5700 0.2850 -1.2800 0.1020 -0.9500 0.1720
Net Inc -1.3000 0.0960 -0.6000 0.2740 -0.9800 0.1660 -0.5300 0.3000 -1.1100 0.1360
TSR 0.6300 0.2640 1.4600 0.0740 1.1000 0.1380 0.6400 0.2630 -0.3900 0.3470
ROE 1.0600 0.1460 -0.2200 0.4130 -0.8600 0.1960 0.8200 0.2080 0.1800 0.4300
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.7200 0.2360 -1.8500 0.0340 -0.6800 0.2480 0.6900 0.2460 0.2100 0.4160
EBITDA -0.6900 0.2450 -0.6100 0.2710 0.5500 0.2960 1.7200 0.0450 -0.0700 0.4700
Sales 0.0100 0.4970 -1.8000 0.0380 -1.3300 0.0930 -0.7500 0.2280 -0.0600 0.4780
Net Inc -2.6900 0.0045 0.9100 0.1840 -1.3700 0.0870 0.0900 0.4630 -0.4800 0.3170
TSR 1.4100 0.0820 -0.3600 0.3590 0.9400 0.1760 1.3100 0.0980 -0.0700 0.4700
ROE 1.0300 0.1670 -0.7300 0.2310 -0.9800 0.1690 0.7700 0.4400 0.2100 0.4150
CEO - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3a(ii):  The higher the level of Base Salary, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.6400 0.0520 -0.6200 0.2680 -1.9400 0.0280 0.4000 0.3450 -0.4800 0.3170
EBITDA 1.0800 0.1430 0.8200 0.2080 -0.8500 0.2000 -1.7400 0.0430 -0.1400 0.4450
Sales -1.9100 0.0300 -1.4400 0.0780 -1.5800 0.0590 -0.1000 0.4620 0.2300 0.4090
Net Inc -1.5300 0.0650 -1.6200 0.0550 -0.4400 0.3320 -0.8100 0.2100 -0.0100 0.4960
TSR -1.4100 0.0710 -1.7500 0.0420 -2.7000 0.0045 -1.3900 0.0840 -1.1100 0.1350
ROE -1.8300 0.0350 -0.2600 0.3990 -0.2900 0.3860 -1.7000 0.0460 -0.5800 0.2820
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.1500 0.4390 -1.2400 0.1110 -1.9400 0.0290 -0.0100 0.4950 0.4500 0.3250
EBITDA -0.9200 0.1810 -2.0700 0.0220 -0.4200 0.3370 0.4000 0.3440 -1.6100 0.0580
Sales -0.7900 0.2150 -0.2800 0.3890 -0.3400 0.3670 -1.3600 0.0890 0.1600 0.4370
Net Inc -0.1800 0.4280 -1.1600 0.1250 -0.2400 0.4040 -0.0200 0.4910 -1.0600 0.1480
TSR -1.5000 0.0700 -1.3200 0.0970 1.2400 0.1110 -1.5100 0.0680 -0.8900 0.1890
ROE 0.9800 0.1650 -0.6600 0.2550 -1.4200 0.0810 -1.7800 0.0400 0.9100 0.1850
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.8900 0.1890 0.3200 0.3730 -0.2700 0.3940 -0.0100 0.4960 0.2400 0.4040
EBITDA -1.2400 0.1100 -2.0300 0.0230 0.4700 0.3200 -1.5300 0.0650 -1.2200 0.1140
Sales -1.7700 0.0400 -1.8700 0.0320 -0.5000 0.3090 -0.7300 0.2330 -0.5600 0.2870
Net Inc -2.4700 0.0080 -1.2400 0.1100 0.6800 0.2500 0.5700 0.2860 -1.4500 0.0760
TSR -0.0700 0.4700 -0.0500 0.4800 -0.3400 0.3680 -1.9300 0.0280 -0.6300 0.2660
ROE 0.0100 0.4960 -0.4900 0.3120 0.8000 0.2140 -1.6700 0.0490 0.2000 0.4220
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.1500 0.4400 -1.2800 1.0100 -0.0600 0.4760 -0.6300 0.2660 0.2500 0.4010
EBITDA -1.9300 0.0290 -1.5000 0.0700 0.0600 0.4760 -0.4900 0.3110 -1.4000 0.0850
Sales -0.4000 0.3960 -2.5800 0.0060 -0.4500 0.3280 -0.8900 0.1880 -0.0500 0.4810
Net Inc -0.9100 0.1820 -1.9100 0.0300 -0.2600 0.4000 0.2100 0.4180 -0.8900 0.1870
TSR -0.9300 0.1770 -0.1200 0.4520 -0.0200 0.4910 -0.2900 0.3870 -1.1200 0.1340
ROE 0.9500 0.1740 -0.7400 0.2320 -1.4000 0.0830 -0.3000 0.3830 -0.0400 0.4830
All Directors - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
CEO - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All directors - CEO - Base Salary vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3b(i):  The higher the level of Total Compensation, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.0700 0.4710 -1.5600 0.0620 -0.8500 0.2000 -2.6100 0.0050 -1.3100 0.0990
EBITDA 0.1300 0.4470 0.0100 0.4970 -0.7200 0.2360 -1.0800 0.1430 -2.3700 0.1200
Sales -0.6600 0.2560 0.0800 0.4700 -0.2400 0.4070 0.4200 0.3390 1.0900 0.1410
Net Inc -0.1900 0.4260 0.4200 0.3380 -0.3600 0.3610 -0.1200 0.4540 -1.3600 0.0890
TSR -1.5400 0.0640 -0.3200 0.3750 0.2000 0.4190 -0.2400 0.4060 -3.3600 0.0010
ROE -0.7400 0.2310 -0.1200 0.4530 0.2300 0.4100 0.0500 0.4800 -1.9000 0.0320
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.0500 0.4790 1.2200 0.1140 0.3500 0.3650 -3.2700 0.0010 1.3500 0.0920
EBITDA 0.3100 0.3790 0.1000 0.4590 0.8000 0.2140 0.2400 0.4040 0.3900 0.3500
Sales -0.6900 0.2460 -1.6900 0.0590 -3.0500 0.0020 0.1500 0.4400 -0.9700 0.1680
Net Inc 0.2900 0.3860 1.2000 0.1170 -3.4500 0.0010 0.9100 0.1820 -1.4400 0.0880
TSR 1.5200 0.0680 -1.8400 0.0360 -2.3300 0.0120 -0.8700 0.1950 -0.5100 0.3050
ROE -0.4400 0.3290 0.1600 0.4350 -0.2400 0.4050 0.7700 0.2220 -1.9500 0.0290
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.0400 0.4840 -0.6900 0.2470 0.6200 0.2720 -3.5600 0.0010 0.1100 0.4570
EBITDA 0.1000 0.4620 0.7800 0.2190 -0.0700 0.4710 -0.7300 0.2340 -1.1100 0.1360
Sales -0.4100 0.3390 -0.2600 0.3970 -1.6500 0.0610 -0.4300 0.3330 -1.1200 0.1330
Net Inc -0.4000 0.3420 0.9300 0.1770 -1.9500 0.0350 0.4500 0.3250 -1.6900 0.0470
TSR 0.9600 0.1700 -0.0800 0.4680 -0.2400 0.4060 -0.3400 0.3690 -1.2300 0.1120
ROE -0.6000 0.2760 -0.4800 0.3170 0.3000 0.3850 0.0600 0.4780 -0.5600 0.2880
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.5500 0.2930 -1.7500 0.0420 -0.9300 0.1780 -1.8700 0.0320 -0.1900 0.4230
EBITDA 0.0500 0.4810 0.5000 0.3100 -1.5600 0.0620 0.5000 0.3110 -0.8400 0.2030
Sales -0.7500 0.2260 0.0800 0.4670 -1.0000 0.1590 0.0200 0.4940 -0.4900 0.3120
Net Inc -0.4100 0.3420 0.5200 0.3010 0.1200 0.4520 0.7800 0.2170 -1.2100 0.1160
TSR -1.3800 0.0860 0.8100 0.2090 -0.3800 0.3530 0.4100 0.3400 -0.9700 0.1670
ROE -0.7000 0.2420 0.1100 0.4070 0.0000 0.5000 0.2900 0.3850 0.4200 0.3390
CEO - Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3b(ii): The higher the level of Total Compensation, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.8000 0.4130 -1.7900 0.0390 -1.2800 0.1030 -1.9900 0.0250 0.6200 0.2680
EBITDA -1.0700 0.1440 -0.6300 0.2640 -0.1500 0.4390 -0.3300 0.3700 -0.0800 0.4680
Sales 0.3200 0.3760 -0.4000 0.3440 -0.7500 0.2270 -0.2200 0.4120 -1.1300 0.1320
Net Inc -2.0700 0.0210 0.2100 0.4170 0.1300 0.4480 0.2800 0.3910 -0.8200 0.2080
TSR -2.0300 0.0230 -1.5300 0.0660 -1.5600 0.0610 -1.8600 0.0330 -1.3900 0.0820
ROE -0.3100 0.3800 -0.5400 0.2950 -0.7500 0.2270 0.1600 0.4360 -0.2300 0.4100
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.4400 0.3320 -0.9600 0.1710 -0.9800 0.1660 -1.1500 0.1280 -2.0400 0.0230
EBITDA 0.7400 0.2310 -0.4100 0.3420 0.1000 0.4580 -0.0100 0.4980 -1.5600 0.0630
Sales -0.6300 0.2640 -3.4100 0.0010 -4.6500 0.0000 -0.3500 0.3650 -1.4100 0.0820
Net Inc -0.8600 0.1960 -1.4100 0.0820 -5.2400 0.0000 -0.5600 0.2880 -1.5600 0.0630
TSR -1.7400 0.0440 -1.5700 0.0620 -2.5000 0.0080 -0.8600 0.1970 -2.0600 0.0220
ROE -0.6500 0.2600 -0.2200 0.4150 -0.9000 0.1880 1.0100 0.1580 -0.6600 0.2560
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.0500 0.4810 -0.5900 0.2770 -1.2600 0.1060 -0.9400 0.1740 -1.5700 0.0600
EBITDA -0.1400 0.4460 -0.9500 0.1740 -1.5200 0.0660 0.0000 0.5000 -1.1200 0.1340
Sales -0.4700 0.3190 -0.1400 0.4450 -1.5500 0.0630 -1.1800 0.1200 -1.1000 0.1370
Net Inc -1.3000 0.0990 0.0100 0.4970 0.6700 0.2520 -1.4300 0.0880 -0.1300 0.4460
TSR -1.3600 0.0910 -1.7900 0.0400 -1.3000 0.0980 -2.2400 0.0140 -1.3700 0.0870
ROE -0.6400 0.2630 -0.2500 0.4020 -1.9100 0.0300 1.1400 0.1280 0.2100 0.4180
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.3300 0.3700 -0.2300 0.4090 -1.3900 0.0850 -0.4800 0.3170 -1.5500 0.0620
EBITDA -0.2300 0.4110 -0.7600 0.2240 -1.8900 0.0320 1.1800 0.1220 -1.2200 0.1130
Sales -0.9200 0.1800 -0.7400 0.2300 -0.1100 0.4580 -0.7200 0.2370 -1.1500 0.1280
Net Inc -1.2200 0.1130 0.0600 0.4750 -1.5900 0.0580 1.0300 0.1540 -0.4600 0.3250
TSR -1.6000 0.0570 -2.4900 0.0070 -1.3100 0.0980 -1.9400 0.0180 -0.2400 0.0100
ROE -0.7700 0.2230 -0.2800 0.3890 -0.6900 0.2460 1.1800 0.1200 -0.0400 0.4860
CEO - Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director -Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All directors - CEO - Total Compensation vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Appendix C Detailed statistical results
308
Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3c(i): The higher the proportion of actual Variable Pay, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.4300 0.3350 2.4500 0.0090 0.7600 0.2250 0.6700 0.2530 1.8900 0.0330
EBITDA 0.4600 0.3250 -0.2300 0.4120 1.6200 0.0560 -1.2600 0.1570 -0.8300 0.2050
Sales 1.2400 0.1100 0.0600 0.4770 0.9500 0.1730 0.3100 0.3800 0.0500 0.4800
Net Inc 0.1800 0.4270 0.5200 0.3020 -0.7700 0.2220 0.0300 0.4890 1.0600 0.1480
TSR 3.2700 0.0010 1.4900 0.0710 0.4700 0.3210 1.3200 0.0960 2.4700 0.0090
ROE 1.5900 0.0590 0.1500 0.4430 -0.1300 0.4470 0.3000 0.3830 0.0700 0.2440
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.0300 0.1550 0.9400 0.1770 1.4100 0.0830 1.9200 0.0300 2.4200 0.0100
EBITDA -1.2200 0.1150 -0.1400 0.4440 0.4300 0.3330 -1.0600 0.1480 1.3600 0.0910
Sales 0.3700 0.3580 1.2600 0.1070 1.4700 0.0750 0.4400 0.3320 2.0600 0.0230
Net Inc 0.1400 0.4440 1.7200 0.0460 1.5300 0.0670 -0.0100 0.4990 1.2900 0.1030
TSR 1.7200 0.0450 1.6500 0.0520 1.2800 0.1050 1.4600 0.0740 1.3100 0.0980
ROE 0.4700 0.3210 0.3600 0.3610 -0.8200 0.2080 0.0500 0.4820 2.2100 0.0160
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.9000 0.1850 0.2800 0.3880 0.8300 0.2040 3.2200 0.0010 0.9400 0.1760
EBITDA 0.2300 0.4090 1.3300 0.0940 0.8700 0.1950 2.3000 0.0130 2.1400 0.0180
Sales -0.9900 0.1630 0.3700 0.3660 -1.1300 0.1320 -1.1100 0.1350 2.3400 0.0110
Net Inc 0.4000 0.3440 1.0800 0.1430 -1.2000 0.1170 -1.1600 0.1260 2.3200 0.0120
TSR 1.5000 0.0700 1.5200 0.0680 0.9200 0.1820 2.0700 0.0220 1.4100 0.0830
ROE 2.0000 0.0250 -0.0200 0.4900 0.4300 0.3350 -1.1700 0.1230 0.0300 0.4900
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.9500 0.1720 1.2500 0.1070 -0.4100 0.3420 3.3400 0.0010 1.1400 0.1290
EBITDA 0.5200 0.3010 -0.5500 0.2910 1.3900 0.0860 2.4300 0.0090 2.4200 0.0100
Sales 0.1430 4.4290 1.2600 0.1070 1.1300 0.1320 -1.1400 0.1300 2.1000 0.0200
Net Inc 1.2100 0.1660 0.2400 0.4040 -0.5200 0.3010 1.3800 0.0850 2.4900 0.0080
TSR 1.3100 0.0980 1.4200 0.0810 1.0800 0.1410 1.6700 0.0490 1.6100 0.0510
ROE 2.2000 0.0160 0.9400 0.1760 0.1000 0.4580 -1.1000 0.1380 0.9200 0.1800
CEO - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3c(ii): The higher the proportion of actual Variable Pay, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.0900 0.1400 0.3800 0.3530 -0.4400 0.3300 1.4700 0.0730 0.3500 0.3620
EBITDA 0.5500 2.9400 0.1300 0.4500 0.1600 0.4350 -0.5100 0.3070 1.1500 0.1280
Sales 0.1300 4.4900 0.8700 0.1940 0.1200 0.4520 1.1000 0.1380 1.7900 0.0400
Net Inc -1.2000 0.1170 0.2400 0.4050 0.5300 0.2990 0.5600 0.2900 1.7800 0.0410
TSR 1.6400 0.0530 2.7600 0.0040 0.0100 0.4980 1.4800 0.0720 2.4300 0.0190
ROE 0.8400 0.2020 0.1200 0.4540 0.5200 0.3010 -1.3900 0.0840 0.1700 0.4350
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.1800 0.1220 0.4000 0.3470 1.2000 0.1180 0.3400 0.3690 1.0900 0.1410
EBITDA 1.3500 0.0920 -0.5500 0.2910 1.2100 0.1180 -0.5500 0.2930 1.6700 0.0520
Sales 1.1400 0.1300 -2.6600 0.0050 1.0300 0.1540 0.6200 0.2680 2.6100 0.0060
Net Inc -0.2100 0.4690 -0.1000 0.4610 1.1500 0.1280 -0.9400 0.1760 2.9000 0.0030
TSR 2.8400 0.0030 1.3900 0.0850 0.9000 0.1870 0.1600 0.4350 0.5600 0.2900
ROE -1.2400 0.1100 0.7900 0.2670 0.7500 0.2300 -0.1400 0.4440 2.1500 0.0190
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.0500 0.1480 0.0600 0.4750 0.8200 0.2070 0.5200 0.3020 3.6800 0.0001
EBITDA 0.2500 0.4000 0.1400 0.4420 1.9300 0.0300 0.7800 0.4180 1.8400 0.0360
Sales -0.1900 0.4250 0.5900 0.2770 1.0000 0.1590 0.1200 0.4530 0.8700 0.1930
Net Inc -0.0200 0.4900 1.2400 0.1090 0.8900 0.1890 -0.5400 0.2940 0.2300 0.4090
TSR 1.4200 0.0790 1.9200 0.0300 0.2200 0.4120 1.8300 0.0360 0.2500 0.4000
ROE 1.2800 0.1020 0.2600 0.3980 1.8100 0.0370 0.4300 0.3340 1.5100 0.0660
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.8400 0.2020 0.4200 0.3370 -0.8900 0.1880 0.5500 0.2920 3.6800 0.0010
EBITDA 0.9600 0.1700 0.2200 0.4120 1.9400 0.0290 1.4500 0.0760 2.5000 0.0080
Sales -1.8100 0.0370 0.2400 0.4050 0.3000 0.3830 0.7500 0.2270 1.0700 0.1440
Net Inc -0.5500 0.2920 1.7000 0.0470 0.2600 0.3980 0.0700 0.4720 0.2400 0.4070
TSR 3.2500 0.0010 3.5100 0.0010 1.3000 0.0980 1.4700 0.0730 1.1300 0.1330
ROE 1.7100 0.0430 0.2700 0.3930 0.2800 0.3900 -0.2400 0.4060 0.8900 0.1900
CEO - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Proportion of actual Variable Pay vs (relationship between Total Compensation vs Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3d(i): The higher the proportion of LTI, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.5100 0.3050 -0.6200 0.2680 -0.9400 0.1760 1.3800 0.0860
EBITDA 0.5800 0.2820 -0.0400 0.4850 -0.2100 0.4170 -1.1300 0.1320
Sales -0.5500 0.2920 1.1300 0.1310 0.1300 0.4500 0.3900 0.3500
Net Inc -0.3200 0.3740 -0.6700 0.2510 -0.0100 0.4990 1.0700 0.1450
TSR -0.4800 0.3170 0.0400 0.4840 -0.3200 0.3740 0.1400 0.4450
ROE -1.7100 0.0460 0.1500 0.4400 -1.7300 0.0440 -0.4700 0.3190
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.8400 0.2010 -0.1600 0.4360 0.7900 0.2170 0.2400 0.4070
EBITDA 0.2400 0.4050 -0.3200 0.3760 0.1600 0.4370 -0.0900 0.4630
Sales -0.8600 0.1970 -0.7300 0.2350 -0.1000 0.4590 -0.8400 0.2010
Net Inc -3.0300 0.0020 0.3300 0.3710 0.2900 0.3880 -0.4800 0.3180
TSR -0.0200 0.4920 0.4600 0.3280 0.4800 0.3170 1.2900 0.1010
ROE -1.3100 0.0970 -0.1100 0.4540 0.1400 0.4450 -2.3100 0.0130
H3d(ii): The higher the proportion of LTI, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.4500 0.0760 -1.7600 0.0420 -3.4900 0.0010 0.1400 0.4450
EBITDA 0.3800 0.3540 -0.5100 0.3050 -0.5900 0.2780 -1.4500 0.0760
Sales 0.2000 0.4210 0.1700 0.4310 -0.6900 0.2460 0.7200 0.2370
Net Inc -1.3100 0.0980 -0.4100 0.3410 -1.1100 0.1360 -1.1000 0.1380
TSR -1.6500 0.0520 1.4700 0.0730 0.9100 0.1820 1.5400 0.0650
ROE -0.6800 0.2510 0.4100 0.3410 0.7500 0.2770 -0.5000 0.3090
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.0500 0.1500 -0.4800 0.3170 0.6600 0.2560 -0.7800 0.2190
EBITDA -0.1200 0.4510 -0.7000 0.2450 0.7500 0.2280 -0.4800 0.3180
Sales -1.8300 0.0360 -2.0100 0.0250 -0.0600 0.4760 -0.5000 0.3090
Net Inc -2.8700 0.0030 0.1800 0.4280 1.6500 0.0540 -1.3900 0.0860
TSR -1.7400 0.0440 1.3500 0.0920 1.4500 0.0770 1.6700 0.0490
ROE 0.8700 0.1940 -0.1700 0.4320 -0.3900 0.3480 -1.9400 0.0290
Insufficient data
Insufficient data
Insufficient data
CEO - Proportion of LTI vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
CEO - Proportion of LTI vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Proportion of LTI vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Insufficient data
Finance Director - Proportion of LTI vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3e(i): The larger the company (in terms of market capitalisation), the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.7800 0.0400 -0.3800 0.3510 -1.3100 0.0980 0.0300 0.4900 1.9700 0.0270
EBITDA -0.6600 0.2570 0.4000 0.3470 -1.1300 0.1320 1.0100 0.1570 -2.8800 0.0040
Sales 0.2600 0.3980 -0.6100 0.2740 -0.0800 0.4680 0.1600 0.4380 -3.4900 0.0010
Net Inc 1.3500 0.0910 -0.2600 0.3970 -0.4100 0.3410 -0.7700 0.2220 -3.3500 0.0010
TSR -2.0400 0.0230 0.0800 0.4680 0.6100 0.2730 0.6100 0.2730 -0.6200 0.2680
ROE 0.6200 0.2690 0.0500 0.4810 -0.2400 0.4050 1.1500 0.1270 -1.7300 0.0460
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.1900 0.1200 -1.4100 0.0810 -0.3300 0.3730 -0.3500 0.3640 0.4400 0.3320
EBITDA -0.7400 0.2310 -0.3700 0.3580 -2.3600 0.0130 0.2900 0.3870 -0.8400 0.2040
Sales 0.0400 0.4820 0.0300 0.4880 -1.7700 0.0420 -0.8000 0.2130 0.9600 0.1720
Net Inc 0.4700 0.3190 -0.8000 0.2130 1.8000 0.0400 -1.1700 0.1230 0.8700 0.1930
TSR -1.0000 0.1610 1.0100 0.1580 -4.8300 0.0000 -0.3600 0.3590 -1.3400 0.0930
ROE -0.0200 0.4930 -1.0600 0.1460 -0.3200 0.3750 0.7500 0.2300 -0.2500 0.4020
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.2300 0.1110 -1.3400 0.0920 -0.9800 0.1640 -1.5730 0.0620 -0.5900 0.2800
EBITDA -0.6300 0.2650 -0.9800 0.1640 0.9900 0.1630 0.6000 0.2770 -0.4200 0.3380
Sales 0.5400 0.2940 -0.6800 0.2500 -0.8200 0.2070 -0.1600 0.4380 -0.4400 0.3310
Net Inc 0.4100 0.3420 -0.5100 0.3070 -0.9900 0.1630 -1.5700 0.0610 -0.8800 0.1900
TSR -0.9100 0.1820 -0.1900 0.4230 -3.0100 0.0020 0.0100 0.4950 -1.3100 0.0970
ROE 0.7800 0.2690 -0.1300 0.4470 -0.7300 0.2340 0.8100 0.2110 -0.6000 0.2760
-1.6800 0.0490
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.8900 0.1870 -1.6800 0.0490 -0.8300 0.2060 -1.6900 0.0480 -0.1700 0.4310
EBITDA -0.6000 0.2750 -0.7600 0.2240 1.7400 0.0440 0.6700 0.2540 -0.6400 0.2630
Sales 0.6400 0.2620 -0.2700 0.3960 -1.4300 0.0880 0.0700 0.4710 -0.3300 0.3690
Net Inc -0.0900 0.4650 -0.5100 0.3040 -1.2900 0.0990 -0.9400 0.1760 -0.9800 0.1650
TSR -0.3100 0.3800 0.5700 0.2850 -3.0000 0.0020 -0.0800 0.4680 -1.6800 0.0490
ROE 0.4200 0.3380 -0.0100 0.4950 -0.4700 0.3210 0.7500 0.2290 0.4000 0.3470
CEO - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3e(ii): The larger the company (in terms of Market Capitalisation), the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.4900 0.3130 -1.1600 0.1250 -0.2000 0.4150 0.0000 0.4990 -1.4300 0.0800
EBITDA -0.5900 0.2790 -0.4200 0.3360 -0.8000 0.2120 -1.2700 0.1050 -2.7600 0.0040
Sales -0.5300 0.2980 -0.4500 0.3280 -0.2900 0.3880 -0.1100 0.4560 -2.3200 0.0130
Net Inc 0.3100 0.3800 -0.6800 0.2500 -0.8700 0.1950 -0.7600 0.2250 -1.7000 0.0480
TSR -0.2000 0.4210 -0.0300 0.4870 -1.6500 0.0520 1.0100 0.1580 -0.4800 0.3150
ROE -0.2300 0.4110 -0.8200 0.2070 -0.2700 0.3930 -1.9100 0.0300 -1.6000 0.0580
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.6600 0.2550 -1.3300 0.0940 -0.9700 0.1680 -1.1300 0.1320 -1.8400 0.0360
EBITDA -0.2100 0.4160 0.3200 0.3770 -0.4100 0.3420 0.1400 0.4460 -3.5600 0.0010
Sales -0.7800 0.2190 -0.3900 0.3500 -0.0400 0.4820 -0.6000 0.2770 -0.2100 0.0210
Net Inc -0.4700 0.3210 0.2300 0.4090 0.2500 0.4020 -0.9100 0.1820 1.2700 0.1050
TSR -0.0800 0.4670 -0.6000 0.2760 -0.0100 0.4970 -0.9200 0.1810 1.2200 0.1140
ROE -0.2600 0.3960 -0.2500 0.4020 -0.5700 0.2850 -0.9200 0.1810 -0.8900 0.1910
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.9400 0.1750 0.4300 0.3320 -0.3700 0.3560 -1.0100 0.1590 -0.4500 0.3280
EBITDA -0.8400 0.2010 -0.3300 0.3710 -0.2900 0.3850 -0.1200 0.4530 1.3100 0.0970
Sales 0.3700 0.3550 -1.1300 0.1300 -0.1200 0.4510 0.5000 0.3080 -0.0400 0.4840
Net Inc -0.0700 0.4710 1.2800 0.1030 -0.0600 0.4780 -0.8000 0.2140 -0.6900 0.2460
TSR -0.3800 0.3530 -1.2900 0.0990 -1.1400 0.1280 0.5400 0.2960 -0.4900 0.3120
ROE -0.3200 0.3760 -1.1000 0.1370 -0.1400 0.4450 -2.2000 0.0150 0.4000 0.3460
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.3900 0.3470 -0.2000 0.4210 -0.5700 0.2860 -1.6100 0.0560 -0.1600 0.4360
EBITDA -1.0500 0.1500 0.4600 0.3220 -0.1000 0.4620 -0.6500 0.2690 -1.5400 0.0650
Sales -0.2900 0.3880 -0.9800 0.1650 -0.2800 0.3890 -0.0300 0.4880 -0.2700 0.3920
Net Inc -0.5800 0.2810 1.1600 0.1260 0.1700 0.4310 -0.7500 0.2280 -0.6300 0.2660
TSR -0.0900 0.4630 -0.0600 0.4740 -1.1500 0.1270 0.0800 0.4690 -0.0900 0.4650
ROE -0.1800 0.4300 -0.3300 0.3690 -1.0400 0.1510 -1.3300 0.0940 0.3300 0.4690
CEO - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Company Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3f(i): The larger the board, the weaker the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -2.7800 0.0030 -0.0800 0.4680 -1.0600 0.1470 0.3100 0.3770 1.2700 0.1050
EBITDA 0.6400 0.2620 -0.5700 0.2840 0.0200 0.4940 -1.7600 0.0410 -0.0300 0.4870
Sales -0.9900 0.1630 -0.1200 0.4510 -0.4000 0.3440 -0.9700 0.1670 -0.5900 0.2800
Net Inc -1.7900 0.0390 0.2000 0.4210 -0.7000 0.2440 -1.4800 0.0720 -0.5800 0.2830
TSR -1.8900 0.0330 -0.1000 0.4610 -0.1400 0.4450 -0.9900 0.1630 -0.5200 0.3020
ROE 0.7900 0.2170 0.7500 0.2280 -0.1700 0.4340 -1.6400 0.0530 -0.4300 0.3350
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.6000 0.2770 -0.9600 0.1700 -0.4600 0.3220 -0.2100 0.4170 0.0400 0.4830
EBITDA 0.3000 0.3820 -0.1100 0.4570 -2.0100 0.0260 -2.6700 0.0050 -0.0400 0.4830
Sales -0.4800 0.3170 0.0800 0.4680 -0.2700 0.3920 -2.3400 0.0110 -0.2600 0.3960
Net Inc -1.1500 0.1270 -0.0500 0.4800 -0.3900 0.3490 -1.6300 0.0540 -0.7100 0.2410
TSR -1.0000 0.1620 0.3200 0.3760 -2.0400 0.0230 -0.7300 0.2340 -0.5600 0.2880
ROE -0.8600 0.1970 -0.4200 0.3360 -0.3600 0.3600 1.2600 0.1070 -0.0800 0.4690
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.0100 0.1570 -0.7300 0.2330 -0.8400 0.2010 -0.8200 0.2070 -2.1500 0.0180
EBITDA -0.8500 0.1980 -0.4600 0.3250 -1.9600 0.0340 -2.7100 0.0040 -1.9400 0.0290
Sales -0.1900 0.4250 -0.5300 0.3000 -2.2500 0.0140 -2.5300 0.0070 -0.3600 0.3590
Net Inc -1.6100 0.0560 -0.0800 0.4680 -1.9500 0.0270 -2.0300 0.0230 -1.3600 0.0880
TSR -1.4700 0.0730 -0.3100 0.3790 0.9400 0.1750 -0.1900 0.4230 -0.3500 0.3650
ROE 0.0000 0.5000 0.2600 0.3980 -0.7800 0.2200 1.2900 0.1010 -0.7300 0.2350
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.2100 0.4180 -0.7900 0.2160 -1.0400 0.1500 -1.0500 0.1480 -2.5500 0.0060
EBITDA -0.7000 0.2420 -0.0700 0.4730 -1.7700 0.0410 -1.8200 0.0370 -1.3400 0.0930
Sales -0.2300 0.4100 -0.4800 0.3150 -2.5400 0.0070 -1.8500 0.0340 0.0000 0.5000
Net Inc -0.9700 0.1670 0.3400 0.3670 -2.5700 0.0060 -1.1600 0.1250 -1.1200 0.1330
TSR -1.2200 0.1130 -0.4200 0.3390 0.7600 0.2250 -1.1200 0.1330 -0.1800 0.4290
ROE -0.4000 0.3460 0.1700 0.4340 -0.5300 0.3000 1.0400 0.1520 -0.1100 0.4550
CEO - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Appendix C Detailed statistical results
314
Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3f(ii): The larger the board, the weaker the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.2300 0.1110 1.1600 0.1250 0.4700 0.3210 0.4800 0.3160 -0.5100 0.3060
EBITDA -0.6500 0.2580 -0.5200 0.3010 -0.5400 0.2950 -2.7700 0.0040 0.1400 0.4450
Sales -0.7700 0.2220 -0.6200 0.2690 -1.1900 0.1200 -2.0100 0.0240 -1.0300 0.1530
Net Inc -0.5800 0.2800 -0.7000 0.2450 -0.4700 0.3180 -2.0600 0.0210 -0.8100 0.2110
TSR -0.4000 0.3440 -0.4400 0.3310 -0.1600 0.4380 0.6000 0.2760 -1.7800 0.0410
ROE -0.9400 0.1760 -0.4400 0.3310 -0.0700 0.4720 -0.2400 0.4040 -0.7500 0.2290
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.4000 0.3450 -0.6800 0.2490 -0.9400 0.1760 -0.8200 0.2070 0.7400 0.2300
EBITDA 0.4000 0.3450 -0.0300 0.4890 -1.6200 0.0580 -0.0900 0.4640 -0.0900 0.4640
Sales -0.3000 0.3820 -0.3400 0.3680 -1.2000 0.1180 -0.8000 0.2130 -0.8500 0.2000
Net Inc -0.1300 0.4480 0.0100 0.4940 -0.6100 0.2720 -0.6800 0.2510 -0.6700 0.2520
TSR -0.8600 0.1970 -0.2000 0.4220 -0.2900 0.3860 -0.0100 0.4940 -0.7700 0.2230
ROE 1.0700 0.1440 -0.2200 0.4140 1.2100 0.1160 -1.0100 0.1590 -1.2800 0.1040
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.9300 0.1770 -0.2000 0.4210 -0.5600 0.2880 -0.0300 0.4880 -1.7900 0.0390
EBITDA -0.4400 0.3300 -0.6500 0.2570 -0.1600 0.4350 -1.1600 0.1250 -0.8000 0.2130
Sales -0.7700 0.2220 -1.1800 0.1200 -0.7600 0.2250 -0.9300 0.1770 -0.4000 0.3450
Net Inc -0.1600 0.4370 -1.4000 0.0820 -0.5300 0.3000 -0.9000 0.1850 -1.1400 0.1280
TSR 0.2400 0.4070 -0.2700 0.3920 -0.1400 0.4450 -0.3400 0.3660 -0.4100 0.3400
ROE -0.0700 0.4730 -0.9900 0.1640 0.5400 0.2940 0.7200 0.2360 -1.8200 0.0360
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.2200 0.4120 -0.5100 0.3040 -1.4400 0.0770 -0.9800 0.1650 -2.0100 0.0250
EBITDA -0.1700 0.4320 -0.9100 0.1840 -0.8500 0.2000 -0.4700 0.3190 -0.5100 0.3050
Sales -0.5200 0.3010 -0.8400 0.2010 -1.9000 0.0300 -1.3400 0.0920 -0.0200 0.4930
Net Inc -0.2000 0.4190 1.5600 0.0620 -1.1300 0.1310 -0.9900 0.1620 -0.8700 0.1950
TSR -0.7500 0.2290 -0.8500 0.2000 -0.6200 0.2680 -0.8200 0.2080 -0.0300 0.4870
ROE -0.6400 0.2630 0.1400 0.4450 1.1800 0.1200 0.7300 0.2330 -1.7200 0.0450
CEO - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
All Directors - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Board Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3g(i): The higher the proportion of non executive, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.0900 0.4630 1.0800 0.1420 -0.1200 0.4510 0.1400 0.4420 -0.3300 0.3700
EBITDA 0.4100 0.3410 -0.1400 0.4440 -0.4700 0.3180 -0.3900 0.3500 -1.4900 0.0730
Sales 0.2200 0.4130 -0.1600 0.4370 0.4200 0.3880 0.5600 0.2880 0.5000 0.3100
Net Inc -0.2900 0.3860 -0.9900 0.1630 0.1200 0.4530 -0.7600 0.2230 -0.2400 0.4040
TSR -0.8400 0.2030 0.1700 0.4330 0.4300 0.3350 0.4100 0.3410 -0.8600 0.1960
ROE -0.4900 0.3120 -0.2300 0.4100 0.2900 0.3850 0.5700 0.2840 -0.6100 0.2730
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.8500 0.0350 1.1700 0.1240 0.0700 0.4710 -0.0500 0.4810 -0.6700 0.2520
EBITDA -0.3200 0.3760 0.4800 0.3160 0.8700 0.1940 -0.8400 0.2030 0.1000 0.4590
Sales -0.5200 0.3010 1.9000 0.0310 0.2500 0.4030 -1.4500 0.0860 -0.1700 0.4320
Net Inc 0.0700 0.4730 -0.3900 0.3500 1.0900 0.1420 -0.0400 0.4860 0.3200 0.3750
TSR -0.4700 0.3200 0.7100 0.2400 1.8600 0.0350 -1.6000 0.0580 0.1500 0.4400
ROE -0.0300 0.4890 -0.5000 0.3090 -0.2600 0.3970 1.5700 0.0600 -0.1400 0.4460
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.9500 0.1730 0.4900 0.3130 -0.5500 0.2920 1.0200 0.1540 -0.0300 0.4890
EBITDA -0.2400 0.4170 0.2500 0.4000 1.0100 0.1570 0.0500 0.4780 0.0700 0.4710
Sales -0.2500 0.4020 0.6100 0.2730 -0.4000 0.3440 0.3900 0.3500 0.1200 0.4520
Net Inc -0.7500 0.4770 -1.8800 0.0320 -0.0800 0.4690 -0.0800 0.4670 0.0900 0.4650
TSR 0.3700 0.3550 1.1800 0.1200 1.5700 0.0610 1.3000 0.0980 -0.6300 0.2640
ROE -0.1200 0.4510 0.4300 0.3350 0.5200 0.3010 0.8500 0.2000 -0.3700 0.3550
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.4100 0.3410 0.0100 0.4990 -0.6900 0.2470 -0.6200 0.2700 0.0500 0.4790
EBITDA -0.8400 0.2010 -0.1200 0.4510 1.2100 0.1150 -0.3900 0.3480 1.2800 0.1040
Sales -0.4400 0.3290 -0.1000 0.4580 -0.2000 0.4220 1.3300 0.0940 -0.0100 0.4980
Net Inc -0.7100 0.2410 0.2100 0.4160 0.9400 0.1750 -0.0300 0.4880 0.2600 0.3880
TSR -0.1300 0.4500 1.3800 0.0850 0.2500 0.4040 -0.1100 0.4580 -1.7200 0.0450
ROE 0.5600 0.2890 -0.2400 0.4050 1.6000 0.0570 1.0200 0.1560 -0.3500 0.3630
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
CEO - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
All Directors - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3g(ii): The higher the proportion of non executives, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.2800 0.3910 1.1900 0.1180 -1.1700 0.1230 0.6100 0.2700 -0.7200 0.2380
EBITDA 0.5800 0.2840 -0.8400 0.2030 -1.2000 0.1180 -0.7400 0.2320 -0.1800 0.4290
Sales -1.0500 0.1480 1.2400 0.1110 -0.5000 0.3180 -0.5300 0.2980 -1.7700 0.0410
Net Inc -1.5700 0.0610 -0.5700 0.2850 -0.4600 0.3220 -0.6900 0.2460 -0.9900 0.1640
TSR -0.6100 0.2710 0.7300 0.2350 -1.4100 0.0820 1.8300 0.0350 -1.2200 0.1130
ROE -0.5400 0.2940 0.3400 0.3690 1.3100 0.0970 1.5100 0.0670 0.5400 0.2960
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.5700 0.2860 0.1000 0.4610 -0.7600 0.2260 -0.2100 0.4160 0.0300 0.4900
EBITDA -0.6100 0.2710 -0.0400 0.4860 0.2000 0.4710 0.8500 0.2000 -0.8600 0.1980
Sales -0.8700 0.1930 0.7100 0.2410 0.0300 0.4880 1.3300 0.0940 -0.1100 0.4570
Net Inc -0.2200 0.4120 -0.5800 0.2820 0.7300 0.2850 -0.1300 0.4480 0.1800 0.4300
TSR 0.3800 0.3540 -0.1100 0.4560 -0.3200 0.3730 -0.1400 0.4450 -2.0400 0.0240
ROE 0.5800 0.2800 -0.5200 0.3020 -0.8200 0.2090 0.5100 0.3020 0.0600 0.4740
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.4100 0.3420 -0.1900 0.4230 -0.6800 0.2480 -0.2000 0.4230 -0.1200 0.4500
EBITDA -0.2000 0.4210 -0.4800 0.3170 1.7900 0.0400 -1.4100 0.0810 0.8700 0.1950
Sales -0.9800 0.1640 0.2100 0.4180 -0.7400 0.2290 1.7900 0.0380 -0.0900 0.4630
Net Inc -2.1300 0.0180 -0.3100 0.3800 0.9000 0.1960 0.3300 0.3710 -0.2400 0.4060
TSR -0.7500 0.2280 0.6500 0.2590 1.0300 0.1520 1.0700 0.1440 -1.7800 0.0400
ROE 0.6900 0.2460 0.0300 0.4890 2.3000 0.0120 1.2800 0.1030 -0.1200 0.4510
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.2500 0.1080 0.8200 0.2060 -0.4800 0.3710 1.4000 0.0820 0.2100 0.4150
EBITDA -0.4100 0.3410 -0.7100 0.2400 0.8700 0.1950 1.0000 0.1610 0.6900 0.2450
Sales -0.5100 0.3040 0.5500 0.2930 -0.6200 0.2690 0.8900 0.1890 0.4200 0.3380
Net Inc -0.1800 0.4300 -1.2300 0.1110 -0.4100 0.3410 0.7000 0.2420 0.8000 0.2140
TSR 0.3800 0.3530 0.8800 0.1900 1.1400 0.1300 0.9900 0.1630 -0.2400 0.4040
ROE -0.3200 0.3750 0.5600 0.2900 0.8100 0.2100 1.0100 0.1590 -1.4200 0.0810
CEO - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
All Directors - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Non-executive/executive director ratio vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3h(i): The larger the size of the Remuneration Committee, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.8500 0.2000 -0.8700 0.1940 -2.5600 0.0060 1.4300 0.0790 -0.2000 0.4220
EBITDA -1.1800 0.1200 0.6300 0.2650 -0.7400 0.2310 0.8000 0.2140 0.9700 0.1690
Sales 0.2600 0.3960 0.9800 0.1650 -0.9700 0.1670 -0.5700 0.2860 0.3100 0.3780
Net Inc -1.3700 0.0880 0.4000 0.3450 -1.5900 0.0580 0.4300 0.3330 0.4300 0.3350
TSR -0.9100 0.1830 -0.4900 0.3140 0.6100 0.2700 0.9000 0.1860 -0.3000 0.3830
ROE -1.1500 0.1280 0.7200 0.2370 -0.0600 0.4740 0.2100 0.4180 -0.0500 0.4810
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.5100 0.0690 -1.1200 0.1340 0.7500 0.2290 1.1200 0.1330 -0.3300 0.3700
EBITDA 1.5300 0.0670 0.8600 0.1980 2.0100 0.0260 0.6600 0.2570 0.3900 0.3480
Sales -0.7800 0.2200 1.3900 0.0840 -1.6100 0.0580 1.2600 0.1060 -1.4400 0.0790
Net Inc -0.1000 0.4610 -0.7300 0.2340 -1.1600 0.1270 1.1200 0.1330 -1.3100 0.0990
TSR -2.6400 0.0050 -0.7900 0.2170 0.8200 0.2080 1.9000 0.0310 -0.3200 0.3740
ROE -2.4400 0.0090 0.2200 0.4130 0.4500 0.3260 -0.3800 0.3540 1.2400 0.1120
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.4400 0.3310 -2.4400 0.0080 -1.7600 0.0410 0.9300 0.1780 -1.2500 0.4000
EBITDA -0.8100 0.2090 0.0300 0.4870 -0.3500 0.3640 -0.1400 0.4440 -2.3200 0.0120
Sales 0.4500 0.3270 0.4700 0.3190 -1.3700 0.0870 1.0300 0.1520 -2.2700 0.0130
Net Inc 0.1800 0.4300 0.7200 0.2360 -1.7900 0.0380 1.7100 0.0460 -2.4800 0.0080
TSR -0.9100 0.1830 -2.4900 0.0070 0.5100 0.3050 0.9500 0.1720 0.1800 0.4280
ROE -1.2000 0.1170 0.5100 0.3060 -0.2300 0.4080 0.2500 0.4020 -0.0700 0.4730
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -1.1900 0.1180 -1.3600 0.0900 -1.6100 0.0560 0.4600 0.3230 -0.8100 0.2090
EBITDA -0.6900 0.2460 0.0700 0.4710 -0.0100 0.4970 -0.2800 0.3910 -2.6700 0.0490
Sales -0.0400 0.4830 0.0500 0.4810 -1.1400 0.1280 0.6600 0.2550 -1.9100 0.0300
Net Inc 0.2100 0.4160 0.5900 0.2800 -1.4900 0.0700 1.4700 0.0730 -2.4600 0.0080
TSR -2.0000 0.0250 -1.8500 0.0350 0.6100 0.2720 0.9000 0.1850 -0.3800 0.3530
ROE -1.5300 0.0650 0.6000 0.2750 0.1500 0.4390 0.3200 0.3730 -0.1900 0.4240
All Directors - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
CEO - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3h(ii): The larger the size of the Remuneration Committee, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.0500 0.1480 -0.2700 0.3940 -0.1300 0.4460 -0.3400 0.3650 -1.9400 0.0300
EBITDA -0.4300 0.3340 1.4900 0.0720 -0.4100 0.3400 -0.7800 0.2200 0.3900 0.3500
Sales 0.3400 0.3670 -0.4800 0.3170 0.0600 0.4760 -1.1100 0.1350 -1.1700 0.1250
Net Inc -0.1600 0.4380 2.6200 0.0050 -0.2700 0.3950 -0.5400 0.2950 -0.0100 0.4940
TSR -0.0500 0.4810 -0.5400 0.2940 0.7000 0.2420 0.6200 0.2690 -0.2600 0.4000
ROE -0.3400 0.3670 0.1400 0.4440 -1.2500 0.1080 0.2900 0.3870 -0.2900 0.3870
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.2200 0.4120 -0.0400 0.4820 1.1900 0.1200 -2.0300 0.0230 -1.3300 0.0950
EBITDA -0.3700 0.3580 2.3000 0.0130 0.0400 0.4850 0.5000 0.3100 0.4000 0.3440
Sales -0.1000 0.4620 1.1300 0.1310 -0.1000 0.4590 -1.4000 0.0840 -0.4300 0.3340
Net Inc 0.1300 0.4470 2.6500 0.0050 -0.6700 0.2520 -0.5300 0.3010 1.0000 0.1610
TSR -0.5400 0.2970 -0.7300 0.2330 -0.7600 0.2250 0.1400 0.4450 0.0100 0.4910
ROE 0.8000 0.2130 -0.1800 0.4290 1.4200 0.0820 0.5500 0.2930 -0.6400 0.2630
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.4100 0.3430 -1.1600 0.1250 -0.5500 0.2930 -0.1200 0.4540 -1.1600 0.1250
EBITDA -1.1300 0.1310 1.4200 0.0810 1.1300 0.1310 -0.1000 0.4610 -2.0300 0.0240
Sales -0.3300 0.3690 0.2400 0.4030 -0.7300 0.2320 -0.3500 0.3640 -1.4300 0.0780
Net Inc -1.2600 0.1060 3.0100 0.0020 -0.6400 0.2610 0.2100 0.4160 -1.2000 0.1170
TSR -0.8500 0.1970 -1.6600 0.0490 1.2700 0.1040 0.5800 0.2830 -0.4800 0.3160
ROE -1.1800 0.1210 0.0700 0.4710 -2.1200 0.0180 0.5900 0.2780 -0.2800 0.3890
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.2900 0.3850 -0.4700 0.3210 -0.7800 0.2180 -0.3000 0.3820 -1.4800 0.0720
EBITDA -0.8000 0.2130 1.8000 0.0390 1.1400 0.1310 0.5600 0.2870 -2.4100 0.0090
Sales 0.3900 0.3490 0.3000 0.3830 -1.5200 0.0660 -0.0700 0.4740 -1.0200 0.1550
Net Inc 0.3700 0.3570 3.0600 0.0010 -0.9900 0.1620 0.3400 0.3670 -1.0600 0.1460
TSR -1.7400 0.0430 -0.0400 0.4860 2.6200 0.0050 0.9100 0.1830 -0.7600 0.2250
ROE -1.5300 0.0650 0.6100 0.2700 -1.5200 0.0670 0.7700 0.2230 -0.4000 0.3460
CEO - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
All Directors - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Remuneration Committee Size vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3i(i): The longer the tenure, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.5100 0.3050 -0.6200 0.2680 -0.9400 0.1760 -1.3800 0.0860 0.1100 0.4550
EBITDA 0.5800 0.2820 -0.0400 0.4850 -0.2100 0.4170 -1.1300 0.1320 -1.4100 0.0840
Sales -0.5500 0.2920 1.1300 0.1310 0.1300 0.4500 -0.3900 0.3500 -0.9900 0.1630
Net Inc -0.3200 0.3740 -0.6700 0.2510 -0.0100 0.4990 -1.0700 0.1450 -0.2600 0.3970
TSR -0.4800 0.3170 -0.0400 0.4840 -0.3200 0.3740 -0.1400 0.4450 -0.3000 0.3830
ROE -1.7100 0.0460 -0.1500 0.4400 -1.7300 0.0440 -0.4700 0.3190 -1.2000 0.1190
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.8400 0.2010 -0.1600 0.4360 0.7900 0.2170 0.2400 0.4070 -0.2300 0.4100
EBITDA 0.2400 0.4050 -0.3200 0.3760 -1.6500 0.0540 -0.0900 0.4630 0.1800 0.4290
Sales 0.8600 0.1970 -0.7300 0.2350 -0.0600 0.4760 -0.8400 0.2010 -0.3100 0.3790
Net Inc -3.0300 0.0020 0.3300 0.3710 -0.7500 0.2280 -0.4800 0.3180 -0.7300 0.2350
TSR -1.7400 0.0440 -0.4600 0.3280 -1.4500 0.0770 -1.2900 0.1010 -0.2600 0.3970
ROE -1.3100 0.0970 -0.1100 0.4540 -0.1400 0.4450 -2.3100 0.0130 -1.7700 0.0420
H3i(ii): The longer the tenure, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.6700 0.2530 -1.7600 0.0420 -0.5700 0.2850 -0.1400 0.4450 -0.1600 0.4370
EBITDA 0.3800 0.3540 -0.5100 0.3050 0.5900 0.2780 -1.4500 0.0760 1.2500 0.1040
Sales 0.2000 0.4210 0.1700 0.4310 0.6900 0.2460 0.7200 0.2370 1.8900 0.0320
Net Inc 0.8100 0.2110 -0.4100 0.3410 1.1100 0.1360 -1.6700 0.0490 -2.5200 0.0070
TSR 0.1600 0.4360 -0.2800 0.3900 0.9100 0.1820 -0.4500 0.3260 -2.1800 0.0170
ROE -0.6800 0.2510 0.4100 0.3410 0.7500 0.2770 -0.5000 0.3090 0.2500 0.4020
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.0500 0.1500 -0.4800 0.3170 0.6600 0.2560 -0.7800 0.2190 1.8700 0.0350
EBITDA -0.1200 0.4510 -0.7000 0.2450 0.1600 0.4370 -0.4800 0.3180 -0.0700 0.2450
Sales -1.8300 0.0360 0.1200 0.4540 -0.1000 0.4590 0.5000 0.3090 1.5300 0.0670
Net Inc -2.8700 0.0030 0.1800 0.4280 -0.2900 0.3880 -1.3900 0.0860 0.6400 0.2620
TSR -0.0200 0.4920 0.8700 0.1940 0.4800 0.3170 -1.1000 0.1380 -1.3600 0.0890
ROE -1.3500 0.0920 0.1700 0.4320 -0.3900 0.3480 -1.9400 0.0290 0.5200 0.3010
CEO - Tenure vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Tenure vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
CEO - Tenure vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Tenure vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3j(i): The greater the number of LTI plans, the weaker the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.5800 0.2830 1.1400 0.1300 -1.1200 0.1340 0.2100 0.4160 -0.6000 0.2770
EBITDA -0.9000 0.1760 0.7300 0.2340 -0.7000 0.2440 1.1500 0.1270 -0.2300 0.4110
Sales 0.0000 0.5000 0.1600 0.4370 -0.4400 0.3300 -2.6000 0.0050 -0.0600 0.4760
Net Inc -0.2400 0.4070 0.5200 0.3030 -1.0100 0.1570 -1.8700 0.0330 0.4000 0.3440
TSR -1.4700 0.0720 0.4500 0.3280 0.6200 0.2700 -0.8300 0.2050 -0.6200 0.2690
ROE 1.1600 0.1250 0.3200 0.3740 -1.9000 0.0320 2.3900 0.0090 -0.5300 0.3000
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.2800 0.3880 -0.2000 0.4200 -0.8200 0.2080 -0.7300 0.2350 -0.9500 0.1740
EBITDA -0.3000 0.3840 -0.8000 0.2130 -0.5200 0.3040 1.0300 0.1650 -0.2700 0.3940
Sales 0.4800 0.3170 -1.4700 0.0740 0.0200 0.4930 -0.8200 0.4070 0.5800 0.2840
Net Inc 0.1900 0.4250 0.6100 0.2710 -1.0000 0.1610 -0.6700 0.2540 -0.5600 0.2900
TSR -1.8000 0.0390 -0.8000 0.2130 -0.8300 0.2040 -1.0500 0.1500 -1.5700 0.0610
ROE -1.8700 0.0340 -0.0900 0.4630 -1.5300 0.0660 1.4000 0.0830 -1.1000 0.1390
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.8800 0.1910 -0.3300 0.3720 -1.2800 0.1020 -0.5700 0.2870 -2.3000 0.0120
EBITDA -0.6300 0.2660 -1.4000 0.0830 -0.3000 0.3840 0.7100 0.2400 -1.0400 0.1510
Sales -0.1800 0.4270 -0.3600 0.3580 -0.9400 0.1760 -0.1500 0.4390 -1.7000 0.0470
Net Inc 0.0800 0.4670 1.1600 0.1260 -1.3400 0.0920 -0.0900 0.4640 -2.1400 0.0180
TSR -1.9400 0.0260 -1.3400 0.0920 0.6500 0.2580 -1.9500 0.0270 0.3000 0.2740
ROE -1.3500 0.0900 -0.5600 0.2880 -2.3900 0.0090 1.9300 0.0280 -0.7500 0.2280
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.0700 0.4720 0.6500 0.2590 -0.8700 0.1920 0.2800 0.3880 -2.1700 0.0170
EBITDA -0.0700 0.4730 0.9700 0.1680 0.1500 0.4420 1.6900 0.0480 -1.6100 0.0560
Sales -0.1000 0.4600 -0.8900 0.1870 -1.0500 0.1500 0.7600 0.2260 -1.6500 0.0510
Net Inc 0.2100 0.4190 0.6500 0.2590 -1.2400 0.1100 0.8900 0.1890 -2.2200 0.0160
TSR -1.8400 0.0350 -0.2000 0.4220 0.1700 0.4310 -0.1600 0.4360 0.7900 0.2170
ROE -0.9200 0.1810 -0.9500 0.1720 -2.1000 0.0200 2.1600 0.0170 0.2600 0.3990
All Directors - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
CEO - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3j(ii): The greater the number of LTI plans, the weaker the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.6100 0.5500 0.8800 0.1910 -1.0400 0.1520 -0.5600 0.2900 0.5300 0.2980
EBITDA 0.7400 0.2310 1.8200 0.0380 -0.4700 0.3190 0.2100 0.4170 0.2100 0.4160
Sales 2.1300 0.0180 -0.1300 0.4500 -1.1800 0.1210 0.5400 0.2950 0.0100 0.4960
Net Inc 1.4400 0.0770 1.2200 0.1130 -0.5800 0.2810 0.0800 0.4700 1.1600 0.1260
TSR -0.9600 0.1690 0.2800 0.3910 -0.6500 0.2600 0.4500 0.3260 -0.4000 0.3470
ROE 1.5200 0.0660 0.1000 0.4600 -0.8300 0.2050 -1.1100 0.1350 0.1900 0.4230
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS -0.4500 0.3270 -1.2900 0.1020 -1.3600 0.0910 0.5700 0.2840 0.1100 0.4550
EBITDA -0.0900 0.4630 -0.7200 0.2370 0.6600 0.2550 1.3200 0.0970 -1.2200 0.1150
Sales 0.8300 0.2060 -1.1500 0.1270 0.0100 0.4970 -1.3100 0.0970 0.7000 0.2450
Net Inc -0.1300 0.4470 -0.2500 0.4010 -0.4600 0.3220 0.4300 0.3340 0.8700 0.1940
TSR -1.2500 0.1080 -0.5900 0.2790 -0.2500 0.4020 -1.2800 0.1040 -0.7000 0.2440
ROE -0.6300 0.2660 -0.4500 0.3260 0.1400 0.4460 1.3100 0.0970 -1.3600 0.0900
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 2.0400 0.0220 0.2100 0.4170 -1.8200 0.0360 1.8200 0.0360 -2.3300 0.0120
EBITDA 1.2300 0.1120 -0.0700 0.4710 0.9300 0.1780 2.3400 0.0120 -1.8300 0.0360
Sales 2.6500 0.0050 -0.5300 0.3000 -0.9200 0.1800 0.1700 0.4320 -1.8100 0.0370
Net Inc 1.8000 0.0380 0.6900 0.2460 0.0100 0.4960 0.5200 0.3030 -1.5300 0.0650
TSR -1.6000 0.0570 -0.9200 0.1790 0.6600 0.2560 1.5400 0.0630 -0.1800 0.4290
ROE 0.4800 0.3140 -0.4800 0.3150 0.5100 0.3060 2.1500 0.0170 2.2700 0.0130
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.0600 0.4770 -0.8700 0.1930 -1.7600 0.0410 2.9400 0.0020 -2.2500 0.0140
EBITDA -0.0800 0.4670 1.4400 0.0780 0.6200 0.2690 3.2600 0.0010 -1.9300 0.0300
Sales 0.2600 0.3960 -0.6500 0.2600 -0.2100 0.4160 0.2400 0.4060 -1.5700 0.0610
Net Inc -0.2400 0.4060 0.4800 0.3170 -0.7300 0.2320 0.9100 0.1830 -1.4800 0.0720
TSR -1.7300 0.0440 0.4200 0.3380 -0.1200 0.4510 0.9200 0.1790 0.0000 0.5000
ROE -0.6300 0.2650 -0.7000 0.2440 0.9000 0.1860 2.6200 0.0060 2.4000 0.0100
CEO - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
All Directors - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - No. of LTI Plans vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3k(i): The higher the maximum award level of Annual Bonus, the stronger the relationship between Total Cash and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.5500 0.2930 0.4900 0.3140 0.4400 0.3310 -0.6500 0.2580 0.6200 0.2700
EBITDA -1.2000 0.1100 1.4600 0.0760 0.0800 0.4670 -0.1800 0.4270 3.1900 0.0010
Sales 0.7400 0.2310 0.7600 0.2260 1.0500 0.1490 0.1600 0.4370 1.9800 0.0270
Net Inc 0.5500 0.2930 0.8900 0.1890 0.0000 0.5000 -0.7000 0.2430 1.7900 0.0400
TSR 0.2100 0.4180 0.3300 0.3700 0.4300 0.3360 0.5500 0.2930 2.6300 0.0060
ROE 0.3000 0.3820 0.0800 0.4670 1.9300 0.0300 1.4800 0.0720 2.5500 0.0070
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.0100 0.4950 0.5800 0.2810 1.2400 0.1110 2.0900 0.0210 0.7100 0.2410
EBITDA 2.6900 0.0050 0.0700 0.4710 1.8300 0.0380 -0.8700 0.1940 0.5200 0.3030
Sales 0.5900 0.2780 1.2700 0.1050 0.8300 0.2040 1.0500 0.1500 0.7100 0.2410
Net Inc 1.1900 0.1200 0.5500 0.2910 1.9000 0.0330 -0.7000 0.2440 0.1800 0.4300
TSR 0.8400 0.2000 0.2300 0.4110 2.1100 0.0200 2.4600 0.0090 0.5800 0.2810
ROE 0.5000 0.3110 1.5600 0.0620 0.2400 0.4050 1.7900 0.0400 -0.1000 0.4600
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 1.9900 0.0250 0.6400 0.2620 0.7700 0.2220 0.9400 0.1740 0.3300 0.3720
EBITDA 0.5600 0.2660 1.9800 0.0260 0.7400 0.2310 0.4200 0.2380 1.1200 0.1330
Sales 1.8700 0.0330 1.5100 0.0680 0.5300 0.3000 0.0900 0.4630 0.4000 0.3430
Net Inc 0.0600 0.4750 1.5200 0.0670 0.7400 0.2310 -0.1900 0.4260 1.1300 0.1310
TSR 1.8700 0.0330 0.8500 0.1990 0.0700 0.4710 0.4800 0.3160 0.5100 0.3070
ROE 2.0800 0.0200 1.1600 0.1250 0.6600 0.2550 0.7000 0.2430 0.0900 0.4640
All Directors - CEO - Maximum bonus potential vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
Finance Director - Maximum bonus potential vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
CEO - Maximum bonus potential vs (relationship between Total Cash and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3k(ii): The higher the maximum award level of Annual Bonus, the stronger the relationship between Total Compensation and Company Performance
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.3800 0.3510 1.4100 0.0830 1.8800 0.0320 1.8200 0.0370 -0.5900 0.2790
EBITDA 0.4200 0.3390 2.0900 0.0210 1.2800 0.1030 -0.0400 0.4850 -0.8700 0.1950
Sales 0.9700 0.1670 0.3400 0.3690 1.4500 0.0760 0.3900 0.3500 0.0000 0.5000
Net Inc 0.6200 0.2690 1.4500 0.0760 -0.3700 0.3560 0.1100 0.4540 -0.1700 0.4320
TSR 0.5800 0.2810 0.2300 0.4080 1.1400 0.1300 0.6900 0.2450 1.1400 0.1310
ROE 0.9400 0.1740 -0.8300 0.2060 0.7000 0.2430 -0.1700 0.4320 0.6400 0.2630
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.4200 0.3380 -0.7200 0.2360 0.2300 0.4110 1.9200 0.0300 -0.3000 0.3810
EBITDA 1.4400 0.0790 0.7600 0.2260 -0.3700 0.3580 1.5400 0.0660 2.0400 0.0250
Sales 1.3800 0.0870 2.4100 0.0100 1.7700 0.0420 1.3000 0.0980 0.2100 0.4160
Net Inc -0.2900 0.3880 0.4000 0.3460 1.9900 0.0270 -0.5400 0.2950 0.2300 0.4110
TSR 0.0300 0.4860 1.6300 0.0540 0.8500 0.2000 1.9200 0.0300 -0.0200 0.4900
ROE 1.2500 0.1090 1.6000 0.0580 -1.1200 0.1360 1.5600 0.0620 -0.4300 0.3330
Year
Performance test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value test stat p-value
EPS 0.6700 0.2520 0.1100 0.4560 -0.7100 0.2390 1.0700 0.1440 0.2700 0.3930
EBITDA 1.9800 0.0260 2.2200 0.0150 0.3700 0.3560 1.9300 0.0300 -0.0300 0.4870
Sales 2.0100 0.0240 1.9200 0.0290 0.7800 0.2180 0.5700 0.2860 0.2100 0.4190
Net Inc 0.2500 0.4010 1.5800 0.0600 0.5400 0.2960 0.1000 0.4590 0.1100 0.4550
TSR 0.6100 0.2720 0.0800 0.4670 1.3200 0.0960 1.2500 0.1080 0.2800 0.3900
ROE 1.6100 0.0560 1.7100 0.0460 -0.3300 0.3700 1.5100 0.0670 0.7200 0.2380
Finance Director - Maximum bonus potential vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
CEO - Maximum bonus potential vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
All Directors - CEO - Maximum bonus potential vs (relationship between Total Compensation and Performance)
2008/09 2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05
2008/09
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3l(i): CEO Total Cash is more strongly linked to Company Performance than that of executive directors
- The closer "r" is to +1, the stronger the positive linear relationship (i.e., when one goes up, the other goes up as well).
- One the other hand, the closer "r" is to -1, the stronger the negative linear relationship (i.e., when one goes up, the other goes down).
- There is no linear relationship between two variables where "r" is 0.
#1 positive significant
Year Year #1 positive insignificant
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO #1 negative 
EPS 0.120 0.096 -0.010 -0.017 EPS 1 2 3 4 Not #1 positive significant
EBITDA 0.036 -0.186 0.142 0.064 EBITDA 3 4 1 2
Sales 0.116 0.232 0.283 0.293 Sales 4 3 2 1
Net Inc 0.068 0.064 0.133 0.196 Net Inc 3 4 2 1
TSR 0.343 0.199 0.184 0.092 TSR 1 2 3 4
ROE 0.005 -0.052 0.059 0.044 ROE 3 4 1 2
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS -0.015 0.058 0.051 0.082 EPS 4 2 3 1
EBITDA -0.046 0.017 0.122 0.165 EBITDA 4 3 2 1
Sales -0.165 0.186 0.126 0.158 Sales 4 1 3 2
Net Inc 0.013 0.249 0.230 0.233 Net Inc 4 1 3 2
TSR 0.029 0.221 0.047 0.193 TSR 4 1 3 2
ROE 0.059 0.191 -0.055 -0.047 ROE 2 1 4 3
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS 0.104 -0.002 0.092 0.109 EPS 2 4 3 1
EBITDA 0.036 -0.020 -0.127 -0.187 EBITDA 1 2 3 4
Sales 0.027 0.089 0.051 0.125 Sales 4 2 3 1
Net Inc 0.074 0.055 0.062 0.079 Net Inc 2 4 3 1
TSR 0.123 0.214 0.327 0.272 TSR 4 3 1 2
ROE -0.036 -0.033 -0.177 -0.134 ROE 2 1 4 3
Total Cash vs Company Performance
2005/06
Total Cash vs Company Performance
2006/07
Note: The reported number is the correlation between two variables (or the correlation coefficient).  The general notation is "r" and measures the strength of the linear relationship between the variables:
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
Total Cash vs Company Performance
Total Cash vs Company Performance
Total Cash vs Company Performance
Total Cash vs Company Performance
2004/05
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS -0.018 -0.150 -0.080 -0.038 EPS 1 4 3 2
EBITDA 0.047 0.250 0.085 0.056 EBITDA 4 1 2 3
Sales 0.074 0.152 0.168 0.192 Sales 4 3 2 1
Net Inc -0.008 0.010 -0.011 0.014 Net Inc 3 2 4 1
TSR 0.146 0.193 0.221 0.243 TSR 4 3 2 1
ROE -0.033 -0.007 0.042 0.045 ROE 4 3 2 1
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS 0.106 0.244 0.146 0.177 EPS 4 1 3 2
EBITDA -0.134 -0.217 -0.132 -0.124 EBITDA 3 4 2 1
Sales 0.229 0.243 0.111 0.183 Sales 2 1 4 3
Net Inc 0.204 0.164 0.113 0.197 Net Inc 1 3 4 2
TSR 0.247 0.318 0.251 0.315 TSR 4 1 3 2
ROE 0.171 0.361 0.117 0.257 ROE 3 1 4 2
Total Cash vs Company Performance
2007/08
Total Cash vs Company Performance
2008/09
2007/08
2008/09
Total Cash vs Company Performance
Total Cash vs Company Performance
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
H3l(ii): CEO Total Compensation is more strongly linked to Company Performance than that of executive directors
- The closer "r" is to +1, the stronger the positive linear relationship (i.e., when one goes up, the other goes up as well).
- One the other hand, the closer "r" is to -1, the stronger the negative linear relationship (i.e., when one goes up, the other goes down).
- There is no linear relationship between two variables where "r" is 0.
#1 positive significant
Year Year #1 positive insignificant
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO #1 negative 
EPS 0.001 0.005 -0.047 -0.070 EPS 2 1 3 4 Not #1 positive significant
EBITDA 0.246 0.088 0.202 0.194 EBITDA 1 4 2 3
Sales 0.105 0.211 0.217 0.246 Sales 4 3 2 1
Net Inc 0.004 0.085 0.183 0.254 Net Inc 4 3 2 1
TSR 0.418 0.213 0.192 0.119 TSR 1 2 3 4
ROE 0.152 0.140 0.167 0.153 ROE 3 4 1 2
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS 0.067 0.224 0.126 0.177 EPS 4 1 3 2
EBITDA 0.131 0.129 0.216 0.269 EBITDA 3 4 2 1
Sales 0.015 0.069 0.170 0.136 Sales 4 3 1 2
Net Inc 0.056 0.188 0.196 0.192 Net Inc 4 3 1 2
TSR 0.234 0.223 0.237 0.184 TSR 2 3 1 4
ROE 0.030 -0.068 -0.011 0.008 ROE 1 4 3 2
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS 0.054 0.076 0.111 0.147 EPS 4 3 2 1
EBITDA 0.080 -0.221 -0.126 -0.329 EBITDA 2 4 3 1
Sales -0.103 0.139 -0.028 0.099 Sales 4 1 3 2
Net Inc 0.173 0.032 0.174 0.044 Net Inc 2 4 1 3
TSR -0.028 0.060 0.105 0.003 TSR 4 2 1 3
ROE -0.032 -0.219 -0.089 -0.167 ROE 1 4 2 3
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
2004/05
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
2005/06
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
2006/07
Note: The reported number is the correlation between two variables (or the correlation coefficient).  The general notation is "r" and measures the strength of the linear relationship between the variables:
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
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Part 3 - Factors affecting the relationship between Pay (Total Cash and Total Compensation) and Company Performance 
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS 0.006 -0.205 -0.078 -0.068 EPS 1 4 3 2
EBITDA -0.018 0.042 -0.021 -0.143 EBITDA 2 1 3 4
Sales 0.046 0.159 0.188 0.149 Sales 4 2 1 3
Net Inc 0.056 0.078 0.066 0.081 Net Inc 4 2 3 1
TSR 0.229 0.294 0.325 0.338 TSR 4 3 2 1
ROE 0.020 0.017 0.138 0.070 ROE 3 4 1 2
Year Year
Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO Performance CEO FD All Dir All - CEO
EPS 0.034 -0.162 -0.087 -0.052 EPS 1 4 3 2
EBITDA -0.085 -0.074 -0.105 -0.055 EBITDA 3 2 4 1
Sales 0.032 0.020 -0.059 0.013 Sales 1 2 4 3
Net Inc -0.093 0.031 -0.079 0.057 Net Inc 4 2 3 1
TSR -0.164 0.007 -0.039 0.065 TSR 4 2 3 1
ROE 0.223 0.122 0.160 0.127 ROE 1 4 2 3
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
2008/09
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
2007/08
2008/09
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
Total Compensation vs Company Performance
2007/08
Appendix C Detailed statistical results
328
       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.8344 4 0.1656 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.908963 4 0.091037
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance 0.3056 15 0.267996 Finance 0.758243 4 0.241757
Food/drink & tobacco 0.337551 7 0.459036 Food/drink & tobacco 0.17128 7 0.713472
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.251783 5 0.682839 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.796175 4 0.203825
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.084594 13 0.783495 Oil/gas & minerals -0.194256 13 0.524822
Other services 0.992093 5 0.000843 Other services -0.201803 5 0.744811
Property -0.384266 3 0.748909 Property -0.998913 3 0.029682
Retail & distribution 0.835246 5 0.078262 Retail & distribution -0.899574 5 0.037623
Transport & leisure -0.492394 3 0.672244 Transport & leisure -0.171185 3 0.890481
Utilities 0.418138 7 0.350539 Utilities 0.169333 7 0.716635
Test Stat 14.06626 9.507732
p-value 0.169991 0.484688
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.61423 5 0.270361 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.988243 5 0.001528
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.551388 3 0.628197 Engineering & other manufacture 0.490908 3 0.673331
Finance 0.146401 12 0.649815 Finance 1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.153396 6 0.771711 Food/drink & tobacco -0.381632 6 0.455343
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.702315 7 0.078492 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.41534 6 0.412815
Oil/gas & minerals 0.277833 6 0.593973 Oil/gas & minerals -0.113532 6 0.830434
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.876959 4 0.123041 Property -0.853511 4 0.146489
Retail & distribution 0.207336 6 0.693452 Retail & distribution -0.521961 6 0.288161
Transport & leisure -0.06375 4 0.93625 Transport & leisure -0.111081 4 0.888919
Utilities -0.746646 4 0.253354 Utilities 0.615791 4 0.384209
Test Stat 7.450928 13.88075
p-value 0.682298 0.126631
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.637131 6 0.173621 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.640985 6 0.1702
Construction & building materials -0.125831 3 0.91968 Construction & building materials -0.980891 3 0.124653
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.999907 3 0.008685 Engineering & other manufacture -0.571969 3 0.61236
Finance 0.323906 11 0.331191 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.083356 8 0.84443 Food/drink & tobacco -0.252244 8 0.546722
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.159122 9 0.682602 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.142258 7 0.760932
Oil/gas & minerals 0.841466 5 0.073945 Oil/gas & minerals -0.640275 5 0.244536
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property 0.240654 4 0.759346 Property -0.519102 4 0.480899
Retail & distribution -0.68277 5 0.203969 Retail & distribution 0.676773 5 0.20957
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities -0.599601 4 -0.599601 Utilities 0.580588 4 0.419412
Test Stat 7.732332 4.994557
p-value 0.654964 0.834783
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.04348 7 0.926257 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.23706 7 0.608767
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.736247 4 0.263753 Engineering & other manufacture 0.910067 4 0.089933
Finance 0.089737 16 0.741024 Finance NA 0 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.121172 9 0.75615 Food/drink & tobacco -0.256494 9 0.50528
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.390001 9 0.299435 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.193982 7 0.676847
Oil/gas & minerals -0.86588 5 0.057761 Oil/gas & minerals 0.385501 5 0.521609
Other services 0.876835 5 0.050918 Other services 0.637293 5 0.247457
Property 0.644132 4 0.355868 Property -0.5333 4 0.466701
Retail & distribution -0.561378 9 0.11577 Retail & distribution -0.460404 9 0.212356
Transport & leisure 0.390541 3 0.744576 Transport & leisure 0.938152 3 0.225073
Utilities 0.864785 4 0.135215 Utilities -0.737129 4 0.262871
Test Stat 13.90862 7.175071
p-value 0.238091 0.70882
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.19614 4 0.80386 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.491308 4 0.508692
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance 0.052581 9 0.89313 Finance NA 0 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.231037 7 0.618163 Food/drink & tobacco -0.107301 7 0.818888
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.012208 7 0.979277 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.49368 5 0.397986
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.649446 3 0.550001 Other services 0.305213 3 0.802545
Property -1 2 NA Property 1 2 NA
Retail & distribution -0.346007 3 0.775074 Retail & distribution 0.139925 3 0.910627
Transport & leisure 0.989251 3 0.093424 Transport & leisure -0.805845 3 0.403423
Utilities -0.110817 5 0.859193 Utilities -0.654296 5 0.230929
Test Stat 0.2817 1.429166
p-value 0.999985 0.984661
2008-09 
CEO 
Tcash
2007-08 
CEO 
Tcash
2006-07 
CEO 
TCash 
2005-06 
CEO 
TCash 
2004-05 
CEO 
Tcash
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 
CEO 
Tcash
2007-08 
CEO 
Tcash
2006-07 
CEO 
TCash 
2005-06 
CEO 
TCash 
2004-05 
CEO 
Tcash
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.888405 4 0.111595 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.545062 4 0.454938
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance -0.212693 15 0.44662 Finance 0.22451 15 0.421144
Food/drink & tobacco 0.865921 7 0.011747 Food/drink & tobacco 0.33998 7 0.455602
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.053178 5 0.932323 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.090387 5 0.885072
Oil/gas & minerals -0.004801 13 0.98758 Oil/gas & minerals 0.236522 13 0.436568
Other services -0.682535 5 0.204188 Other services -0.670108 5 0.215843
Property 0.987396 3 0.101184 Property 0.983709 3 0.115068
Retail & distribution 0.980346 5 0.003298 Retail & distribution 0.597896 5 0.286902
Transport & leisure -0.277944 3 0.820694 Transport & leisure 0.28522 3 0.815867
Utilities 0.404483 7 0.368093 Utilities 0.893754 7 0.006669
20.16782 8.991046
0.027705 0.532954
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.754666 5 0.14038 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.844445 4 0.155555
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.8986 3 0.28917 Engineering & other manufacture 0.214943 3 0.862087
Finance -0.144153 12 0.654895 Finance 0.009811 11 0.977161
Food/drink & tobacco 0.222351 6 0.67197 Food/drink & tobacco -0.488381 6 0.325672
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.253812 6 0.627457 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.557367 7 0.19363
Oil/gas & minerals 0.202612 6 0.700241 Oil/gas & minerals 0.198821 6 0.705698
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.67184 4 0.32816 Property -0.156515 4 0.843485
Retail & distribution 0.11501 6 0.828246 Retail & distribution 0.343996 6 0.504359
Transport & leisure -0.326923 4 0.673077 Transport & leisure 0.137486 4 0.862514
Utilities -0.267531 4 0.732469 Utilities 0.020532 4 0.979468
3.395093 3.907843
0.970541 0.951409
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.172967 6 0.743137 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.087852 6 0.868561
Construction & building materials -0.575199 3 0.60985 Construction & building materials -0.144534 3 0.907663
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.000804 3 0.999488 Engineering & other manufacture 0.300854 3 0.805457
Finance -0.293835 11 0.380474 Finance -0.228549 11 0.49907
Food/drink & tobacco -0.422464 8 0.297083 Food/drink & tobacco -0.269904 8 0.51797
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.377728 8 0.356244 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.079829 8 0.850955
Oil/gas & minerals 0.265553 5 0.665905 Oil/gas & minerals 0.49025 5 0.401788
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.496166 4 0.503834 Property -0.704601 4 0.295399
Retail & distribution 0.488023 5 0.404261 Retail & distribution 0.283497 5 0.643935
Transport & leisure -1 2 NA Transport & leisure 1 2 NA
Utilities -0.837623 4 0.162377 Utilities -0.878751 4 0.121249
4.917525 3.889702
0.896619 0.952186
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.221384 7 0.633308 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.577852 7 0.174224
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.988291 4 0.011709 Engineering & other manufacture -0.654914 4 0.345086
Finance -0.121852 16 0.653034 Finance -0.011154 16 0.967296
Food/drink & tobacco 0.21793 9 0.573234 Food/drink & tobacco 0.278562 9 0.467945
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.133052 8 0.753456 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.10658 7 0.820091
Oil/gas & minerals 0.383879 5 0.523514 Oil/gas & minerals 0.309058 5 0.612852
Other services 0.624061 5 0.260531 Other services 0.949406 5 0.013557
Property -0.989668 4 0.010332 Property 0.510894 4 0.489106
Retail & distribution -0.648782 9 0.058704 Retail & distribution 0.351802 9 0.353177
Transport & leisure -0.827537 3 0.379482 Transport & leisure 0.822244 3 0.385444
Utilities -0.084869 4 0.915131 Utilities 0.422252 4 0.577748
17.09021 7.865635
0.105235 0.725287
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.115375 4 0.884625 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.367301 4 0.632699
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance -0.409594 9 0.27361 Finance -0.20525 9 0.596271
Food/drink & tobacco -0.194166 7 0.676552 Food/drink & tobacco -0.278853 7 0.544793
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.178969 6 0.734413 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.030075 5 0.961713
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.380901 3 0.751228 Other services -0.077604 3 0.950546
Property -1 2 NA Property -1 2 NA
Retail & distribution 0.828471 3 0.378422 Retail & distribution 0.355389 3 0.768697
Transport & leisure -0.80631 3 0.402922 Transport & leisure -0.997962 3 0.04065
Utilities 0.836208 5 0.07759 Utilities 0.523446 5 0.365356
4.154998 1.252029
0.842875 0.996101
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 
CEO 
Tcash
2007-08 
CEO 
Tcash
2006-07 
CEO 
TCash 
2005-06 
CEO 
TCash 
2004-05 
CEO 
Tcash
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.562417 4 0.437583 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.454515 4 0.545485
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance 0.104683 15 0.710424 Finance 0.06304 15 0.823385
Food/drink & tobacco -0.16648 7 0.721275 Food/drink & tobacco 0.265958 7 0.564293
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.215868 5 0.727298 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.196956 4 0.803044
Oil/gas & minerals 0.559334 13 0.046872 Oil/gas & minerals 0.179604 13 0.557117
Other services -0.581364 5 0.303902 Other services -0.110117 5 0.860078
Property -0.836819 3 0.368825 Property -0.798991 3 0.410735
Retail & distribution 0.758189 5 0.137446 Retail & distribution -0.76983 4 0.23017
Transport & leisure -0.777098 3 0.433382 Transport & leisure -0.128549 3 0.917936
Utilities 0.547484 7 0.203348 Utilities 0.427844 7 0.338279
5.774253 2.158262
0.83386 0.994977
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.913445 5 0.030168 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.306172 5 0.616349
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.400083 3 0.737963 Engineering & other manufacture 0.206103 3 0.867844
Finance 0.566743 12 0.05468 Finance -0.040534 12 0.900468
Food/drink & tobacco -0.160786 6 0.760899 Food/drink & tobacco 0.118373 6 0.823271
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.565574 7 0.185736 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.81762 6 0.04686
Oil/gas & minerals 0.233788 6 0.655707 Oil/gas & minerals 0.150821 6 0.775484
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.162908 4 0.837092 Property 0.737425 4 0.262575
Retail & distribution 0.450844 6 0.369553 Retail & distribution -0.121584 6 0.818522
Transport & leisure -0.353113 4 0.646887 Transport & leisure -0.93624 4 0.06376
Utilities 0.634152 4 0.365848 Utilities -0.149954 4 0.850046
9.333167 8.012971
0.500804 0.62757
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.382487 6 0.454248 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.700395 5 0.187761
Construction & building materials -0.981235 3 0.123522 Construction & building materials 0.272256 3 0.82446
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.502276 3 0.664992 Engineering & other manufacture 0.64703 3 0.552022
Finance 0.041342 11 0.903938 Finance 0.450549 10 0.1913
Food/drink & tobacco 0.339649 8 0.410441 Food/drink & tobacco -0.425602 8 0.293125
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.664046 9 0.051105 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.425747 8 0.292943
Oil/gas & minerals 0.102904 5 0.869211 Oil/gas & minerals -0.171459 5 0.782766
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.006555 4 0.993445 Property -0.211309 4 0.788692
Retail & distribution -0.812196 5 0.094899 Retail & distribution 0.528057 5 0.360361
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities -0.74267 4 0.25733 Utilities -0.512097 4 0.487903
7.743928 6.017305
0.653834 0.813807
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.442433 7 0.320203 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.364428 6 0.477557
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.944046 4 0.055954 Engineering & other manufacture 0.948572 4 0.051428
Finance 0.118899 16 0.660968 Finance 0.094983 16 0.72641
Food/drink & tobacco 0.0171 9 0.965173 Food/drink & tobacco -0.109369 8 0.796563
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.028459 9 0.942063 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.407798 8 0.31592
Oil/gas & minerals 0.71592 5 0.173805 Oil/gas & minerals 0.111236 5 0.858663
Other services 0.372808 5 0.536563 Other services 0.982098 5 0.002868
Property 0.866561 4 0.133439 Property 0.83073 4 0.16927
Retail & distribution 0.227248 8 0.588352 Retail & distribution -0.412302 9 0.270137
Transport & leisure -0.938932 3 0.223634 Transport & leisure -0.711201 3 0.496303
Utilities 0.479033 4 0.520967 Utilities 0.353073 4 0.646927
7.185208 16.26422
0.783893 0.131602
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.033576 4 0.966424 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.077738 4 0.922262
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance 0.259738 9 0.499718 Finance -0.163577 9 0.674105
Food/drink & tobacco -0.068723 7 0.883607 Food/drink & tobacco 0.24235 6 0.643592
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.1866 7 0.688704 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.666865 6 0.147983
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.798318 3 0.411447 Other services 0.999839 3 0.011425
Property -1 2 NA Property 1 2 NA
Retail & distribution -0.282723 3 0.817524 Retail & distribution 0.225536 3 0.855173
Transport & leisure -0.960553 3 0.179408 Transport & leisure -0.998247 3 0.037699
Utilities -0.152153 5 0.807023 Utilities -0.424339 5 0.476398
0.628704 1.894915
0.999683 0.984066
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.36803 4 0.63197 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.698947 4 0.301053
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance 0.23769 15 0.393644 Finance 0.612347 4 0.387653
Food/drink & tobacco 0.55829 7 0.192736 Food/drink & tobacco 0.078169 7 0.867701
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.14429 5 0.81692 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.836447 4 0.163553
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.05856 13 0.849296 Oil/gas & minerals 0.175176 13 0.567036
Other services -0.63566 5 0.249063 Other services 0.710849 5 0.17833
Property -0.56536 3 0.617477 Property -0.987255 3 0.10175
Retail & distribution -0.73228 5 0.159438 Retail & distribution 0.408967 5 0.49419
Transport & leisure -0.89724 3 0.291144 Transport & leisure -0.696611 3 -0.696611
Utilities -0.86962 7 0.010976 Utilities -0.645069 7 -0.645069
Test Stat 12.374 7.201155
p-value 0.26081 0.706328
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.77427 5 0.124291 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.91815 5 0.027762
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.39154 3 0.743886 Engineering & other manufacture 0.325374 3 0.789019
Finance 0.415 12 0.179759 Finance 1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.47509 6 0.340982 Food/drink & tobacco -0.118775 6 0.822676
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.20845 7 0.653767 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.391757 6 0.442427
Oil/gas & minerals -0.17571 6 0.739146 Oil/gas & minerals 0.007394 6 0.988908
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.42435 4 0.575649 Property -0.069057 4 0.930943
Retail & distribution 0.17591 6 0.738853 Retail & distribution -0.503316 6 0.308777
Transport & leisure -0.83919 4 0.160811 Transport & leisure 0.164586 4 0.835414
Utilities -0.42178 4 0.578225 Utilities 0.261969 4 0.738031
Test Stat 6.15173 4.418251
p-value 0.80236 0.881795
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.32399 6 0.531015 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.238798 6 0.648611
Construction & building materials 0.70612 3 0.500883 Construction & building materials 0.895145 3 0.294143
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.98813 3 0.098176 Engineering & other manufacture -0.451399 3 0.70185
Finance 0.21073 11 0.533952 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.33305 8 0.420168 Food/drink & tobacco -0.585146 8 0.127566
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.35584 9 0.347288 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.639447 7 0.122009
Oil/gas & minerals 0.36373 5 0.547307 Oil/gas & minerals 0.39714 5 0.507971
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.2572 4 0.742801 Property -0.344183 4 0.655818
Retail & distribution -0.52332 5 0.36549 Retail & distribution -0.533624 5 0.354354
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities 0.76349 4 0.23651 Utilities 0.262832 4 0.737168
Test Stat 4.15008 5.856913
p-value 0.94032 0.754149
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.41922 7 0.349161 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.044365 7 0.924757
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.1744 4 0.825596 Engineering & other manufacture -0.378271 4 0.621729
Finance 0.07086 16 0.794253 Finance NA 0 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.29589 9 0.439488 Food/drink & tobacco 0.135146 9 0.728839
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.1334 9 0.732228 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.756533 7 0.049026
Oil/gas & minerals 0.17382 5 0.779808 Oil/gas & minerals 0.436965 5 0.461889
Other services -0.24165 5 0.695348 Other services 0.059931 5 0.923739
Property 0.16941 4 0.830588 Property -0.020591 4 0.979409
Retail & distribution -0.20787 9 0.591483 Retail & distribution 0.187462 9 0.629114
Transport & leisure 0.9222 3 0.252774 Transport & leisure 0.430215 3 0.716875
Utilities 0.77393 4 0.226074 Utilities -0.577844 4 0.422156
Test Stat 3.10117 5.100638
p-value 0.98932 0.884355
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.95942 4 0.040576 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.594463 4 0.405537
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance 0.2233 9 0.563584 Finance NA 0 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.0258 7 0.956222 Food/drink & tobacco 0.770734 7 0.042537
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.35843 7 0.429837 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.691228 5 0.196145
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.96369 3 0.172085 Other services 0.785678 3 0.424629
Property 1 2 NA Property -1 2 NA
Retail & distribution -0.02833 3 0.981963 Retail & distribution -0.498641 3 0.667665
Transport & leisure -0.19144 3 0.877368 Transport & leisure 0.628461 3 0.56737
Utilities -0.30268 5 0.620586 Utilities -0.563322 5 0.322739
Test Stat 4.76069 5.277723
p-value 0.78282 0.626112
2008-09 
CEO 
Tcomp
2007-08 
CEO 
TComp 
2006-07 
CEO 
Tcomp
2005-06 
CEO 
Tcomp
2004-05 
CEO 
Tcomp
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 
CEO 
Tcomp
2007-08 
CEO 
TComp 
2006-07 
CEO 
Tcomp
2005-06 
CEO 
Tcomp
2004-05 
CEO 
Tcomp
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.93757 4 0.06243 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.00271 4 0.99729
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance -0.329158 15 0.230927 Finance -0.050703 15 0.857584
Food/drink & tobacco 0.801689 7 0.030133 Food/drink & tobacco 0.30323 7 0.508557
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.53233 5 0.355749 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.459983 5 0.435695
Oil/gas & minerals 0.042417 13 0.890568 Oil/gas & minerals -0.492495 13 0.087305
Other services -0.051678 5 0.934231 Other services -0.016398 5 0.979123
Property 0.998871 3 0.030248 Property 0.99967 3 0.016363
Retail & distribution -0.155341 5 0.803013 Retail & distribution 0.191674 5 0.757456
Transport & leisure -0.77092 3 0.439594 Transport & leisure -0.304482 3 0.803033
Utilities -0.194185 7 0.676522 Utilities -0.639981 7 0.121597
9.992943 5.084059
0.441113 0.885493
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.757976 5 0.137622 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.8905 4 0.1095
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.9631 3 0.173481 Engineering & other manufacture 0.034903 3 0.977776
Finance -0.324289 12 0.303775 Finance 0.127106 11 0.709582
Food/drink & tobacco 0.032782 6 0.950844 Food/drink & tobacco -0.184705 6 0.726093
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.112252 6 0.832329 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.11928 7 0.798942
Oil/gas & minerals 0.09582 6 0.85671 Oil/gas & minerals -0.035708 6 0.946461
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.386753 4 0.613247 Property -0.634257 4 0.365743
Retail & distribution 0.074216 6 0.888881 Retail & distribution 0.392777 6 0.441132
Transport & leisure 0.962423 4 0.037577 Transport & leisure -0.873992 4 0.126008
Utilities -0.031056 4 0.968944 Utilities 0.146019 4 0.853981
7.069271 5.149569
0.71889 0.880965
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.000451 6 0.999324 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.373182 6 0.466212
Construction & building materials -0.044982 3 0.971354 Construction & building materials -0.490621 3 0.67354
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.139313 3 0.911021 Engineering & other manufacture 0.164269 3 0.894947
Finance 0.58584 11 0.058243 Finance -0.045637 11 0.894004
Food/drink & tobacco 0.045316 8 0.915149 Food/drink & tobacco -0.597088 8 0.118089
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.026511 8 0.950315 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.587318 8 0.125811
Oil/gas & minerals -0.822481 5 0.087354 Oil/gas & minerals -0.587306 5 0.297763
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.989418 4 0.010582 Property -0.857557 4 0.142443
Retail & distribution 0.636008 5 0.248719 Retail & distribution 0.269109 5 0.661542
Transport & leisure -1 2 NA Transport & leisure 1 2 NA
Utilities 0.222152 4 0.777848 Utilities 0.040461 4 0.959539
14.13248 7.332257
0.167034 0.693749
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.078233 7 0.867594 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.175807 7 0.706132
Construction & building materials 1 2 Construction & building materials 1 2
E-business & computer services NA 1 E-business & computer services NA 1
Engineering & other manufacture 0.60025 4 0.39975 Engineering & other manufacture 0.617527 4 0.382473
Finance -0.062499 16 0.818137 Finance -0.011451 16 0.966428
Food/drink & tobacco 0.728086 9 0.026139 Food/drink & tobacco 0.333867 9 0.379904
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.577891 8 0.133525 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.48014 7 0.275499
Oil/gas & minerals 0.110561 5 0.859516 Oil/gas & minerals -0.397309 5 0.507774
Other services -0.766229 5 0.13082 Other services -0.38745 5 0.51932
Property -0.849656 4 0.150344 Property 0.371947 4 0.628053
Retail & distribution -0.102574 9 0.792862 Retail & distribution 0.204672 9 0.597328
Transport & leisure -0.984476 3 0.11232 Transport & leisure 0.986077 3 0.106358
Utilities 0.194921 4 0.805079 Utilities 0.083329 4 0.916671
11.01227 3.151807
0.442236 0.988564
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.728537 4 0.271463 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.00262 4 0.99738
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance -0.282045 9 0.462161 Finance -0.120424 9 0.757619
Food/drink & tobacco -0.610323 7 0.145535 Food/drink & tobacco -0.317148 7 0.488257
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.235024 6 0.653955 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.364897 5 0.545925
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.83294 3 0.373312 Other services 0.493359 3 0.671538
Property 1 2 NA Property 1 2 NA
Retail & distribution -0.560284 3 0.621384 Retail & distribution 0.018313 3 0.988341
Transport & leisure 0.62785 3 0.56787 Transport & leisure 0.109511 3 0.930143
Utilities 0.059558 5 0.924213 Utilities -0.611072 5 0.273538
3.058549 0.632806
0.93063 0.999675
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 
CEO 
Tcomp
2007-08 
CEO 
TComp 
2006-07 
CEO 
Tcomp
2005-06 
CEO 
Tcomp
2004-05 
CEO 
Tcomp
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.451324 4 0.548676 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.903101 4 0.096899
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance 0.379297 15 0.163217 Finance 0.181439 15 0.517533
Food/drink & tobacco -0.109859 7 0.81462 Food/drink & tobacco 0.371842 7 0.411462
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.430159 5 0.469698 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.663476 4 0.336524
Oil/gas & minerals -0.291227 13 0.334354 Oil/gas & minerals 0.306766 13 0.30798
Other services 0.396349 5 0.508896 Other services 0.863305 5 0.059409
Property -0.931276 3 0.237393 Property -0.905293 3 0.279303
Retail & distribution -0.749958 5 0.144329 Retail & distribution 0.944596 4 0.055404
Transport & leisure -0.99663 3 0.052282 Transport & leisure -0.665031 3 0.536836
Utilities 0.142153 7 0.761105 Utilities 0.269254 7 0.559288
5.84326 6.838409
0.828255 0.740607
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.936667 5 0.01895 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.405236 5 0.498529
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.227864 3 0.853652 Engineering & other manufacture 0.025864 3 0.983533
Finance 0.308305 12 0.329578 Finance -0.066275 12 0.837853
Food/drink & tobacco -0.343796 6 0.504624 Food/drink & tobacco 0.152413 6 0.773151
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.226449 7 0.625349 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.63174 6 0.178452
Oil/gas & minerals -0.384837 6 0.451242 Oil/gas & minerals -0.360369 6 0.482847
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.900835 4 0.099166 Property 0.834309 4 0.165691
Retail & distribution 0.540234 6 0.268484 Retail & distribution -0.095178 6 0.857664
Transport & leisure -0.580093 4 0.419907 Transport & leisure 0.746491 4 0.253509
Utilities 0.396284 4 0.603716 Utilities 0.133021 4 0.866979
10.81619 4.817992
0.372017 0.903
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.140796 6 0.790201 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.018884 5 0.975957
Construction & building materials 0.894352 3 0.295274 Construction & building materials -0.803756 3 0.405664
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.376169 3 0.754483 Engineering & other manufacture 0.53382 3 0.641512
Finance -0.085397 11 0.802859 Finance -0.381678 10 0.276446
Food/drink & tobacco -0.337029 8 0.414294 Food/drink & tobacco -0.412878 8 0.309333
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.093666 9 0.810574 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.24165 8 0.564236
Oil/gas & minerals -0.901415 5 0.036603 Oil/gas & minerals 0.7701 5 0.127663
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property 0.180136 4 0.819864 Property -0.933158 4 0.066842
Retail & distribution -0.515327 5 0.374189 Retail & distribution -0.647869 5 0.237139
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities 0.473305 4 0.526695 Utilities -0.521911 4 0.478089
5.272479 7.594533
0.872249 0.668375
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.70729 7 0.075477 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.304832 6 0.556915
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1
Engineering & other manufacture 0.481295 4 0.518705 Engineering & other manufacture -0.328704 4 0.671296
Finance 0.133287 16 0.622645 Finance 0.137224 16 0.612311
Food/drink & tobacco 0.29721 9 0.437345 Food/drink & tobacco -0.151609 8 0.720058
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.715005 9 0.03038 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.059937 8 0.887887
Oil/gas & minerals 0.254999 5 0.678879 Oil/gas & minerals -0.663339 5 0.222267
Other services 0.296 5 0.6287 Other services -0.533396 5 0.3546
Property 0.886173 4 0.113827 Property 0.814753 4 0.185247
Retail & distribution 0.094706 8 0.823485 Retail & distribution 0.208331 9 0.590644
Transport & leisure -0.432255 3 0.715436 Transport & leisure -0.018683 3 0.988106
Utilities 0.170017 4 0.715436 Utilities 0.598036 4 0.401964
4.980444 4.7571
0.93211 0.942357
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.796075 4 0.203925 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.464884 4 0.535116
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance 0.123021 9 0.752524 Finance 0.100838 9 0.796307
Food/drink & tobacco -0.197048 7 0.671937 Food/drink & tobacco 0.761611 6 0.07847
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.058384 7 0.901053 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.321114 6 0.534885
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.998613 3 0.03353 Other services 0.818744 3 0.389341
Property 1 2 NA Property -1 2 NA
Retail & distribution -0.09487 3 0.939513 Retail & distribution -0.572161 3 0.612211
Transport & leisure 0.321859 3 0.791384 Transport & leisure -0.013339 3 0.991508
Utilities -0.408855 5 0.49432 Utilities -0.074441 5 0.905307
1.824992 2.616922
0.985915 0.956056
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        H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.327782 4 0.672218 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.922795 4 0.077205
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.146775 5 0.813794 Engineering & other manufacture 0.14721 5 0.813245
Finance 0.803947 9 0.009016 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.376884 5 0.531751 Food/drink & tobacco -0.785126 5 0.115636
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.320544 5 0.598972 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.542111 4 0.457889
Oil/gas & minerals -0.195663 7 0.674155 Oil/gas & minerals -0.371549 7 0.41186
Other services -0.218299 4 0.781701 Other services 0.974973 4 0.025027
Property -0.535716 3 0.640084 Property -0.057761 3 0.963208
Retail & distribution -0.327255 4 0.672745 Retail & distribution -0.287651 4 0.712349
Transport & leisure 0.617584 3 0.576223 Transport & leisure 0.846018 3 0.357986
Utilities 0.636947 6 0.173785 Utilities 0.384457 6 0.451727
Test Stat 6.370947 11.16323
p-value 0.847503 0.344943
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.293093 4 0.706907 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.924389 4 0.075611
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.113252 4 0.886748 Engineering & other manufacture 0.356147 4 0.643853
Finance -0.122242 8 0.773069 Food/drink & tobacco 0.630203 6 0.17984
Food/drink & tobacco -0.338579 6 0.511539 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.519449 4 0.480551
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.929161 5 0.022391 Oil/gas & minerals -0.213939 5 0.729696
Oil/gas & minerals -0.699861 5 0.188247 Other services -1 2 NA
Other services 1 2 NA Property -0.993795 4 0.006205
Property -0.793207 4 0.206793 Retail & distribution -0.439815 6 0.382816
Retail & distribution 0.052719 6 0.920995 Transport & leisure -0.449865 4 0.550135
Transport & leisure -0.296184 4 0.703816 Utilities -0.059612 5 0.924144
Utilities -0.513934 5 0.37571
Test Stat 5.85949 13.11916
p-value 0.826927 0.157288
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.985187 4 0.014813 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.730459 4 0.269541
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA
Finance 0.339321 9 0.371678 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.469895 7 0.287351 Food/drink & tobacco 0.240068 7 0.604091
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.789571 5 0.112146 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.900883 3 0.28584
Oil/gas & minerals 0.487294 3 0.675968 Oil/gas & minerals 0.696923 3 0.509104
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.272356 3 0.824395 Property -0.871608 3 0.326155
Retail & distribution -0.874375 3 0.322543 Retail & distribution 0.220008 3 0.858783
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities -0.805344 5 0.10003 Utilities -0.685535 5 0.201402
Test Stat 12.08742 2.134394
p-value 0.147346 0.952029
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.480178 4 0.519822 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.092751 4 0.907249
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.840728 4 0.159272 Engineering & other manufacture 0.864197 4 0.135803
Finance 0.110772 10 0.760639 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.129583 8 0.759737 Food/drink & tobacco -0.060785 8 0.886309
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.388225 7 0.389453 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.502979 5 0.38772
Oil/gas & minerals -0.804343 5 0.100787 Oil/gas & minerals 0.17234 5 0.781661
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.540799 3 0.636244 Property 0.734559 3 0.474778
Retail & distribution 0.02575 5 0.967218 Retail & distribution -0.963462 5 0.008338
Transport & leisure 0.578337 3 0.607403 Transport & leisure 0.458966 3 0.69644
Utilities 0.943173 5 0.016122 Utilities -0.156012 5 0.802168
Test Stat 9.730565 9.356591
p-value 0.464441 0.40503
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.167199 3 0.893055 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.956469 3 0.188531
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance -0.325253 9 0.393068 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.169163 8 0.688818 Food/drink & tobacco -0.0045 8 0.991563
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.089404 9 0.819076 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.173724 7 0.709507
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services -0.910911 3 0.27076 Other services 0.678287 3 0.525446
Property -1 2 NA Property -1 2 NA
Retail & distribution 1 2 NA Retail & distribution 1 2 NA
Transport & leisure 0.974157 3 0.145046 Transport & leisure -0.691532 3 0.513873
Utilities 0.044228 4 0.955772 Utilities -0.67773 4 0.32227
Test Stat 0.72558 0.563705
p-value 0.998131 0.996975
2008-09 FD 
Tcash
2007-08 FD 
Tcash
2006-07 FD 
Tcash
2005-06 FD 
TCash vs
2004-05 FD 
Tcash
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 FD 
Tcash
2007-08 FD 
Tcash
2006-07 FD 
Tcash
2005-06 FD 
TCash vs
2004-05 FD 
Tcash
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.644662 4 0.355338 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.480335 4 0.519665
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.214238 5 0.729325 Engineering & other manufacture -0.108309 5 0.862367
Finance -0.037973 9 0.922734 Finance 0.00344 9 0.992992
Food/drink & tobacco -0.123589 5 0.843043 Food/drink & tobacco 0.486939 5 0.405466
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.091524 5 0.883631 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.191848 5 0.757239
Oil/gas & minerals -0.154212 7 0.741303 Oil/gas & minerals 0.019902 7 0.96622
Other services 0.140044 4 0.859956 Other services 0.185998 4 0.814002
Property 0.954508 3 0.192763 Property 0.579474 3 0.606516
Retail & distribution 0.203182 4 0.796818 Retail & distribution 0.973621 4 0.026379
Transport & leisure 0.782613 3 0.427773 Transport & leisure 0.994898 3 0.064334
Utilities 0.047965 6 0.928108 Utilities 0.03023 6 0.954669
0.894295 5.356349
0.999972 0.912689
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.504047 4 0.495953 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.785394 3 0.42492
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.886012 4 0.113988 Engineering & other manufacture 0.50359 4 0.49641
Finance 0.567169 8 0.142609 Finance 0.499274 7 0.253971
Food/drink & tobacco 0.239134 6 0.648136 Food/drink & tobacco -0.227164 6 0.665116
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.583135 4 0.416865 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.903603 5 0.035403
Oil/gas & minerals 0.124236 5 0.842225 Oil/gas & minerals -0.523118 5 0.365712
Other services -1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.655847 4 0.344153 Property 0.194934 4 0.805066
Retail & distribution 0.070437 6 0.89452 Retail & distribution 0.370885 6 0.469181
Transport & leisure -0.040385 4 0.959615 Transport & leisure -0.185499 4 0.814501
Utilities 0.736475 5 0.155814 Utilities -0.806691 5 0.099015
4.135686 9.40213
0.941018 0.494412
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.009549 4 0.990451 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.267002 4 0.732998
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA
Finance 0.163177 9 0.674867 Finance 0.181446 9 0.640352
Food/drink & tobacco -0.49794 7 0.255446 Food/drink & tobacco -0.216718 7 0.640667
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.3922 4 0.6078 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.07494 4 0.92506
Oil/gas & minerals 0.803877 3 0.405534 Oil/gas & minerals 0.808251 3 0.400829
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property 0.765808 3 0.444678 Property 0.335994 3 0.781856
Retail & distribution -0.07602 3 0.951557 Retail & distribution -0.999504 3 0.020057
Transport & leisure -1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities -0.209333 5 0.735429 Utilities 0.207087 5 0.738225
1.516938 0.514512
0.992423 0.999851
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.738865 4 0.261135 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.635413 4 0.364587
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.71104 4 0.28896 Engineering & other manufacture -0.497823 4 0.502177
Finance 0.276815 10 0.438773 Finance 0.174605 10 0.629484
Food/drink & tobacco 0.110792 8 0.793958 Food/drink & tobacco 0.231186 8 0.581724
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.241418 6 0.644908 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.515609 5 0.373881
Oil/gas & minerals 0.291048 5 0.634726 Oil/gas & minerals 0.590094 5 0.294894
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.901485 3 0.284956 Property 0.454453 3 0.69967
Retail & distribution -0.056064 5 0.928655 Retail & distribution -0.3114 5 0.610018
Transport & leisure 0.60869 3 0.583391 Transport & leisure 0.872409 3 0.325113
Utilities 0.806046 5 0.099501 Utilities 0.651038 5 0.234071
4.260401 2.692796
0.934836 0.987759
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.906065 3 0.278144 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.943991 3 0.214078
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance 0.084496 9 0.828887 Finance -0.416786 9 0.264435
Food/drink & tobacco 0.078359 8 0.853677 Food/drink & tobacco -0.032466 8 0.939168
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.258675 8 0.536186 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.288468 7 0.5304
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services -0.963206 3 0.17323 Other services -0.737766 3 0.471762
Property 1 2 NA Property 1 2 NA
Retail & distribution 1 2 NA Retail & distribution -1 2 NA
Transport & leisure -0.669205 3 0.533269 Transport & leisure -0.586228 3 0.601224
Utilities 0.946254 4 0.053746 Utilities 0.550678 4 0.449322
3.534362 1.203496
0.831573 0.990846
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 FD 
Tcash
2007-08 FD 
Tcash
2006-07 FD 
Tcash
2005-06 FD 
TCash vs
2004-05 FD 
Tcash
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.770686 4 0.229314 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.604429 4 0.395571
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.120794 5 0.846575 Engineering & other manufacture 0.637659 5 0.247098
Finance 0.520246 9 0.151057 Finance 0.795163 9 0.010415
Food/drink & tobacco -0.523362 5 0.365447 Food/drink & tobacco -0.869595 5 0.055411
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.623168 5 0.261419 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.815045 5 0.09279
Oil/gas & minerals 0.604892 7 0.150155 Oil/gas & minerals 0.656735 7 0.109046
Other services 0.211181 4 0.788819 Other services 0.665596 4 0.334404
Property -0.787289 3 0.422968 Property -0.805932 3 0.403329
Retail & distribution -0.482351 4 0.517649 Retail & distribution 0.92358 3 0.250498
Transport & leisure 0.286397 3 0.815085 Transport & leisure 0.868218 3 0.330531
Utilities 0.390579 6 0.443923 Utilities 0.030468 6 0.954312
4.126374 15.06422
0.966073 0.179576
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.942709 4 0.057291 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.041695 4 0.958305
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.650544 4 0.349456 Engineering & other manufacture 0.522624 4 0.477376
Finance -0.162683 8 0.700309 Finance -0.142302 8 0.736764
Food/drink & tobacco -0.563022 6 0.244705 Food/drink & tobacco -0.049025 6 0.926521
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.176083 5 0.776968 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.647871 5 0.237137
Oil/gas & minerals 0.529657 5 0.358632 Oil/gas & minerals 0.29509 5 0.629806
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.264301 4 0.735699 Property 0.481011 4 0.518989
Retail & distribution 0.337943 6 0.512383 Retail & distribution -0.02375 6 0.964382
Transport & leisure -0.626375 4 0.373625 Transport & leisure -0.758969 4 0.241031
Utilities 0.445798 5 0.451798 Utilities 0.773244 5 0.125118
7.037439 4.644111
0.721906 0.91365
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.918366 4 0.081635 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.80963 4 0.19037
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA
Finance 0.290949 9 0.44752 Finance 0.015018 8 0.971845
Food/drink & tobacco 0.585343 7 0.167379 Food/drink & tobacco -0.041288 7 0.929967
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.354929 5 0.557767 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.125156 4 0.874844
Oil/gas & minerals 0.801864 3 0.407683 Oil/gas & minerals -0.264119 3 0.829838
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.918112 3 0.259427 Property 0.935635 3 0.229656
Retail & distribution -0.902062 3 0.284106 Retail & distribution 0.04193 3 0.973299
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure 1 2 NA
Utilities -0.198787 5 0.748574 Utilities -0.261069 5 0.671412
3.576002 1.231333
0.893212 0.996323
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.504024 4 0.495976 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.288637 4 0.711363
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.81905 4 0.18095 Engineering & other manufacture 0.774336 4 0.225664
Finance 0.585862 10 0.075121 Finance 0.337103 10 0.340827
Food/drink & tobacco 0.355418 8 0.387586 Food/drink & tobacco -0.098606 7 0.833414
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.289558 7 0.528777 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.486759 6 0.327526
Oil/gas & minerals 0.437377 5 0.461417 Oil/gas & minerals 0.557167 5 0.329231
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property 0.959667 3 0.181425 Property 0.727647 3 0.481228
Retail & distribution 0.30063 4 0.69937 Retail & distribution -0.915158 5 0.029285
Transport & leisure -0.094747 3 0.939591 Transport & leisure -0.574855 3 0.610117
Utilities 0.799146 5 0.104741 Utilities 0.041036 5 0.947766
5.851496 8.241334
0.827582 0.605277
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.208692 3 0.866159 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.988316 3 0.097414
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance 0.821358 9 0.00663 Finance -0.463285 9 0.209133
Food/drink & tobacco 0.184066 8 0.662592 Food/drink & tobacco 0.358894 7 0.429191
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.063808 9 0.870451 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.06918 7 0.882837
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services -0.931229 3 0.237475 Other services 1 2 NA
Property -1 2 NA Property -1 2 NA
Retail & distribution 1 2 NA Retail & distribution 1 2 NA
Transport & leisure -0.813852 3 0.394734 Transport & leisure -0.801484 3 0.408088
Utilities 0.303601 4 0.696399 Utilities -0.342181 4 0.657819
4.97993 1.914264
0.662413 0.927412
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EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.248562 4 0.751438 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.942173 4 0.057827
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.014834 5 0.981114 Engineering & other manufacture 0.564546 5 0.321452
Finance 0.823136 9 0.006414 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.457564 5 0.438432 Food/drink & tobacco -0.430175 5 0.46968
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.346467 5 0.567857 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.484909 4 0.515091
Oil/gas & minerals -0.507073 7 0.245426 Oil/gas & minerals 0.489741 7 0.264598
Other services 0.114837 4 0.885163 Other services -0.9801 4 0.0199
Property -0.435173 3 0.713375 Property -0.172058 3 0.889917
Retail & distribution -0.38856 4 0.61144 Retail & distribution -0.175239 4 0.824761
Transport & leisure 0.417803 3 0.725601 Transport & leisure 0.69888 3 0.507364
Utilities -0.781426 6 0.066441 Utilities -0.502525 6 0.309664
Test Stat 13.5611 11.98389
p-value 0.258237 0.286136
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.551905 4 0.448095 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.872098 4 0.127902
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.591742 4 0.408258 Engineering & other manufacture -0.127725 4 0.872276
Finance -0.047017 8 0.911973 Food/drink & tobacco 0.793694 6 0.059453
Food/drink & tobacco -0.222545 6 0.671693 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.347562 4 0.652438
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.897741 5 0.038646 Oil/gas & minerals -0.135804 5 0.827622
Oil/gas & minerals -0.716969 5 0.172874 Other services 1 2 NA
Other services -1 2 NA Property -0.578667 4 0.421333
Property -0.842983 4 0.157017 Retail & distribution -0.380219 6 0.457155
Retail & distribution 0.084744 6 0.873188 Transport & leisure -0.30406 4 0.69594
Transport & leisure 0.163866 4 0.836134 Utilities 0.115578 5 0.85317
Utilities -0.438669 5 0.459938
Test Stat 7.147038 6.53567
p-value 0.711495 0.685337
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.699387 4 0.300613 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.087885 4 0.912115
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA
Finance 0.157832 9 0.685067 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.107452 7 0.818635 Food/drink & tobacco 0.129898 7 0.781334
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.61087 5 0.273742 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.860994 3 0.339684
Oil/gas & minerals -0.682778 3 0.521543 Oil/gas & minerals -0.470139 3 0.688407
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property 0.944561 3 0.212976 Property -0.540494 3 0.636474
Retail & distribution -0.117074 3 0.925297 Retail & distribution -0.986008 3 0.106623
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities 0.857567 5 0.063131 Utilities 0.776865 5 0.122204
Test Stat 5.069994 1.198226
p-value 0.75007 0.990968
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.751502 4 0.248498 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.467851 4 0.532149
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.787703 4 0.212297 Engineering & other manufacture 0.524649 4 0.475351
Finance 0.538106 10 0.108601 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.074363 8 0.861083 Food/drink & tobacco -0.062632 8 0.882871
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.293991 7 0.522191 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.440042 5 0.458368
Oil/gas & minerals 0.367857 5 0.542419 Oil/gas & minerals 0.748568 5 0.145501
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property 0.90902 3 0.273664 Property -0.775367 3 0.43513
Retail & distribution 0.627473 5 0.257143 Retail & distribution -0.430314 5 0.46952
Transport & leisure -0.077758 3 0.950447 Transport & leisure -0.849841 3 0.353396
Utilities -0.213784 5 0.72989 Utilities -0.633377 5 0.251307
Test Stat 4.319828 4.455564
p-value 0.931768 0.878958
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.649271 3 0.550148 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.970742 3 0.154377
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance 0.416253 9 0.26511 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.218242 8 0.603604 Food/drink & tobacco 0.595093 8 0.119643
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.267203 9 0.487014 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.071577 7 0.878799
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.918203 3 0.25928 Other services -0.664926 3 0.536926
Property -1 2 NA Property -1 2 NA
Retail & distribution 1 2 NA Retail & distribution 1 2 NA
Transport & leisure -0.810725 3 0.398147 Transport & leisure 0.917273 3 0.260772
Utilities 0.913042 4 0.086958 Utilities 0.077094 4 0.922906
Test Stat 3.51444 0.938547
p-value 0.833694 0.987835
2008-09 FD 
Tcomp
2007-08 FD 
Tcomp
2006-07 FD 
Tcomp
2005-06 FD 
Tcomp
2004-05 FD 
Tcomp
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 FD 
Tcomp
2007-08 FD 
Tcomp
2006-07 FD 
Tcomp
2005-06 FD 
Tcomp
2004-05 FD 
Tcomp
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.371524 4 0.628476 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.782662 4 0.217338
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.47169 5 0.422505 Engineering & other manufacture 0.394834 5 0.510667
Finance -0.016769 9 0.965847 Finance 0.181336 9 0.64056
Food/drink & tobacco -0.39008 5 0.516235 Food/drink & tobacco 0.298897 5 0.625177
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.844421 5 0.071921 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.787091 5 0.114089
Oil/gas & minerals -0.421093 7 0.346787 Oil/gas & minerals -0.36818 7 0.416447
Other services 0.279256 4 0.720744 Other services 0.234029 4 0.765971
Property 0.982442 3 0.119472 Property 0.669257 3 0.533225
Retail & distribution -0.111022 4 0.888978 Retail & distribution 0.766029 4 0.233971
Transport & leisure 0.616438 3 0.57715 Transport & leisure 0.944181 3 0.213712
Utilities -0.327746 6 0.525984 Utilities -0.806322 6 0.052634
5.319243 9.525122
0.914726 0.573539
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.980369 4 0.019631 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.842596 3 0.362052
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.794245 4 0.205755 Engineering & other manufacture 0.137922 4 0.862078
Finance 0.044346 8 0.916961 Finance -0.270755 7 0.557013
Food/drink & tobacco 0.485352 6 0.329138 Food/drink & tobacco -0.05751 6 0.91383
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.666085 4 0.333915 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.780172 5 0.119562
Oil/gas & minerals -0.184689 5 0.76619 Oil/gas & minerals -0.739836 5 0.152927
Other services 1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.510678 4 0.489322 Property -0.495028 4 0.504972
Retail & distribution -0.09816 6 0.853233 Retail & distribution 0.434434 6 0.389345
Transport & leisure -0.504644 4 0.495356 Transport & leisure 0.300549 4 0.699451
Utilities 0.298677 5 0.625445 Utilities -0.413065 5 0.489434
7.74003 5.7333221 0.8371486
0.654214 0.837149
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.579042 4 0.420958 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.924663 4 0.075337
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA
Finance 0.493942 9 0.176544 Finance 0.020942 9 0.957353
Food/drink & tobacco -0.542509 7 0.208326 Food/drink & tobacco -0.431642 7 0.333533
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.41151 4 0.58849 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.094674 4 0.905326
Oil/gas & minerals 0.81182 3 0.396954 Oil/gas & minerals 0.807482 3 0.401659
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.597033 3 0.592692 Property -0.92053 3 0.255514
Retail & distribution 0.951349 3 0.199397 Retail & distribution 0.408501 3 0.732104
Transport & leisure -1 2 NA Transport & leisure -1 2 NA
Utilities -0.368368 5 0.541813 Utilities 0.128773 5 0.836495
4.159789 3.523626
0.842427 0.897348
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.290016 4 0.709984 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.320978 4 0.679022
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.294725 4 0.705275 Engineering & other manufacture -0.099325 4 0.900675
Finance 0.486864 10 0.153556 Finance 0.392768 10 0.261545
Food/drink & tobacco 0.700011 8 0.053218 Food/drink & tobacco 0.17194 8 0.683911
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.140271 6 0.790974 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.384567 5 0.522706
Oil/gas & minerals 0.315758 5 0.604749 Oil/gas & minerals 0.402681 5 0.501505
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.301335 3 0.805136 Property -0.945964 3 0.210239
Retail & distribution -0.896794 5 0.039179 Retail & distribution 0.051728 5 0.934167
Transport & leisure -0.929576 3 0.240347 Transport & leisure -0.497972 3 0.668157
Utilities 0.436687 5 0.462207 Utilities 0.671087 5 0.214918
9.141436 1.007558
0.518736 0.999822
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.99483 3 0.064763 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.641065 3 0.556986
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA
Finance -0.097561 9 0.802819 Finance 0.017322 9 0.964721
Food/drink & tobacco -0.406063 8 0.318185 Food/drink & tobacco -0.223776 8 0.594217
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.286708 8 0.491155 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.097705 7 0.834921
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.967896 3 0.16175 Other services 0.749819 3 0.460281
Property 1 2 NA Property 1 2 NA
Retail & distribution 1 2 NA Retail & distribution -1 2 NA
Transport & leisure 0.904714 3 0.280169 Transport & leisure 0.854177 3 0.348123
Utilities -0.290783 4 0.709217 Utilities 0.08982 4 0.91018
1.366206 0.288365
0.986584 0.999913
Appendix C Detailed statistical results
339
       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 FD 
Tcomp
2007-08 FD 
Tcomp
2006-07 FD 
Tcomp
2005-06 FD 
Tcomp
2004-05 FD 
Tcomp
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.723835 4 0.276165 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.55031 4 0.44969
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.879814 5 0.049105 Engineering & other manufacture 0.742228 5 0.150883
Finance 0.514561 9 0.156371 Finance 0.894291 9 0.001139
Food/drink & tobacco -0.259293 5 0.673596 Food/drink & tobacco -0.737405 5 0.155013
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.368368 5 0.541813 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.663135 5 0.22246
Oil/gas & minerals 0.016304 7 0.972325 Oil/gas & minerals 0.098638 7 0.83336
Other services -0.431157 4 0.568843 Other services -0.90268 4 0.09732
Property -0.852906 3 0.349677 Property -0.868602 3 0.330038
Retail & distribution -0.554637 4 0.445363 Retail & distribution 0.50272 3 0.664666
Transport & leisure 0.055793 3 0.964462 Transport & leisure 0.729067 3 0.479908
Utilities -0.151254 6 0.77485 Utilities 0.051988 6 0.922088
6.123416 17.83809
0.865004 0.085414
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.591593 4 0.408407 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.745058 4 0.254942
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.941931 4 0.058069 Engineering & other manufacture 0.165339 4 0.834661
Finance -0.12296 8 0.771763 Finance -0.45191 8 0.260964
Food/drink & tobacco -0.260581 6 0.617976 Food/drink & tobacco 0.294997 6 0.570341
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.000902 5 0.998851 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.422662 5 0.478332
Oil/gas & minerals 0.630565 5 0.254082 Oil/gas & minerals 0.634743 5 0.249962
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.49405 4 0.50595 Property 0.797035 4 0.202965
Retail & distribution 0.278123 6 0.593572 Retail & distribution 0.048364 6 0.92751
Transport & leisure -0.188467 4 0.811533 Transport & leisure -0.967141 4 0.032859
Utilities 0.619428 5 0.265151 Utilities 0.23019 5 0.709523
5.767214 9.435143
0.834427 0.491364
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.858344 4 0.141656 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.101558 4 0.898443
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA
Finance -0.344597 9 0.363801 Finance 0.040608 8 0.923944
Food/drink & tobacco 0.453172 7 0.307171 Food/drink & tobacco 0.168319 7 0.718284
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.122371 5 0.844582 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.125241 4 0.874759
Oil/gas & minerals 0.813787 3 0.394805 Oil/gas & minerals -0.999077 3 0.027349
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property 0.341776 3 0.777943 Property -0.29747 3 0.807714
Retail & distribution -0.056936 3 0.963734 Retail & distribution -0.940274 3 0.221138
Transport & leisure 1 2 NA Transport & leisure 1 2 NA
Utilities -0.232572 5 0.706571 Utilities 0.162299 5 0.794265
3.519811 0.086423
0.897647 1
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.363627 4 0.636373 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.037474 4 0.962526
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.437695 4 0.562305 Engineering & other manufacture 0.484514 4 0.515486
Finance 0.805725 10 0.004894 Finance -0.02366 10 0.948273
Food/drink & tobacco 0.086588 8 0.838457 Food/drink & tobacco -0.339348 7 0.456495
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.110643 7 0.813315 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.455186 6 0.364377
Oil/gas & minerals 0.046372 5 0.940978 Oil/gas & minerals 0.199164 5 0.748103
Other services NA 1 NA Other services NA 1 NA
Property -0.413685 3 0.728483 Property 0.576464 3 0.608864
Retail & distribution 0.213455 4 0.786545 Retail & distribution -0.006564 5 0.991642
Transport & leisure 0.592164 3 0.596547 Transport & leisure 0.913286 3 0.267073
Utilities 0.362083 5 0.549263 Utilities -0.86983 5 0.055263
6.699938 4.990987
0.753436 0.891779
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.322529 3 0.790934 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.926565 3 0.245494
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 1 2 NA Engineering & other manufacture -1 2 NA
Finance 0.477183 9 0.193975 Finance 0.331916 9 0.382867
Food/drink & tobacco -0.012749 8 0.976098 Food/drink & tobacco 0.748366 7 0.052988
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.416754 9 0.264476 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.360166 7 0.427437
Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA Oil/gas & minerals NA 1 NA
Other services 0.937649 3 0.225995 Other services -1 2 NA
Property -1 2 NA Property -1 2 NA
Retail & distribution 1 2 NA Retail & distribution 1 2 NA
Transport & leisure 0.975354 3 0.141633 Transport & leisure 0.970511 3 0.154988
Utilities 0.0017 4 0.9983 Utilities 0.75341 4 0.24659
2.792051 1.258107
0.90355 0.973917
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.29945 5 0.624506 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.936363 5 0.019086
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.262148 5 0.670086 Engineering & other manufacture -0.059638 5 0.924112
Finance 0.227742 16 0.396269 Finance 0.628286 4 0.371714
Food/drink & tobacco 0.37414 7 0.408345 Food/drink & tobacco -0.029655 7 0.949679
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.293255 7 0.523283 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.577879 6 0.229671
Oil/gas & minerals -0.006394 13 0.983461 Oil/gas & minerals -0.19995 13 0.512498
Other services 0.77059 5 0.127266 Other services 0.241923 5 0.695005
Property -0.39339 4 0.60661 Property -0.171439 4 0.828561
Retail & distribution 0.486822 5 0.405596 Retail & distribution -0.790763 5 0.111217
Transport & leisure 0.235269 3 0.848806 Transport & leisure 0.548241 3 0.630595
Utilities 0.459054 8 0.25255 Utilities 0.364954 8 0.374044
Test Stat 3.39384 11.29159
p-value 0.984431 0.419168
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.667376 5 0.218429 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.96549 5 0.007656
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.776373 4 0.223627 Engineering & other manufacture 0.374745 4 0.625255
Finance -0.064596 18 0.798995 Finance -0.177598 3 0.886335
Food/drink & tobacco 0.162333 7 0.728031 Food/drink & tobacco -0.563676 7 0.187548
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.796403 8 0.018008 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.273819 7 0.55238
Oil/gas & minerals 0.060047 10 0.86912 Oil/gas & minerals -0.137792 10 0.704238
Other services -0.254651 4 0.745349 Other services -0.470388 4 0.529612
Property -0.863842 4 0.136158 Property -0.952885 4 0.047115
Retail & distribution 0.20393 6 0.698345 Retail & distribution -0.501984 6 0.310271
Transport & leisure -0.389752 4 0.610248 Transport & leisure -0.298403 4 0.701597
Utilities -0.393262 8 0.335131 Utilities 0.370313 8 0.366529
Test Stat 9.941342 13.44125
p-value 0.535671 0.265466
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.646159 7 0.116887 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.649782 7 0.114169
Construction & building materials -0.333839 3 0.783311 Construction & building materials -0.999831 3 0.011722
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.99771 3 0.043088 Engineering & other manufacture -0.636709 3 0.560591
Finance 0.387615 17 0.124226 Finance -1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.325782 7 0.475812 Food/drink & tobacco -0.10566 7 0.821625
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.191951 8 0.648834 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.324931 6 0.529757
Oil/gas & minerals 0.660853 8 0.074399 Oil/gas & minerals 0.561673 8 0.147394
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.702383 4 0.297617 Property 0.216591 4 0.783409
Retail & distribution 0.14818 7 0.751195 Retail & distribution 0.382768 7 0.39673
Transport & leisure 0.826144 3 0.38106 Transport & leisure -0.975292 3 0.141811
Utilities -0.280074 7 0.542958 Utilities -0.335776 7 0.461552
Test Stat 8.379517 5.944633
p-value 0.678958 0.819893
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.091526 7 0.845271 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.311456 7 0.496524
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.736093 4 0.263907 Engineering & other manufacture 0.915056 4 0.084944
Finance 0.046124 15 0.870342 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.025929 9 0.947206 Food/drink & tobacco -0.383643 9 0.308072
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.357102 8 0.38518 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.491671 6 0.321922
Oil/gas & minerals -0.190849 7 0.681872 Oil/gas & minerals 0.70015 7 0.079824
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property 0.267241 4 0.732759 Property -0.081654 4 0.918346
Retail & distribution -0.398266 8 0.328458 Retail & distribution -0.828482 8 0.011047
Transport & leisure 0.367034 4 0.632966 Transport & leisure 0.845837 4 0.154163
Utilities 0.25594 7 0.579593 Utilities -0.216655 7 0.640767
Test Stat 3.049542 16.05524
p-value 0.980234 0.065737
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.374322 4 0.625678 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.922632 4 0.077368
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.260546 4 0.739454 Engineering & other manufacture 0.07259 4 0.92741
Finance -0.041102 15 0.884366 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.5092 9 0.161481 Food/drink & tobacco -0.109644 9 0.778861
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.140723 10 0.698192 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.116984 8 0.782648
Oil/gas & minerals 0.641761 4 0.358239 Oil/gas & minerals 0.927912 4 0.072088
Other services 0.350895 5 0.562572 Other services 0.639673 5 0.245124
Property -0.950939 3 0.200243 Property 0.298891 3 0.806766
Retail & distribution 0.634559 6 0.175919 Retail & distribution -0.141273 6 0.7895
Transport & leisure -0.711253 3 0.496256 Transport & leisure -0.588967 4 0.411033
Utilities -0.317688 5 0.602418 Utilities -0.585053 5 0.300087
Test Stat 4.857971 7.746487
p-value 0.937849 0.653584
2008-09 All 
Tcash
2007-08 All 
Tcash
2006-07 All 
Tcash
2005-06 All 
Tcash
2004-05 All 
Tcash
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All 
Tcash
2007-08 All 
Tcash
2006-07 All 
Tcash
2005-06 All 
Tcash
2004-05 All 
Tcash
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.520058 5 0.369036 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.611607 5 0.272999
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.288207 5 0.638188 Engineering & other manufacture -0.138953 5 0.823651
Finance -0.114256 16 0.67351 Finance 0.032659 16 0.904428
Food/drink & tobacco 0.495302 7 0.258375 Food/drink & tobacco 0.393093 7 0.383006
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.106123 7 0.820853 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.197908 7 0.670562
Oil/gas & minerals -0.142303 13 0.642823 Oil/gas & minerals 0.046134 13 0.881036
Other services -0.375462 5 0.533429 Other services -0.314305 5 0.606505
Property 0.934234 4 0.065766 Property 0.607984 4 0.392016
Retail & distribution 0.923484 5 0.025114 Retail & distribution 0.880566 5 0.048651
Transport & leisure 0.453493 3 0.700356 Transport & leisure 0.86319 3 0.336926
Utilities 0.00943 8 0.98232 Utilities 0.092743 8 0.827102
10.53021 6.245353
0.483417 0.856502
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.684554 5 0.202311 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.892041 4 0.107959
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.475691 4 0.524309 Engineering & other manufacture 0.023819 4 0.976181
Finance 0.404963 18 0.095499 Finance -0.41 17 0.102153
Food/drink & tobacco 0.030423 7 0.948376 Food/drink & tobacco 0.238953 7 0.605821
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.52377 7 0.22759 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.23611 8 0.573471
Oil/gas & minerals -0.304725 10 0.39194 Oil/gas & minerals 0.042356 10 0.907513
Other services 0.405092 4 0.594908 Other services -0.47112 4 0.52888
Property -0.660776 4 0.339224 Property 0.022796 4 0.977204
Retail & distribution 0.06879 6 0.896978 Retail & distribution 0.369457 6 0.47103
Transport & leisure 0.027065 4 0.972935 Transport & leisure -0.236305 4 0.763695
Utilities 0.247545 8 0.554465 Utilities -0.289459 7 0.528924
5.806024 6.169509
0.885988 0.861818
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.182042 7 0.696051 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.084727 7 0.856679
Construction & building materials -0.388165 3 0.746218 Construction & building materials 0.069113 3 0.955966
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.082037 3 0.947715 Engineering & other manufacture 0.377336 3 0.75368
Finance -0.352308 17 0.16547 Finance -0.331491 17 0.193673
Food/drink & tobacco -0.619278 7 0.138077 Food/drink & tobacco -0.339263 7 0.456615
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.528795 7 0.222345 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.124276 7 0.790648
Oil/gas & minerals 0.464901 8 0.245767 Oil/gas & minerals 0.664365 8 0.072327
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.574903 4 0.425097 Property 0.388217 4 0.611783
Retail & distribution 0.022224 7 0.96228 Retail & distribution -0.113011 7 0.809369
Transport & leisure -0.607726 3 0.584164 Transport & leisure -0.353245 3 0.770157
Utilities 0.598159 7 0.155981 Utilities 0.64143 7 0.120483
9.089367 7.92577
0.613644 0.719937
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.292499 7 0.524405 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.442515 7 0.320103
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.986953 4 0.013047 Engineering & other manufacture -0.660399 4 0.339601
Finance 0.156541 15 0.577434 Finance 0.08035 15 0.775907
Food/drink & tobacco 0.220151 9 0.569234 Food/drink & tobacco 0.41576 9 0.265734
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.337169 7 0.459578 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.475051 6 0.341027
Oil/gas & minerals 0.248188 7 0.591518 Oil/gas & minerals -0.03926 7 0.933401
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.804195 4 0.195805 Property 0.610347 4 0.389653
Retail & distribution -0.551648 8 0.156347 Retail & distribution 0.168065 8 0.690762
Transport & leisure -0.209131 4 0.790869 Transport & leisure 0.78537 4 0.21463
Utilities 0.491916 7 0.262156 Utilities 0.498321 7 0.255025
12.1565 3.647162
0.274719 0.961864
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.91824 4 0.08176 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.827013 4 0.172987
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.807804 4 0.192196 Engineering & other manufacture 0.16538 4 0.83462
Finance -0.081056 15 0.773984 Finance -0.30548 15 0.268202
Food/drink & tobacco 0.308069 9 0.419947 Food/drink & tobacco 0.096084 9 0.805759
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.437933 9 0.238416 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.671471 8 0.068239
Oil/gas & minerals 0.817964 4 0.182036 Oil/gas & minerals 0.894263 4 0.105737
Other services 0.027742 5 0.964682 Other services -0.074188 5 0.905628
Property 0.267453 3 0.827636 Property -0.709652 3 0.497704
Retail & distribution 0.314764 6 0.543446 Retail & distribution 0.290976 6 0.575854
Transport & leisure -0.931225 4 0.068775 Transport & leisure -0.946594 4 0.053406
Utilities 0.795646 5 0.10743 Utilities 0.487161 5 0.405219
11.51847 12.08709
0.400903 0.357133
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All 
Tcash
2007-08 All 
Tcash
2006-07 All 
Tcash
2005-06 All 
Tcash
2004-05 All 
Tcash
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.630823 5 0.253827 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.599478 5 0.285289
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.109866 5 0.860396 Engineering & other manufacture 0.452909 5 0.443709
Finance 0.330546 16 0.211136 Finance 0.005335 16 0.984357
Food/drink & tobacco -0.032323 7 0.945156 Food/drink & tobacco -0.011693 7 0.980151
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.655813 7 0.109718 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.728553 6 0.100525
Oil/gas & minerals 0.585253 13 0.035617 Oil/gas & minerals 0.173043 13 0.57184
Other services -0.67926 5 0.207242 Other services 0.105305 5 0.86617
Property -0.652869 4 0.347131 Property -0.633076 4 0.366924
Retail & distribution 0.34407 5 0.570721 Retail & distribution -0.384433 4 0.615567
Transport & leisure -0.137273 3 0.912332 Transport & leisure 0.58383 3 0.603107
Utilities 0.430098 8 0.287499 Utilities 0.292658 8 0.481793
7.213297 5.4249
0.781557 0.908858
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.957485 5 0.010456 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.221177 5 0.720701
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.941746 4 0.058254 Engineering & other manufacture -0.005071 4 0.994929
Finance 0.558281 18 0.016044 Finance 0.435504 18 0.070848
Food/drink & tobacco -0.367189 7 0.4178 Food/drink & tobacco -0.208373 7 0.653884
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.307924 8 0.4581 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.65086 6 0.161568
Oil/gas & minerals 0.011292 10 0.975301 Oil/gas & minerals 0.290343 9 0.448508
Other services -0.925441 4 0.074559 Other services -0.111765 4 0.888235
Property 0.081836 4 0.918164 Property 0.597176 4 0.402824
Retail & distribution 0.491323 6 0.322317 Retail & distribution -0.092592 6 0.861509
Transport & leisure -0.674177 4 0.325823 Transport & leisure -0.745229 4 0.254771
Utilities 0.159283 8 0.706358 Utilities -0.066157 8 0.876317
20.16507 5.498152
0.043128 0.904668
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.4436 7 0.318776 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.752248 6 0.084468
Construction & building materials -0.999796 3 0.012847 Construction & building materials 0.470656 3 0.688034
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.570862 3 0.613218 Engineering & other manufacture 0.706834 3 0.500245
Finance 0.26626 17 0.301606 Finance 0.061304 16 0.821563
Food/drink & tobacco 0.679392 7 0.093199 Food/drink & tobacco -0.039663 7 0.93272
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.687062 8 0.059759 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.498316 7 0.25503
Oil/gas & minerals 0.717227 8 0.045217 Oil/gas & minerals -0.180758 8 0.668389
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.142781 4 0.857219 Property 0.612191 4 0.387809
Retail & distribution 0.265817 7 0.564508 Retail & distribution 0.18678 7 0.688415
Transport & leisure 0.678927 3 0.52489 Transport & leisure 0.315424 3 0.795707
Utilities -0.096915 7 0.836243 Utilities 0.029498 7 0.949945
10.13584 4.561276
0.518212 0.950542
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.359164 7 0.428819 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.397259 6 0.435458
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.94749 4 0.05251 Engineering & other manufacture 0.946051 4 0.053949
Finance -0.131454 15 0.640509 Finance 0.331633 15 0.227229
Food/drink & tobacco 0.010829 9 0.977941 Food/drink & tobacco -0.251197 8 0.548444
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.170479 8 0.686491 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.406022 7 0.366097
Oil/gas & minerals 0.721842 7 0.067019 Oil/gas & minerals 0.644172 7 0.118391
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property 0.975636 4 0.024364 Property 0.653989 4 0.346011
Retail & distribution 0.291106 7 0.526474 Retail & distribution -0.823545 8 0.011982
Transport & leisure -0.959621 4 0.040379 Transport & leisure 0.086396 4 0.913604
Utilities 0.517536 7 0.234176 Utilities 0.360786 7 0.426582
17.25404 15.28488
0.068928 0.122016
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.189439 4 0.810561 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.890997 4 0.109003
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.636872 4 0.363129 Engineering & other manufacture -0.843907 4 0.156093
Finance 0.606497 15 0.016527 Finance -0.376838 15 0.166189
Food/drink & tobacco -0.217247 9 0.574466 Food/drink & tobacco 0.240092 8 0.566828
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.278412 10 0.436026 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.223162 7 0.630511
Oil/gas & minerals -0.415186 4 0.584814 Oil/gas & minerals 0.914483 4 0.085517
Other services 0.514457 5 0.375139 Other services 0.587396 4 0.412604
Property -0.932658 3 0.234967 Property 0.152677 3 0.902421
Retail & distribution 0.592991 6 0.214773 Retail & distribution 0.397625 6 0.434996
Transport & leisure -0.909394 4 0.090606 Transport & leisure 0.337739 4 0.662261
Utilities -0.25334 5 0.680922 Utilities -0.574034 5 0.311521
9.108133 10.23492
0.611912 0.509388
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EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.23376 5 0.705101 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.935301 5 0.019562
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.094628 5 0.879696 Engineering & other manufacture 0.503178 5 0.387502
Finance 0.236433 16 0.377986 Finance 0.542179 4 0.457821
Food/drink & tobacco 0.706911 7 0.075704 Food/drink & tobacco -0.037245 7 0.936814
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.344836 7 0.448764 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.420047 6 0.406985
Oil/gas & minerals -0.163656 13 0.593177 Oil/gas & minerals -0.030623 13 0.920892
Other services 0.17281 5 0.781071 Other services -0.982269 5 0.002827
Property -0.456736 4 0.543264 Property -0.259629 4 0.740371
Retail & distribution -0.637688 5 0.247069 Retail & distribution 0.092872 5 0.881922
Transport & leisure -0.636595 3 0.560684 Transport & leisure -0.340332 3 0.778921
Utilities -0.743988 8 0.034307 Utilities -0.454923 8 0.257399
Test Stat 10.82291 19.30412
p-value 0.458217 0.055848
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.78294 5 0.117363 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.925948 5 0.02392
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.127829 4 0.872171 Engineering & other manufacture 0.342954 4 0.87921
Finance -0.053952 18 0.831623 Finance -0.1886 3 0.420001
Food/drink & tobacco 0.083846 7 0.858158 Food/drink & tobacco -0.365579 7 0.668855
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.617583 8 0.102781 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.198976 7 0.787925
Oil/gas & minerals -0.309007 10 0.384978 Oil/gas & minerals 0.200344 10 0.578919
Other services 0.177683 4 0.822317 Other services -0.106199 4 0.893801
Property -0.615592 4 0.384408 Property -0.253704 4 0.746296
Retail & distribution 0.157276 6 0.766032 Retail & distribution -0.413655 6 0.414907
Transport & leisure -0.672064 4 0.327936 Transport & leisure -0.206953 4 0.793047
Utilities -0.348045 8 0.398201 Utilities 0.509361 8 1.802718
Test Stat 6.467442 8.466306
p-value 0.840428 0.671024
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.253934 7 0.582672 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.279224 7 0.544235
Construction & building materials 0.695904 3 0.510007 Construction & building materials 0.901442 3 0.28502
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.185125 3 0.881462 Engineering & other manufacture -0.690407 3 0.514863
Finance 0.248522 17 0.336131 Finance -1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.072689 7 0.876924 Food/drink & tobacco -0.146804 7 0.753454
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.390991 8 0.33818 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.705299 6 0.117476
Oil/gas & minerals 0.440448 8 0.274749 Oil/gas & minerals -0.002672 8 0.99499
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.460026 4 0.539974 Property -0.919447 4 0.080553
Retail & distribution 0.026255 7 0.955444 Retail & distribution -0.504853 7 0.247845
Transport & leisure 0.997163 3 0.047963 Transport & leisure -0.955201 3 0.191278
Utilities 0.534028 7 0.216944 Utilities 0.256031 7 0.579453
Test Stat 4.336129 6.61017
p-value 0.959034 0.761663
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.337624 7 0.458932 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.149549 7 0.748947
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.473837 4 0.526163 Engineering & other manufacture 0.119671 4 0.880329
Finance 0.170896 15 0.542547 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.088077 9 0.821726 Food/drink & tobacco -0.050966 9 0.896397
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.078772 8 0.852913 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.656444 6 0.156771
Oil/gas & minerals 0.041098 7 0.930288 Oil/gas & minerals 0.003947 7 0.9933
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.265651 4 0.734349 Property -0.200971 4 0.799029
Retail & distribution -0.76275 8 0.027727 Retail & distribution -0.311674 8 0.452354
Transport & leisure 0.53022 4 0.46978 Transport & leisure 0.205435 4 0.794565
Utilities 0.449736 7 0.311315 Utilities -0.077812 7 0.868303
Test Stat 7.577619 2.095749
p-value 0.670018 0.989861
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.752721 4 0.247279 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.034291 4 0.965709
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.051604 4 0.948396 Engineering & other manufacture 0.747266 4 0.252734
Finance 0.310638 15 0.259791 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.481265 9 0.189644 Food/drink & tobacco 0.10609 9 0.785891
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.210226 10 0.559921 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.170899 8 0.685749
Oil/gas & minerals 0.572448 4 0.427552 Oil/gas & minerals 0.841046 4 0.158954
Other services 0.740588 5 0.152284 Other services 0.52967 5 0.358619
Property 0.65133 3 0.548422 Property 0.241001 3 0.845049
Retail & distribution 0.67495 6 0.141315 Retail & distribution -0.400413 6 0.43148
Transport & leisure -0.623735 3 0.571229 Transport & leisure -0.875449 4 0.124551
Utilities -0.419946 5 0.481469 Utilities -0.568467 5 0.317339
Test Stat 8.278885 6.514771
p-value 0.688125 0.770321
2008-09 All 
Tcomp
2007-08 All 
Tcomp
2006-07 All 
Tcomp
2005-06 All 
TComp 
2004-05 All 
Tcomp
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All 
Tcomp
2007-08 All 
Tcomp
2006-07 All 
Tcomp
2005-06 All 
TComp 
2004-05 All 
Tcomp
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.518236 5 0.371018 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.553922 5 0.332666
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.561354 5 0.324811 Engineering & other manufacture 0.490393 5 0.401629
Finance -0.261026 16 0.328827 Finance -0.025912 16 0.924113
Food/drink & tobacco 0.30374 7 0.507808 Food/drink & tobacco 0.210766 7 0.650087
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.524879 7 0.226427 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.392319 7 0.384028
Oil/gas & minerals -0.22607 13 0.457679 Oil/gas & minerals -0.576734 13 0.039072
Other services 0.103231 5 0.868796 Other services 0.0846 5 0.892413
Property 0.964518 4 0.035482 Property 0.680482 4 0.319518
Retail & distribution -0.2139 5 0.729746 Retail & distribution 0.212837 5 0.731067
Transport & leisure -0.44116 3 0.709134 Transport & leisure 0.113751 3 0.927427
Utilities -0.315956 8 0.445828 Utilities -0.669197 8 0.069532
9.351319 9.481006
0.589499 0.577584
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.85213 5 0.066723 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.905306 4 0.094694
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.896549 4 0.103451 Engineering & other manufacture 0.214218 4 0.785782
Finance 0.24084 18 0.33569 Finance -0.45231 17 0.068315
Food/drink & tobacco 0.172105 7 0.712133 Food/drink & tobacco 0.326119 7 0.475328
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.382324 7 0.397324 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.080358 8 0.849976
Oil/gas & minerals 0.14073 10 0.698178 Oil/gas & minerals -0.247517 10 0.490526
Other services 0.826164 4 0.173836 Other services -0.402654 4 0.597346
Property -0.416511 4 0.583489 Property -0.6393 4 0.3607
Retail & distribution -0.079302 6 0.881296 Retail & distribution 0.435746 6 0.38775
Transport & leisure 0.343969 4 0.656031 Transport & leisure -0.519896 4 0.480104
Utilities 0.448762 8 0.264715 Utilities -0.324579 7 0.477539
5.415173 7.651795
0.909407 0.744114
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.481083 7 0.27442 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.256323 7 0.579006
Construction & building materials -0.030661 3 0.980478 Construction & building materials -0.478083 3 0.682664
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.979938 3 0.127735 Engineering & other manufacture 0.874967 3 0.321767
Finance 0.081237 17 0.756599 Finance -0.393275 17 0.118356
Food/drink & tobacco -0.283265 7 0.538173 Food/drink & tobacco -0.534998 7 0.21595
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.120889 7 0.796269 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.621844 7 0.135977
Oil/gas & minerals -0.369584 8 0.367547 Oil/gas & minerals 0.062778 8 0.882601
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.693533 4 0.306467 Property -0.921855 4 0.078145
Retail & distribution 0.212039 7 0.648069 Retail & distribution 0.198723 7 0.669259
Transport & leisure -0.923237 3 0.251067 Transport & leisure 0.161518 3 0.896722
Utilities 0.64397 7 0.118545 Utilities 0.47377 7 0.282843
5.593467 9.478684
0.899067 0.577797
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.222502 7 0.631549 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.15874 7 0.733896
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.190224 4 0.809776 Engineering & other manufacture 0.207169 4 0.792831
Finance 0.337266 15 0.21895 Finance -0.041351 15 0.88367
Food/drink & tobacco 0.650265 9 0.057936 Food/drink & tobacco 0.361163 9 0.339599
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.242215 7 0.600759 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.582046 6 0.225523
Oil/gas & minerals 0.265944 7 0.564314 Oil/gas & minerals 0.031798 7 0.946045
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.91909 4 0.08091 Property 0.076178 4 0.923822
Retail & distribution -0.571342 8 0.139033 Retail & distribution 0.270472 8 0.517054
Transport & leisure -0.860747 4 0.139253 Transport & leisure 0.556244 4 0.443756
Utilities 0.686344 7 0.088598 Utilities 0.568608 7 0.182858
13.66903 3.193399
0.188631 0.976499
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.044322 4 0.955678 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.679553 4 0.320447
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.825218 4 0.174782 Engineering & other manufacture -0.178051 4 0.821949
Finance -0.07 15 0.804218 Finance 0.250314 15 0.368224
Food/drink & tobacco 0.086589 9 0.824701 Food/drink & tobacco 0.023997 9 0.951137
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.616232 9 0.077197 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.73213 8 0.038916
Oil/gas & minerals 0.804286 4 0.195714 Oil/gas & minerals 0.846159 4 0.153841
Other services 0.375409 5 0.533492 Other services 0.538726 5 0.348872
Property -0.729553 3 0.479456 Property 0.239717 3 0.845891
Retail & distribution -0.137501 6 0.795048 Retail & distribution -0.045275 6 0.932134
Transport & leisure -0.929167 4 0.070833 Transport & leisure -0.687787 4 0.312213
Utilities 0.055452 5 0.929433 Utilities -0.576451 5 0.309003
8.696327 8.261865
0.6499 0.689672
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All 
Tcomp
2007-08 All 
Tcomp
2006-07 All 
Tcomp
2005-06 All 
TComp 
2004-05 All 
Tcomp
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.653467 5 0.231727 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.674756 5 0.211462
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1
Engineering & other manufacture 0.867285 5 0.056869 Engineering & other manufacture 0.657262 5 0.228077
Finance 0.441935 16 0.086548 Finance 0.351602 16 0.181732
Food/drink & tobacco 0.113746 7 0.808145 Food/drink & tobacco 0.238166 7 0.607047
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.275959 7 0.549151 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.878822 6 0.021136
Oil/gas & minerals -0.171283 13 0.575818 Oil/gas & minerals 0.154722 13 0.613766
Other services -0.407794 5 0.495554 Other services -0.879576 5 0.049249
Property -0.72603 4 0.27397 Property -0.706943 4 0.293057
Retail & distribution -0.768097 5 0.129294 Retail & distribution 0.850193 4 0.149807
Transport & leisure -0.874924 3 0.321822 Transport & leisure -0.299476 3 0.806377
Utilities -0.022707 8 0.957439 Utilities 0.083354 8 0.844433
10.72134 16.15734
0.466895 0.13539
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.883099 5 0.04713 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.544496 5 0.342695
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.291292 4 0.708708 Engineering & other manufacture 0.218557 4 0.781443
Finance 0.521228 18 0.026541 Finance 0.393615 18 0.106072
Food/drink & tobacco -0.365159 7 0.420577 Food/drink & tobacco 0.015053 7 0.974447
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.124291 8 0.769343 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.557541 6 0.250345
Oil/gas & minerals 0.127422 10 0.725746 Oil/gas & minerals -0.305086 9 0.424696
Other services -0.948753 4 0.051248 Other services 0.389656 4 0.610344
Property -0.782299 4 0.217701 Property 0.834929 4 0.165071
Retail & distribution 0.513587 6 0.297355 Retail & distribution 0.012703 6 0.980947
Transport & leisure -0.862106 4 0.137894 Transport & leisure -0.503411 4 0.496589
Utilities 0.408333 8 0.315223 Utilities 0.433709 8 0.283019
14.85038 6.370239
0.18945 0.847555
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.75366 7 0.0504 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.209219 6 0.690751
Construction & building materials 0.900671 3 0.28615 Construction & building materials -0.795147 3 0.414788
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.747789 3 0.462231 Engineering & other manufacture 0.618846 3 0.575201
Finance 0.152042 17 0.560204 Finance -0.017204 16 0.949578
Food/drink & tobacco 0.184975 7 0.691322 Food/drink & tobacco 0.119393 7 0.798753
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.037744 8 0.929297 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.171153 7 0.713678
Oil/gas & minerals -0.094931 8 0.823072 Oil/gas & minerals 0.264878 8 0.526095
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.490234 4 0.509766 Property -0.2964 4 0.7036
Retail & distribution 0.147647 7 0.75207 Retail & distribution -0.634663 7 0.125728
Transport & leisure 0.954961 3 0.191793 Transport & leisure -0.200954 3 0.871192
Utilities 0.088585 7 0.850203 Utilities 0.104579 7 0.82343
3.604671 3.028059
0.98009 0.99035
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.652003 7 0.112519 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.528337 6 0.281235
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.003191 4 0.996809 Engineering & other manufacture 0.03053 4 0.96947
Finance -0.138154 15 0.623415 Finance 0.077249 15 0.784364
Food/drink & tobacco -0.009767 9 0.980104 Food/drink & tobacco -0.269044 8 0.519357
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.386727 8 0.343941 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.10408 7 0.824263
Oil/gas & minerals 0.100864 7 0.829638 Oil/gas & minerals -0.477526 7 0.278502
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.677345 4 0.322655 Property 0.985739 4 0.014261
Retail & distribution 0.369629 7 0.414471 Retail & distribution -0.333132 8 0.420051
Transport & leisure -0.596647 4 0.403353 Transport & leisure 0.795263 4 0.204737
Utilities 0.514273 7 0.237658 Utilities 0.182301 7 0.695632
5.133689 10.49429
0.88207 0.398248
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.766085 4 0.233915 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.253343 4 0.746657
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.865695 4 0.134305 Engineering & other manufacture 0.446319 4 0.553681
Finance 0.146927 15 0.601301 Finance 0.337764 15 0.218228
Food/drink & tobacco -0.33098 9 0.384293 Food/drink & tobacco 0.683621 8 0.061573
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.109262 10 0.763822 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.12517 7 0.789166
Oil/gas & minerals -0.547293 4 0.452707 Oil/gas & minerals 0.765465 4 0.234535
Other services 0.789493 5 0.112208 Other services -0.015472 4 0.984528
Property 0.608994 3 0.583147 Property 0.383549 3 0.749403
Retail & distribution 0.750384 6 0.085685 Retail & distribution 0.137525 6 0.795013
Transport & leisure -0.997968 4 0.002032 Transport & leisure -0.095552 4 0.904448
Utilities -0.621088 5 0.263493 Utilities -0.193598 5 0.755051
22.24683 3.554904
0.022529 0.98118
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EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.25609 5 0.677536 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.94902 5 0.013711
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.316409 5 0.603963 Engineering & other manufacture -0.117624 5 0.850583
Finance 0.256194 14 0.376639 Finance 1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.353785 5 0.559129 Food/drink & tobacco -0.771436 5 0.12658
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.396201 6 0.436796 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.533735 5 0.354235
Oil/gas & minerals -0.010657 11 0.975191 Oil/gas & minerals -0.464733 11 0.14981
Other services -0.542006 4 0.457994 Other services 0.775965 4 0.224035
Property -0.427011 4 0.572989 Property -0.179889 4 0.820111
Retail & distribution 0.325688 5 0.592773 Retail & distribution -0.693122 5 0.194403
Transport & leisure 0.624779 3 0.570378 Transport & leisure 0.851061 3 0.35192
Utilities 0.445375 8 0.26878 Utilities 0.348329 8 0.39779
Test Stat 2.658067 14.38695
p-value 0.994517 0.156062
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.657518 5 0.227832 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.932284 5 0.020937
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.743338 4 0.256662 Engineering & other manufacture 0.316138 4 0.683862
Finance 0.079639 16 0.769384 Finance 1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.068512 7 0.883963 Food/drink & tobacco -0.606287 7 0.148961
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.759773 7 0.047501 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.34157 6 0.507571
Oil/gas & minerals 0.051787 7 0.912202 Oil/gas & minerals -0.717535 7 0.069466
Other services 1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.849287 4 0.150714 Property -0.972017 4 0.027983
Retail & distribution 0.205585 6 0.695968 Retail & distribution -0.475581 6 0.340412
Transport & leisure -0.052501 4 0.947499 Transport & leisure -0.254581 4 0.745419
Utilities -0.23865 7 0.606294 Utilities 0.084409 7 0.857213
Test Stat 7.737569 10.52352
p-value 0.654453 0.309787
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.816355 5 0.091825 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.745467 5 0.148126
Construction & building materials -0.47126 3 0.687599 Construction & building materials -0.985816 3 0.107352
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.997273 3 0.04703 Engineering & other manufacture -0.521784 3 0.650534
Finance 0.373674 16 0.153951 Finance -1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.324494 7 0.477661 Food/drink & tobacco -0.09869 7 0.833274
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.609615 7 0.146133 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.096622 5 0.877169
Oil/gas & minerals 0.534535 6 0.274563 Oil/gas & minerals 0.261566 6 0.616599
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.648045 4 0.351955 Property 0.443147 4 0.556853
Retail & distribution 0.160754 5 0.796207 Retail & distribution 0.047787 5 0.939179
Transport & leisure 0.772974 3 0.437536 Transport & leisure -0.951839 3 0.198381
Utilities -0.153969 7 0.741701 Utilities -0.351766 7 0.439074
Test Stat 6.305294 2.519568
p-value 0.852237 0.990588
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.172066 7 0.712197 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.354231 7 0.435647
Construction & building materials NA 2 NA Construction & building materials NA 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.786633 4 0.213367 Engineering & other manufacture 0.948004 4 0.051996
Finance 0.05623 14 0.848583 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.042085 9 0.914392 Food/drink & tobacco -0.331381 9 0.383682
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.323287 8 0.434748 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.498343 6 0.314366
Oil/gas & minerals -0.001984 7 0.996631 Oil/gas & minerals 0.748364 7 0.052988
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property 0.045712 4 0.954288 Property 0.07632 4 0.92368
Retail & distribution -0.373985 7 0.408555 Retail & distribution -0.862175 7 0.012558
Transport & leisure 0.567168 3 0.616078 Transport & leisure 0.47093 3 0.687837
Utilities 0.268734 7 0.560077 Utilities -0.19912 7 0.668625
Test Stat 2.405983 15.91781
p-value 0.992176 0.068618
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -1 2 NA Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 2 NA
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.291572 4 0.708428 Engineering & other manufacture 0.042346 4 0.957654
Finance -0.245966 14 0.396632 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.800295 8 0.017049 Food/drink & tobacco -0.101736 8 0.810556
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.179362 10 0.620026 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.173576 8 0.681022
Oil/gas & minerals 0.630268 4 0.369732 Oil/gas & minerals 0.919 4 0.081
Other services 0.097047 5 0.87663 Other services 0.957606 5 0.010411
Property -0.965457 3 0.167817 Property 0.346962 3 0.774427
Retail & distribution 0.727167 5 0.16389 Retail & distribution 0.071759 5 0.908712
Transport & leisure 0.71699 3 0.491039 Transport & leisure -0.965397 3 0.167964
Utilities -0.391874 5 0.514133 Utilities -0.50507 5 0.385422
Test Stat 7.672016 9.375213
p-value 0.660839 0.403384
2008-09 All - 
CEO TCash 
2007-08 All - 
CEO Tcash
2006-07 All - 
CEO Tcash
2005-06 All - 
CEO Tcash
2004-05 All - 
CEO TCash 
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All - 
CEO TCash 
2007-08 All - 
CEO Tcash
2006-07 All - 
CEO Tcash
2005-06 All - 
CEO Tcash
2004-05 All - 
CEO TCash 
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.494724 5 0.39683 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.603315 5 0.281386
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.252665 5 0.681753 Engineering & other manufacture -0.090481 5 0.884953
Finance -0.111547 14 0.704209 Finance -0.069854 14 0.812431
Food/drink & tobacco -0.236889 5 0.701229 Food/drink & tobacco 0.40578 5 0.497896
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.152346 6 0.773249 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.30333 6 0.558959
Oil/gas & minerals -0.165621 11 0.626487 Oil/gas & minerals 0.173752 11 0.609398
Other services 0.481128 4 0.518872 Other services 0.548865 4 0.451135
Property 0.93947 4 0.06053 Property 0.618058 4 0.381942
Retail & distribution 0.850276 5 0.067963 Retail & distribution 0.912649 5 0.030582
Transport & leisure 0.788295 3 0.421928 Transport & leisure 0.995755 3 0.058682
Utilities 0.096045 8 0.821021 Utilities 0.16277 8 0.700154
7.613739 7.2739
0.74743 0.776489
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.599591 5 0.285174 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.900156 4 0.099844
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.612314 4 0.387686 Engineering & other manufacture -0.005973 4 0.994027
Finance 0.425488 16 0.100366 Finance -0.482455 15 0.068544
Food/drink & tobacco 0.069573 7 0.882175 Food/drink & tobacco -0.060728 7 0.897094
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.528339 6 0.281232 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.459169 7 0.299997
Oil/gas & minerals -0.255997 7 0.579506 Oil/gas & minerals 0.126854 7 0.786374
Other services -1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.647671 4 0.352329 Property 0.078316 4 0.921684
Retail & distribution 0.045713 6 0.931478 Retail & distribution 0.353582 6 0.49173
Transport & leisure -0.320108 4 0.679892 Transport & leisure 0.112398 4 0.887602
Utilities 0.419068 7 0.349357 Utilities -0.201474 6 0.701878
5.032533 7.003877
0.888994 0.725079
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.38371 5 0.523713 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.317943 5 0.602111
Construction & building materials -0.245751 3 0.841931 Construction & building materials 0.217703 3 0.860287
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.059393 3 0.962167 Engineering & other manufacture 0.242756 3 0.843897
Finance -0.277081 16 0.298832 Finance -0.317199 16 0.231268
Food/drink & tobacco -0.594683 7 0.159033 Food/drink & tobacco -0.310767 7 0.497528
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.700248 6 0.121311 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.09037 6 0.864814
Oil/gas & minerals 0.833467 6 0.039291 Oil/gas & minerals 0.875593 6 0.022253
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.833556 4 0.166444 Property 0.715514 4 0.284486
Retail & distribution -0.718073 5 0.171895 Retail & distribution -0.28988 5 0.636149
Transport & leisure -0.534977 3 0.64064 Transport & leisure -0.435052 3 0.71346
Utilities 0.689595 7 0.086488 Utilities 0.733656 7 0.060549
15.42233 11.69175
0.163967 0.387253
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.255781 7 0.579836 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.288291 7 0.530664
Construction & building materials NA 2 NA Construction & building materials NA 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.936164 4 0.063836 Engineering & other manufacture -0.657023 4 0.342977
Finance 0.121789 14 0.67832 Finance -0.018164 14 0.950855
Food/drink & tobacco 0.306228 9 0.422874 Food/drink & tobacco 0.427005 9 0.251682
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.366989 7 0.418074 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.494001 6 0.319276
Oil/gas & minerals 0.390594 7 0.386309 Oil/gas & minerals 0.027441 7 0.953432
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.811299 4 0.188701 Property 0.189368 4 0.810633
Retail & distribution -0.491274 7 0.262875 Retail & distribution 0.170948 7 0.714012
Transport & leisure 0.619444 3 0.574717 Transport & leisure 0.865747 3 0.333687
Utilities 0.50276 7 0.250136 Utilities 0.504836 7 0.247863
8.876096 2.90734
0.543902 0.983521
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -1 2 NA Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 2 NA
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.842367 4 0.157633 Engineering & other manufacture 0.133506 4 0.866494
Finance 0.109079 14 0.710492 Finance -0.123341 14 0.674424
Food/drink & tobacco 0.298486 8 0.472692 Food/drink & tobacco 0.068756 8 0.871488
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.464412 9 0.20788 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.696062 8 0.055165
Oil/gas & minerals 0.815652 4 0.184348 Oil/gas & minerals 0.889085 4 0.110915
Other services -0.18578 5 0.764826 Other services 0.126815 5 0.838968
Property 0.218049 3 0.860062 Property -0.74465 3 0.465232
Retail & distribution 0.256128 5 0.677489 Retail & distribution 0.190225 5 0.759266
Transport & leisure -0.957043 3 0.187275 Transport & leisure -0.920665 3 0.255295
Utilities 0.72641 5 0.164553 Utilities 0.473155 5 0.420862
3.430295 5.093868
0.969412 0.88482
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Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All - 
CEO TCash 
2007-08 All - 
CEO Tcash
2006-07 All - 
CEO Tcash
2005-06 All - 
CEO Tcash
2004-05 All - 
CEO TCash 
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.666186 5 0.219559 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.651277 5 0.23384
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.159563 5 0.797703 Engineering & other manufacture 0.37807 5 0.530354
Finance 0.382035 14 0.177664 Finance -0.013214 14 0.964241
Food/drink & tobacco -0.411785 5 0.490918 Food/drink & tobacco -0.840957 5 0.074295
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.448052 6 0.372896 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.748117 6 0.087177
Oil/gas & minerals 0.700798 11 0.016296 Oil/gas & minerals 0.129433 11 0.70447
Other services -0.256583 4 0.743417 Other services 0.373257 4 0.626743
Property -0.673835 4 0.326165 Property -0.655778 4 0.344222
Retail & distribution 0.17425 5 0.779266 Retail & distribution -0.094075 4 0.905925
Transport & leisure 0.295181 3 0.80924 Transport & leisure 0.872808 3 0.324594
Utilities 0.424711 8 0.294246 Utilities 0.429022 8 0.288841
6.17451 9.305432
0.86147 0.593722
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.972064 5 0.005582 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.11852 5 0.849449
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.971367 4 0.028633 Engineering & other manufacture -0.035032 4 0.964968
Finance 0.504344 16 0.046352 Finance 0.70988 16 0.002065
Food/drink & tobacco -0.393932 7 0.381898 Food/drink & tobacco -0.131996 7 0.777864
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.380351 7 0.399971 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.528559 6 0.280994
Oil/gas & minerals -0.189481 7 0.68407 Oil/gas & minerals 0.116343 7 0.803824
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.158625 4 0.841375 Property 0.544341 4 0.455659
Retail & distribution 0.487832 6 0.326299 Retail & distribution -0.062419 6 0.906493
Transport & leisure -0.378428 4 0.621572 Transport & leisure -0.927206 4 0.072794
Utilities 0.164117 7 0.725124 Utilities 0.121458 7 0.795324
18.71442 10.39092
0.044044 0.406892
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.504813 5 0.385703 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.872257 4 0.127743
Construction & building materials -0.985496 3 0.108559 Construction & building materials 0.597702 3 0.592161
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.449314 3 0.703337 Engineering & other manufacture 0.599955 3 0.59037
Finance 0.380075 16 0.146463 Finance 0.194006 15 0.488421
Food/drink & tobacco 0.662596 7 0.104822 Food/drink & tobacco -0.047328 7 0.919744
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.417469 7 0.351391 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.471218 6 0.345489
Oil/gas & minerals 0.845883 6 0.033798 Oil/gas & minerals -0.402043 6 0.429429
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property 0.144198 4 0.855802 Property 0.758366 4 0.241634
Retail & distribution 0.145164 5 0.815822 Retail & distribution -0.104121 5 0.867669
Transport & leisure 0.611209 3 0.581367 Transport & leisure 0.398314 3 0.739191
Utilities 0.000333 7 0.999435 Utilities 0.083534 7 0.858682
6.438752 4.613895
0.842546 0.948416
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.260389 7 0.572783 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.393918 6 0.439685
Construction & building materials NA 2 NA Construction & building materials NA 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.954206 4 0.045794 Engineering & other manufacture 0.918148 4 0.081852
Finance 0.016433 14 0.955535 Finance 0.408342 14 0.147193
Food/drink & tobacco 0.038578 9 0.921507 Food/drink & tobacco -0.255553 8 0.541292
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.202993 8 0.629714 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.392728 7 0.383487
Oil/gas & minerals 0.774273 7 0.040998 Oil/gas & minerals 0.673449 7 0.09723
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property 0.7818 4 0.2182 Property 0.862967 4 0.137033
Retail & distribution 0.165345 6 0.754243 Retail & distribution -0.881648 7 0.008675
Transport & leisure -0.108302 3 0.930917 Transport & leisure -0.586041 3 0.601372
Utilities 0.521154 7 0.230342 Utilities 0.369384 7 0.414805
9.700527 16.76084
0.467148 0.079826
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -1 2 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 2 NA
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.648652 4 NA Engineering & other manufacture -0.822127 4 0.177873
Finance 0.524402 14 0.054219 Finance -0.144759 14 0.62148
Food/drink & tobacco -0.350292 8 0.394953 Food/drink & tobacco 0.308575 7 0.500727
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.306769 10 0.388608 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.052059 7 0.911741
Oil/gas & minerals -0.439555 4 0.560445 Oil/gas & minerals 0.899231 4 0.100769
Other services 0.151866 5 0.807384 Other services 0.169666 3 0.891462
Property -0.949815 3 0.202541 Property 0.202966 3 0.869884
Retail & distribution 0.839697 5 0.075165 Retail & distribution 0.624748 5 0.259848
Transport & leisure -0.997071 3 0.048739 Transport & leisure -0.99535 3 0.061415
Utilities -0.317897 5 0.602166 Utilities -0.619743 5 0.264837
6.442842 6.282615
0.776788 0.790987
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EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.2494 5 0.685772 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.963136 5 0.008449
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.0783 5 0.900452 Engineering & other manufacture 0.516692 5 0.372701
Finance 0.44683 14 0.109207 Finance 1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.50199 5 0.388812 Food/drink & tobacco -0.429976 5 0.469909
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.31815 6 0.538878 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.475367 5 0.418382
Oil/gas & minerals 0.33894 11 0.307897 Oil/gas & minerals 0.414746 11 0.204678
Other services 0.10389 4 0.896112 Other services -0.981449 4 0.018551
Property -0.4401 4 0.559944 Property -0.287271 4 0.712729
Retail & distribution -0.2696 5 0.660942 Retail & distribution -0.215296 5 0.728009
Transport & leisure 0.41771 3 0.725668 Transport & leisure 0.698805 3 0.507431
Utilities -0.7707 8 0.025205 Utilities -0.487865 8 0.220036
Test Stat 9.67101 18.09283
p-value 0.5602 0.053418
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.74924 5 0.144936 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.884607 5 0.046231
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.10348 4 0.896524 Engineering & other manufacture 0.292613 4 0.707387
Finance -0.0171 16 0.94983 Finance 1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.1325 7 0.777092 Food/drink & tobacco -0.365224 7 0.420487
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.5082 7 0.244175 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.237953 6 0.649808
Oil/gas & minerals -0.3444 7 0.449432 Oil/gas & minerals 0.039246 7 0.933425
Other services -1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.7705 4 0.22949 Property -0.393645 4 0.606355
Retail & distribution 0.18285 6 0.728777 Retail & distribution -0.352681 6 0.492912
Transport & leisure 0.19322 4 0.806784 Transport & leisure -0.207029 4 0.792971
Utilities -0.0497 7 0.915674 Utilities 0.064925 7 0.890011
Test Stat 4.71748 3.802738
p-value 0.90923 0.923909
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.7337 5 0.158234 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.114731 5 0.854241
Construction & building materials 0.73977 3 0.469872 Construction & building materials 0.872377 3 0.325155
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.1973 3 0.873537 Engineering & other manufacture -0.681348 3 0.522788
Finance 0.24429 16 0.36187 Finance -1 2 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.2383 7 0.606854 Food/drink & tobacco -0.186463 7 0.688925
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.7846 7 0.036687 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.085264 5 0.891571
Oil/gas & minerals 0.22497 6 0.668239 Oil/gas & minerals -0.217452 6 0.678963
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.5594 4 0.440559 Property -0.942401 4 0.057599
Retail & distribution 0.22996 5 0.709802 Retail & distribution -0.751098 5 0.14337
Transport & leisure 0.99953 3 0.019471 Transport & leisure -0.941004 3 0.219769
Utilities 0.47117 7 0.285869 Utilities 0.139387 7 0.765662
Test Stat 7.41441 4.035161
p-value 0.7646 0.945747
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.28535 7 0.535053 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.568063 7 0.183374
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.69452 4 0.30548 Engineering & other manufacture 0.6191 4 0.3809
Finance 0.24563 14 0.397298 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco 0.20516 9 0.596426 Food/drink & tobacco -0.036819 9 0.925077
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.05645 8 0.894378 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.311415 6 0.547978
Oil/gas & minerals 0.00861 7 0.985385 Oil/gas & minerals 0.095301 7 0.838946
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property 0.36048 4 0.639523 Property -0.421074 4 0.578926
Retail & distribution -0.7479 7 0.053197 Retail & distribution -0.200722 7 0.666066
Transport & leisure 0.49011 3 0.67391 Transport & leisure -0.999389 3 0.022247
Utilities 0.45232 7 0.308201 Utilities -0.196569 7 0.672703
Test Stat 6.31163 3.060602
p-value 0.78844 0.961844
EPS Growth EBITDA
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 2 NA Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -1 2 NA
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.031 4 0.969001 Engineering & other manufacture 0.764317 4 0.235683
Finance 0.21676 14 0.456658 Finance NA 1 NA
Food/drink & tobacco -0.7804 8 0.022319 Food/drink & tobacco 0.066403 8 0.87586
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.2523 10 0.481976 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.183931 8 0.662829
Oil/gas & minerals 0.39998 4 0.600017 Oil/gas & minerals 0.756047 4 0.243953
Other services 0.45017 5 0.446816 Other services 0.475816 5 0.41788
Property 0.61718 3 0.576551 Property 0.283634 3 0.81692
Retail & distribution 0.76035 5 0.135656 Retail & distribution -0.206269 5 0.739245
Transport & leisure 0.77699 3 0.433492 Transport & leisure -0.937959 3 0.225427
Utilities -0.5341 5 0.353821 Utilities -0.498267 5 0.392914
Test Stat 9.63781 2.97504
p-value 0.47282 0.965276
2008-09 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2007-08 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2006-07 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2005-06 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2004-05 All - 
CEO Tcomp
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2007-08 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2006-07 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2005-06 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2004-05 All - 
CEO Tcomp
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.306514 5 0.615934 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.790158 5 0.111688
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.544552 5 0.342636 Engineering & other manufacture 0.472224 5 0.421907
Finance -0.207214 14 0.4772 Finance 0.140257 14 0.632478
Food/drink & tobacco -0.411161 5 0.491643 Food/drink & tobacco 0.307138 5 0.615178
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.647097 6 0.164835 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.573193 6 0.234372
Oil/gas & minerals 0.125329 11 0.713493 Oil/gas & minerals -0.501204 11 0.116285
Other services 0.271485 4 0.728515 Other services 0.227622 4 0.772378
Property 0.970418 4 0.029582 Property 0.699211 4 0.300789
Retail & distribution -0.156669 5 0.801342 Retail & distribution 0.110784 5 0.859235
Transport & leisure 0.616354 3 0.577218 Transport & leisure 0.944146 3 0.213779
Utilities -0.29815 8 0.473214 Utilities -0.650612 8 0.080638
8.558893 10.37061
0.662535 0.497391
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.951357 5 0.012784 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.908512 4 0.091488
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.971741 4 0.028259 Engineering & other manufacture 0.344793 4 0.655207
Finance 0.092739 16 0.732651 Finance -0.353518 15 0.196144
Food/drink & tobacco 0.265062 7 0.565656 Food/drink & tobacco 0.015472 7 0.973738
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.308912 6 0.551372 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.2311 7 0.618065
Oil/gas & minerals 0.002016 7 0.996578 Oil/gas & minerals -0.464947 7 0.293154
Other services 1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.388407 4 0.611593 Property -0.644515 4 0.355485
Retail & distribution -0.094552 6 0.858594 Retail & distribution 0.342647 6 0.506144
Transport & leisure -0.544451 4 0.455549 Transport & leisure 0.353209 4 0.646791
Utilities 0.261556 7 0.571001 Utilities -0.342395 6 0.506477
10.71631 6.336933
0.380043 0.786206
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.639865 5 0.244937 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.069465 5 0.911625
Construction & building materials -0.093573 3 0.940342 Construction & building materials -0.532469 3 0.642529
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.977381 3 0.13566 Engineering & other manufacture 0.868871 3 0.329692
Finance 0.028618 16 0.916213 Finance -0.490267 16 0.053861
Food/drink & tobacco -0.176986 7 0.704223 Food/drink & tobacco -0.41636 7 0.352805
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.799754 6 0.056133 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.210081 6 0.689515
Oil/gas & minerals 0.688824 6 0.13018 Oil/gas & minerals 0.842682 6 0.035177
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.691678 4 0.308322 Property -0.911939 4 0.088061
Retail & distribution -0.082696 5 0.894829 Retail & distribution 0.229202 5 0.710746
Transport & leisure -0.939502 3 0.222576 Transport & leisure 0.205507 3 0.868231
Utilities 0.755662 7 0.04944 Utilities 0.623477 7 0.134649
10.18953 13.59817
0.513424 0.256031
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.354632 7 0.435091 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.067679 7 0.885367
Construction & building materials 1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.320274 4 0.679726 Engineering & other manufacture -0.270482 4 0.729518
Finance 0.254376 14 0.380152 Finance -0.08109 14 0.782873
Food/drink & tobacco 0.704757 9 0.033999 Food/drink & tobacco 0.246332 9 0.522863
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.326053 7 0.475423 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.49226 6 0.321252
Oil/gas & minerals 0.409764 7 0.361263 Oil/gas & minerals 0.285394 7 0.534988
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.753564 4 0.246436 Property -0.288951 4 0.711049
Retail & distribution -0.797325 7 0.031739 Retail & distribution 0.386059 7 0.392334
Transport & leisure -0.977502 3 0.135296 Transport & leisure 0.068745 3 0.956201
Utilities 0.715668 7 0.070541 Utilities 0.639496 7 0.121971
15.56171 3.224653
0.112885 0.975632
Sales Growth Net Income Growth
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 2 NA Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -1 2 NA
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.810237 4 0.189763 Engineering & other manufacture -0.191362 4 0.808638
Finance 0.075007 14 0.798844 Finance 0.326387 14 0.254742
Food/drink & tobacco 0.122114 8 0.773302 Food/drink & tobacco -0.146468 8 0.729275
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.60154 9 0.086598 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.738461 8 0.036411
Oil/gas & minerals 0.662755 4 0.337245 Oil/gas & minerals 0.734196 4 0.265804
Other services 0.194736 5 0.753631 Other services 0.61993 5 0.264649
Property -0.75905 3 0.451327 Property 0.1966 3 0.87402
Retail & distribution -0.201448 5 0.745254 Retail & distribution -0.133128 5 0.830998
Transport & leisure -0.926961 3 0.244824 Transport & leisure -0.881715 3 0.312778
Utilities 0.079656 5 0.898686 Utilities -0.425442 5 0.475126
4.139744 5.637676
0.940823 0.844731
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       H3m: Pay-Performance relationships by Industry
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
Test Stat
p-value
2008-09 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2007-08 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2006-07 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2005-06 All - 
CEO Tcomp
2004-05 All - 
CEO Tcomp
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.679323 5 0.207183 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.586493 5 0.298601
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.871202 5 0.054403 Engineering & other manufacture 0.675025 5 0.21121
Finance 0.400021 14 0.156426 Finance 0.554678 14 0.039529
Food/drink & tobacco -0.161152 5 0.795706 Food/drink & tobacco -0.661531 5 0.223991
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.191704 6 0.715966 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.789625 6 0.061731
Oil/gas & minerals -0.071175 11 0.835266 Oil/gas & minerals 0.370422 11 0.262117
Other services -0.438539 4 0.561461 Other services -0.897056 4 0.102944
Property -0.730313 4 0.269687 Property -0.709182 4 0.290818
Retail & distribution -0.42969 5 0.470237 Retail & distribution 0.267715 4 0.732285
Transport & leisure 0.055687 3 0.96453 Transport & leisure 0.728995 3 0.479976
Utilities -0.049774 8 0.906829 Utilities 0.067969 8 0.87295
7.642922 14.31277
0.744888 0.216167
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.74628 5 0.147436 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.732489 5 0.159258
Construction & building materials NA 1 NA Construction & building materials NA 1 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.60539 4 0.39461 Engineering & other manufacture 0.360426 4 0.639574
Finance 0.558814 16 0.02444 Finance 0.379146 16 0.147533
Food/drink & tobacco -0.245402 7 0.595824 Food/drink & tobacco 0.125657 7 0.788358
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.099799 7 0.831419 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.383866 6 0.452484
Oil/gas & minerals -0.495459 7 0.2582 Oil/gas & minerals -0.818938 7 0.024241
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property -0.636662 4 0.363338 Property 0.774022 4 0.225978
Retail & distribution 0.504624 6 0.307314 Retail & distribution 0.077374 6 0.88417
Transport & leisure -0.138611 4 0.861389 Transport & leisure -0.987313 4 0.012687
Utilities 0.696487 7 0.082104 Utilities 0.237729 7 0.607726
9.401928 17.52862
0.494431 0.063455
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.925704 5 0.024037 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.193132 4 0.806868
Construction & building materials 0.871508 3 0.326286 Construction & building materials -0.831773 3 0.374652
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture 0.739466 3 0.470156 Engineering & other manufacture 0.609019 3 0.583126
Finance 0.151948 16 0.574274 Finance 0.231397 15 0.406653
Food/drink & tobacco 0.061267 7 0.896184 Food/drink & tobacco 0.091772 7 0.844858
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.130251 7 0.780749 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.392889 6 0.44099
Oil/gas & minerals 0.563784 6 0.243924 Oil/gas & minerals -0.604882 6 0.203334
Other services -1 2 NA Other services -1 2 NA
Property -0.550389 4 0.449611 Property -0.295202 4 0.704798
Retail & distribution 0.255657 5 0.678069 Retail & distribution -0.816974 5 0.091371
Transport & leisure 0.96728 3 0.163302 Transport & leisure -0.244578 3 0.842701
Utilities 0.057288 7 0.902904 Utilities 0.159558 7 0.732561
5.950046 5.382715
0.876677 0.911226
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -0.280489 7 0.542335 Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 0.583925 6 0.223662
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials 1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.524108 4 0.475892 Engineering & other manufacture 0.437587 4 0.562413
Finance 0.088827 14 0.762674 Finance 0.093676 14 0.750085
Food/drink & tobacco -0.069096 9 0.859798 Food/drink & tobacco -0.283402 8 0.496388
Media/marketing & telecoms -0.275578 8 0.508856 Media/marketing & telecoms 0.287308 7 0.53213
Oil/gas & minerals 0.173971 7 0.709106 Oil/gas & minerals -0.235394 7 0.611362
Other services 1 2 NA Other services 1 2 NA
Property 0.225465 4 0.774535 Property 0.9099 4 0.0901
Retail & distribution -0.347319 6 0.499971 Retail & distribution -0.416603 7 0.352494
Transport & leisure 0.940398 3 0.220905 Transport & leisure 0.985493 3 0.108569
Utilities 0.555597 7 0.195354 Utilities 0.165666 7 0.7226
3.325587 5.695899
0.972691 0.840133
TSR ROE
Industry cor n p-value Industry cor n p-value
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 1 2 NA Chemicals & pharmaceuticals -1 2 NA
Construction & building materials -1 2 NA Construction & building materials -1 2 NA
E-business & computer services NA 1 NA E-business & computer services NA 1 NA
Engineering & other manufacture -0.867875 4 0.132125 Engineering & other manufacture 0.439436 4 0.560564
Finance 0.165472 14 0.571844 Finance 0.432272 14 0.122677
Food/drink & tobacco -0.445168 8 0.26903 Food/drink & tobacco 0.711953 7 0.072708
Media/marketing & telecoms 0.07921 10 0.827812 Media/marketing & telecoms -0.191813 7 0.680326
Oil/gas & minerals -0.690795 4 0.309205 Oil/gas & minerals 0.721782 4 0.278218
Other services 0.394912 5 0.510576 Other services -0.712045 3 0.495538
Property 0.573364 3 0.611276 Property 0.423967 3 0.721274
Retail & distribution 0.931214 5 0.021431 Retail & distribution 0.320298 5 0.599269
Transport & leisure -0.986095 3 0.106288 Transport & leisure -0.982392 3 0.119643
Utilities -0.77067 5 0.106288 Utilities -0.349407 5 0.564347
11.97052 3.840099
0.287034 0.954272
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